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VOLUME 1



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VOLUME I



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ILLINOIS IN THE WORLD WAR
VOLUME I

THE
HISTORY OF THE 33rd DIVISION
A. E. F.

BY

FREDERIC LOUIS HUIDEKOPER
FORMER LIEUTENANT COLONEL, ADJUTANT GENERAL,
UNITED STATES ARMY, AND DIVISION ADJUTANT,
33RD DIVISION, AUTHOR OF 'MILITARY STUDIES,' 'THE
MILITARY UNPREPAREDNESS OF THE UNITED STATES.'

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PREFACE

It should be a peculiar gratification to the people of Illinois that the war history of the Illinois National Guard as represented in the 33rd Division has been written by a military historian so eminent as Lieutenant Colonel Frederic L. Huidekoper. As Division Adjutant of the 33rd Division he enjoyed access to original reports and records which, supplemented by his personal knowledge of many of the events described and by his private diary, gave him most excellent materials for his task. Upon his presentation of the history to the Governor of the State of Illinois in April, 1919, the Governor assigned to the Illinois State Historical Library the task of publishing it, under an appropriation made by the General Assembly. As published, the complete work consists of four volumes: Volumes I, II, and III contain the narrative and a series of appendices comprising in great part the material on which the narrative is based; Volume IV is a portfolio containing a series of maps of the division's operations. For general distribution a larger edition, containing only the narrative text, has been prepared.

Acknowledgments are due to various persons for the share they have had in bringing the undertaking to a successful conclusion. After Governor Frank O. Lowden had entrusted to the library the task of publication, he retained his interest in the task and supported and assisted in every way its prosecution. Lieutenant Colonel Huidekoper has given assistance in the many difficulties of preparing for the press so elaborate a work and has read the book in proof. Major General George Bell, Jr., former commander of the 33rd Division, read the entire work in manuscript and has given assistance in many ways, notably in obtaining the assistance of Captain Clyde L. Thompson, U. S. A., retired, in redrawing the maps. To Captain Thompson the debt of this office is, indeed, a great one. He supervised and in considerable

PREFACE

measure assisted in redrafting the maps and preparing them for the engraver, a task that could only be performed by one combining the qualifications of an expert draftsman and a skillful military officer. The photographs of the operations of the 108th Engineers owe their excellence to the work of Master Engineers Wilber F. Willis and Frank T. Farrell, and to the supervision of Colonel Henry A. Allen. Further, the editor is much indebted to Colonel Allen for his constant and helpful interest in the publication. Professor Clarence W. Alvord, former editor of the Illinois Historical Collections, had the task of deciding on the form and manner of publication, and with Miss Mary E. Wheelhouse and Mrs. Leila W. Tilton, formerly editorial assistants in the office, performed most of the labor of preparing the book for the press. Miss Nellie C. Armstrong, now editorial assistant in the office, after assisting in the preparation of the book for the press, has supervised with the utmost efficiency every detail of the intricate process of seeing a book of this sort through the hands of the engraver and the printer. Mrs. Jessie Palmer Weber, librarian of the Illinois State Historical Library, has given precious assistance in untangling the business snarls that inevitably occur in the publication of a work of this sort. The Illinois Historical Survey has contributed the services of its assistants for many editorial tasks.

THEODORE C. PEASE

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL FREDRIC L. HUIDEKOPER

INTRODUCTION

The portion of this history which chronicles the operations of the 33rd Division from its arrival in France until the Armistice with Germany was begun on Monday, November 18th, 1918, exactly one week after the cessation of hostilities, and was completed on February 28th, 1919. Appendices numbers two to thirty-five, both inclusive, as well as all the maps originally contained in Volume IV, were likewise finished during the same period. This work was done at such times as the author could spare from his duties as the Division Adjutant. As soon as the fighting ceased, the paper-work exacted by orders from higher authority multiplied to a remarkable degree; on December 2nd, 1918, the Assistant Division Adjutant, Major Henry S. Hooker—who had been injured by the fall of his horse—was evacuated to a hospital at Commercy and was subsequently sent back to the United States, thus depriving the author of the services of a most valuable assistant; from December 8th to 20th, 1918, the 33rd Division was in constant movement, advancing from the Troyon-sur-Meuse sector through Lorraine into Rhenish Germany, whence it was withdrawn into the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg; and during part of February, 1919, the author was absent on temporary duty in Paris with the Presidential Party of the American Peace Commission. In spite of these handicaps—far from conducive to such concentrated and uninterrupted thought as is usually deemed a *sine qua non* for accurate historical writing—that part of this history was finished in slightly more than three months. The chapters dealing with the organization of the 33rd Division, its period of training at Camp Logan, Houston, Texas, its movement to Camp Upton, Yaphank, Long Island, and its voyage overseas, and with the events from the Armistice until its demobilization at Camp Grant, Rockford, Illinois, in June, 1919, as well as the Conclusion and the appendices pertaining to them, were written during the summer and autumn of 1919.

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That true historical perspective can only be attained after a certain lapse of time subsequent to the events is generally conceded. This *desideratum* is peculiarly applicable to political history but, on the other hand, the method here employed possesses advantages not otherwise obtainable, in military history especially. The events have produced an impression still indelible, the principal actors can be consulted in person, and most of the documents are readily accessible. Important light—and chiefly those side-lights which are almost invariably lacking in the bald accounts contained in the average official documents—can thus be thrown upon the events to be chronicled in a manner quite impossible when the participants are no longer living or when their memories have become hazy by lapse of time or confused by conflicting accounts. Inaccuracies and discrepancies disclosed by the exhaustive sifting of evidence can be promptly corrected by submitting them to, and by questioning, the individuals who, having taken an active part, are thoroughly conversant with the actual facts. Furthermore, the personal equation—which plays such an important rôle in human events and without which no true history can be written—can be ascertained, to a large measure, from the participants themselves. These factors, judiciously weighed and discriminately interwoven with the events described, create an atmosphere and afford an understanding otherwise impossible to convey.

At the time that this history was begun, the records of the 33rd Division were, from the standpoint of the military historian, in a distinctly unsatisfactory condition. A succession of orders during the eight months preceding had reduced the impedimenta of the various headquarters to a minimum. Before leaving Camp Logan, all records were thoroughly culled out and only those considered absolutely necessary for efficient functioning by the units were taken overseas. Other reductions were made on the British front, and every paper not deemed indispensable was sent to the rear. There was, consequently, a notable dearth of documents relating to the period from the organization of the 33rd Division in August, Sep-

INTRODUCTION

tember and October, 1917, until its arrival in the American sector during the last week of August, 1918. These records, the author has been officially informed, have been sent to the War Department, together with many thousands of other military papers, but as yet they have not been classified and, under existing orders, are not open to public inspection. Of the subsequent period terminating with the Armistice, the material was much more abundant, and such documents as were missing were fortunately obtained by the author by dint of considerable correspondence with other headquarters and officers. Personal application to the late Major Robert M. Johnston, Chief of the Historical Section at the American General Headquarters at Chaumont revealed a total absence, at that time, of records in respect to the operations of the 33rd Division on the British front. Nevertheless, through the instrumentality of Brigadier General C. M. Wagstaff, the British Liaison Officer at G. H. Q., Lieutenant Colonel Stephen C. Clark, the Adjutant of the Second (American) Corps, and the Australian War Records Office in London, the author was enabled to obtain all the information needed for a complete account of those operations. He is, consequently, deeply grateful to them for their kindness.

The records of the 33rd Division covering the period from the Armistice until its demobilization were as complete as could be desired, whereas those pertaining to the period spent at Camp Logan and in the movement overseas to France were conspicuous for their absence, for the reasons already enumerated. Luckily, throughout the war the author kept an exceptionally detailed diary which, together with certain other memoranda retained by him, constitute the principal source of information for this period. This diary also proved invaluable in supplementing, by data not recorded elsewhere, the documents bearing upon other periods of this narrative.

No effort has been spared to make this history as accurate and comprehensive as possible. Every report was subjected to the utmost scrutiny, and any inaccuracy or discrepancy was immediately corrected by returning the report to

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the unit commander for verification or for such alteration as was requisite to conform to the established facts. Many hours were spent by the author in personal conference with Brigade, Regimental, Battalion and Company commanders and with the Operations Officers of the various organizations. At these conferences all orders, reports, maps and operations were examined with greatest thoroughness, and an immense amount of valuable information, which supplemented and explained the data not embodied in formal documents, was thereby obtained. In a number of cases, the narrative itself was submitted to the commanders of the various units concerned for correction and suggestion. The author has personally verified every single reference cited in this work, translated every French order and communication quoted, and wrote the original manuscript on a typewriter himself.

To Major General George Bell, Jr., the Division Commander, with whom every phase of this history was thoroughly discussed and who carefully read every page of the text and footnotes, the author acknowledges a debt of deepest gratitude for his invaluable corrections and suggestions. To the following officers and men of the 33rd Division the author tenders his heartiest thanks and appreciation for the material which they supplied and for the assistance which they rendered to him in the preparation of this work: Brigadier General Henry D. Todd, Jr., commanding the 58th Field Artillery Brigade; Brigadier General Paul A. Wolf, commanding the 66th Infantry Brigade; Brigadier General Edward L. King, commanding the 65th Infantry Brigade; Lieutenant Colonel George Roth and Majors Harold P. Erskine and Roane Waring, the adjutants of those brigades; Colonel Edgar A. Myer of the 129th Infantry, Colonel John V. Clinnin of the 130th Infantry, Colonel Joseph B. Sanborn of the 131st Infantry and Colonel Abel Davis of the 132nd Infantry, as well as their Operations Officers and the commanders of the various infantry battalions with whom he had frequent consultations; Colonel Henry A. Allen of the 108th Engineers, Captain Clyde L. Thompson, his Adjutant, the non-commis-

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sioned officers of the Topographical Section of that regiment who reproduced many of the maps for Volume IV, and Lieutenant Colonel James Lindsey-Oliver who personally obtained several very important reports on the battle of Hamel from the Australian Records Office in London.

The chapter devoted to the 58th Field Artillery Brigade was prepared by Lieutenant Leon Dessez, the Operations Officer of that Brigade, to whom the author expresses deep obligation for his important contribution.

To Major Charles L. Sampson, formerly G-3 of the 33rd Division, the author's thanks are due for the copy of Field Order No. 18, issued by the Third Army Corps on September 21st, 1918, to govern its attack at the opening of the Meuse-Argonne battle.

For material furnished and assistance rendered in response to every appeal, the author is especially indebted to the following members of the 33rd Division Staff: Lieutenant Colonel William H. Simpson, Chief of Staff, and the officers, men and Army Field Clerks in his office, Mr. H. E. Larson in particular; Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. Allen, G-2, and the officers and men under him, who supplied most of the military information and copied the major portion of the larger maps; Colonel Levy M. Hathaway, the Division Surgeon, and his successor, Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Orr; and Major M. B. Southwick, G-3 and former commander of the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, and the officers and men in his office.

To all the officers and men of the Division Adjutant's office who, after winning the admiration and affection of the author by their efficiency, splendid loyalty and faithful service during the periods of organization, training, movement overseas and active operations, rendered invaluable assistance to him in the collection, classification and copying of much of the information embodied in this history, he acknowledges a debt of gratitude beyond his power to express, particularly to Major Henry S. Hooker, the Assistant Division Adjutant; Captain—then First Lieutenant—Frank A. Biederman and

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Lieutenants Louis B. Tovstein and Milo G. Miller of the Statistical Office; Mr. William Lewis Judy, the Chief Clerk; Regimental Sergeant-major A. H. Relyea; Battalion Sergeant-major Thomas R. Joyce, who copied and verified the General and Field Orders in Appendix three; Battalion Sergeant-major Frank Grabin; and Lieutenant—then Regimental Sergeant-major—Brooke Fellers, whose efficiency in copying this complicated manuscript and its voluminous appendices and whose assistance in the compilation of much of the material were of incalculable aid to the author.

F. L. H.

1614 Eighteenth Street, N. W.,

Washington

November 11th, 1919



HONORABLE FRANK O. LOWDEN

THE 33rd Division, or the "Prairie" Division as we like best to call it, was composed exclusively of National Guard organizations from the State of Illinois. New York and Pennsylvania were the only other states to have divisions of their own; therefore, Illinois had a peculiar pride in this division. From the moment the different units forming it were mustered into the Army, our people followed all their movements with interest and pride. The division saw the hardest kind of service and distinguished itself down to the moment the Armistice was signed. It won the praise, not only of the highest officers in our own army but equally the praise of the highest officers in the French and British armies. For it was the only division in the American Expeditionary Forces to fight with the French and the British as well as with fellow Americans. It came out of the war with the reputation of being one of the best combat divisions in the Allied Army.

Illinois is proud of the heroes of this division, not alone for their achievements as soldiers but also for their conduct as men. No scandal was ever connected with the division. Wherever it was stationed, it won the friendship of the civilian population by the fine bearing of its men. For patriotic devotion in service, for honor in camp and field, for valor in battle, for courage in the face of death, the division won glory for Illinois. Illinois, therefore, justly regards the record of the division as one of her most priceless possessions. It will ever form a notable chapter in her history.

FRANK O. LOWDEN.

November 20, 1919



MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE BELL, JR.

THE 33rd Division accomplished every task assigned to it. Not a single failure is recorded against it.

Not a scandal occurred to mar the glory of its achievements.

Duty to God, to country and to home, well done, is the highest standard humanly attainable. The officers and men of the 33rd Division did their duty superbly. Their deeds and the example which they set are imperishable. Illinois may well be proud of her sons, both the living and the dead.

GEO. BELL, JR.,
Major-General, U. S. A.,
Commander, 33rd Division

CAMP GRANT, ILLINOIS
November 19, 1919

I. ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING OF THE 33RD DIVISION AT CAMP LOGAN

On August 23, 1917, the War Department issued General Order No. 114, directing thirty-one major generals, accompanied by their authorized aides-de-camp, to proceed to certain stations and to assume command of the troops there. By virtue of these orders, Major General George Bell, Jr. was assigned to the command of Camp Logan at Houston, Texas, and on the following day special orders were issued designating the officers who were to command the brigades and constitute the Division Staff of the 33rd Division,¹ all of whom were instructed to reach Camp Logan not later than August 25, 1917, and to report to the Division Commander for duty. Telegraphic orders had been sent a few days previously to these officers, nearly all of whom arrived at Houston on Saturday, August 25, to find that place under martial law in consequence of the lamentable shooting affray on the evening of August 23.

Situated on Washington Street, about four miles from the centre of Houston, Camp Logan was at that time in a decidedly unfinished state. It was occupied by certain units—numbering 36 officers and 1,291 men, who had arrived during the preceding eight days—²forming the vanguard of the National Guard of Illinois, which was to constitute the nucleus of the 33rd Division by virtue of General Orders Nos. 95 and 101, issued by the War Department on July 19 and August 3, 1917, respectively. The preparations necessary to receive, equip, and train the large number of Illinois troops whose arrival was expected in the near future were immedi-

ately made, so far as was possible under the circumstances, by General Bell, who established his headquarters in a mess building near the Washington Street entrance on Monday, August 27. On the following morning General Order No. 1 was issued, designating the aides-de-camp of the Division Commander and the officers who were to be the chiefs of the various departments of the Division Staff.³ The extremely amicable relations which existed between the 33rd Division and the civilians of Houston for more than eight months were inaugurated at a banquet given at the Rice Hotel on August 30 by the Chamber of Commerce of Houston.⁴

September 10 witnessed the arrival of the first increment of the Illinois National Guard, and other units followed in rapid succession, although it was not until October 26 that the last of the state troops reached Camp Logan.⁵ Every conceivable effort was made by General Bell to have all the Illinois troops sent immediately to Houston and to obtain the *matériel*, equipment, and supplies needed in order to reorganize the regiments as prescribed by the Tables of Organization⁶ and to begin with the minimum delay their training, even if only to the extent that the first units of "Kitchener's Army" in England were trained. His urgings fell far short of securing the results for which he had striven and, on September 17, orders were received from the War Department directing him, accompanied by his Chief of Staff, his Aide-de-Camp, and two enlisted men, to reach Hoboken on September 23, prepared for prolonged field service. On September 19 he left Camp Logan, joined a party of American division commanders, spent his entire time in Europe in investigating personally and gathering all possible information as to the conditions and methods of warfare employed by the Allies on their western front, and did not return to Houston until December 7.

During General Bell's absence the command of the 33rd

Division devolved upon Brigadier General Henry D. Todd, Jr. of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade, as the ranking officer present. To him was intrusted the difficult task of organizing the division. The slowness with which the troops were sent from Illinois⁷ postponed the issuing of the orders prescribing this reorganization until October 9⁸ and, as a matter of fact, it could not be put into actual operation until October 16. In spite of many difficulties, some of which arose from conditions peculiar to National Guard units as they were then constituted, at the end of October, 1917,⁹ the organization of the 33rd Division was, in effect, complete. The splitting up of certain regiments,¹⁰ the reorganization of others, and the temporary confusion inseparable from such readjustment had, necessarily, not conduced to systematic or uninterrupted training of the troops. Moreover, there existed at that juncture a conspicuous dearth of the *matériel* and supplies which are indispensable to a properly equipped military force. Furthermore, during the last week of October several contingents of drafted men, numbering approximately five hundred each, were received from the 86th Division at Camp Grant, Rockford, Illinois.¹¹ This influx of recruits, many of whom lacked physical fitness for military service and some of whom were unable to speak English,¹² obviously augmented the unsettled conditions then existing throughout the command. In consequence, the telegram in cipher which came from The Adjutant General of the Army on October 31, directing that the 33rd Division be made ready to sail for France about November 30,¹³ was like a bolt from the blue. The unpreparedness of the troops for over-sea service and the actual conditions at Camp Logan at that time are described in a memorandum formulated by the Division Adjutant on November 1, 1917, for his own future reference, from which the following excerpts are taken:

The 33rd Division, temporarily under the command of Brigadier General Henry D. Todd, Jr., in the absence of Major General George Bell, Jr., in France, is composed in the main of former Illinois National Guard and numbers today 914 officers and 23,295 enlisted men, a total of 24,209, in which are included substantially 2,000 drafted men received the past week from the 86th Division at Camp Grant, Rockford, Illinois; 60 officers and 959 enlisted men belonging to the Camp troops, and 57 officers and 2,109 enlisted men of the 8th Illinois Infantry (colored). Neither the Camp troops nor the 8th Illinois will be sent abroad, according to present information.¹⁴ The actual strength of the 33rd Division proper is therefore 797 officers and 19,306 enlisted men—including 2,000 drafted men. Camp Grant at Rockford, Illinois, and Camp Dodge at Des Moines, Iowa, are still to furnish this division with 4,400 more drafted men, but, even so, there will still be a shortage of men since the Tables of Organization prescribe that a division shall consist of 27,152 enlisted men.

General Bell and most of the officers of the Divisional Staff reached Houston on August 25, 1917, and since that time have made unremitting efforts to get all the Illinois National Guard, the necessary *matériel* and supplies sent to this camp. It was not until the 16th of October that all the Illinois troops reached here and that the new organization, based upon European organization, could be properly effected, insomuch as the new organization required that the two Infantry Brigades—viz: the 65th Brigade (Brigadier General Hill) and the 66th Brigade (Brigadier General Foster)—¹⁵should consist of two infantry regiments of 3,652 enlisted men each instead of three regiments of lesser strength. The former 5th and 7th Illinois Infantry ceased to exist as such and, by virtue of the new organization, became the Divisional and Brigade Machine Gun Battalions, and the Divisional Train Headquarters and Military Police, and were included in the composition of the Division Trains.

Camp Logan itself is not finished. The plans of many buildings have been repeatedly changed, thus resulting in much unnecessary confusion and expenditures for which there can be no possible justification. Recently it has been decided to make many of them semi-permanent by the addition of windows and doors, and this work has not yet been com-

pleted. It was only today that the Division Headquarters moved into an inclosed building, with windows and a wooden floor, having thus far occupied buildings with dirt floors and open sides exposed to every particle of dust produced by six weeks of continuous drought. Many of the storehouses and warehouses are of faulty construction, and the Camp Engineer informed me yesterday that some of the roofs are sagging to such an extent that it was only a question of time before they would collapse completely. The heating facilities are meagre to a degree. The Base Hospital is without running water, except for two or three faucets put in by the Constructing Quartermaster contrary to authorization because he realized the folly of having no running water whatsoever. It has been suggested from Washington that the total absence of heating facilities be overcome by stoves in the operating rooms and by carrying heating pipes up the outside of the Base Hospital. Comment upon the danger of stoves in operating rooms where ether is used, or the inadequacy of heating pipes on the outside of a hospital is superfluous. Since the temperature of late has been quite low at night—sometimes below freezing—the sick in the Base Hospital have had increased suffering on account of the cold.¹⁶

The re-organization of the Division necessarily affected the training of the troops, but the principal factor which militated against the prompt beginning of this training was the slowness with which the Illinois troops were sent to this camp. At the present time, intensive training of the infantry regiments has not been of more than four weeks duration as a whole. The machine-gun training was not begun until October 10th. In the case of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade the situation was extraordinary. The three regiments composing that Brigade are a fair sample. The 122nd Field Artillery was formerly the First Illinois Cavalry and only within a few months converted into the 2nd Illinois Field Artillery. The 123rd Field Artillery was the 6th Illinois Infantry until after its arrival at Camp Logan. The 124th Field Artillery was the brand-new 3rd Illinois Field Artillery and was only organized in August, 1917. The training of these Field Artillery regiments has been confined to dummy guns donated to one of them, and not one single organization has ever fired a real field piece. The 122nd and 124th only had dummy guns

in Illinois; the 123rd was converted from infantry into field artillery less than six weeks ago at this camp, where no field guns of any sort or description existed until yesterday, when twenty-four three-inch guns arrived. For a long time Brigadier General Todd, commanding the 58th Field Artillery Brigade, was the only officer, Regular or otherwise, with artillery experience, but, by dint of much telegraphing, two other Regular officers were sent to assist him in training this brigade in preliminary work. Artillery ammunition is conspicuous for its paucity.¹⁷

Of machine guns there are only twelve Maxims and twenty Lewis guns. Only a very few officers have taken the course at Fort Sill and are competent to instruct in this most important work.

Although General Bell bent every effort, beginning before the end of August, to establish target ranges for small-arms and field artillery, in spite of all that could be done, these ranges are just approaching completion. Neither the artillery nor the machine gun troops have fired so much as one single round in target practice, and the same is true of the infantry without exception. . . .

There is a decided shortage of ordnance *matériel* of many kinds, including rifles and pistols.¹⁸ On several occasions I have had to lend my own Colt automatic to officers of the Military Police for expeditions when riot sticks were scarcely sufficient protection and when it was advisable for the officers to be properly armed. . . .

As a matter of fact, the real training of this aggregation has just begun in real earnest. . . . General Pershing, in a recent communication to the War Department which was transmitted to all Division Commanders, laid the strongest possible emphasis upon the absolute necessity of thorough target practice in this country before troops are sent abroad, and he gave ample warning that the conditions in France arising from many causes, including intensive agriculture, were such that target ranges were well-nigh impossible to find. For these reasons, he emphatically declared that American troops should be taught to shoot before they are sent abroad, doubly so since they will have little or no opportunity for target practice in France.

In the light of the facts enumerated above, the reader is left to draw his own conclusions as to whether the 33rd Division was ready at that time to be sent overseas.

During the first fortnight of November, 1917, contingents of drafted men, numbering as a rule approximately five hundred men each, arrived at Camp Logan at frequent intervals.¹⁹ By November 14, the 33rd Division had been augmented by 6,600 recruits, about 5,600 of whom came from the 86th Division at Camp Grant, Illinois, and about 1,000 from the 88th Division at Camp Dodge, Iowa. While the drafted men from the 88th Division were noticeably superior to those from the 86th, it was manifest that the quality of men sent by both these divisions was, with certain exceptions, by no means all that could have been desired, and that many of them were, so to speak, discards.²⁰ More than five hundred proved to be alien enemies,²¹ while those who, because of their physical condition and for other reasons, were unsuited to make soldiers, and the non-English speaking and illiterates, were in such considerable numbers²² that it became necessary eventually to discharge 2,189 of these men on "surgeon's certificate of disability."²³ The mass of correspondence and reports on the subject of these undesirables, as well as the necessity of complying with the gradations of alien-born soldiers required by the War Department, necessarily prevented the officers of the division from devoting as much time to the training of the troops as they otherwise could have done.

During the first part of November, 1917, four British and five French officers, accompanied by a number of noncommissioned officers, reported as instructors²⁴ and under their energetic and able supervision the training of the troops received an additional impetus, apart from the invaluable instruction given in the latest European methods.

On November 6, Governor Frank O. Lowden of Illinois, accompanied by several important officials of that state, arrived at Camp Logan, was given an informal reception by General Todd, and spent the afternoon visiting and inspecting some of the organizations. On the following day, Governor Lowden and Governor W. P. Hobby of Texas reviewed from the balcony of the Rice Hotel in Houston a parade composed of the majority of the 33rd Division.²⁵ On November 8, Governor Lowden again spent part of the day at Camp Logan and that afternoon he and the state officials accompanying him left Houston for Springfield, Illinois.²⁶

On November 19, instructions were received from The Adjutant General of the Army to send all general officers to Washington for a physical examination to determine their fitness for over-sea service. Although nothing further had been heard respecting the sailing of the division about November 30, as announced on October 31, the first real inkling that its departure would be deferred was contained in a telegram from the Chief of Ordnance, received on November 20, to the effect that the ordnance stores due to the 33rd Division would be shipped to Camp Logan in accordance with the priority list and that the major portion thereof should arrive within the next thirty days. In the absence of contrary instructions, all necessary arrangements had been made to have the 123rd Field Artillery horse-drawn but, as a precautionary measure, inquiries made by telegraph on November 19 elicited a response next day from The Adjutant General of the Army that the "regiment [of] Heavy Artillery will be motorized" but that "tractors will not be delivered for some months." On November 28 telegraphic orders were received from The Adjutant General of the Army to report approximately the date when the prescribed course of target practice would be finished, and also the exact number of men needed to bring the

division up to full strength. On November 29 the Commanding General was directed to report when the engineer regiment, the engineer train, the mobile laboratory, and two sanitary squads would be fully equipped and in readiness for over-sea service. The first news that General Bell had returned from France was received on November 30 in a telegram which he sent from Washington asking for exact information concerning the shortage of men, including those needed to replace eight hundred alien enemies. That he had been successful in obtaining from the military authorities in Washington a promise that the 33rd Division would receive its full quota of recruits was attested by the receipt on December 3 of a telegram from The Adjutant General of the Army announcing that the "War Department expects to send 3,500 drafted white men to your Division immediately" and asking if there were any reason why they should not be sent.²⁷

The period of slightly more than eleven weeks, during which Brigadier General Todd was the acting division commander, was replete with difficulties and required the exercise of exceptional judgment and patience in this stage of transition to an organization bearing some semblance to a properly constituted military force. Allusion has already been made to the reorganization effected in October, 1917,²⁸ which was hampered further by the influx of 6,600 drafted men received between October 25 and November 14—many of whom had to be discharged because they were unfit for military service—by the expected departure overseas scheduled to take place "on or about November 30,"²⁹ by the lack of *matériel*, equipment, clothing, and supplies of almost every sort, and by numerous other factors which need not be enumerated here. Every effort was made by General Todd and all the officers of the division to expedite the passage through this unavoidable period of transformation, to remedy the innumerable

defects then existing, to obtain the urgently needed *matériel*, clothing, and supplies,³⁰ to push the training of the troops to the limit possible under the circumstances, and to instill into comparatively green officers and men that discipline and efficiency which alone can create an effective military force. Apart from the obstacles encountered within the division itself, which were to be expected during such a period of transition, innumerable handicaps from outside sources had to be overcome.³¹ The wells in Texas constituted the principal source of supply of oil to the United States Navy, as well as a valuable adjunct to the Allies, but their operation was seriously imperiled by disturbances created by disaffected persons during October and November, 1917. Through the vigorous action and tact of General Todd, acting under the supervision of Major General Ruckman, commanding the Southern Department, any interruption in this vital supply was effectually prevented, although it involved the guarding of these oil wells by a considerable force of troops, whose training and target practice suffered correspondingly.³² Frequent changes in organization were prescribed by the War Department.³³ The establishment of a training school for officers was ordered on October 10 but, notwithstanding several inquiries by telegraph, at the end of November the requisite information concerning it had not been forthcoming.³⁴ In spite of every effort to get rid of the undesirables, especially the alien enemies, the absence of a fixed policy in the Army War College effectually prevented definite action.³⁵ The foregoing were a few of the many factors which retarded the attainment of the desideratum to which unremitting labors were devoted. The weeding out of officers not up to the standard requisite for war was, fortunately, not subjected to similar handicaps. Several boards of efficiency were created during November, 1917, and bore immediate fruit in that on December 1 a number of resig-

nations, tendered as a result of the findings of these boards, were accepted by The Adjutant General of the Army.³⁶

On Friday, December 7, 1917, Major General Bell, accompanied by his Aide-de-Camp, Captain William H. Simpson, and his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel W. K. Naylor, returned to Camp Logan. At three o'clock that afternoon, he addressed the general and field officers of the command, emphasizing the "vital necessity of unwavering discipline" and thorough efficiency as the only known method to minimize losses and to insure victory in war. He laid particular stress upon target practice, upon cleanliness and neatness in appearance as the very foundation of discipline, and upon the obligation on the part of everyone for the most strenuous work; and he announced that all incompetent officers would be eliminated and that their places would be filled by deserving men from the ranks.³⁷

The events of the few days immediately succeeding General Bell's resumption of command were scarcely encouraging to those who were striving for military efficiency. On December 8 came a notification from The Adjutant General of the Army that the departure of the division had been deferred and that all over-sea equipment received by it would at once be shipped to the 32nd Division. A vigorous protest made on December 13 proved futile and in the meantime, announcements were received that the movement of the 33rd Division had been postponed until February and that the motor transport requested could not be supplied. Instructions from the War Department on December 15 to deliver to the 32nd Division all woolen clothing with the exception of one suit per man led to protest by General Bell on the score of the detrimental effect on the health of the command and the handicap to the training entailed by depriving the men of the two uniforms indispensable to the proper performances of their duties.

The division had now been stripped of its ordnance and all its over-sea supplies, and its clothing had been reduced to an absolute minimum; furthermore, no solution had been reached in Washington as to the disposition of the alien enemies in the ranks³⁸ and no further information had been given concerning the 3,500 drafted men promised on December 3. Notwithstanding this situation, orders were received during the third week in December to prepare the division for over-sea service, inasmuch as it stood well up on the list of those destined for duty in France.

At the close of the year 1917 the various units and services of the 33rd Division were beginning to resemble a real military force in the embryonic stage. A noticeable improvement in the discipline, military courtesy, and general appearance of both officers and men was manifest. Officers not up to standard were being weeded out at a rapid rate through the medium of efficiency boards; the others showed by their work that the Division Commander's warnings had not fallen on unheeding ears. In every branch of training the utmost efforts were put forth, particular attention being paid to target practice and bayonet work as the fundamentals of a soldier's schooling, and both officers and men responded in a gratifying manner to the severe demands made upon them. For officers, noncommissioned officers, and men, schools of various kinds were established and were instrumental in effecting a marked improvement. The 33rd Division Infantry School of Arms, under the able management first of Captain John P. Lucas and later of Captain William H. Simpson, proved particularly successful in this respect. The invaluable assistance of the British and French instructors was beginning to be apparent, and both military missions, especially the French, kept in close touch with the work of their officers by means of frequent visits and inspections. As in all other matters, the highest standard



LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM H. SIMPSON

in paper-work and records was exacted by the Division Commander, who was particularly insistent that the service records of the men be kept absolutely accurate and complete to date. To that end, each service record in the command was repeatedly examined, during a period of several months, by officers specially selected for that purpose from the offices of the Division Adjutant and the Division Surgeon, and every inaccuracy was corrected on the spot.

The year 1918 opened auspiciously in some ways and quite the contrary in others. Effective progress was being made daily in the training of the troops but it was apparent that there was a long road to travel before the standard of efficiency demanded by General Bell would be attained. Nearly all the field officers of infantry and artillery³⁹ were sent to the Brigade and Field Officers' School at San Antonio, Texas, in compliance with orders, and the regimental commanders, with the exception of two,⁴⁰ were temporarily replaced by colonels of the Regular Army selected by the War Department. Four hundred and thirty-two enlisted men were sent to Leon Springs, Texas, on January 9, to attend the training camp there for candidates for commissions. Brigadier General David J. Foster, commanding the 66th Infantry Brigade, to the regret of the command, failed to qualify physically for over-sea service and on January 8 was ordered to be "honorably discharged." The dearth of officers at this stage of the training naturally exercised a detrimental effect, which was further augmented by the arrival on January 8 of 414 enlisted men from the 32nd Division, classed as alien enemies.⁴¹ The precaution was taken, however, to put them into a provisional regiment under the command of Major Abel Davis, thus keeping them separate and distinct from the division units.

Up to that time no definite policy as to the disposition of

alien enemy soldiers had been announced by the War Department but the receipt, on January 9, of orders to report the number of Austrian subjects in the division belonging to Teutonic, Magyar, Polish, Rumanian, Czechish, Ruthenian, and other consolidated races determined General Bell to take the bull by the horns. The following characteristic telegram was accordingly sent that same day to The Adjutant General of the Army:

Urgently request authorization to deal with so-called alien enemies in this Division and Camp according to my discretion in order to salvage as many as possible period Alien enemies in this camp added to those recently sent from another camp will make some twelve hundred period Out of them at least four hundred can be obtained who are eager and desire to fight against Central Powers period If thorough investigation proves sincerity of their desire it would be manifestly advantageous to utilize them period It is understood that partial or complete naturalization will not prevent their being shot if captured by Germans period Authorization described above is earnestly desired comma particularly since it would help to dispose of this hitherto unsolved question period It is understood that instructions relative to alien enemies were to be issued by War Department December thirtieth period No such instructions have yet reached this Division Request information whether they have been issued and what is their purport. BELL.

That same day the Division Commander inaugurated a novelty by prescribing a competition for the selection of the best company in each of the four infantry regiments. When chosen, these companies were to be given special instruction in infantry work, to be designated "Model Companies," and to set the standard of efficiency for the others.⁴²

January 10, 11⁴³ and 12 were marked by the worst storm in that part of Texas since February 14, 1895—a heavy fall of snow and a minimum temperature of eleven degrees above

zero, the lowest at Houston during January for thirty-two years. The troops, being all under canvas, suffered somewhat and training had to be partly suspended on January 11. A succession of instructions from the War Department extending over several weeks had led to the separation from the division of so many officers that the progress of the training was noticeably impaired thereby,⁴⁴ and on January 15,⁴⁵ General Bell telegraphed The Adjutant General of the Army that he had received orders to hold 460 enlisted men and 140 officers, fully equipped, in readiness to precede the division abroad but that, even by stripping every organization, the full quota of these men could not be supplied.

By reason of certain wise and effective measures, the remonstrances raised in many quarters by so-called "conscientious objectors" were virtually unheard at Camp Logan, and on January 17 General Bell answered The Adjutant General of the Army's inquiry respecting these by the crisp statement that "there are none and consequently none who refuse to work or serve."

Stability in the matter of organization proved somewhat difficult to attain because of the changes directed by higher authority. Fair examples of this were the consolidation of the Personnel Office and War Risk Insurance with the Adjutant's Office ordered on January 11, and the abolition, prescribed on January 19, of all "Statistical Sections in Divisions, regiments and elsewhere in the United States," which had been in active operation since September, 1917.⁴⁶

The days from January 15 to 19, inclusive, were notable for the visit of Lieutenant Colonel R. V. K. Applin of the Royal Army, whose able handling of the British machine guns at the battle of Messines had brought him great renown. On January 15 and 16 he lectured to all the officers of the division on the subject of "Machine-Gun Tactics," and so extraordi-

narly interesting and valuable was the information given that he was induced by General Bell to prolong his stay and to deliver an address on the subject of "Discipline and Training" to all the officers and noncommissioned officers of the command on January 19. Discipline he defined as "the instant and willing obedience to all orders," and he laid the utmost emphasis upon the necessity of absolute discipline on the part of every soldier and the "duty of efficiency" obligatory upon every officer. His remarks produced so profound an impression that they were subsequently published in a small pamphlet which was distributed to every officer and man in the division.

On December 3, 1917, The Adjutant General of the Army had given notification that 3,500 drafted white men were to be sent "immediately" to the 33rd Division, but during the ensuing six weeks nothing further was heard about them. This long delay excited the interest of the state officials of Illinois, and on January 21 Brigadier General Frank S. Dickson, the adjutant general of Illinois, telegraphed to inquire the number of men needed to fill the division to maximum strength. In accordance with his request the following answer was sent him that same day by Major H. C. Castor, the assistant division adjutant:

Retel this date. There are today nine naught two officers and twenty-three thousand two hundred nineteen enlisted men in Division but enlisted strength included eleven hundred and sixty-four so-called enemy aliens who cannot go to France under present orders and about eight hundred men who will probably be discharged on certificates of disability or orders from Local Boards et cetera which makes effective force about twenty-one thousand, two fifty-five and leaves a shortage of forty-eight eighty-four to fill Division to full strength period. If six hundred and five enemy aliens who have taken oath to fight for United States anywhere be taken,

men needed would be four thousand, two hundred seventy-nine.⁴⁷

On January 24, Major General John F. Morrison, the director of training, spent the day at Camp Logan, making thorough inspections and, as did Colonel Applin, made commendatory remarks on the condition of the troops. The week ending January 26⁴⁸ was notable for the success in the "insurance drive," as a result of which the Division Commander was enabled to report that "every officer on duty with the 33rd Division has taken out \$10,000 insurance."⁴⁹

Frequent allusion has been made to the impossibility of getting rid of the alien enemies in the ranks inasmuch as no definite policy respecting their disposition had been formulated in Washington.⁵⁰ On January 27, however, there came an official announcement to the effect that subjects of hostile countries who were not desirous of serving in the army were to be discharged at once, but that an agent of the Department of Justice would have to be consulted in the case of each alien enemy whose internment was deemed advisable. The partial solution of this question, which had been a fruitful source of annoyance for months, cleared the way for the complements of men required to overcome the existing shortage.⁵¹ The Division Commander acted instantly and sent the following characteristic telegram that afternoon:

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

About forty-three hundred recruits are needed for this Division and I urgently request that they be sent here at once period While I was in France Commanding General emphasized the absolute necessity of sending no troops which were not thoroughly disciplined and equipped period I do not desire to be advanced on priority list comma that is matter for War Department to determine itself comma but I should like to have two or three months in which to train men sent to raise Division to full strength period Any soldier knows that

to fill up well disciplined Division with four thousand green men necessarily decreases the efficiency greatly and I am endeavoring to avoid impairing efficiency seriously by having recruits unloaded wholesale on Division on eve of its departure overseas period Am certain that General Morrison Director of Training believes in filling up immediately all Divisions intended for France period If this is doubted comma request that you consult him by telegraph period I invite attention to fact that there are plenty of Illinois men in northern camps where they are virtually hibernating and cannot train whereas not a day has been lost in this camp period I desire to command a fighting comma or even an Assault Division but not a Replacement Division period There are plenty of others not so advanced in training as this Division which could be selected for that rôle period I desire when we reach France to be a help comma not a hindrance as I understand is the case with some other organizations already sent period The main object of this request is to render effective service comma to take advantage of the opportunities for training which are better in this camp than in almost any other in the United States or France and moreover should like to have a sporting chance when I get to France.

BELL.

Apart from the telegraphic instructions bearing on minor matters which poured into Division Headquarters in a steady stream, the first week of February, 1918, was noteworthy for five communications of major importance. The first announced that forty-one colonels and lieutenant colonels of field artillery, including those from the 33rd Division, would be sent on February 9 from the Brigade and Field Officers' School at San Antonio to the School of Fire at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The second directed that the 33rd Division be made ready at the earliest possible moment for duty abroad and that notification be given when it was equipped and in readiness. The third ordered that a regiment of infantry be sent to Galveston, Texas, to Major General Ruckman, commanding the Southern Department; the fourth prescribed a report

on the *matériel*, competent instructors, and needs of the artillery brigade required to secure efficiency in the minimum time; and the fifth announced that all enlisted men sent abroad must be fully equipped.

Early in the second week in February, there was received a lengthy telegram from The Adjutant General of the Army, which explained the new system of assigning a number to every soldier and allotted to the 33rd Division those from 1,375,000 to 1,410,000. This numbering was accomplished in a remarkably short time but the labor involved can be better imagined than described.⁵² On February 10 a communication was received emanating from the office of The Adjutant General of the Army on February 6, and announcing that the organization of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade would be "that prescribed for the Sixth division of each corps, known in the organization project as the base and training division." This was tantamount to a declaration that the 33rd Division had been designated as a replacement division, and was followed next day by a copy of this same communication bearing a first indorsement, dated February 7, 1918, and addressed "To the Commanding Generals of all Regular, National Guard and National Army Divisions in the United States, for their information." This drew from General Bell a very vigorous protest against the judging of the division in February by conditions set forth in reports made by inspectors general in November and December, and against being "branded to the entire Army in the United States as inefficient" without an opportunity to be heard and without proper investigation by War Department inspectors.⁵³

The close of the second week in February, 1918, found Camp Logan at the top of the list of camps in the matter of war risk insurance, with a total of \$316,000,500.⁵⁴ Unusual efforts had been put forth for weeks, the officers and men had

been appealed to from every conceivable angle—family, business, personal, medical, logical, sentimental, and otherwise—and the results speak for themselves.

On February 18,⁵⁵ a report from Major J. M. Willis, commanding the base hospital at Camp Logan, announced that 2,189 men had been discharged from the 33rd Division on surgeon's certificate of disability.⁵⁶ At five o'clock that afternoon all officers of the division, other than those of infantry and the machine gun battalions, assembled and were addressed by General Bell. After reading a letter from an American general commending the division and telling them of the flattering comments made by Colonel Applin and Major Thenier of the British and French Military Missions, he declared that a marked slackening in the work had become apparent. This state of affairs, he announced, must be overcome; the 33rd must be made one of the best divisions; he wanted the officers to do their part; and those who were not willing to do their utmost he advised to hand in their resignations and to go to their homes.⁵⁷

More than eleven weeks had elapsed since anything had been heard of the 3,500 recruits promised on December 3, 1917,⁵⁸ but at 9:08 P.M. on February 21, 1918,⁵⁹ a telegram was received from The Adjutant General of the Army respecting the existing shortage. Twelve minutes later the following response was en route:

Retel today relative to number of men required to fill this Division to authorized strength period Actual vacancies now existing five thousand one hundred and twenty-four comma but owing to large number of prospective vacancies about six thousand men should be sent to this Division.

BELL.⁶⁰

The last day of February, 1918, was marked by the first of a series of general inspections of the entire division which

took place at varying intervals during two months. This initial inspection revealed a marked improvement in the troops but, at the same time, disclosed a number of defects, and stringent orders were given by General Bell for their immediate correction. The month of February was characterized by a gratifying progress in the appearance, discipline, training, and general efficiency of the division. The work of former months was accelerated to a noticeable degree, and the response on the part of officers and men was distinctly encouraging. The stage in which the training could be intensive in the fullest sense of the word had at last been reached, and the various schools were worked at full blast. The indolent and the shirker, of whatever rank, were dealt with in a summary fashion, and the weeding out of incompetents continued unabated. Every effort was made to develop both practical skill and initiative, and, to that end, particularly intensive training was given in gallery and target practice⁶¹ and in bayonet work. The infantry was given tours of duty in a system of trenches and was subjected to gas attacks arranged by the British and French instructors to simulate as closely as possible actual battle conditions on the Allied western front. Not one whit behind the infantry was the artillery in its training; practice was now begun in the firing of live shells, shrapnel, and bar-rages.⁶²

Aside from the usual routine, the first week of March, 1918, was noteworthy chiefly for the arrival of Brigadier General Paul A. Wolf, who reported for duty and assumed command of the 66th Infantry Brigade, and for the visit of Representative (later Senator) Medill McCormick of Illinois. Instructions were received on March 4 to send to Washington all general officers, including the Division Commander, who had not been physically examined. Three days later Major General Ruckman, commanding the Southern Department, re-

requested that a battalion be placed at the disposal of the Commanding Officer of the 57th Infantry, so as to comply with a direct order from the Secretary of War respecting certain guards, but fortunately subsequent arrangements obviated the necessity for this measure.⁶³

The ensuing week of March was characterized by a few occurrences deserving of notice, the principal one of which related to the shortage in men which still existed, notwithstanding the promise of 3,500 made on December 3, 1917.

The following letter was sent to Washington:

HEADQUARTERS, 33RD DIVISION, FLH-hel-bf.
CAMP LOGAN, HOUSTON, TEXAS.

March 9th, 1918.

From:— COMMANDING GENERAL, 33rd Division.
To:— CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.
Subject:— Recruits needed by the 33rd Division.

1. There are herewith attached and marked "Inclosure No. 1" copies of telegrams and other communications sent to the War Department, covering a period from December 11, 1917—almost immediately after my return from France—to February 22, 1918, regarding the number of recruits needed by this Division to expand it to its maximum authorized strength.

2. While in France, the Commanding General, A. E. F., personally declared to me that no divisions should be sent overseas unless they were thoroughly disciplined and equipped, and the attached correspondence will demonstrate that I have been, and am still doing, my utmost to conform to his wishes. I know no royal road to efficiency except through discipline and training. It must be obvious that any division, no matter how efficient, is necessarily greatly weakened by the infusion of raw recruits on the eve of taking the field. For that reason I have made every conceivable endeavor to have the five thousand men needed by this division sent here at once in order that they may be at least partially trained before our departure overseas. The Chief of Staff ought to know personally the present needs of this division with reference to recruits. If then he is in accord with the policy of delaying



BRIGADIER GENERAL PAUL A. WOLF

the assignment of recruits until the eve of the departure of the division, I will do my utmost to carry out his wishes. If, on the other hand, such is not his desire, I recommend, in the strongest possible terms, that the recruits needed by this division be sent to it immediately. Twenty-eight recruits for the 370th Infantry passed that regiment en route and arrived here the day after its departure. Such things do not create efficiency.

3. It is requested that this communication be referred to the Chief of Staff himself and not to a subordinate. Having been a Staff officer I know only too well how important communications frequently never reach the officer to whom they are addressed.

GEORGE BELL, JR.,
Major General, N. A.

On March 11 the Division Signal Officer, Major Karl Truesdell, was relieved and ordered to Hoboken "prepared for extended field service" abroad. On the following day, after a thorough inspection of the 132nd Infantry the Regular colonel then in command of that regiment was relieved and was subsequently detached from the division. At adjutant's call that day official announcement was made of the new policy forbidding all commissioned officers of the 33rd Division to leave camp on the nights of Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday of each week. Two hours of study or recitation were prescribed for those nights and, in addition, study or a tactical walk each Wednesday from 1:30 to 5:30 P.M.⁶⁴

March 19⁶⁵ was notable for the visit of Brigadier General W. A. White, Royal Army, who was in charge of recruiting for the British in the United States and Canada, and who delivered an address that evening in Houston. A Division School of Operations was established, with sessions on the evenings of Tuesday and Thursday of each week, for the purpose of familiarizing the principal officers of the command with the fundamentals of organization, staff work, billeting, and supply.⁶⁶ By far the most important event of that day

was the receipt of a telegram from Major General Thomas H. Barry, commanding the 86th Division at Camp Grant, Rockford, Illinois, announcing that orders from the War Department directed that 2,700 men be transferred to the 33rd Division within the next eight days, and asking whether they could be received. An affirmative response was immediately telegraphed, and preparations were begun to care for this increment which had been expected for more than three months.⁶⁷

On March 22,⁶⁸ instructions were received from The Adjutant General of the Army to report at once the shortage of men in each arm of the service in the division, specifying the needs of each regiment of artillery and infantry as well as those of the other units. The Division Commander requested authorization to establish a detention camp for the new recruits but was informed two days later that such a camp was not deemed necessary, since the drafted men who would be sent would have had more than a fortnight's service in their own depot brigade or division.⁶⁹ In the meantime, the receipt of copies of the instructions sent to the Commanding Generals of Camps Grant, Dodge, and Taylor afforded the information that 2,700 drafted men would be received from the 86th Division, 2,300 from the 88th Division, and 1,000 from the 84th Division.⁷⁰

On the afternoon of March 26 the officers of the division were hastily assembled and given another straightforward talk by General Bell, who laid the utmost stress upon the necessity of subordinating all other matters to that of getting the troops into fighting condition. The existing defects, he declared, lay within the power of the officers to rectify, and the necessity for the strictest discipline was again emphasized. This meeting was supplemented by General Order No. 48, issued next day, subjecting officers and men to identical restric-

tions in respect to leaving camp at night. All soldiers were required to remain in camp on the nights of Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday, for the purpose of study. In order to overcome the existing deficiencies, night schools were established and the hours of drill were increased from seven to eight a day, divided equally between the morning and afternoon.⁷¹

Apart from the "speeding-up" of the work of the officers and men of the division, the last ten days of March, 1918,⁷² were notable chiefly for the visits of Major Thenier of the French Military Mission, Major Ragnald Hvoslef, the first military attaché from Norway to the United States, and the notification that the 108th Engineers and the 108th Engineer Train would be sent to France as soon as they were in readiness and the necessary vessels were available.

The opening week of April, 1918, was characterized by several events of more than ordinary importance. On April 2 came a notification from the Commanding General of the 86th Division that 891 enlisted men had left Camp Grant that day for Camp Logan and that they would be followed by 900 men next day and a like number on April 4. Final disposition of the alien-born in the ranks was still impossible since no definite policy respecting them had yet been announced from Washington. A few days previously a ruling had been received from The Adjutant General of the Army to the effect that officers born in enemy countries could be utilized overseas provided their loyalty to the United States was beyond question. The Division Commander thereupon inquired by telegraph whether a similar ruling would be applicable to soldiers who, although born in hostile countries, were thoroughly loyal and who had made a sworn statement that they would "serve in the United States Army anywhere and against any enemy whatsoever." The response, which settled finally this

problem that had been the source of such vexation for months, was to the effect that enlisted men born in enemy countries might be sent overseas provided they had been completely naturalized, whereas those who had not become wholly naturalized were not to be allowed to serve in Europe, irrespective of their wishes.⁷³

On April 4, some of the officers who had spent more than three months at the Brigade and Field Officers' School at San Antonio, Texas, returned to the division, and Colonel John J. Garrity was transferred from the command of the 132nd Infantry to that of the 130th Infantry, replacing Colonel Frank S. Wood, relieved.⁷⁴ On April 5 occurred the first review of the entire 33rd Division which was held at the manoeuvre grounds four miles north of Camp Logan. Beginning at 9:45 A. M., three hours were required for the troops to pass in front of General Bell and his Staff and, although certain defects were noticeable, the troops and animals showed a marked improvement since the various brigade and regimental reviews which had been held frequently in the preceding weeks.⁷⁵ That same day General Order No. 52 was issued, embodying for the information and guidance of all concerned, the numerous regulations which would govern the transfer of the division to the port of embarkation. April 5 marked the arrival of the first increment of drafted men destined to fill the division to its maximum strength. The following table enumerates those received during the course of the month:⁷⁶

DATE OF ARRIVAL	NUMBER OF MEN	FROM
April 5.....	892	86th Division, Camp Grant, Rockford, Illinois
April 6.....	891	86th Division, Camp Grant
April 7.....	814	86th Division, Camp Grant
April 8.....	1,150	88th Division, Camp Dodge, Des Moines, Iowa
April 8.....	500	84th Division, Camp Taylor, Louisville, Kentucky
April 9.....	1,148	88th Division, Camp Dodge
April 10.....	500	84th Division, Camp Taylor
April 23.....	100	86th Division, Camp Grant
April 25.....	150	Base Hospital, 88th Division, Camp Dodge
April 29.....	1,000	Depot Brigade, 86th Division, Camp Grant
TOTAL.....	7,145	

As these successive detachments reached Camp Logan, they were formed into two new organizations created for the express purpose of putting them into the best possible condition, physically and otherwise, before distributing them throughout the division, thus avoiding all unnecessary transfers subsequently. The first 3,000 recruits were incorporated into the "First Provisional Regiment" under the command of Major H. C. Ridgway, and the remaining 4,145 into the "Second Provisional Regiment" under Captain William H. Simpson, General Bell's senior aide-de-camp. They were subjected to a searching physical examination, given intensive training each day, their service records were put into perfect order, and, after a thorough examination of their qualification cards, supplemented by personal investigation, the men themselves were classified and assigned, during the latter part of April, to the various units according to the needs of each organization.

On April 6, with the object of stimulating interest in the Third Liberty Loan, the 66th Infantry Brigade, the 122nd Field Artillery, and Ambulance Company No. 131 paraded in Houston and were reviewed from the balcony of the Rice Hotel by the Division Commander.

Apart from minor matters—many of them more or less routine in their nature—training of the most intensive sort, and the arrival of five increments of recruits enumerated in the table given above, the second week of April, 1918, was noteworthy chiefly for the exchange of telegrams between The Adjutant General of the Army and the Division Commander on the subject of the shortage still unfilled in the division, the former laying particular emphasis upon the conservation of the enlisted personnel and the elimination of such men only as were manifestly unsuited for foreign service. General Bell reported that the 108th Engineers and the 108th Engineer Train were in readiness for over-sea service, but that certain minor shortages in the way of clothing would have to be furnished them at the port of embarkation. As a matter of fact, the instructions received from several sources relative to the supply of clothing for foreign service were so contradictory that information was requested as to which system was to be followed.⁷⁷

During the third week in April, General Bell reported to The Adjutant General of the Army that, inclusive of the 103 men still expected from Camp Grant, 763 recruits were needed to fill the vacancies caused by the transfer of the alien enemies out of the division. Eighty enlisted men who had failed to qualify for commissions at the training camp at Leon Springs, Texas, returned to the division as did some of the officers who had attended the Brigade and Field Officers' School at San Antonio, where six from the 33rd Division were unsuccessful in passing the final examination. Three telegrams of major importance were received from The Adjutant General of the Army: the first ordered the 108th Engineers and 108th Engineer Train to be sent to Hoboken, leaving on April 23 for Camp Merritt, New Jersey; the second directed that all alien enemies in the division who had not completed

their naturalization be transferred to the 44th Infantry at Camp Lewis, American Lake, Washington; while the third greatly reduced the number of enlisted men in the School Detail of officers and men destined to precede the division overseas for special training, and prescribed that this party be made ready to sail early in June.

The fourth week in April, 1918, opened with the return from the Officers' Training Camp at Leon Springs of 156 men of the 33rd Division who had successfully completed the course and had thus become eligible for commissions.⁷⁸ On April 22 Appendix No. 1 to General Order No. 52⁷⁹ was issued in printed form with supplementary information bearing upon the movement of the division to the port of embarkation, and about noon on the following day, to the envy of their fellow soldiers, the 108th Engineers, under Colonel Henry A. Allen, and the 108th Engineer Train marched out of Camp Logan and entrained for Camp Merritt, en route overseas. The significance of the departure of these two units, thus forming the vanguard of the division, was fully appreciated and the preparations for the expected movement, which had been systematically made for many weeks, were thereby given an additional impetus. That the signs had been correctly interpreted was attested by the fact that before the end of the week orders were received to send off the Division Headquarters, Headquarters Troop, the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, the entire 65th Infantry Brigade, and four camp infirmaries, so as to reach Camp Upton, Long Island, as soon as possible after midday on May 2. Upon receipt of these instructions a number of telegrams were dispatched, recalling all officers on leave or absent for any reason except by orders from higher authority.⁸⁰

On the morning of April 25, 704 alien enemies—that is, aliens born in enemy countries and who had not completed

their naturalization—left Camp Logan under the command of Major John D. White, 124th Field Artillery, en route for Camp Lewis, Washington.⁸¹

Frequent allusion has been made to the repeated efforts of General Bell, beginning immediately after his return from France at the end of November, 1917, to have all vacancies filled in the enlisted personnel of the division and the necessary recruits sent promptly in order that they might be given two or three months' training before the command started overseas.⁸² As late as April 22, 1918, and within a few days after the receipt of orders for the departure of the Division Headquarters, the last increment of recruits had not arrived from Camp Grant. In response to a telegram received that day from the Commanding General of the 86th Division, announcing that he had been ordered by the War Department to transfer 1,000 men to the 33rd Division, General Bell telegraphed him that he "would like to have the one thousand soldiers mentioned as soon as possible," and two days later he again telegraphed the Commander of the 86th Division: "How soon can you send one thousand men? Should like them as quickly as possible. Please answer."⁸³ As shown in the table on page 27, the entire 7,145 recruits arrived within the month of April and the final increment did not arrive until April 29. Yet General Bell had urgently recommended on January 27, 1918, that the efficiency of the division be not seriously impaired "by having recruits unloaded wholesale on Division on eve of its departure overseas."⁸⁴

Strenuous indeed were the closing days of April, 1918, as is invariably the case during the hours immediately preceding a long journey by any considerable body of troops.⁸⁵ Aside from the preparations which of necessity cannot be made until the last moment, the arrival of such a large number of recruits at the eleventh hour entailed Herculean labor to assign them

to the various units according to the needs of the organizations and the qualifications of the men themselves. By dint of extraordinary efforts, the task was successfully accomplished⁸⁶ and, on April 30, Confidential General Order No. 37 was issued for the departure of the leading units of the division beginning on May 1. On the evening of April 30, the Division Commander, accompanied by his two Aides-de-Camp, Captains William H. Simpson and Frank Baackes, and by the Division Adjutant, Major Huidekoper, left Houston for Washington, where they spent three days on business pertaining to the division,⁸⁷ and reached Camp Upton, Yaphank, Long Island, about noon on May 6, in advance of all troops except the Headquarters Detachment and the Headquarters Troop, and the officers of the Division Staff.

Brigadier General Todd, of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade, who had been left in command at Camp Logan, had meanwhile received orders from The Adjutant General of the Army to send to Camp Upton the remaining units of the division and to ship to Hoboken the advanced detachment of 314 officers and men destined for training overseas. This operation was pushed as rapidly as possible in view of conflicting orders and the failure of the railway officials to furnish the Pullman cars allotted to three sections of the trains scheduled to leave Camp Logan on May 8.⁸⁸ As a matter of fact, the movement of the division from Texas to Camp Upton⁸⁹ and Camp Merritt⁹⁰ was effected with remarkable dispatch considering the distance and the number of troops and equipment to be moved.

Meanwhile, the Division Commander and his Staff were busily occupied at Camp Upton with the multiplicity of details attendant upon any movement of troops overseas. The various detachments arrived in rapid succession after May 6, but their stay was comparatively brief and on May 8 the exodus

of the 33rd Division began with the departure for the port of embarkation at Hoboken, New Jersey, of the advance party composed of fifteen officers and fifteen men under Major Frank W. Barber, and another party under Brigadier General Hill, followed on May 9⁹¹ by the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion and on May 10 by the Headquarters of the 65th Infantry Brigade and the major portion of the 129th Infantry.⁹² There were no departures of troops during the week-end of May 11 to May 13, and the preceding week was notable for three visits paid to the "Prairie Division" by the Honorable Frank O. Lowden, governor of Illinois, on May 6, 9, and 13. At 1:30 P. M. on Thursday, May 9, he made a very happy and stirring address to the troops of the 33rd Division then at Camp Upton, bidding them Godspeed and assuring them of the pride and deep interest of the people of Illinois in their career overseas. On Monday, May 13, at the same hour, he delivered a similar speech to the troops which had arrived in the meantime.⁹³

At four o'clock that afternoon, the Division Commander, accompanied by his two Aides-de-Camp, left for New York, and early next morning the outward movement of troops to Hoboken was resumed.⁹⁴ In the case of some of the last units, their stay at Camp Upton was limited to twenty-four hours and the preparation of the voluminous passenger lists and the numerous other papers required at the port of embarkation, coupled with the ordinary work connected with such a rapid movement, demanded the most strenuous efforts on the part of officers and men alike. The results, however, fully justified the many arduous hours spent in acquiring the habit of accuracy in the compilation of records,⁹⁵ as well as in other military matters.

The first organizations of the 33rd Division to sail were the 108th Engineers and the 108th Engineer Train, which had

left Camp Logan on April 23 and had spent a few days at Camp Merritt, New Jersey. They left Hoboken on May 8 and reached Brest on May 18. The troops which passed through Camp Upton followed on May 10, 16, and 22, the Division Commander and his Staff sailing on May 16. The 58th Field Artillery Brigade, which passed through Camp Merritt, came next on May 26, and the rear was brought up on June 4 by its commander and by the 108th Sanitary Train.⁹⁶ In nearly every instance, the transports were dispatched in convoys composed of two or more ships, and all transports were met, when about thirty-six hours from Brest, by five or more American destroyers and were escorted into port. Notwithstanding the absence of lights at night, the crowding of the ships,⁹⁷ which was imperative in view of the urgent needs of the Allies for men, and certain other unavoidable discomforts, the troops suffered no serious hardships. The strictest discipline was maintained, particular attention being paid to the health and cleanliness of the command, and boat drills took place at least once daily.⁹⁸ The voyages were devoid of important episode, with one exception: the *Leviathan*, when within sight of the lighthouse outside of Brest, faced the simultaneous attack of several German submarines. Fortunately it escaped unscathed, and it was asserted by credible eyewitnesses that two of the submarines were sunk by gunfire and that the American destroyers captured a third and towed it, crew and all, into the harbor of Brest.⁹⁹

II. TRAINING AND OPERATIONS WITH THE BRITISH ARMY

The first increment of the 33rd Division to reach France was made up of the 108th Engineers, under Colonel Henry A. Allen, and the 108th Engineer Train, which landed at Brest on May 18, 1918. They were followed five days later by a convoy with part of the 65th Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier General Henry R. Hill, and the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion. On May 24¹ arrived a convoy composed of the *Mount Vernon* and *Agamemnon*, bearing the Division Commander, his Staff, part of the 66th Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier General Paul A. Wolf, two regiments of infantry and certain other units; six days later the remainder of the infantry, the 108th Train Headquarters and Military Police, and the 108th Supply Train landed at Brest.

Upon the arrival of General Bell at Brest no information existed at the headquarters of the commanding general of the port of disembarkation as to the first station of the 33rd Division in France. That evening, however, orders were received directing the Division Headquarters to proceed "to Base Section No. 4" (i. e., Havre),² but this destination was subsequently changed to Rouen. In compliance with these orders, the Division Commander, accompanied by his Staff and by the greater part of the Headquarters Detachment, left Brest on May 25 at 3:20 P.M.; but, upon reaching Paris at 4:30 A.M. on the following day, a British staff officer appeared at the Gare Montparnasse with orders changing the destination to Oisemont. The journey was altered accordingly and Oisemont was reached that same evening. On the

next day a new destination was given and the Division Headquarters were established that afternoon (May 27) at Huppy, about five miles south of Abbeville.³ In the "Huppy area" the Division Commander was rejoined by most of his command, the headquarters of the 66th Infantry Brigade being located at Haucourt and that of the 108th Engineers at Tailly.⁴ It was not until June 2 that the 65th Infantry Brigade reached Béhen,⁵ having been delayed en route by an epidemic of scarlet fever. At this time the town of Abbeville was so severely bombed almost every night by enemy aeroplanes that slow evacuation was begun. The German preparation for their anticipated drive to the sea via Amiens and Abbeville was apparently well under way.

The first casualty in the 33rd Division occurred on the night of May 26, when a train containing the headquarters of the 66th Infantry Brigade, the headquarters troop, and a part of the headquarters detachment, was pursued and bombed by German aeroplanes near Rouen; and Sergeant Kenna of the headquarters troop was slightly wounded.⁶

Upon arrival in the Huppy area the 33rd Division became part of the IIInd American Army Corps and, by virtue of its location, passed under the jurisdiction of the Fourth British Army (General Sir Henry Rawlinson). A course of intensive training was immediately inaugurated,⁷ but it was not until June 26 that the whole division less the artillery brigade was once more united.⁸

Decoration Day, May 30, was memorable for the visit paid to the Division Commander at the Chateau Carnett, at Huppy, by Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, accompanied by his Aide-de-Camp and by Major Robert Bacon, former ambassador to France and secretary of state. The British Commander-in-Chief was received with full honors.⁹

On June 9, 1918, the 33rd Division moved in two

marches to the Eu area, where it succeeded the 35th American Division¹⁰ (Major General William M. Wright), which had then started for the Toul sector. There was some difficulty in disposing of the American equipment and in getting for the troops the necessary British equipment, due to the decided shortage, but eventually this matter was adjusted to the satisfaction of all concerned.¹¹ By June 12, the "Program of Training (first phase)" prescribed by General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, was in full operation.¹² This training, effected with the assistance and advice of the 30th British Division under Major General Williams, was of the most intensive sort, comprising problems ranging from the battalion to the division, and proved extremely beneficial.¹³ A number of officers and enlisted men were also ordered away to various schools, some in France, others in England;¹⁴ indeed, with the exception of the Chief of Staff, almost all the heads of the departments of the Division Staff were sent to school and were replaced by substitutes.¹⁵

In compliance with orders from the XIXth Corps, British Expeditionary Forces, the 108th Engineers were sent forward on June 13, 1918, to the Bois de Querrieu to work, under the supervision of the Chief Engineer of the Fourth British Army, on the intrenchments of the "Army Line" to Poulainville in the vicinity of Amiens.¹⁶ At this point the Germans were fully expected to make a mighty effort to break through in their endeavor to reach the English Channel.

On June 20-21,¹⁷ pursuant to orders from the IInd Corps, American Expeditionary Forces, and the XIXth Corps, British Expeditionary Forces, the 33rd Division moved by bus and marching to the Long, IIIrd Corps, and Martainneville areas, the Division Headquarters being established at Molliens-au-Bois on the afternoon of June 21.¹⁸

Two days later the 66th Infantry Brigade and the 122nd

Machine Gun Battalion occupied the Vaden line for twenty-four hours as a test, but, on June 26,¹⁹ this battalion, together with the machine gun companies of the 131st and 132nd Infantry, was transferred to the Bois de Querrieu for duty with the Australian Corps, and the 66th Brigade began the construction and wiring of the "Daily Mail Line" of intrenchments.²⁰ On June 29 and 30,²¹ certain companies were ordered to commence training under the Australian Corps and certain machine gun units were sent to Pont Remy for target practice. On July 2, the 66th Infantry Brigade held a tactical exercise on the Baisieux-Warloy line and that afternoon the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, General John J. Pershing, paid a visit to the Division Commander²² and made a short speech to the officers of the Division Staff. During the period from June 13 to July 4 a number of officers and men were sent away to various schools.²³ The training was continued in a decidedly intensive fashion and every effort was exerted to bring the command up to the highest standard of military efficiency.²⁴

In the meantime plans had been initiated by the British for an operation which was destined to redound greatly to the credit of the 33rd Division and, through it, to the American army at large. General Sir Henry Rawlinson, commanding the Fourth British Army, had asked permission of the Commanding General of the IIInd American Corps to utilize certain units of the 33rd Division in an attack which he contemplated making, and his request was granted.²⁵ After being filled up to maximum strength, two companies (C and E, 131st Infantry) were accordingly sent to report to the general commanding the 11th Australian Brigade, and two companies (A and G, 132nd Infantry) to the commander of the 4th Australian Brigade, both of the Australian Corps under Lieutenant General Sir John Monash. Reaching their desti-

nations on the night of June 29–30, these four companies were given a rehearsal with the tanks on June 30 and July 1. On July 2 they were taken into the front trenches and, after a reconnaissance, moved to their proper sectors; Companies C and E, 131st Infantry, were assigned to the 42nd and 43rd Battalions (11th Australian Brigade) and Companies A and G, 132nd Infantry, to the 13th and 15th Battalions (4th Australian Brigade). One platoon was distributed to each of the four companies of these battalions²⁶ and, following the procedure adopted by the Australians, about forty men were taken out of each company, in order to form a nucleus for a new organization in case the remainder of the company were wiped out. On June 30, six companies of the 131st Infantry, constituting the rest of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of that regiment were sent under their majors to the 4th and 11th Australian Brigades respectively, but were suddenly withdrawn on the evening of July 2 as a result of a request from General Read to General Sir Henry Rawlinson. On the afternoon of July 3, the latter received instructions from the British Commander-in-Chief to withdraw all American troops from this attack but, inasmuch as the four companies of the 131st and 132nd Infantry were already in position, he replied that it was impossible to withdraw them without abandoning the entire operation.²⁷

The operation proposed had for its object the capture of the ground a few miles east of Amiens and about a mile south of the Somme, on which were situated the town of Hamel, the Bois de Hamel, and the Bois de Vaire south of it, a formidable position, which commanded the Australian trenches in this sector. The enemy's system, some seven hundred yards from the British lines near the Somme, ran southwest through the Notamel Wood and the high ground to a salient known as the "Pear Trench," about two hundred and

fifty yards from the British lines, and thence along the western edge of the Vaire Wood. In the rear of this system the enemy was known to have strong garrisons in deep dugouts at Hamel.²⁸

July 4 was the date selected for the attack which was to be made by the 4th Australian Division and by the Americans. The general plan was for the 4th Australian Brigade to capture the Vaire and Hamel Woods and to consolidate on the spur east of them, while the 6th Brigade on the right and the 11th Brigade²⁹ on the left were to carry and to consolidate the positions on either flank as far as the objective designated.³⁰ Beginning on the north the 42nd Battalion was formed on the left and the 43rd on the right, followed by the 44th, while the 41st constituted the reserve of the 11th Australian Brigade, its sphere of action being bounded on the right by a line south of Hamel. On its right was the 4th Australian Brigade, with the 15th, 16th, and 13th Battalions in the front line and the 14th in reserve. The mission of the 15th Battalion was to attack north of the Hamel and Vaire Woods, which were to be dealt with by the 16th, while the 13th attacked south of the Vaire Wood. Its right was covered by the 6th Australian Brigade. The attack was to be made in three waves, supported by a large number of tanks and protected by a lifting barrage. This was to be reënforced by trench mortars and machine guns, while 161 guns of the Australian Corps devoted themselves to counterbattery work, and the IIIrd Corps on the north and the French Corps on the south coöperated with their heavy artillery.³¹

At 3:10 A.M. on July 4, the harassing fire, which had been in operation for eight minutes, changed to a barrage and lifted for one hundred yards with the launching of the attack. On the extreme left the 42nd Battalion met with slight resistance until it reached the first objective, about

one thousand yards from the jumping-off line. South of it the 43rd Battalion, although subjected to some machine-gun fire, successfully attained the western edge of Hamel, where considerable opposition was encountered from the enemy in dug-outs, but these were quickly mopped up. On its right the 6th Brigade found the German wire only partially destroyed, encountered stiffer resistance and heavier machine-gun fire, and suffered a number of casualties from defective barrage.³² The enemy in the Pear Trench fought with grim resolution against the 15th Battalion and south of it the Vaire Trench temporarily arrested the advance of the 16th Battalion, both being additionally subjected to a heavy enfilade fire of machine guns. Spirited rushes, coupled with vigorous use of the bayonet and bombs, resulted in the capture of these two positions and in the surrender of a large number of Germans. The troops then pushed on to the first objective, where the entire attacking force made a halt of ten minutes under cover of a heavy smoke screen, the lines reformed, the tanks overtook the infantry and, in the sector of the 11th Brigade, the 44th Battalion leapfrogged into position ahead of the 43rd.

At 4:10 A. M. the advance was resumed but no determined resistance was offered by the enemy, although some casualties were suffered until the machine guns at Hamel and in the Hamel Wood were put out of action. At 5 A. M. the final objective was reached and at this point the enemy, in large numbers and from strong positions, made a determined stand. Assisted by the tanks, assaults were promptly launched against him, the strong points crushed, and his trenches thoroughly mopped up. The infantry then began to dig in, completing this operation about 7 A.M. but not without loss, inasmuch as the cessation of the Australian barrage in the rear of his trenches at 5:30 A. M. was the signal for the resumption of activity on the part of snipers, machine guns,

and artillery, which maintained a lively fire throughout the day. The morning was devoted to consolidating the positions gained and during the afternoon some of the enemy's posts were rushed. At dusk the Germans retaliated by attacking the 44th Battalion, but a counterattack, in which Company G, 132nd Infantry, participated, repulsed him with a loss of about fifty prisoners.³³

The aeroplanes on both sides were extremely active during the main engagement, dropping bombs and using machine guns against the positions of their adversaries. The Australian aeroplanes also brought up ammunition and wire, dropping them by means of parachutes. Upon the cessation of the protective barrage at 5:30 A. M., the Australian aeroplanes flew over in large formations and retained command of the air until noon, when thirty-five enemy planes appeared to dispute their supremacy. Two of the Australian aircraft were downed and that night the Germans bombed the Allied positions unmercifully.³⁴

In the action at Hamel,³⁵ three Australian brigades and one thousand American troops were employed. Every objective was attained and the capture of these strong German positions rid the Australian lines of the menace and annoyance to which they had long been subjected. Forty-one German officers and 1,431 men were made prisoners, and *matériel* was captured amounting to 171 machine guns, 26 trench mortars, and two 77-millimeter pieces. The Australian casualties were less than eight hundred,³⁶ while the American losses were confined to 24 enlisted men killed, 8 officers and 123 men wounded, and 21 men missing.³⁷

The action at Hamel, while of minor importance from a military standpoint, exercised an incalculable influence.³⁸ Amiens was generally considered at that time to be the danger spot on the entire western front. All signs indicated

that the great German drive, which was expected at almost any moment, would be aimed at England by way of Amiens and the valley of the Somme to the Channel. It has since been discovered that such was the German plan at that time. The action at Hamel took place on the Fourth of July, a date particularly full of significance to Americans. It was the first time that American troops had coöperated with troops of the British Empire in a battle of any magnitude, and it demonstrated to the British and French that in all the American troops—National Guard and National Army as well as Regulars—they possessed allies upon whom they could depend in any military operation, no matter how difficult.³⁹

That very day the Division Commander received from General Sir Henry Rawlinson the following telegram:

July 4, 1918.

33RD AMERICAN DIVISION.

I have much pleasure in forwarding the following message just received from the Commander-in-Chief, Begins: "Will you please to convey to Lt. Gen. Sir J. Monash and all ranks under his command including the tanks and the detachment of the 33rd American Division my warm congratulations on the success which attended the operation carried out this morning and on the skill and gallantry with which it was conducted.

DOUGLAS HAIG."

From General RAWLINSON.

On the following day the Commander of the Fourth British Army telegraphed:

GENERAL BELL, 33rd Illinois Division.

July 5, 1918.

Am anxious to express to you, General Bell, and to all ranks of the 33rd (Illinois) Division, my warm thanks for the gallant part taken by portions of your division in the attack at Hamel and Vaire Wood on Independence Day. I hear nothing but praise of the manner in which your units fought the enemy and my only regret is that I was not permitted to

employ a larger portion of your fine division. Perhaps later on there may be another opportunity.

General RAWLINSON.

That same day came the following letter :

AUSTRALIAN CORPS.

CORPS HEADQUARTERS,
5th July, 1918.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I desire to take the opportunity of tendering to you, as their immediate Commander, my earnest thanks for the assistance and services of the four Companies of Infantry who participated in yesterday's brilliant operations.

The dash, gallantry and efficiency of these American Troops left nothing to be desired, and my Australian Soldiers speak in the very highest terms in praise of them. That Soldiers of the United States and of Australia should have been associated for the first time in such close co-operation on the battlefield, is an historic [event] of such significance that it will live forever in the annals of our respective Nations.

Yours very sincerely,

JOHN MONASH,
Lieut.-General,
Commanding Australian Corps.

MAJOR-GENERAL BELL,

Commdg. 33rd American Division.⁴⁰

On July 5, 1918, the 129th Infantry was reviewed by the Premier of Great Britain, the Right Honorable David Lloyd-George,⁴¹ and on the following day the companies of the 131st and 132nd Infantry were relieved in the trenches and sent back to their respective organizations.⁴² The next four weeks were comparatively devoid of notable events except for the inspection made on July 22 and 23 by the IIInd American Corps for the purpose of determining whether the 33rd Division was fit for active service.⁴³ Nevertheless, during the entire period from July 13 to August 9 there was no cessation in the intensive training given to officers and men alike, and there were constant inspections and frequent shiftings of the

various units with the object of insuring to each one the maximum amount of instruction of every sort possible under the circumstances.⁴⁴ Every organization was given at least one tour of duty in the front lines; reliefs were effected; complete systems of defense were constructed; constant target practice was made obligatory; schools of every kind were instituted or attended; and no stone was left unturned to learn everything in military matters which could be taught by the British instructors.⁴⁵

Allusion has already been made to the German drive to the English Channel⁴⁶ which was expected at any moment to take place through Amiens and the valley of the Somme. The Germans instead of striking at Amiens drove for Paris. The Allies, after stopping them, counterattacked and about the middle of August the counterattack gradually spread north toward the British positions, with the result that August 9, 1918, proved another memorable day in the history of the 33rd Division.

About fifteen miles east and slightly north of Amiens, the Somme, always tortuous in this region, makes a succession of sharp bends. North of the river and in one of these U-shaped bends lies the village of Chipilly on a ridge bearing the same name. Northwest of this village and resembling an irregular letter "G" is the Malard Wood, the base of which touches the edge of the Somme and terminates north of Chipilly. Directly north of Chipilly Ridge is Gressaire Wood, roughly forming a right angle and terminating at the road from Corbie to Bray, its axis lying in a northeastwardly direction. Chipilly Ridge and Gressaire Wood, both of which had been strongly fortified, formed a position which completely dominated the British trenches in that sector and rendered impossible the passage of the Somme or any advance in that vicinity so long as they were held by the enemy. The

position had been taken, but all attempts to hold it had proved abortive. After the attack at Hamel on July 4, the British line south of the Somme had been advanced to a point directly opposite Chipilly, but the continuous enfilade fire from that ridge had made the line well-nigh untenable and its withdrawal was consequently under consideration. The British commanders determined, however, to take the bull by the horns and to make a final effort to secure Chipilly Ridge and Gressaire Wood, which constituted the key to the entire sector.

Orders were therefore issued on August 8, 1918, placing the 131st Infantry (Colonel Joseph B. Sanborn) under the 58th British Division (Major General Frank Ramsay) in the reserve of the IIIrd British Corps and directing its movement to Heilly, where the Headquarters of the 18th British Division were located, and Franvillers. These positions were reached that same evening, but at ten o'clock instructions were received by the regimental commander to move at once to an assembly point on the Bray-Corbie road about three thousand yards south of Heilly, facing east across that road and immediately west of the Cobar Trench, in readiness to attack next morning at one o'clock. Since the troops had been marching the greater part of the night and were without supports, and as the terrain had never been reconnoitred and no provisions had been made for supplies, the general commanding the 58th British Division decided to postpone the attack in that direction. The 131st Infantry was sent forward through Vaux-sur-Somme to a position in readiness in the valleys between that town and Saily-le-Sec. At the same time orders were dispatched to the regimental machine gun company at Franvillers to move to Vaux and there to await orders.

On the morning of August 9, 1918, the troops arrived in

the valley of the Somme in a decidedly exhausted condition, the 3rd Battalion having covered fully twenty miles. Moreover, they were without water and rations, since some of the transport had been unable to accompany them and, as a matter of fact, did not overtake them until later in the day.

The British plan contemplated an assault at 5 P.M. starting from a jumping-off line extending from a point nine hundred yards northwest of the intersection of the Bray-Corbie and Morlancourt-Chipilly roads southeast to the point where the road running northeast from Chipilly terminates at the edge of the ridge. The assault was to be made by the 10th London Battalion (175th British Brigade) on the right, the 131st Infantry in the centre and the 175th Brigade—less the 10th London Battalion but with one battalion of the 174th Brigade attached—⁴⁷on the left. At 1:30 P.M. Colonel Sanborn was informed of this plan and was ordered to reconnoitre in the direction of the Gressaire Wood, but the lieutenant colonel and the battalion commanders who were sent forward accompanied by scouts soon returned with the report that such a reconnaissance could not be effected, inasmuch as the enemy was in occupation of the Malard Wood and the region beyond it. The 131st Infantry was in march formation on the road west of Saily-le-Sec when, at 3:30 P.M., the Commanding General of the 58th Division came in person to deliver the order of attack to the regimental commander. When it was realized, however, that the troops could not possibly reach the jumping-off line at five o'clock, the zero hour was postponed to 5:30 P. M. As not a moment was to be lost, the regimental commander, in spite of having had no rest whatsoever for twenty-four hours and notwithstanding his sixty-two years, immediately started at a run for the head of his column, set it in motion, and preceded it to the jumping-off line. Under full packs and a hot sun the troops covered

approximately four miles at a rapid gait and, upon reaching the position designated, were formed with the 1st Battalion on the right, the 2nd on the left, and the 3rd in reserve on the Sailly-Laurette-Chipilly road at the entrance to the ravine between Les Célestins and the Malard Wood.

The attack of the 131st Infantry, which was covered by a line of skirmishers, was led by Colonel Sanborn in person through the heaviest sort of enemy barrage, but it was not until it had been thoroughly launched and after he had been knocked down by the concussion of a shell that he returned to the rear, collected runners from the reserve battalion, and established his P. C. in a shell hole in the ravine mentioned above. The onslaught of the Americans was irresistible. The Germans were thrown into a panic and their retreat was so precipitate that their battalion commander abandoned in his dugout orders, maps, telephone switchboard—everything. Even the machine-gun nests were powerless to arrest the advance and, at 8 P.M., the 2nd Battalion reported that it had reached its objective. Its left flank remained uncovered for the reason that the 175th British Brigade had been unable to keep pace with it and did not get up until the following day.

On the right, however, greater resistance was encountered, and the 1st Battalion and the 10th London Battalion were held up by heavy machine-gun fire from the woods northwest of Chipilly Ridge. The commander of the latter unit reported this fact and asked for assistance, whereupon a company from the 3rd Battalion was sent forward and the enemy was driven out of the woods.

The presence of the enemy and a number of machine guns at Chipilly and on that ridge rendered further advance of that part of the line out of the question, but, after dark, a British detachment mopped up the town, capturing the German commander and his machine guns along the ridge, as well as some

three hundred prisoners. At 9:20 P. M. the commander of the 1st Battalion reported that his line extended from near the southwestern corner of Gressaire Wood east to the northern end of Chipilly Ridge and thence south along the Somme to the road leading to Chipilly, and that the troops had dug in. The 2nd Battalion was therefore left that night with both flanks unprotected but by 6 A. M. on August 10 it was joined by the 1st Battalion plus one company, and both units took position on the objective. This fact was reported to the commanding general, 58th Brigade, and the remainder of the 3rd Battalion was sent forward to reënforce the line, which later in the day assumed position along the Corbie-Bray road from the intersection of the Morlancourt-Étinehem road on the west to the "Double Telegraph Post" on the east. In spite of heavy artillery and machine-gun fire and much gas the position was held and consolidated, and at 9 P. M. the 13th Australian Brigade and one machine gun company passed through the American lines and took up positions opposite Bray-sur-Somme and the bend of the river. During the night the 131st Infantry changed front and occupied a line extending from the crossroads at the eastern edge of the woods north of the Bray-Corbie road south to the Somme and thence along the right bank to a point south of the Chipilly Ridge in touch with the troops on the left bank.

This position was held until August 14, the enemy being driven out of Étinehem and the pocket south of that village on the night of August 11-12. On August 14 orders were received to occupy a new line west of Bray-sur-Somme, and the movement was completed on the next day at 6 A.M. The 1st Battalion was placed in the front line, the 3rd in support, and the 2nd in reserve. The attack on August 9 was made without any preparation, being extemporized under dire emergency. The heights, of which Chipilly Ridge and Gres-

saire Wood formed part, completely dominated the low ground south of the Somme where the most advanced British lines were situated, while their left flank suffered under a continuous enfilade fire which was rapidly making them untenable. Possession of those heights had therefore become a necessity; hence the haste displayed. The operation of the 131st Infantry was crowned with success; the enemy was dislodged from these heights and driven out of Gressaire Wood with a loss of some seven hundred prisoners, seven 5.9 howitzers, thirteen 4.2 guns, two 10-inch guns, two 75-millimeter French pieces, six guns of various other calibres, two minenwerfers, about one hundred machine guns, more than fifty-nine rifles, an aeroplane in perfect condition, and a large amount of other *matériel*. Not only was the British objective attained, but a portion of the Corbie-Bray road beyond was seized. These results were achieved with a loss of only 385 American officers and men, but the next six days—August 11-16, inclusive—during which the 131st Infantry was subjected to incessant fire and gas, were attended by casualties to the number of 370.⁴⁸

The action at Gressaire Wood⁴⁹ is particularly notable in that it initiated the penetration of the German line which developed into the final British advance. The British commanders, with characteristic promptness, expressed their appreciation of the brilliant achievement. On August 10 Lieutenant General Sir H. K. Butler, commanding the IIIrd British Corps sent the Division Commander the following telegram:

Hearty congratulations on successful attack carried out by 131st Infantry Regiment yesterday. Added 33rd Division 66th American Brigade, 131st Infantry Regiment.

On the same day the British Division Commander sent this letter:

HEADQUARTERS
58TH DIVISION

x.viii.xviii.

DEAR GENERAL BELL:

I wish to express to you my appreciation of the great assistance afforded to my Division by your 131 Regiment in the attack on Gressaire Wood yesterday afternoon, and my admiration for the way it carried out a very difficult manoeuvre to get into the Battle Line and for the stout way in which it overcame all resistance.

I enclose a letter of thanks which I would be glad if you would forward to the officer commanding the regiment.

Yours sincerely,

FRANK RAMSAY.

The letter in question read as follows:

HEADQUARTERS
58TH DIVISION

x.vii.xviii.

DEAR COLONEL SANBORN:

I have to thank you for the very great assistance which your regiment afforded in its attack on Gressaire Wood yesterday afternoon.

You had a very difficult task to perform and the way in which your battalions manoeuvred and took the objectives allotted to them reflects the greatest credit on all ranks.

I have to thank you personally on the way in which you led your Regiment on to its battle alignment, and which very materially assisted in the success of the operation.

Yours sincerely,

FRANK RAMSAY.⁵⁰

During the period from August 8 to 23, 1918, the 33rd Division, frequently bombed and shelled by the enemy,⁵¹ continued its very intensive training under the Program of Training prescribed by the General Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces.⁵² The training circulars issued in conformity therewith,⁵³ were decidedly thorough, and no effort was spared to bring the troops up to the highest possible standard of discipline and efficiency. Much attention was paid to target

practice, every unit was given a considerable period in the trenches, and a large number of officers and men were sent away to school.⁵⁴ Great stress was also laid upon the importance of taking the utmost care of all property and the admirable British system of feeding and grooming horses was put into operation. On August 15 the 132nd Infantry relieved the 12th Australian Brigade in the reserve trenches, and on the following day both the 65th and 66th Brigades had units occupying the front line positions, the latter relieving the front line and assembling in the Camon and Hamel areas on August 19.⁵⁵

This period was particularly notable for an event unique in the history of an American division. On August 12, about eleven o'clock in the morning, George V, king of England, arrived at the Headquarters of the 33rd Division, at the Chateau of Molliens-au-Bois, where he was received with full honors. Awaiting him were General Pershing, the commander-in-chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, and General Tasker H. Bliss, who had arrived the day before. On the former the King bestowed the Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath, and the latter he made a Commander of the Order of St. Michael and St. George. The King, accompanied by a group of officers, among whom were General Sir Henry Rawlinson, commanding the Fourth British Army, then proceeded to the spot near the chateau, where some three hundred men selected from every unit in the 33rd Division were drawn up in a hollow square, and decorated twelve officers and enlisted men for the gallantry which they had displayed in the action at Hamel on July 4. To some were given the Military Cross, to others the Distinguished Conduct Medal or the Military Medal, the King personally pinning the decoration on the breast of each recipient and congratulating him upon his bravery. Seven others had been singled out for the

same honor but their wounds precluded their leaving the hospital. At 11:30 A. M. the ceremony terminated and the King took his departure.⁵⁶

On August 21,⁵⁷ orders were issued for the transfer of the 33rd Division by rail to the First American Army in the Toul sector,⁵⁸ and preparations were begun accordingly, all British rifles, bayonets, Vickers, Maxim and Lewis guns being turned in and Springfield rifles being issued to the men.⁵⁹ The experience and training received under the British proved to be of incalculable value, as was realized at the time and to a still greater degree later. The severance of the cordial relations which had characterized the stay of the 33rd Division was genuinely regretted on both sides and found expression in the following letters from General Sir Henry Rawlinson, commanding the Fourth British Army, and General Godley:

HQ. FOURTH ARMY,
21st August, 1918.

33RD ILLINOIS DIVISION.

FOURTH ARMY No. G. S. 2/13.

On the departure of the 33rd Division from the Fourth Army, I desire officially to record my admiration of the energy, keenness and soldierly qualities exhibited by all ranks during their period of training under my orders. The marked advance which has been made and the satisfactory standard of fighting efficiency that has been reached reflects high credit on all concerned, and guarantee that the Division will render brilliant service to the Allied cause wherever it may be employed as a fighting Division in face of the enemy.

My regret is that it will not have further opportunity for offensive action whilst in the Fourth British Army, but portions of the Division have already acquitted themselves most gallantly, and I desire to tender my warm thanks to those units engaged for their brilliant successes in the Hamel offensive and at Gressaire Wood.

I greatly regret the departure of the Division and offer

to General Bell and all ranks under his command the best of good fortune in the strenuous times which lie before them.

H. RAWLINSON.

General Godley's letter to General Bell was equally complimentary. It read thus:

III CORPS C. O. 1565
20th August, 1918.

MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE BELL, JR.,
Commanding 33rd American Division.

On the departure of your Division from this Corps, I write to ask you to convey to all ranks under your command our thanks and appreciation of the excellent work that the Division has done during its period of attachment to the III Corps.

The 131st Regiment of the 66th Brigade, carried out the attack on the 9th August in a manner which reflected great credit, not only on its gallantry, but on its previous training; and the work done by the whole of your Division during its periods of attachment and of holding the line has been of high order.⁶⁰

All ranks of the III British Corps wish the 33rd Division the best of luck in the future, and in watching its future victorious career will always remember with great pleasure the time which they have spent together with their American comrades in arms.

ALEX GODLEY,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding III Corps.⁶¹

The next to the last day of the stay in the British area, August 22, was notable for the visit of the Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt, the assistant secretary of the navy, who arrived at the Headquarters of the 33rd Division at one o'clock that afternoon, accompanied by his Staff, and lunched with the Division Commander, his personal Staff and the brigade commanders at the Chateau of Molliens-au-Bois. General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Lieutenant General Sir John Monash, and Lieutenant General Godley were expected but were prevented from coming by the renewed violence with

which the battle had broken out that morning. After lunch Mr. Roosevelt proceeded to the Molliens Wood, where the 65th Infantry Brigade was drawn up in mass formation. In a stirring speech he thanked the troops of the 33rd Division, on behalf of the government, for the lustre which they had shed upon American arms, told them that on all sides he had heard of their prowess, and that he had been given the story of their achievements at Hamel by the King of England himself.⁶²

On the night of August 23-24, 1918, the troops of the 33rd Division⁶³ began entraining at Vignacourt, St. Roch, and Longueau for their journey by rail from the British area to that of the First American Army in the Toul sector. On August 25 the new Division Headquarters were opened in the chateau at Tronville-en-Barrois, and at four o'clock next morning the last of the units detrained and occupied billets in the vicinity.⁶⁴ That same day instructions were issued prescribing that the training of the division for the ten days beginning on August 28 would be based upon the "Memorandum for Corps and Division Commanders," General Headquarters, dated August 5, 1918, supplemented by Training Circular No. 159, 33rd Division, August 15, and by certain requirements contained in Training Circular No. 161.⁶⁵ The German scheme of defense and a memorandum on the "Secrecy of Troop Movements" were published on August 29,⁶⁶ a reconnaissance was made on the next day with a view to selecting a proper terrain for a division manoeuvre, and on August 31 the front line was inspected by the operations section.⁶⁷ That night certain modifications of position were effected,⁶⁸ and on September 1 directions were published relative to "Combat Instructions" and to the concealment of troops against observation by hostile aeroplanes.⁶⁹ Next day the 65th Infantry Brigade performed a tactical exercise in


advance and passage of lines, and the 108th Supply Train, which had been detached since its arrival in France on May 30, rejoined the division.⁷⁰ The 58th Field Artillery Brigade, which had been separated from the division since its departure from Camp Logan, had undergone a course of instruction at Ornans, and had been attached to the 89th and 1st Divisions in succession.⁷¹ During the operations in Picardy the British had supplied the necessary artillery but, as the 33rd Division was about to undertake active operations as a whole, the 52nd Artillery Brigade under Brigadier General George Albert Wingate of the 27th Division was attached to the command; and, on September 3, its first regiment arrived in the Tronville area. Next day the 33rd Division engaged in a terrain exercise under the supervision of the Vth American Corps.⁷² On September 5, orders were received from the First American Army placing the 33rd Division "at the disposal of the II French Army for tactical control, administration and supply," directing it to proceed to the "area occupied by the II French Army" and prescribing the movement of one brigade of infantry on the night of September 5-6.⁷³ Later in the day orders were received from the II French Army placing the division at the disposal of the 17th French Corps and directing its movement to the Blercourt area, southwest of Verdun, beginning on the night of September 5-6;⁷⁴ and the necessary instructions were issued in consequence.⁷⁵

III. OCCUPATION OF THE SECTOR AT VERDUN AND BEGINNING OF THE MEUSE- ARGONNE BATTLE

The movement from the area of the First American Army to the Verdun sector began on the night of September 5-6. The foot troops traveled by bus and the other troops marched, staging at the Issoncourt area. The operation, headed by the 65th Infantry Brigade, terminated on September 8.¹ In the meantime the new division P. C. had opened at Blercourt at 4 P.M. on September 7, and that evening orders were received from the 17th French Army Corps for the relief of the right regiment of the 157th French Division in the sector of Hill 304 and of the units of the 120th French Division in the sector comprising the Mort Homme and Cumières.² The necessary instructions were issued at once,³ and the relief of all French units in those sectors was effected during the nights of September 7, 8, and 9,⁴ the command passing on September 10 at 8 A.M.⁵ to the 33rd Division, the headquarters of which were transferred that morning from Blercourt to Fromeréville.⁶ On the night of September 11-12 the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade moved into the Bois des Sartelles,⁷ the firing batteries, which had been hurried into position beforehand, and all the machine guns of the division participating at 1 A.M. on September 12 in the demonstration fire which opened along part of the Allied front as a diversion to cover the American attack at St. Mihiel.⁸ During the nights of September 13-14⁹ and 15-16 the 79th American Division on the west of the 33rd Division relieved



CONSENGVOYE CAUSEWAY



FORGES CREEK BOTTOM

that part of the 157th French Division which had not been relieved by the 33rd¹⁰ on the nights of September 7, 8, and 9.¹¹ Meanwhile, on September 14 the 33rd and 79th Divisions had passed from the 17th French Corps to the IIIrd American Corps under Major General Robert L. Bullard,¹² an inspection had been made of the sector of the right (66th) Brigade,¹³ and orders had been issued for the opening of the 33rd Division Infantry School on September 19 at the Bois de Nixéville (Sud).¹⁴ September 15, 16, and 17 were characterized by modifications in the position of certain units,¹⁵ by an inspection of the sector occupied by the 65th Brigade,¹⁶ and by the measures taken to guard against hostile aerial observation and gas attacks, to better the existing liaison, to familiarize the officers and men with the "Combat Instructions, Confidential, No. 1348," issued by General Headquarters, and to improve the handling of the platoons.¹⁷

The French plan of defense of the Verdun sector required eight 3-inch guns to be placed east of the Meuse in the territory occupied by the 18th French Division under General Andlauer; but, as it was deemed advisable to withdraw them, the necessary arrangements were made by the IIIrd Corps, and these two batteries of the 105th Field Artillery returned to the Bois des Sartelles during the night of September 16-17.¹⁸ By that date the area not only of the First Army but also that of the IIIrd Corps had become crowded with troops which were being brought up in expectation of a general attack, and the IIIrd Corps ordered that the location of the 33rd Division Infantry School at the Bois de Nixéville (Sud) be changed. However, after a thorough reconnaissance of the division area disclosed that there existed no other place fit for this school, the IIIrd Corps consented, on September 18, that it should remain at the location announced on September 14.¹⁹ On September 19 instructions were issued in respect to

the situation reports to be rendered each day and the necessity for concealment against enemy aerial observation was reiterated.²⁰ On the night of September 20–21 three companies of the 132nd Infantry in the front trenches were replaced by twelve.²¹ Since the plan of the First Army for the general offensive contemplated the introduction of the 4th and 80th Divisions between the 33rd and the 79th, orders were issued on September 21 for the relief of two battalions of the 33rd Division by one from the 4th and another from the 80th, both of which were to pass temporarily under the command of the 33rd Division, and for certain rectifications of position in consequence, all of which was to be effected during the night of September 21–22.²² On September 23 the plan of liaison to accompany the field order for the attack was issued, followed next day by the field order itself and the requisite annexes.²³ The necessary liaison agents were also sent to the adjoining divisions and brigades.²⁴ On September 25 two addenda to the field order and one addendum to the plan of liaison were issued;²⁵ and that afternoon the P. C.s of the 33rd Division and of the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade were moved from Fromeréville to "P. C. la Hutte,"²⁶ a dugout in the Bois Bourrus, in readiness for the attack next morning.²⁷

During this period from September 6 to 25, inclusive, a number of officers and enlisted men were sent away to various schools,²⁸ but the maximum amount of instruction was given to the units²⁹ consistent with the occupation of a so-called "quiet sector," which, however, became more animated after the demonstration fire on the early morning of September 12.³⁰ No effort was spared to develop among the officers and men the highest *esprit de corps* and that spirit of relentless initiative which is invaluable in battle. Thorough instruction in the use of every available weapon, especially the bayonet,

was continued unceasingly and the utmost stress was laid upon the absolute necessity for every precaution against hostile aerial observation and gas attacks. The highest standard of discipline and implicit obedience not only to the spirit but to the very letter of orders was exacted. These requirements, which were characteristic of the training at Camp Logan and with the British, were maintained undiminished in the Verdun sector,³¹ both officers and men responding admirably.

On the other hand, considerable difficulty was experienced in the control of traffic. During the week preceding the attack on September 26, there poured through the bottle-neck at Fromeréville an endless stream of artillery, transportation, vehicles, troops of every sort, and officers on reconnaissance—all intent upon getting to the front as quickly as possible, regardless of traffic regulations and the insistence of higher authority upon the concealment of troop movements.³² It was only by the most drastic measures that offenders were controlled within the area of the 33rd Division and that all movements by convoys or troops were restricted to the hours of darkness between 8:30 P.M. and 6 A.M. Luckily, most of the week in question was marked by bad weather—always cloudy and often rainy—so that aerial observation was difficult, if not impossible. Another fortunate factor was the comparative supineness of the enemy artillery, which confined its operations largely to harassing fire, particularly against the roads and the forward areas which for several days prior to the battle were packed with troops and *matériel*.

The French counterstroke, begun in the Château-Thierry sector on July 18, 1918, developed during the next two months into a general offensive by the Allies along almost the entire western front. It was characterized by notable successes, ground was gained nearly everywhere, and a distinct weakening of the German morale was apparent. At Château-

Thierry and on the British front American troops participated, under the orders of the French or British, in the active operations which wrested from the enemy many of his strongest positions. On September 12 American troops began a drive which resulted in the capture of the St. Mihiel salient. This salient had defied all attacks for four years, and its capture freed the important railway from Bar-le-Duc through Commercy and Toul to Nancy, which had previously been subjected to constant shelling and bombing. The success thus achieved was promptly followed up by incessant blows elsewhere on the western front, and the enemy was robbed of all chance of resuming the offensive.

One of the most important of these operations occurred just a fortnight after the commencement of the St. Mihiel drive and was made by the joint action of the Second French Army west of the Argonne Forest and of the First American Army between the Argonne and the river Meuse. The eventual objectives of this concerted offensive were Sedan and Mézières, two important railway centres through which most of the supplies were forwarded to the German forces within the quadrilateral formed by those two points and Laon, Rheims, and Verdun. The seizure of Sedan and Mézières had a threefold object: first, the capture or destruction of the German armies within that quadrilateral; second, the severance of the principal belt railway of the enemy, which ran, more or less parallel to his front, from the Vosges to Lille and which served as his main line of supply; and third, the threat which such a success would necessarily make against the German positions on the Meuse, the last strong line of defense west of the Rhine. Once in possession of the west bank of the Meuse from St. Mihiel to Mézières, the Allies would be in a decidedly favorable position from which to attack the heights of the upper Meuse. Such an offensive, if

successful, would imperil the enemy's retreat to the Rhine, would force the evacuation of all northern France and southern Belgium and, furthermore, would result in the capture of the important mines of Longuyon and Briey³³ and lead, if so desired, to the investing of Metz.

The First American Army, under the command of General Pershing, was at that time composed of the Ist, IIIrd, IVth, and Vth American Corps, the 17th French Army Corps, and the 2nd Colonial Army Corps.³⁴ Its plan was to attack in the direction of Buzancy and Stonne, with the IIIrd Corps (Major General Robert L. Bullard) on the right next to the Meuse, the Vth Corps (Major General George H. Cameron) in the centre, and the Ist Corps (Major General Hunter Liggett) on the left. The right of the IIIrd Corps was to maintain liaison with the 17th French Army Corps (General Claudel) east of the Meuse, while the Ist Corps, the left of which was to penetrate through the eastern half of the Argonne Forest, kept touch with the French Fourth Army (General Mangin) on the west. The reserve of each corps was composed of one division, while three divisions constituted the general reserve of the First American Army.

In conformity with this plan, the mission of the IIIrd Corps was to break through the enemy positions between the Ruisseau de Forges and the Bois de Forêt, to exploit its success by advancing northward from the Bois de Forêt in the direction of Buzancy and Stonne, and at the same time to organize the west bank of the Meuse for defense in proportion as the attack progressed. The attack was to be made with three divisions in the front line, the 33rd Division (Major General George Bell, Jr.) on the east, its right along the left bank of the Meuse, the 80th Division (Major General Adelbert Cronkhite) in the centre and the 4th (Regular) Division (Major General John L. Hines) on the

west. This last division was to maintain liaison with the 79th Division (Major General Joseph E. Kuhn), which formed the right of the Vth Corps, while the 33rd did likewise with the 18th French Division (General Andlauer), which constituted the left of the 17th French Army Corps east of the Meuse. The first objective of the IIIrd Corps was the enemy's second position, the Hagen Stellung Nord which will be described presently,³⁵ and its second objective was the American Army objective, the Volker Stellung, both of which were to be reached during "D day."³⁶

The plan of the 33rd Division, formulated in compliance with that of the IIIrd Corps,³⁷ prescribed an attack against the German positions from the Meuse westward to the Passarelle du Don exclusive—a footbridge leading across the Forges Brook midway between Béthincourt and the Moulin de Raffecourt. The left of the division was directed to make its attack in such a way as to reach as quickly as possible the open terrain north of Drillancourt and east of the village of Gercourt-et-Drillancourt and the Tranchée du Bois Juré, thus assisting the centre of the division in the capture of the Bois de Forges. In a word, the attack was to be made by echelons, the left in advance. At the conclusion of the operation the division was to organize and hold the line extending from the Côte de l'Oie on the south to the outskirts of the town of Dannevoux on the north, its movement of conversion bringing it into position facing northeast and parallel to the Meuse, and it was to clear away any enemy between its front and the river.³⁸ The attack was to be made in one bound by the 66th Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General Paul A. Wolf) in the front line, its regiments side by side, the 132nd Infantry (Colonel Abel Davis) on the right and the 131st Infantry (Colonel Joseph B. Sanborn) on the left. Two battalions of each regiment were to be placed in the front line and one bat-



BEGINNING OF PASSAGE OVER FORGES CREEK



BEGINNING OF PASSAGE OVER FORGES CREEK

talion in support. The mission of the 132nd was to penetrate and capture the Bois de Forges, while the 131st Infantry was to advance over the open ground west of that obstacle, carry the villages of Drillancourt and Gercourt-et-Drillancourt, the Tranchée du Bois Juré and the Tranchée du Bois Rond, mop up the ground between the northern edge of the Bois de Forges and the northern boundary of the division, and finally take position facing the west bank of the Meuse between a point four hundred meters north of the Bois de Forges and the Laiterie de Belhame.

The 66th Infantry Brigade was reënforced by Company A, 1st Gas and Flame Regiment, and its reserve consisted of one battalion, 130th Infantry, stationed near Cumières, one company being detailed to support the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion.

The Divisional Reserve was composed of troops of the 65th Infantry Brigade with headquarters at Béthelainville, namely, the 130th Infantry (Colonel John V. Clinnin), less one battalion; the 123rd Machine Gun Battalion (Major Albert L. Culbertson), less Companies A and B; the 108th Engineers (Colonel Henry A. Allen), less the 2nd Battalion, in the ravine of the Ruisseau de Damon; the 129th Infantry (Colonel Edgar A. Myer), plus Companies A and B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, occupying the sector of the 79th Division and Centres of Resistance 304 and Lorraine; and the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion (Major Mariano B. Southwick) participating in the barrage from Centres of Resistance Loison and Eiffel.³⁹

The attack was to be made under cover of a rolling barrage of artillery and machine guns, supported in addition by counterbattery and neutralization fire against the enemy's guns east of the Meuse by the corps and divisional artillery not engaged in barrage. Nine aeroplanes and a number of

tanks were to coöperate with the infantry. The 1st Battalion, 108th Engineers, was directed to have in readiness all materials necessary to assist the troops in crossing the Forges Brook, and to build a bridge in the vicinity of Forges and roads across the valley as soon as the new position had been occupied.

The enemy troops opposite the 33rd Division at that time were identified as the 115th Division, which contained many inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine. It extended from the Meuse westward to Malancourt, the 40th Regiment on the east, the 136th in the centre, and the 171st on the west. Each regiment consisted of three battalions, one in the front line, one in reserve, and one in the rear area at rest, each battalion being composed of three companies. Along the front were groups of from twenty to thirty men, with sentry squads along the Forges Brook, especially at the points of crossing. The units were far below prescribed strength and the troops were war-weary and discouraged.

The terrain over which the IIIrd Corps was to attack presented many interesting features, as the region north of Verdun is known to be a natural fortress of extraordinary strength and has for centuries played an important rôle in all wars in which France has been engaged. The enemy's position opposite the 33rd Division rested at its western extremity on a line of ridges running northward from Sivry-la-Perche through the Bois de Malancourt to the walled town of Montfaucon. This place was connected with the extensive Bois de Forges by a series of ridges running east to the Meuse and embracing Hills 308, 277, 281, and 272. From these ridges spurs jut to the northeast or southeast, among them being the ridge west of the Bois d'en Dela, that toward Gercourt, and the ridge projecting from Montfaucon.

The soil, as a rule chalky, is solid except where it is

interspersed with patches of clay. Such forests as still exist are difficult to penetrate. The general trend of the wide valleys which alternate between the ridges is toward the Meuse, and their bottoms are of clay and frequently very marshy. The most important of these valleys was that of the Forges Brook which separated the American and German fronts. This brook, averaging about five meters in width east of Béthincourt and two meters west of that town, has two channels in the major part of its course, the southern arm being fordable. The approaches to the stream are marshy but in a dry season present little difficulty; in such weather as that which preceded the attack, however, the Forges Brook constituted a decided obstacle.

The German positions on the front of the 33rd Division were distinctly cut up and therefore presented considerable difficulty to an attack. Organized in depth, they comprised three barrier positions or systems of defense, the southern entitled the Hagen Stellung, the second the Volker Stellung, and the northern the Kriemhild Stellung. The first, which ran from the wood southwest and west of Malancourt to the Bois de Forges, skirting the southern and southeastern edge to the Meuse, consisted of two positions, the Hagen Stellung Sud and the Hagen Stellung Nord, each of two trenches. When the Germans rearranged their defense at Verdun on August 15, 1917, the former was replaced by a series of advanced posts jutting to the south line bastions and provided with machine-gun emplacements and shelters for small groups of men. This line served as a covering zone, while the real line of resistance was the Hagen Stellung Nord, extending from the Bois de Véry along the southern edge of the Bois de Montfaucon, where it bent to the north past the Bois de Cuisy and thence in a broad bow south of the village of Cuisy to the Bois de Forges, at which point it joined the Hagen Stellung

Sud. Better located than the latter, it was additionally strengthened by a deep ravine west of Béthincourt which it completely dominated. During the preceding six months the enemy had made substantially no improvements in this system except near Hill 281, north of which was a zone of dugouts, and on the eastern edge of the Bois de Montfaucon, although some new observation posts had been constructed along this front. The trenches, protected by a double or treble network of low, concertina wire, were in good condition; but the dugouts—holding fifteen or twenty men and about fifteen feet deep—were not of concrete and the communicating trenches were exposed except where concealed by crests or woods.

Beyond the Hagen Stellung Nord and at distances from it ranging from one and a half to four kilometers was the Volker Stellung, which may be likened to a snake, its head in the Argonne Forest southwest of Montblainville and its tail at Dannevoux. In its first form it began between Baulny and Charpentry on the west, but the head and first third of its length had been recently constructed. These new works joined the old about one kilometer southeast of Épinonville whence this system pursued its serpentine course around the southern and eastern outskirts of Montfaucon, north to the Bois de Septsarges, where it bent toward the east through the opening between the Bois de Sachet and the Bois d'en Dela, and skirted the southern and eastern edges of the Bois Juré to a point midway between Dannevoux and the Meuse. The communicating trenches were not particularly strong but were defiladed by the crest and protected by the Bois de Sachet, d'en Dela, and Juré; the trenches south of these woods, however, were in bad condition and there existed no intermediate defenses between the Hagen and Volker systems.

The third or withdrawal system, known as the Kriemhild Stellung, constituted part of the final line of resistance of the

Hindenburg system. It consisted of two widely separated positions, the southernmost lying three kilometers from the Volker Stellung at the nearest point. The western extremity of this position rested on the Grandpré-Varennes road about three kilometers from the former town, whence it extended through Sommerance, across the Bois de Moncy, south of the Bois de Ognons and, bending to the northeast, terminated about two kilometers from Briulles-sur-Meuse. The second line of the Kriemhild Stellung, situated some six kilometers farther north, ran in a fairly straight line south of the villages of Thénorgues, Sivry-les-Bezancy, Bayonville et Chennery, and Andevanne, and terminated at the river directly opposite Dun-sur-Meuse.

The Kriemhild Stellung was a continuation on the east of the Brunhild Stellung, which it adjoined at Mouron. Begun in October and November, 1917, it was only partly completed; the finished portion was, however, constructed in accordance with the latest German regulation. East of the Meuse, the Kriemhild Stellung was nearer completion and was extremely strong.

During the varying phases of the struggle for Verdun in 1916 and 1917, the Germans established a large number of emplacements for artillery. In 1918 the number actually occupied was small by comparison, but four nests of batteries had been located, their activity being dependent largely upon the unit serving the guns. One of these nests was in the vicinity of Gercourt, north of Hill 281; the second was in the Fond-des-Haupt-Prés, Fond de Tanières, and the Bois de Forges; the third was in the neighborhood of Cuisy on the slopes south of the ravine of Grands-Prés; and the fourth was in the region of the Bois de Cuisy, four batteries being in reserve in the ravine of the Bois de Montfaucon. The guns were of the average calibre, including small and medium

howitzers. Batteries were known to be in the Bois de Forges and in June some ten batteries of 77- and 105-millimeters appeared between Apremont and Montfaucon. Counter-battery work also disclosed a number of large calibre guns of Austrian manufacture.

The entire region north of Verdun is one of extraordinary natural strength. Generally speaking, the terrain consists of a series of high ridges, the ends of which overlap one another alternately in such a way as to afford perfect observation and flanking fire. In the sector embraced in the attack of the IIIrd American Corps the most striking features are the wide and marshy valley of the Ruisseau de Forges, the massive Bois de Forges, and the walled town of Montfaucon, perched on a height which completely dominates miles of the surrounding terrain. The configuration of the ground is such that it was evident that (a) the right or east bank of the Meuse permitted observation well to the rear of the positions south of the Forges Brook; (b) any attack on the west bank and within several kilometers of the river would be exposed to flanking fire by artillery posted on the commanding heights east of the Meuse; and (c) the line of crests, of which Montfaucon was the key, was plainly the first objective in any advance on the left bank of the river.

On September 25, 1918, at 11:30 P.M., all the corps artillery in the First American Army began its preparation fire.⁴⁰ Three hours later—2:30 A.M. on September 26—the army artillery joined in and, under cover of this combined fire, the troops assembled at their appointed places in the front-line trenches. In the 33rd Division everything was in readiness for the attack; and the 108th Engineers, who had prepared 12,000 fascines and had stored them, with planks and other necessary material, in the forward trenches, began the construction of nine passages over the Forges Brook, built the



FORGES-BÉTHINCOURT ROAD, WEST FROM FORGES



ARTILLERY BRIDGE, FORGES CREEK

necessary approaches, and laid the duckboards, tapes, and ropes leading to them. The early part of the night had been very still; but as the moon rose, a heavy ground mist gathered and later the sky became overcast. Protected by covering parties of infantry, the bombardment, and the mist, the engineers succeeded, in spite of the enemy's artillery and machine-gun fire, in getting these bridges in place and ready before the zero hour,⁴¹ while in their rear the infantry successfully performed the difficult work of cutting lanes through the network of wire in front of the American positions.⁴² Farther to the east the 108th Field Signal Battalion completed the laying of a cable across the Meuse, this work having been begun the night before for the purpose of insuring lateral communication with the 18th French Division on the right bank.⁴³

At 5:30 A.M. the divisional artillery joined in the bombardment with preparation fire⁴⁴ and a standing barrage by the 75s which, in the case of the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, was put down along the Forges-Béthincourt road for twenty-five minutes.⁴⁵ Under its protection, supplemented by that of a machine-gun barrage,⁴⁶ covered by a smoke-screen⁴⁷ and concealed by the fog, the attack was launched at the same minute. Side by side the 131st and 132nd Infantry, the former on the west, the latter on the east, advanced into the marshy valley of the Forges Brook, plunged through the morass, crossed the stream at nine different points where passages had been prepared by the engineers, and re-formed on the northern bank, using the Forges-Béthincourt road as a guide. Considering the terrain, the obstacles encountered, and the heavy machine-gun fire from the enemy's positions dominating the valley, this operation was attended with very little loss.⁴⁸ This was undoubtedly due to the tremendous American bombardment, the fog, the remarkable speed with

which the crossing was effected, and to the height of the enemy's fire.⁴⁹ The advance of the 131st Infantry, however, was hampered by the failure of the 319th Infantry (160th Infantry Brigade, 80th Division) to be in its proper position immediately west of the 131st at the zero hour; this circumstance necessitated putting in the support battalion—the 1st, commanded by Captain Carroll M. Gale—to clean up a portion of the sector assigned to the 319th Infantry.⁵⁰

At 6:27 A.M. the rolling barrage commenced⁵¹ and the troops, which had then been re-formed along the Forges-Béthincourt road,⁵² jumped off. Scarcely had the advance begun when an immense amount of enemy wire and heavy fire from well-organized machine-gun nests on the slopes and in the various woods were encountered. All efforts to establish liaison with the 80th Division proved fruitless and, in consequence, the left flank of the regiment remained "in the air" throughout the attack and until long after the objective had been attained.⁵³

Following behind a rolling barrage about eight hundred meters wide,⁵⁴ the 131st Infantry advanced with unusual rapidity, notwithstanding the difficult terrain, the heavy fire from the enemy artillery and machine-gun nests, the smoke from the barrage, and the fog which made it impossible to see farther than a few yards. The trenches of Cervaux, Besace, Billemont, Lenime, and Berny were successfully crossed and mopped up, and a large number of machine-gun nests were reduced.⁵⁵ At the Cervaux Trench, about two hundred meters from the jumping-off line, the 1st Battalion ran athwart the rear waves of the preceding battalions and a mass of wire, was held up for an hour, and became separated from the rest of the regiment. It was not until 8 A.M. that it succeeded in extricating itself; but, once under way, it pushed forward as rapidly as possible, although then fully two miles behind the

other two battalions. It crossed the German trenches without meeting resistance; but its progress was greatly hampered by subsequent trenches, the large amount of enemy wire and the transverse ravines encountered, and by the smoke—in which Companies A and D, which had run into troops in front of them, became lost. It was only by following the compass bearing that Companies B and C were able to maintain direction and to cross the top of the hill and the German main line of defense. At this point the smoke became less dense, no enemy infantry was encountered, no friendly troops were visible, there was no sign of Companies A and D, and the barrage was more than two miles ahead. Upon the assumption that the rest of the regiment was somewhere in advance, the battalion commander deployed Companies B and C in combat groups covering the regimental front and pushed on, frequently under machine-gun fire from the enemy. Upon reaching an enemy strong point in a copse about one thousand yards southwest of Drillancourt, Company C had a lively fight which ended in the killing of six Germans and the capture of fifteen prisoners, three machine guns, and two fieldpieces. During this little engagement Company B, reënforced by one platoon of Company C, advanced on the eastern slope of the valley to Drillancourt, where the former took a machine-gun nest and three prisoners and the latter six machine guns and thirty prisoners. Company C then pushed forward to Ger-court-et-Drillancourt, and in that town captured eight machine guns, two fieldpieces, forty prisoners, and a Mercedes motor ambulance. The advance to the northeast was resumed, the left of the company protected by two platoons, one moving along the edge of the Bois Juré, the other by the east bank of the Hoche Brook. Little opposition was encountered, as the crews of the German machine guns in that wood drew back and permitted the company to pass unmolested. About a mile

north of Gercourt-et-Drillancourt, Company C overtook the American barrage, which was extremely thin at this point, and the movement was slowed down to conform to it. The platoon on the left then recrossed the stream and Company C turned eastward, its front prolonged to the south by Company B which, upon reaching the road from Gercourt-et-Drillancourt to Consenvoye, had swung in the same direction, its right following that road. This latter company had scarcely changed front when it came under point-blank fire from a 77-millimeter gun, protected by a machine gun, posted on the high ground about a kilometer northeast of Gercourt-et-Drillancourt.⁵⁶ A spirited attack resulted in the killing of part of the crew and the capture of these guns as well as several other fieldpieces which were found abandoned in the vicinity. Further resistance was confined to a few machine guns, which ceased firing long before they could be reached, and the sky line in front was dotted with fleeing Germans.

The objective, seven kilometers from the point of departure, was attained at 10:10 A.M., and a report to this effect was dispatched by runner to the regimental commander.⁵⁷ The arrival of these troops was evidently unexpected, since 8 German officers—including a colonel—and 138 men were discovered in dugouts and houses on the side of the cliff. They surrendered when fired upon,⁵⁸ thus bringing the total number of prisoners captured that morning by the 1st Battalion up to 406; in addition, they took the stores along the cliff abandoned by the enemy.⁵⁹ Position was promptly taken along the Verdun-Sedan highroad and railway, facing the Meuse, the front of the 1st Battalion, two kilometers in length, extending from the junction of the road leading to Consenvoye on the south to a point about seven hundred meters southeast of the Laiterie de Belhame. Owing to the transference of many men to other units and to the fact that no other American troops

were in sight, the line was thinly held. The consolidation was effected by platoon posts and the troops at once started to dig in,⁶⁰ under cover of the guns of Company C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, which, after completing its opening barrage, had followed the 1st Battalion.⁶¹

Meanwhile the 3rd Battalion (Major Francis M. Allen), which formed the left of the 131st Infantry, had experienced many vicissitudes. Immediately after crossing the Forges Brook, every attempt was made to establish liaison with the 319th Infantry of the 80th Division, but all efforts proved ineffectual and in consequence a platoon was posted on the left to cover that exposed flank.⁶² The movement had scarcely begun before it was held up for twenty minutes by a barrage over the sector of advance allotted to this battalion, put down by the machine guns of the 80th Division in spite of the fact that the machine guns of the 33rd Division designated to cover the initial movement of this particular command had then ceased firing.⁶³ Upon the termination of this barrage the advance was resumed under constant heavy machine-gun fire which failed, however, to check the progress. As the troops toiled up the southern slope of Hill 227 the sun burst through the mist, and the scene which unfolded before them stimulated them to the greatest effort.⁶⁴ Upon reaching a point about two hundred and fifty yards south of Gercourt-et-Drillancourt the 3rd Battalion was greeted by a hot fire from enemy machine-gun nests and snipers. Gallant action on the part of an officer and two corporals and effectual work by a platoon of the 124th Machine Gun Battalion soon put them *hors de combat*,⁶⁵ while the Bois Juré was subjected to such a violent machine-gun fire that the infantry was enabled to penetrate that wood.⁶⁶ The task of mopping up to a depth of two hundred yards beyond the flank trenches a kilometer in length along the eastern edge of the Bois Juré was a slow and diffi-

cult one;⁶⁷ nevertheless, the work was thoroughly done and the 3rd Battalion succeeded in reaching the objective on scheduled time, 11 A.M., having captured, during its advance, a large number of prisoners,⁶⁸ twenty-eight machine guns, six cannon, and a quantity of engineering equipment.⁶⁹ The troops promptly occupied and began the consolidation of the northernmost sector, in the rear of the left of the 1st Battalion, their right resting on the high ground south of the Ravin du Gué Semette and their left close to the Laiterie de Belhame,⁷⁰ where the 3rd Platoon of the 124th Machine Gun Battalion was posted to protect that flank, which remained uncovered until the 319th Infantry of the 80th Division reached its objective immediately adjacent on the afternoon of September 27.⁷¹ A platoon of infantry was at once sent to take possession of an enemy depot between Dannevoux and the Meuse, which was found to contain an enormous quantity of war *matériel* of every sort.⁷²

The 2nd Battalion (Major Hamlet C. Ridgway), which formed the right of the 131st Infantry, was subjected to no such delay after leaving the jumping-off line, although the trench mortar detachment accompanying it was put out of action at the very start and the 37-millimeter gun had to be left behind as it was impossible to move it across the Forges Brook.⁷³ The advance of this battalion, however, was impeded in numerous ways; among other difficulties, it encountered a severe resistance and two of its companies, E and F, were lost in the smoke.⁷⁴ These companies, reënforced by the detachment of engineers attached to Company E which fought as infantry, nevertheless pushed on, making such good progress that they reached the objective about 11 A.M., almost simultaneously with the 3rd Battalion, and took their proper position in the rear of the 1st Battalion.⁷⁵ The remaining companies, G and H, were hampered by a succession of



CORDUROY ROAD, SOUTH END OF FORGES CREEK SWAMP



CORDUROY ROAD, NORTH END OF FORGES CREEK SWAMP

machine-gun nests, resistance encountered in the enemy rear trenches—which were rapidly mopped up, however—machine guns in Drillancourt, and attacks by hostile aeroplanes, which turned their machine guns on the troops and wounded two men.⁷⁶ Great care had to be exercised to maintain close liaison with the 132nd Infantry on the right and to avoid too rapid an advance lest the eastern flank of the 131st be exposed to the enemy in the Bois de Forges before that wood had been thoroughly secured. Consequently it was not until 12:15 P.M. that Companies G and H attained the objective and rejoined Companies E and F. The 2nd Battalion then took position in second line, its right resting on the Côte des Grands-Prés and its left at the Ravin du Gué Semette in touch with the right of the 3rd Battalion, and the work of consolidation was rapidly pushed to completion. The 2nd Battalion contributed its share to the captures of the day by approximately 250 prisoners, 30 machine guns, and 10 fieldpieces.⁷⁷

At 1:30 P.M. Company D, which formed the left of the 1st Battalion, reached its objective after many delays. At the outset it had followed Companies I and L of the 3rd Battalion up the first crest and, about two hundred and fifty yards north of the Berny Trench, had encountered an enemy strong point in a copse. A skillful attack yielded 106 prisoners, but at this point the company lost touch completely with Companies I and L. After thoroughly mopping up this position, it continued its advance alone through Gercourt-et-Drillancourt and along the eastern edge of the Bois Juré, where it was subjected to enemy fire but luckily incurred no casualties. Pushing on it took position in the rear of the 3rd Battalion, facing north, its left close to the Tranchée du Bois Rond; when its arrival was reported, however, it was moved forward into place on the left of the 1st Battalion.⁷⁸

It was still later in the afternoon when the commanding

officer of Company A, which had constituted the right of the 1st Battalion, reported his arrival. In advancing up the first hill this company had run into Companies F and H of the 2nd Battalion and had coöperated with them in the capture of about one hundred Germans and several machine guns. It then skirted the southwestern edge of the Bois de Forges, continued through Drillancourt, swung to the east upon reaching the road from Gercourt-et-Drillancourt to Consenvoye, and halted one kilometer east of the former town in the position originally assigned to it. When the commanding officer reported the arrival of the company, it was ordered forward to take over the southern sector of the battalion, which had been held by Company B pending its appearance.⁷⁹

During the afternoon twelve machine guns, captured from the enemy and manned by a section of the 37-millimeter detachment, some orderlies, and intelligence privates were posted on the ridge in the rear of the 2nd Battalion as a protection against any offensive on the part of the enemy from the Bois Juré.⁸⁰

In addition to the seizure of the enemy depot near Dannevoux, to which allusion has been made, the captures effected by the 131st Infantry during its advance of seven kilometers were very considerable and included among other *matériel*, sixteen guns of various calibres, fifty-two machine guns, and some railway cars.⁸¹ The number of prisoners taken was estimated at six hundred and fifty but, as many of these were turned over to other units for immediate use, the number cannot be exactly determined. Considering the results achieved the cost was comparatively small, since only one officer and 19 enlisted men were killed, although 2 officers and 131 other ranks were wounded.⁸² There were no missing reported in this action.

Not less successful was the attack of the 132nd Infantry

(Colonel Abel Davis) on the right or east of the 131st Infantry. As has been seen, its mission was to break through the enemy positions in front of and in the formidable Bois de Forges and to organize the Verdun-Sedan road four hundred meters north of the Bois de Forges.⁸³ The proximity of this regiment to the Meuse made it the pivot for all operations west of that river. Its formation for the attack was analogous to that of the 131st Infantry,⁸⁴ on the right of which it crossed the valley of the Forges Brook and re-formed on the Béthincourt-Forges road,⁸⁵ its left just west of the Moulin de Raffecourt and its right about one thousand yards from the outskirts of the village of Forges.

At 6:15 A.M., when the standing barrage changed into a rolling barrage and started forward,⁸⁶ the front line battalions of this regiment—the 1st (Captain B. J. Dodd) on the right, the 2nd (Major Paul C. Gale) on the left, with the 3rd (Major John J. Bullington) in its rear—followed at a distance of three hundred meters. Upon reaching the Diogenes Trench and the southern edge of the Bois de Forges about 6:30 A.M., the troops were greeted by a hot fire from the enemy machine guns; but the advance was not interrupted, since the flanking platoons speedily disabled the guns. At this point Company D, 1st Battalion, which formed the entire right, separated from the rest of that unit and swung to the east in order to carry out the particular mission assigned to it. Brushing aside all opposition, it proceeded to capture the village of Forges, mopped up all trenches in the immediate vicinity, and started after the battalion.⁸⁷

Meanwhile the 132nd Infantry had attained a position in the Bois de Forges extending from the Forges-Drillancourt road on the left to the southwestern edge of the woods on the right and had met a very severe resistance from a mass of machine-gun nests echeloned in five tiers. So heavy was their

fire that further progress in line formation was out of the question, and the troops were accordingly split up into small combat groups. In this fashion the regiment pushed forward under incessant fire, flanking the machine-gun nests, strong points, and other resistance, and bombing isolated posts. In this operation trench mortars were used to great advantage, while the enemy snipers who infested the trees were effectually disposed of by the riflemen. The dense fog which hung low in the woods cloaked the movements of the Americans and full advantage was taken of it. It was a fortunate factor in view of the method employed, which alone enabled the troops to cope successfully with the conditions confronting them. The companies necessarily became somewhat mixed and, because of the density of the woods, many men were lost or separated from the groups to which they belonged. By the time the Forges-Drillancourt road was crossed, however, the advance was being made in as good order as could be expected under such difficult circumstances.⁸⁸

At this point the front of the regiment swung to the right until it faced the northeast and the advance continued.⁸⁹ As the 1st Battalion approached the Ravin du Rapilleux one company was met by heavy machine-gun fire from a commanding position on the farther side; but the troops worked quietly forward, rushed the gun, and killed the entire crew. At the same time the left company of the same unit closed in on the German battalion headquarters situated at the eastern edge of the woods between the mouth of the ravine just mentioned and that of the Ravin Pimpanel, surprised the machine guns defending it, and captured a considerable number of prisoners. The German commander and part of his staff were barely able to escape and beat a hasty retreat across the bridge to Consenvoye, their flight covered by two machine guns in the valley of the Meuse.⁹⁰ The 1st Battalion then continued its movement

and about 9:45 A.M. reached its objective and took position along the railway track, its left opposite the mouth of the Ravin Pimpanel. Here it was joined soon after by the right company, which had attacked Forges and which extended the line as far as the easternmost point of the woods.⁹¹

Meanwhile the 2nd Battalion had attained the sixty-centimeter railway, which traversed the Bois de Forges about three hundred yards west of the Forges-Drillancourt road, and had executed a turning movement to the northeast which brought its right upon the road running from the southwest corner of the woods and issuing through the Ravin Pimpanel. Its advance was marked by frequent encounters with machine-gun nests, which were reduced in short order, and by heavy artillery fire as it debouched from the woods. Before ten o'clock it, too, had reached its objective; it then took position north of the 1st Battalion, its left just beyond the Côte des Grands-Prés.⁹²

In its rear the 3rd Battalion followed at a distance of five hundred yards until the Bois de Forges was reached. Here it struck off toward the north, skirting the western edge of the woods in order to maintain the liaison between the 131st and 132nd Infantry and to fill the void created by the turning movement of the latter. Part of this battalion was sent to take commanding positions in the centre of the Bois de Forges, to mop up that wood and to hold the approaches in the event of a counterattack. The remainder continued on to its objective, where it arrived about 10 A.M., and took position north of the 2nd Battalion,⁹³ its left prolonged by the 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, which came into place at 10:10 A.M.⁹⁴

At ten o'clock the entire 132nd Infantry was on its objective and the work of digging in began.⁹⁵ The consolidation was effected with the assistance of the engineers but was subjected to an annoying fire from enemy machine guns in the

direction of Consenvoye.⁹⁶ Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, which had followed the 3rd Battalion, arrived at 10:30 A.M.; half an hour later Company A, which had been attached to the 2nd Battalion, came up and put its guns into position in that sector, but it was after midday before they succeeded in silencing the enemy.⁹⁷ The trench mortars and 37-millimeter guns had been unable to keep pace with the infantry but during the course of the afternoon they were brought up and placed in position.⁹⁸

The distance covered by the 132nd Infantry was five kilometers,⁹⁹ and its operation was a notable achievement. That it was able in three hours and a half to fight its way through such a formidable forest as the Bois de Forges, one of the strongest positions in the Verdun sector, which had been held by the Germans for four years and which was a veritable fortress bristling with machine guns, is proof of the skill and energy with which the regiment was handled. That the encircling movement of the 131st Infantry contributed greatly to the result in nowise detracts from the feat of the 132nd. Apart from what was accomplished in the operation itself, in which the regiment engaged the 72nd and 115th German Reserve Infantry Regiments and various detachments of minenwerfers, signalmen, and the like, the captures effected were not less remarkable. In addition to 800 prisoners, 4 six-inch howitzers, 10 fieldpieces, 10 trench mortars, 109 machine guns, 2 anti-tank guns, and a large quantity of ammunition and stores fell into its hands.¹⁰⁰ Such were the results achieved with a loss to the 132nd Infantry of only one officer and 15 men killed, and 72 men wounded.¹⁰¹

In the history of the 66th Infantry Brigade, Thursday, September 26, 1918, was a notable day. The brigade had broken through an enemy position which had defied every such attempt for four years; it had carried the Bois de Forges;



BRIGADIER GENERAL EDWARD L. KING

it had established itself solidly on the west bank of the Meuse in position to cover the right flank of an American advance northward or to form the pivot of a movement against the heights east of the river in case an operation in that direction were decided upon. In addition to the great amount of *matériel* captured, it had taken approximately 1,400 German officers and men. Its own casualties numbered only 2 officers and 34 other ranks killed, and 2 officers and 203 other ranks wounded, a total of 241.¹⁰² The work of the auxiliary arms, as well as that of the infantry, had been such as to receive the highest commendation.¹⁰³ The achievements of the day were admirably summarized by the brigade commander, who declared in his report:

This entire engagement was particularly interesting because of the fact that it was an action planned and executed by a Brigade as a unit. It was entirely successful, owing, first to the courage and dash of our splendid troops, and second because the plans had been carefully worked out and studied by all concerned and during the action these plans were followed with marvellous exactness.¹⁰⁴

During this battle the 65th Brigade (Brigadier General Edward L. King) acted as the reserve of the 33rd Division, although the 130th Infantry (Colonel John V. Clinnin) constituted the reserve for the 66th Infantry Brigade in the attack.¹⁰⁵ Of this regiment the 1st Battalion (Captain James Lindsey-Oliver) had been detached on September 24 and sent to Germonville to report to the commander of the 66th Brigade. Three companies, A, C, and D, were utilized to assist the 108th Engineers to carry material to the front-line trenches during the night of September 24-25, while Company B was stationed north of Cumières to support the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion in the Vaux-Setif Trenches and on the Haut de la Côte de l'Oie.¹⁰⁶ The 2nd and 3rd Battalions

under the regimental commander, marched on the night of September 25 from the Bois de Ville to a position in the ravine of the Ruisseau de Bamont, directly south of the Fort de Bourrus, where they arrived on September 26 at 1 A.M., in ample time before the zero hour. The 129th Infantry (Colonel Edgar A. Myer), which had been relieved on the night of September 25 by units from the 80th, 4th, and 79th Divisions, moved to Esnes and was established, together with Companies A and B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, in the Rascasse Trench between Hills 304 and 310, where it was retained all day.¹⁰⁷ The rest of the 123rd Machine Gun Battalion (Major Albert L. Culbertson) at 8 P.M. on September 25 followed the 130th Infantry from the Bois de Ville to Bamont Ferme, where it arrived at 12:30 A.M. on September 26 and stayed for the remainder of the night. Early on the morning of September 26 orders were received from the brigade commander to proceed to a position in the rear of the Mort Homme. The advance was accordingly resumed but at 11:30 A.M. it was held up by the congestion of traffic one kilometer east of La Claire and did not reach its position until several hours later.¹⁰⁸

The brigade P. C. remained at Béthelainville until 10 A.M., when it was moved forward to point 177.713, on the commanding ridge 1,300 yards northeast of Esnes. At this place orders were received designating the 65th Brigade as the reserve of the IIIrd Corps, and at 12:59 P.M. it was so reported to the Corps Commander¹⁰⁹ Pursuant to instructions from the brigade commander, received about 12:30 P.M., the 130th Infantry, less its 1st Battalion, proceeded under cover of the smoke screen from the guns east of the Meuse via Chattancourt to the Mort Homme, but so great was the congestion in this position and so heavy the enemy artillery fire that the two battalions were put under shelter in the

trenches in the immediate vicinity of Chattancourt, a fortunate precaution inasmuch as this place was bombarded continuously throughout the night. In this position the regiment was rejoined at the end of the day by the 1st Battalion.¹¹⁰

IV. DEFENSE OF THE MEUSE SECTOR

From September 27 to October 7, 1918, inclusive, the operations of the 33rd Division on the west bank of the Meuse were characterized by no engagement of major importance. The positions occupied at the close of the battle on September 26 were held, except for certain modifications which will be enumerated, and thoroughly organized. During this period of eleven days the troops were subjected to incessant artillery fire and gas from both banks of the Meuse. The resistance of the enemy to the attacks of the First American Army between that river and the Argonne was conspicuous for its desperation, so that heavy losses were entailed in driving him from the exceptionally strong heights which he had fortified and occupied for more than four years.¹

On September 27, the 66th Infantry Brigade retained and strengthened its positions facing the Meuse from the eastern edge of the Bois de Forges opposite Brabant² to the Laiterie de Belhame.³ The arrival there that evening of the 319th Infantry of the 80th Division afforded protection to the left flank which had been exposed for more than twenty-seven hours.⁴

At 6 A.M. the headquarters of the 65th Infantry Brigade received telephonic instructions from G-3 of the 33rd Division to move without delay to positions south of Gercourt-et-Drillancourt, there to await further orders and to reconnoitre thoroughly the area held by the 80th Division with a view to relieving it.⁵ The necessary instructions were issued and at

9 A.M. the 129th Infantry, forming the head of the column and accompanied by Companies A and B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, began its advance via Esnes and Béthincourt to the valley south of Hill 281. Here the brigade P. C. was established⁶ and a defensive position taken by the regiment, which sent officers and noncommissioned officers to reconnoitre the positions of the 319th Infantry north and east of Dannevoux preparatory to relieving the 80th Division.⁷ The 129th was followed by the 130th Infantry, which left Chattancourt at 7 A.M. but, upon reaching Esnes, found the road between that point and Béthincourt completely blocked and was compelled to make a detour by a trail along the western slope of the Mort Homme. As this movement had to be made in single file, it was 2 P.M. before that regiment reached Béthincourt, where it resumed its march in normal formation and took position in the rear of the 129th Infantry.⁸ It was followed by the battalion P. C. and Companies C and D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, which were posted on the southern slope of Hill 281, where they were rejoined by Companies A and B.⁹ The transport of the 129th Infantry, forming the tail of this column, was caught in the congestion of traffic north of Esnes and did not reach its destination until 6 P.M.¹⁰

The 52nd Field Artillery Brigade moved one battery of the 308th French Regiment of heavy artillery to the Ravin des Caurettes, west of Cumières, sent a detachment to operate the German guns captured near Drillancourt, and directed the 1st Battalion, 104th Field Artillery, to proceed at 7:30 P.M. from La Claire to new positions near the southwestern corner of the Bois de Forges. During the afternoon and evening it participated in counterbattery work against the enemy artillery,¹¹ which had been quite active in shelling the Bois de Forges, Cumières, and the back areas.¹²

Saturday, September 28, was devoid of interesting fea-

tures so far as the 66th Infantry Brigade was concerned. Patrols were sent to reconnoitre the Meuse and the points of crossing, and the enemy artillery subjected the vicinity of the Bois de Forges and the Côte des Grands-Prés to harassing fire.¹³ Considerable enemy movement was also observed between the Bois de Brabant and Brabant, and the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion kept the crossroads in the town under fire from 9 until 1 A.M., incidentally silencing a fieldpiece.¹⁴

There were no changes of position by the 65th Infantry Brigade during the morning and most of the afternoon, although a reconnaissance in the region of the Bois de Danneveux and the Bois de la Côte Lemont was made by the regimental, battalion, company, and platoon commanders of the 130th Infantry with a view to relieving certain units of the 80th Division.¹⁵ At 2:30 P.M. a warning order was received from Division Headquarters directing the brigade to "march at once to the Bois d'en Dela, north of Hill 281, where it will be held at the disposal of the Comdg. General, III Army Corps as Corps Reserve."¹⁶ About 6 P.M. this movement began, the 129th Infantry advancing to the Bois Sachet, the 130th and 123rd Machine Gun Battalion to the Bois d'en Dela.¹⁷ At 8:30 P.M. orders were issued for the relief of the 80th Division that night, its right brigade by the 129th Infantry and Company B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, and its left brigade by the 130th Infantry and Company C, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, while Companies A and D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, were to constitute the reserve of the 65th Brigade.¹⁸ At midnight the relief of the right sector held by the 319th Infantry began and was completed at 8 A.M. on September 29; but, as the enemy artillery fire was extremely heavy and as many gas shells were used, this operation was attended with a loss of nine men killed and twenty-five wounded.¹⁹ The relief of the left sector of the



DEMOLISHED BRIDGE, OLD FORGES CONSENVOYE ROAD



FORGES CREEK BOTTOM

80th Division did not occur that night owing to a misunderstanding which is graphically described by Colonel Clinnin:²⁰

At 22:00 Hour on this date, verbal orders were received from the Commanding General, 65th Brigade, for the 130th Infantry to relieve the 320th Infantry in the line in the BOIS-DE-LA-CÔTE-LEMONT and the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, reported to the Commanding Officer, 320th Infantry, at his P. C. near cross roads south of the BOIS-D'EN DELA where he was informed that no orders had been received by the Commanding Officer, 320th Infantry, for a relief and, until such orders were received, no relief would take place. Runners were arranged to bring information to the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, when such orders were received by the Commanding Officer, 320th Infantry, and the 130th Infantry remained in bivouac in the BOIS-D'EN-DELA for the night.

5:20 A.M. morning of 29th September, 1918, information was received from the Commanding Officer, 320th Infantry, that orders had arrived for the relief and that said relief would take place at once.

The sequel will be described in the narrative for September 29.

The divisional artillery spent a quiet morning but during the afternoon subjected Brabant and the road leading to Malbrouck on the east bank of the Meuse to heavy fire, as considerable enemy movement in that direction had been observed. Two appeals for assistance were received from the 80th Division, one being responded to, the other communicated to the corps artillery, as the enemy batteries were out of range. The 1st Battalion of the 105th Field Artillery was also moved to a position near the Tranchée de la Roue.²¹ The 108th Engineers were kept busy repairing the roads in the forward area, which were in bad condition, and in building bridges and new roads across No Man's Land.²²

Sunday, September 29, was another day of inaction on the part of the 66th Infantry Brigade except for patrols along the Meuse searching for good points of passage and for frequent enemy artillery fire close to its positions.²³

In the 65th Brigade, the 129th Infantry completed its relief of the sector of the right brigade of the 80th Division at 8 A.M., as has been seen, and during the afternoon was joined by Company B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, which occupied the positions in the Bois de Dannevoux. The day was devoted to consolidating and improving the sector.²⁴ The relief of the left sector, which was effected by the 130th Infantry, began after 5:30 A.M. but was not finished until 2:20 P.M. for the reasons already alluded to, aggravated by congestion of traffic and the bad condition of the roads.²⁵ This regiment was joined in the Bois de la Côte Lemont²⁶ by Company C, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, while Companies A and D of that organization remained in the Bois d'en Dela as the brigade reserve.²⁷ The artillery of the 80th Division was temporarily retained in the sector but at the disposal of the 4th Division,²⁸ while the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, in addition to firing on an enemy battery and requesting counter-battery work by the corps artillery to suppress the heavy shelling to which the 132nd Infantry was being subjected about 3 P.M., supported the front of the 65th Brigade by the 1st Battalion, 104th Field Artillery, about two hours later.²⁹ As a matter of fact, the extreme left of the 33rd Division was under intense enemy fire, mixed with gas shells, during intervals on the night of September 29-30.³⁰

The 108th Engineers were busily occupied constructing the new road from Cumières to Raffecourt³¹ and in effecting other necessary work, in which they were assisted by a detachment of 150 men from the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion.³²

Monday, September 30, like the preceding four days, was marked by overcast skies, occasional rain, mist, and decidedly cool temperature for that season.³³ The IIIrd Corps made virtually no progress owing to the resistance of the enemy, whose artillery was very active along the entire front.

In the sector occupied by the 33rd Division, the Cumières road, the Bois de Forges and its vicinity, the position of the 131st Infantry, and the area of the 65th Brigade were heavily shelled.³⁴ The divisional artillery was therefore kept busy with counterbattery work. In the case of certain trench mortars and guns which were beyond its range, it was obliged to send requests to the corps artillery for support.³⁵ The enemy fire was not confined to the west bank of the Meuse, both the 131st Infantry and a regiment of the French 18th Division being considerably harassed;³⁶ in the case of the latter, the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion was appealed to for assistance.³⁷

The usual patrols were made by both infantry brigades, but there were no changes of position beyond the occupation of the Bois de Septsarges by Company D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion.³⁸ The 65th Brigade bent its efforts to organizing its sector in accordance with the plan of defense formulated by the IIIrd Corps³⁹ on September 25,⁴⁰ but suffered some casualties from the heavy shelling and gassing to which it was subjected.⁴¹ There was no cessation in the work of the 108th Engineers and the new road from Cumières to Raffecourt was fast approaching completion.⁴²

Tuesday, October 1, 1918, was rather more quiet, but a material gain was made by the IIIrd Corps in the sector of its left divisions.⁴³ The enemy's artillery was less active, although certain spots received a considerable amount of shelling.⁴⁴ The 52nd Field Artillery Brigade had a comparatively restful day in consequence, its principal operations being confined to the assumption of new positions near the Moulin de Raffecourt by three batteries of the 106th Field Artillery; the departure at 5 P.M. of the 212th French Regiment of field artillery, which had been withdrawn by the IIIrd Corps and which proceeded during the night of October 1-2 to the

Bois de Nixéville (Nord) ;⁴⁵ and the issuance of orders to the 106th Field Artillery to support the attack of the 18th French Division on the east bank of the Meuse next morning.⁴⁶

There were no changes of position by the infantry of the 33rd Division,⁴⁷ but the patrolling of the Meuse was continued⁴⁸ and the Machine Gun Company attached to the 129th Infantry indulged for a short period in harassing fire against enemy strong points.⁴⁹ The events which occurred that day in the 65th Infantry Brigade are thus described by its commander :

October 1st: Arrangements made for a gas projector attack from Subsector occupied by the 129th Infantry⁵⁰ on enemy lines in vicinity of Vilosnes night 1st/2nd October. Unfavorable wind condition prevented the carrying out of this attack. There was more than ordinarily heavy enemy artillery action this date from the vicinity of Sivry-sur-Meuse. There was an enemy gas attack on Subsector occupied by 130th Infantry at 19:00 hours which was ineffective so far as units of this Brigade were concerned, but was carried by prevailing winds toward the sector of the 4th Division, which division was immediately notified. The work of taping [sic] the Main Line of Resistance in the 130th Infantry Sector was started. Brigade Defense Scheme was issued, providing for brigade sector to be held by the 130th Infantry on the left, and the 129th Infantry on the right with a two-battalion front, echeloned in depth, in two positions, with the Outpost Zone garrisoned by the strength of one battalion per regiment and the Main Line of Resistance garrisoned by the remaining battalions of each Regiment in a continuous line, the troops distributed in depth, leaving a sufficient Barrage Zone unoccupied between the Outpost Zone and the Main Line of Resistance. Work on Main Line of Resistance, in accordance with Scheme of Defense, deferred by 130th Infantry until their position became better settled.⁵¹

Wednesday, October 2, was unmarked by any advance on the part of the IIIrd Corps or any important changes of position by the troops of the 33rd Division.⁵² The enemy

artillery, comparatively quiet during most of the morning, grew more active during the rest of the day, shelling the Ger-court-Drillancourt road, the Bois de Forges and Forges during the afternoon, and subjecting this latter village and Cumières to intermittent fire during the night.⁵³ Shortly after daybreak the 104th Field Artillery silenced the enemy batteries which had put down a barrage on the 65th Infantry Brigade, and in the afternoon the howitzer regiment—the 106th—engaged in counterbattery work against the enemy guns on the east bank of the Meuse.⁵⁴ At 8:15 P.M. this regiment started for new positions east of Béthincourt, but the road at Cumières was found completely blocked and the advance had to be abandoned after the gun carriages left at the side of the road had been camouflaged and the horses sent back.⁵⁵ The 1st Battalion, 105th Field Artillery, was likewise in movement that night and changed its batteries from the Moulin de Raffecourt to the vicinity of the Bois Sachet.⁵⁶

So far as the infantry of the 33rd Division was concerned the day was unimportant,⁵⁷ save in the sector of the 65th Brigade, where some changes were made in the 129th Infantry⁵⁸ and Company B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion harassed the enemy in retaliation for his barrage.⁵⁹ Other events of interest that Wednesday are thus summarized by the brigade commander:⁶⁰

October 2nd: Heavy enemy gas shelling on the front of the 129th Infantry. Smoke screen on the front of the 130th Infantry, but no attack followed. 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, substituted for 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, as Divisional Reserve. Regiments directed to send out patrols along the River Meuse with the object of discovering any routes and means of crossing that river. Gas projector attack on the town of Vilosnes at 23:00 hours by the First Gas Regiment successfully carried out. Enemy artillery very active this date, enfilading our positions from the right bank of the

River Meuse, assisted by direct observation and frequent registrations of fire by aeroplanes.

October 3, 1918, was another day of trench routine for the troops of the 65th and 66th Infantry Brigades.⁶¹ The enemy artillery continued its customary harassing fire,⁶² to which the guns of the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, supported from time to time by the corps artillery, responded. At 1 P.M. the 102nd Ammunition Train was ordered to load all available trucks with ammunition and to proceed posthaste to the 4th Division at Cuisy,⁶³ and that night the 1st Battalion, 105th Field Artillery, moved forward into concealed positions along the northwestern edge of the Bois de la Côte Lemont, but was heavily shelled and gassed in the operation, as well as subjected to lively machine-gun and rifle fire.⁶⁴ Companies A and B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, likewise advanced to the same wood during the course of the night of October 3-4 and lost twelve men in this movement.⁶⁵

These movements were in pursuance of the warning orders issued about 3 P.M. from Division Headquarters, followed by Field Order No. 28 at 10:15 P.M.,⁶⁶ all based upon Field Order No. 22, IIIrd Corps, which had been received early in the afternoon. This corps order announced that the First American Army would continue its attack while the IIIrd Corps would do likewise on D day at H hour with its centre and left divisions, its object being to penetrate the German third position between the Meuse and Cunel and to capture the heights northeast of the latter place. To this end the 80th Division, forming the left, was to attack along the Bois de Ognons and the 4th Division, in the centre, the Bois de Fays, its eastern flank protected by the 33rd Division, which was to hold its present sector. In conformity with this plan the Commanding General of the 33rd Division took the necessary dispositions, the most essential of which were as



CUMIÈRES-RAFFECOURT ROAD, CUMONT RAVINE



COMPLETED SECTION OF FORGES-BÉTHINCOURT ROAD

follows: The 132nd Infantry in the Forges subsector was to be relieved that night and was directed to proceed straight to Malancourt where it was to await orders and form part of the reserve of the IIIrd Corps. Its sector was to be taken over by the remaining troops of the 66th Brigade and Companies A and D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, were to report to the Division Machine Gun Officer and to be stationed along the northwestern edge of the Bois de la Côte Lemont during the night of October 3-4 so as to be utilized in overcoming enemy resistance and in breaking down counterattacks between the Bois de Briouilles, the Bois de Forêt, and Briouilles-sur-Meuse. Both the 65th and the 66th Brigades were charged to be on the alert against attack and the former was to establish combat liaison with the 4th Division. The reserve of the 33rd Division was constituted from the support battalions of the 129th and 131st Infantry and the 122nd Machine Gun Battalions in their present positions. The artillery was to neutralize the enemy guns in the Bois de Chatillon, the Bois des Sartelles, and the two ravines east of Liny-devant-Dun, and to station three batteries of 75s along the northwestern edge of the Bois de la Côte Lemont.

At 11:10 P.M. announcement was made by the division P. C. that "D" day would be October 4, and "H" hour at 5:25 hours, French time, or 5:25 A.M., American time.⁶⁷ All the movements prescribed for the night of October 3-4 were executed on scheduled time⁶⁸ except that of the two companies of the 124th Machine Gun Battalion, which was delayed by a combination of circumstances such as every unit experiences in the course of war.⁶⁹

On Friday, October 4, 1918, the First American Army wrested from the enemy more ground between the Argonne and the Meuse than on any other single day since its attack on September 26.⁷⁰ The most important gains were effected

by the IIIrd Corps, which pivoted on the 33rd Division immediately next to the river and attacked at 5:25 A.M. with the 4th Division in the centre and the 80th Division on the left.

In the 33rd Division the withdrawal from the Bois de Forges sector of the 132nd Infantry—which moved that day to Malancourt, where it passed into the reserve of the IIIrd Corps—⁷¹necessitated a redistribution of the 131st Infantry and of Companies B and C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, which therefore occupied the entire sector of the 66th Infantry Brigade and continued the usual patrols along the Meuse.⁷² Companies A and D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, reached their new positions on the northwestern edge of the Bois de la Côte Lemont, passed under the commanding officer of the 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, and, together with his companies, supported the 4th Division by harassing fire against Briulles and the Tranchée de Teton,⁷³ the latter of which proved such a stumbling-block for several days. Close to them were two batteries of the 105th Field Artillery which remained silent throughout the day pursuant to orders from the IIIrd Corps, whereas the rest of the divisional artillery was actively employed in supporting the attack of the 4th Division and in counterbattery work against the enemy's guns east of the Meuse.⁷⁴

The rôle of the 65th Brigade was to be on the alert against attacks and to maintain combat liaison with the 4th Division on its right. Its part in the operation of the day is thus epitomized by the brigade commander:⁷⁵

October 4th: Third Battalion 130th Infantry took up new location as Brigade Reserve in trenches near Hill 281.⁷⁶ Hostile balloon brought down at 4:36 P.M. Second gas projector attack planned by First Gas Regiment on the town of Vilosnes. Preparatory to attack planned by 4th Division morning Oct. 5th [should be 4th], combat liaison established between 130th Infantry and the regiment of the 4th

Division on their left. Patrols of one officer and 34 men, each, from 123rd M. G. Bn. and 124th M. G. Bn., sent out to reconnoiter and, if possible, occupy Teton Trench, returned, reporting that they were unable to accomplish their mission. Harassing Machine Gun fire concentrated upon the town of Brioules and the region one kilometer northwest of that place.⁷⁷

Apart from the issuance of two confidential memoranda⁷⁸ and orders to carry out the instructions of the IIIrd Corps in respect to the reconnaissance and occupation of the Tranchée de Teton,⁷⁹ the day was barren of interest in the P. C. of the 33rd Division at La Hutte in the Bois Bourrus.

Saturday, October 5, was largely devoted by the IIIrd Corps to consolidating the gains made the day before,⁸⁰ but there was considerable activity on the part of the Allied artillery and of the aeroplanes on both sides.⁸¹ During the afternoon and evening the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade was busily employed in firing on Haraumont, Liny-devant-Dun, Brioules, and the Tranchée de Teton and in counterbattery work against the German guns on both banks of the Meuse. There were no changes of position by its units, but at 6:15 P.M. the 2nd Battalion of the 308th French Regiment of heavy artillery was withdrawn from the division⁸² and proceeded to the Bois des Sartelles during the night.⁸³ The companies of the 123rd and 124th Machine Gun Battalions in the Bois de la Côte Lemont continued their harassing fire in the vicinity of Brioules,⁸⁴ but the attempt to infiltrate machine guns and automatic rifles into the Tranchée de Teton failed, the enemy refusing to relinquish possession.⁸⁵

The troops of the 66th Brigade holding the sector along the Meuse had an uneventful day except for the customary patrols and some shelling in their vicinity, coupled that night with a few bombs dropped in various parts of the division area.⁸⁶ The 132nd Infantry remained at Malancourt as part

of the corps reserve,⁸⁷ while the 65th Brigade took over part of the front facing the Meuse, and its right regiment, the 129th Infantry, suffered 374 casualties as a result of the heavy shelling and gassing to which it was subjected throughout the day.⁸⁸

In compliance with instructions received from General Headquarters, based upon the decision of the French government, announcement was made by the P. C. of the 33rd Division that "the legal time will be retarded at midnight, October fifth" and timepieces were accordingly directed to be set back one hour at midnight.⁸⁹

Sunday, October 6, was marked by no advance on the part of the IIIrd Corps, which continued the organization of the terrain already gained,⁹⁰ and was fairly quiet on the whole. The enemy artillery indulged in its customary harassing fire, shelling various points in the area of the 33rd Division, among them the Bois de Forges and the Côte de l'Oie, and his aeroplanes were likewise rather active. The Allied artillery was distinctly active during the day,⁹¹ all the available guns of the Army and IIIrd Corps concentrating on the enemy batteries in the Bois de Chatillon, while the 75s of the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade devoted their attention to the Tranchée de Teton and Brioules⁹² as instructed.⁹³ There were no changes of position on the part of this command until evening, when the 2nd Battalion, 104th Field Artillery, moved from La Claire to the vicinity of the Moulin de Raffecourt in proximity to the 1st Battalion of that regiment.⁹⁴ The 1st Battalion, 105th Field Artillery, remained in the Bois de la Côte Lemont as did the companies from the 123rd and 124th Machine Gun Battalions which supported the artillery by harassing fire on Brioules, the ridge northwest of that place, and the Tranchée de Teton.⁹⁵

To the troops of the 66th Infantry Brigade, occupying

the sector along the Meuse, the day was one of ordinary trench routine, with the usual patrols in the river valley and occasional artillery fire from the enemy.⁹⁶ The 132nd Infantry remained at Malancourt in the reserve of the IIIrd Corps, but its 3rd Battalion and machine gun company were attached that afternoon to the 4th Division, by orders from the IIIrd Corps,⁹⁷ reported to the commanding officer of the 59th Infantry, and during the night of October 6-7 relieved the 58th Infantry and a battalion of the 59th in the Bois de Fays.⁹⁸ At 9:30 P.M. orders were issued by the IIIrd Corps returning the remainder of the 132nd Infantry to the 33rd Division⁹⁹ but, obviously, they were not received until the following day.

Allusion has already been made to the operations of the 123rd Machine Gun Battalion and the events of that day which concerned the infantry of the 65th Brigade are thus described by its commander:¹⁰⁰

October 6th: Order of Corps Commander to neutralize the Trench de Teton by Machine Gun and Artillery fire and by Infantry raiding parties with bayonets and bombs, in order to protect the right flank of brigade troops in the Bois de Fays from danger of enemy machine gun fire, received and carried out. Final result reported October 7th. Town of Briulles on immediate left of Brigade front was bombed by 20 Allied planes commencing at 18:00 hours. First Bn. 129th Infantry was withdrawn from the line to Regimental Reserve [on] account [of] long continuous service in the line and having suffered heavy casualties as a result of enemy artillery activity concentrated upon that Regimental Sector and the enemy gas attack of October 5th.¹⁰¹ Commanding officer 130th Infantry made request for detail of engineers to remove nitro-glycerine charges from the muzzles of 7 captured German guns, which was approved. Orders issued to all units of the Brigade to insure men protecting themselves by proper wearing of the gas mask in case of gas attacks.

Save for the usual routine work and carrying out of in-

structions from higher authority, that Sunday was without event of particular interest in the P. C. of the 33rd Division¹⁰² until the receipt of an order issued that day by General Claudel, commanding the 17th French Army Corps, announcing that the 33rd Division had been placed under his command by order of General Pershing and that, while maintaining its normal defensive mission on the left bank of the Meuse, it should be in position to coöperate in an offensive action by the 17th Army Corps on the east bank "on J day at H hour."¹⁰³ To that end the 33rd Division was directed to place two battalions in the southern part of the Bois de Forges ready to cross at Brabant and one in the northern part preparatory to crossing at Consenvoye, the exact time of passage to depend upon the progress of the attack and to be fixed by the Commanding General of the 18th French Division (General Andlauer) who would be in charge of the operations on the left bank. Of engineers there were to be one or two companies in the region of Brabant-Consenvoye ready to throw bridges for the infantry. The artillery formed the subject of a separate order which prescribed its division into three groups; two battalions of 75s in battery south of the Bois de Forges, the third in the direction of the Côte de l'Oie and one battalion of 155s north of Chattancourt—the whole forming one group under a colonel to be designated by the Commanding General of the 33rd Division—the mission of which was to protect by a rolling barrage the attack of the two infantry battalions debouching from Consenvoye.¹⁰⁴ To insure complete unity of action, the first order directed that the infantry, engineers, and artillery of the 33rd Division participating in this attack should be placed "under the command of one and the same chief." These two communications were accompanied by a "Personal and Secret Note for the Generals commanding the 29th and 33rd Divisions, U. S.," which announced that "at the moment when the Normal Objective has been attained,



BRIDGE, FORGES CREEK



ROAD OVER FORGES CREEK BRIDGE

the American units will begin exploitation in the U. S. zone," and outlined the plan under which this exploitation would be effected.¹⁰⁵

The 33rd Division was likewise placed under the 17th French Army Corps by virtue of Field Order No. 24 issued by the IIIrd Corps that day, but only for tactical purposes;¹⁰⁶ for administration and supply it was retained under the IIIrd Corps by the provisions of an order issued at midnight that Sunday.¹⁰⁷

Monday, October 7, 1918, was largely devoted by the IIIrd Corps to holding and organizing the ground already gained and to preparing for future attack.¹⁰⁸ The cloudy weather which had persisted for days rendered aerial observation poor, so that the aeroplanes on both sides were very little in evidence. The artillery likewise was rather quiet, although there was some spasmodic firing during the course of the day and the enemy shelled the neighborhood of Forges with gas from 10 P.M. until shortly before midnight.¹⁰⁹ The 52nd Field Artillery Brigade was comparatively silent,¹¹⁰ but preparations were made for the attack next day;¹¹¹ and, in consequence thereof, the 2nd Battalion, 105th Field Artillery, moved at nightfall from the Bois de la Côte Lemont to new positions on the Côte de l'Oie.¹¹² About the same time Companies A and D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, proceeded from the former place to the Bois de Forges, where they arrived about 9 P.M. and rejoined the rest of their command,¹¹³ leaving two companies of the 123rd Machine Gun Battalion in occupation of the Bois de la Côte Lemont¹¹⁴ together with the 1st Battalion, 130th Infantry.¹¹⁵

The troops of the 66th Infantry Brigade occupying the sector along the Meuse spent the day preparing for the attack of the morrow, and at dark the 2nd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 131st Infantry, under Major Hamlet C. Ridg-

way, were assembled in the northern part of the Bois de Forges and placed under the command of Colonel Abel Davis, 132nd Infantry, in readiness to cross the river at Consenvoye next day.¹¹⁶ The commanding officer of the 132nd Infantry, having received from the IIIrd Corps the order returning his 1st and 2nd Battalions to the 33rd Division,¹¹⁷ proceeded with them from Malancourt to the Bois de Forges. There he was joined during the course of the evening by the detachment from the 131st Infantry just mentioned and by Companies B and D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, the former of which put twelve guns in position on the ridge north of the Ravin du Gué Semette. In addition to these troops his command was comprised of Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, which reported next morning at eight o'clock,¹¹⁸ two companies, 108th Engineers, which were busy that night, as they had been for several days, getting everything into readiness for the bridges which they were to throw opposite Brabant and Consenvoye; the 1st and 2nd Battalion, 104th Field Artillery, in the southwestern portion of the Bois de Forges; the 2nd Battalion, 105th Field Artillery, on the southern slopes of the Côte de l'Oie;¹¹⁹ and the 2nd Battalion, 106th Field Artillery (155-millimeter howitzers) near Chattancourt.

Allusion has already been made to the attaching of the 3rd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, to the 4th Division and to its relief of the 58th Infantry and one battalion of the 59th Infantry in the Bois de Fays during the night of October 6-7.¹²⁰ The position thus assumed formed a salient, with the enemy on both flanks and strongly entrenched in the Bois de Maulamont directly in front of it. This position was maintained throughout October 7 and 8, the patrols in constant contact with the Germans and the battalion itself subjected to "intense artillery and machine gun fire from both flanks."¹²¹

The operations of the infantry of the 65th Brigade were

principally confined to the usual trench routine, performed under constant artillery fire which inflicted a large number of casualties upon the 129th Infantry,¹²² and to complying with the warning order just received from the division P. C. relative to the utilization of troops of that regiment in the approaching operation east of the Meuse.¹²³

Apart from the customary routine work,¹²⁴ the P. C. of the 33rd Division at La Hutte in the Bois Bourrus spent a busy day in formulating, in pursuance of the orders of the 17th French Army Corps, the dispositions for the impending attack. These were communicated, in substance, to the unit commanders concerned by means of a warning order, followed at 6 P.M. by Field Order No. 27 embodying all the particulars and, subsequently, by the notification that "D" day had been fixed for October 8 and "H" hour at 5 A.M.¹²⁵ About the middle of the afternoon the Division Commander received a visit from General Andlauer, commanding the 18th French Division, under whose direction the attack was to be made next day, and every detail was found to be thoroughly understood.¹²⁶

During the course of the preceding narrative frequent mention has been made of the troops of the 33rd Division which were to participate in this operation, the purpose of which was to seize and hold the heights of the Meuse between that river and the Thinte northeast of Beaumont. The initial attack was to be made by the 17th Army Corps¹²⁷ with the 18th French Division on the west and the 26th French Division on the east, the former reënforced by four Senegalese battalions, the latter by two. The mission of the 18th Division, to which the 58th Brigade of the 29th American Division was attached, was to seize the observatories of Haumont, Ormont, and the ridge of Malbrouck; the 26th French Division was to get possession of the Bois des Caures

and the village of Flabas; the 10th French Colonial Division was destined to protect the attack of the 26th Division and to be prepared to seize the ridge of Caurières and the southern part of l'Herbebois; while the 15th French Colonial Division maintained its usual defensive mission on the extreme right.¹²⁸ The normal objective of the 17th Army Corps was fixed at the line Flabas (exclusive), Crépion (exclusive), southern edge of the Bois de la Reine, Consenvoye (exclusive), and, until it had been attained, the 33rd Division was to continue its defensive mission on the west bank of the Meuse. When the 18th and 26th French Divisions had gained the normal objective, their success was to be exploited by that part of the 33rd Division which was destined to cross to the east bank and by the 58th American Brigade which was to be introduced between the 33rd American and the 18th French Division.¹²⁹ The first exploitation objective of the corps was defined by the line Flabas (inclusive), Crépion (exclusive), Bois d'Etrayes, southern edge of the Bois de Chaume, while the second exploitation objective comprised Flabas (inclusive), Crépion (exclusive), Bois d'Etrayes (inclusive), Bois de la Grande Montagne and Sivry-sur-Meuse.¹³⁰ The 57th Brigade of the 29th American Division under Major General Charles G. Morton, was to remain with the corps reserve, since the fan-shaped terrain where the attack was to take place did not permit the 29th Division, which had not yet been in action, to be utilized in its entirety until the advance had progressed beyond the normal objective. The IIIrd Corps was to assist in this operation by a simultaneous attack west of the Meuse¹³¹ but, inasmuch as the principal operation was to occur on the east bank, the 26th American Division (Major General Clarence R. Edwards), which formed part of the reserve of the First Army, was stationed at Verdun.

To insure concerted action between it and the French

forces across the Meuse every precaution had been taken by the 33rd Division. All details in respect to infantry movements, artillery support, bridges to be built at Brabant and Consenvoye, engineering work to be performed,¹³² and liaison to be maintained, had been thoroughly arranged by means of frequent conferences between the officers of the 33rd Division on one hand and those of the 17th Army Corps and the 18th French Division on the other.¹³³ A cable had been laid across the Meuse¹³⁴ and, on the night of October 7–8, everything was in readiness for the attack.¹³⁵

V. OPERATIONS WITH THE 17TH FRENCH ARMY CORPS ASTRIDE THE MEUSE, OCTOBER 8 TO OCTOBER 15, 1918

At 5 A.M. on Tuesday, October 8, 1918, the attack of the 17th French Army Corps began on the east bank of the Meuse without preliminary artillery preparation.¹ While the 15th and 10th Colonial Divisions on the east maintained a defensive attitude, the 26th and 18th French Divisions were launched in a direction approximately north-northeast. The latter, which formed the left of the attack at its opening, jumped off at the zero hour from its trenches east of Samogneux and, as it advanced, the battalions of the 58th Infantry Brigade (29th Division), which had been assembled along the Meuse Canal,² came into their allotted positions on its left.³ This delicate operation was effected with remarkable smoothness and precision. Although the enemy flooded Côte 344 with gas shells within the first hour, he was evidently unprepared for such a manoeuvre and at 7:20 A.M. his customary artillery reaction had not occurred.⁴ Pushing forward toward their respective objectives,⁵ the French and Americans crossed near Brabant, the road leading northeast from that place, and shortly before 8 A.M. the 58th Infantry Brigade reached the Tranchée de Balis. Upon receiving a report to this effect, General Andlauer requested the Commanding General of the 33rd Division to order the leading battalion of the 132nd Infantry to cross the Meuse at Brabant.⁶

Meanwhile the engineers had been hard at work per-

forming a task of extreme difficulty. During the night of October 7–8, those of the 18th French Division had constructed a bridge over the canal at Samogneux; the engineers of the 17th Army Corps had built a pontoon bridge over the Meuse at Regnéville;⁷ and the 108th Engineers of the 33rd Division had everything in readiness to throw passages for infantry over the river and canal opposite Brabant and Consenvoye. At dawn on October 8 this work was begun and pushed at top speed, despite the fact that the material had to be carried and put into place under direct enemy observation in broad daylight, and the construction effected under heavy artillery fire averaging ninety shells an hour—many of them gas shells, so that masks had to be worn during part of the time. The maximum depth of water near Brabant was 12 feet and the bridge was 120 feet in length; near Consenvoye the maximum depth of water was 16 feet and the bridge 156 feet long, the latter requiring five and a half hours of work to finish. Notwithstanding the difficulties and casualties involved, the construction progressed without interruption and with such rapidity that both bridges were finished on scheduled time. The main bridge at Consenvoye, which had been partly destroyed, was then reestablished and important repairs were made on the Brabant-Consenvoye road, both operations being carried on under heavy shell fire.⁸

The 108th Field Signal Battalion showed similar efficiency under equal handicaps. During the night of October 7–8 a telephone cable was laid across the marshes, river, and canal of the Meuse; but at daybreak one working party was fired upon, attacked, and part of it captured. The necessary work had been successfully performed, however, so that there was no interruption in the communication between both banks and, by a lucky chance, the Americans who had been made prisoners were recaptured later in the day.⁹

Upon receipt, about 8 A.M., of the instructions from the Commander of the 18th French Division—to which allusion has been made—the necessary orders were sent from the P. C. of the 33rd Division to Colonel Abel Davis.¹⁰ At 9 A.M. the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 132nd Infantry, were accordingly set in motion from the southern part of the Bois de Forges, crossed the Meuse on the newly constructed bridge near Brabant,¹¹ and formed just north of that village on a line running east and west, the 2nd Battalion on the right, the 1st on the left.¹² The effectiveness of employing machine guns in intimate conjunction with the infantry had been strikingly demonstrated by the 33rd Division in its attack on September 26. Profiting by this experience, accordingly, Company A, 124 Machine Gun Battalion, was posted on the right of the 2nd Battalion¹⁴ and Company D on the left of the 1st Battalion.¹⁵ Each battalion had also sections of trench mortars and 37-millimeter guns attached to it. The 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, which was to form the support, was left in the northern portion of the Bois de Forges, inasmuch as it was destined to cross at Consenvoye, and was similarly provided, the machine gun company of the same regiment being attached to it.¹⁶ Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, which had put twelve guns in position north of the Ravin du Gué Semette during the night of October 7–8, remained on the left bank to coöperate with the artillery in covering the attack east of the Meuse,¹⁷ while Company C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, was retained with the other battalions of the 131st Infantry occupying the sector of the 66th Infantry Brigade along the river.¹⁸

At 10:15 A.M. it was reported that the 18th French Division had experienced great difficulty in its progress through the Bois d'Haumont on account of enemy wire and machine guns and that its schedule was therefore delayed one hour.



BRABANT INFANTRY PASSERELLE

On its left the 58th American Infantry Brigade was reported to be in possession of the Balis and Anatolie Trenches and of Malbrouck, its first objective, and to have reached the southern edge of the Bois de Brabant.¹⁹ At 11 A.M. the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 132nd Infantry, together with the two machine gun companies operating with them—the entire force in line of combat groups preceded by scouts—began their advance toward the normal objective assigned to them; namely, the road running from Consenvoye²⁰ northeast to the northern edge of the Bois de Consenvoye. The movement had scarcely commenced when both flanks came under enemy machine-gun fire, the right from the southwestern edge of the Bois de Consenvoye, the left from the village of Consenvoye. This menace, which was decidedly unexpected inasmuch as it had been assumed that this region had been thoroughly mopped up by the troops ahead, was promptly met by dispatching to either flank combat groups of half platoons, with automatic riflemen in the lead. By this method the hostile machine-gun nests were engaged and their fire confined against the flanks while the line continued its advance.²¹ The enemy in addition used anti-tank guns against the troops and a number of casualties were sustained; but, at 12:30 P.M., the normal objective was reached and the lines were re-formed pending the receipt of orders for a resumption of the advance to the first exploitation objective.²²

Meanwhile, the progress of the 58th Infantry Brigade had been temporarily held up near Malbrouck, but at 1:50 P.M.—after examining a map dropped by an aviator near P. C. Neptune, which showed the left of the 17th Army Corps in position from Consenvoye to the Bois de Consenvoye—the Commander of the 18th Division gave instructions that the third battalion from the 33rd Division cross immediately at Consenvoye and that the entire force push forward, under the

protection of its artillery, from the normal objective to the first exploitation objective north of the Bois de Chaume.²³ In conformity therewith, the 2nd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 131st Infantry, left the northern part of the Bois de Forges, crossed the Meuse by the newly-completed foot-bridge, and took position in support of the two battalions of the 132nd Infantry. The sequel is thus described by Colonel Davis.²⁴

At 3:00 P.M. the order came to make the advance at 4 P.M. Accordingly, the battalions started off under the protection of a rolling barrage,²⁵ keeping 300 meters in the rear of the barrage. The advance proceeded without much opposition until darkness when the attacking battalions at the south edge of the Bois de Chaume there halted and dug-in for the night.²⁶

The consolidation was effected in echelon by the 2nd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, on the right, one hundred meters south of the southern edge of the Bois de Chaume, and by the 1st Battalion, on the left, about seven hundred meters northeast of Consenvoye, while the 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, took position on the Consenvoye-Richêne road, south of the Bois de Chaume, in support.²⁷ The line of the 17th Army Corps extended that evening from these positions across the western edge of the Bois de Consenvoye and north of Malbrouck through points 5996 and 6596 in the Bois de Brabant to the Ravin de Walonsevaux, where the right of the 58th Infantry Brigade rested. Thence it ran northeast to point 6901, where it bent sharply southeast through the Ormont Ferme, the observation post south of the Bois d'Ormont and the northern edge of the Bois d'Haumont, turned east and slightly north to the northwestern corner of the Bois des Caures, where it swung abruptly south through Côte 329 to the wood of La Wavrille northeast of Beaumont.²⁸ This front was a mixture of the intermediate and normal objectives, coupled with certain posi-

tions in advance of the latter line. So far as the troops of the 66th Brigade on the east bank of the Meuse were concerned, their operation that Tuesday had been a complete success,²⁹ and their position at nightfall south of the Bois de Chaume and the first exploitation objective conformed to the intentions of General Andlauer, who purposed to utilize them as the pivot on the left for the manoeuvres during the succeeding days.³⁰

The position of the 33rd Division astride the Meuse was distinctly delicate, as such positions invariably are, particularly in view of the extensive marshes on both sides of the river and the canal, the limited number of bridges available near the front, the difficulty of rapid communication, and the fact that the enemy artillery and machine guns on the heights north and east of Sivry-sur-Meuse completely dominated, not only the open ground adjacent to the right bank, but the American positions on the left bank for a considerable distance below Dannevoux. It was therefore essential that the ground gained on the east bank be securely held, lest a retirement by the troops there expose the right flank of those on the opposite bank and oblige them to withdraw, thereby in turn, imperiling the right of the IIIrd American Corps. Accordingly, every measure was taken by the Commander of the 33rd Division to guard against such an eventuality and to be in readiness to support his forces on the east bank at a moment's notice.

With this purpose in view, orders were sent that afternoon to the commanding officer of the 131st Infantry to concentrate the 1st and 3rd Battalions of his regiment on the edges of the Bois de Forges ready to act as a reserve for the troops on the east bank in case of emergency. This order was promptly carried out,³¹ but there were no further changes that day or night in their position nor in the positions of Com-

panies B and C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, in the sector of the 66th Brigade west of the Meuse.³²

So far as active operations went, the day was comparatively quiet for the 65th Brigade, since orders had been received to refrain from further raids or attacks on the Trenchée de Teton.³³ The 129th Infantry, which formed the right and occupied the sector in the bend of the Meuse from above Dannevoux to a point opposite Vilosnes, supported by Company B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, had another costly day, losing 178 officers and men from heavy shelling and gassing. That night its 3rd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, sent to reënforce the troops on the east bank, crossed at Consenvoye and reached their destination at 2 A.M. on October 9.³⁴ The sector west of the 129th was held by the 130th Infantry and Company B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, their left terminating at the farther edge of the Bois de la Côte Lemont which, as well as Hill 281, was occupied by Companies A and D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion.³⁵ The 3rd Battalion of the 130th constituted the brigade reserve in the vicinity of the brigade P. C. at Hill 281, south of Gercourt-et-Drillancourt.³⁶

The divisional artillery was comparatively silent throughout the day, although the 1st Battalion, 106th Field Artillery (155-millimeter howitzers), engaged in harassing fire against the Bois de Chaume from 8:40 A.M. until 3 P.M., incidentally devoting some attention to enemy machine guns in the open ravine between that wood and the Bois de Consenvoye.³⁷ On the other hand, the group under Colonel Smith, 106th Field Artillery,³⁸ was kept well occupied. At 5 A.M. the 2nd Battalion, 105th Field Artillery (75-millimeter guns), joined with the French guns in barrages on sensitive points, lifting as the infantry attack progressed; about noon, however, its fire ceased.³⁹ At 4 P.M., the time set for the advance of the troops

of the 33rd Division from the normal objective, rolling and standing barrages were laid down on the east bank of the Meuse for two hours by the 75s,⁴⁰ together with accompanying fire by the "heavies" for an hour and thirty-five minutes.⁴¹ The enemy was evidently on the alert, since he pounded the Bois de Forges with 75s and 155s from 1:30 to 4 A.M. During the attack that morning, however, his artillery reaction was rather weak, probably owing to the superiority of the six hundred guns at the disposal of the 17th Army Corps, but in the course of the afternoon he showed decided activity in counterbarrages and in harassing fire along the lines of communications.⁴² The Allies retaliated however, with a continuous fire of their heavy and long-range guns throughout the night of October 8.

During the evening the Commander of the 17th Army Corps issued his orders for the ensuing day, directing that advantage be taken of that night to hold the ground already gained, particularly the Bois d'Haumont, to reorganize the units and reserves, and to rectify the positions of the troops, which were to be echeloned in depth. Announcement was made that the attack would be resumed at 8:30 A.M. on October 9, and emphasis was laid upon the urgency for progress along the crest of Hill 338 north of Malbrouck, to the north and northwest of the Bois de Consenvoye, at the Bois d'Ormont and in the direction of Flabas—the purpose of the last being to clean up the terrain between the Bois d'Haumont and the Bois des Caures. The right flank of the corps was to be protected by the 26th and 10th Colonial Divisions (French), while the 57th Brigade (29th American Division) was retained in the corps reserve, with one regiment and a machine gun battalion on the right bank of the Meuse in the zone of Brabant-Samogneux and a like force on the Côte de l'Oie.⁴³

It was quite late when this order reached the P. C. of the

33rd Division, so that it was not until 11:45 P.M. that Field Order No. 28 was issued. It embodied all the above which pertained to the division but fixed the beginning of the exploitation at 6 A.M., when the artillery was to lay down a standing barrage which was to roll forward at 6:40 A.M. It likewise directed that the battalion of the 129th Infantry, already placed at the disposal of Colonel Davis, cross to the east bank that same night, and it put special stress upon the necessity for care in protecting the right flank and in maintaining liaison between it and the troops of the 29th Division.⁴⁴

On Wednesday, October 9, 1918, at 6 A.M., a standing barrage fired by the artillery group under Colonel Smith came down in front of troops of the 33rd Division, which had spent the previous night on the right bank of the Meuse south of the Bois de Chaume and along the Consenvoye-Richêne road.⁴⁵ Both battalions and the two machine gun companies operating with them then formed three hundred meters in its rear and at 6:40 A.M., when this barrage began to roll forward,⁴⁶ the infantry started to advance. The 1st Battalion, 132nd Infantry, and Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, on the left, moved nearly parallel to the Consenvoye-Sivry-sur-Meuse road over the open ground and along the slopes which skirt the east bank in this sector. Although under heavy fire from enemy artillery and machine guns, and although several times held up, no unusual obstacles were encountered; under the protection of a double barrage and accompanying fire from the guns of their own artillery group,⁴⁷ at 11 A.M. they reached the first exploitation objective, which ran from a point nearly opposite Dannevoux to the northern edge of the Bois de Chaume. Strong combat patrols were sent forward toward the second exploitation objective, about one kilometer farther north, and the troops began to dig in.⁴⁸



CONSENVOYE INFANTRY PASSERELLE

The 2nd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, and Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, on the right, experienced much greater difficulties. Upon reaching the middle of the Bois de Chaume these units met stout opposition from the enemy, whose well-served machine guns inflicted some losses upon them and delayed their progress until they fell behind their proper alignment with the units on the left. In spite of the thick woods, dense underbrush, and incessant machine-gun fire from the east and northeast, their advance continued, although somewhat slowly. Progress became increasingly difficult, owing to the constantly augmented volume of machine-gun fire against the right flank, coming, apparently, from the sector through which the 58th Infantry Brigade (29th Division) was presumed to be advancing.⁴⁹ The 2nd Battalion and the machine gun company operating with it pushed on, nevertheless, and eventually reached the first exploitation objective at 11:55 A.M., nearly one hour after the arrival of the troops forming the left. Both detachments then sent out strong combat patrols toward the second objective and proceeded to dig in.⁵⁰

The 2nd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 131st Infantry, which constituted the support, upon reaching its allotted position, detached one company to cover the right flank while the other dug in a short distance in the rear of the 2nd Battalion.⁵¹

As soon as the barrage lifted, the combat patrols from both the front line battalions advanced to the second exploitation objective, which in that sector followed approximately the road from Sivry-sur-Meuse to the Villeneuve Ferme. The intervening ground was without cover, save for a few scattering copses, and considerable opposition was encountered, particularly by the patrols from the 2nd Battalion on the right. A number of machine-gun nests and small groups of the enemy

had to be reduced to submission, but ultimately these combat patrols attained the second exploitation objective. Just as they reached this line the dense fog lifted; to the amazement of both sides, the fronts were seen to be only about fifty meters apart. The enemy quickly fell back several hundred yards but left some machine guns in his main line of defense.⁵²

The situation of these forces and the conditions confronting them are thus graphically described by Colonel Davis:⁵³

Throughout the advance from the normal to the second objective our right battalion looked in vain for liaison with the Division on our right.⁵⁴ Under orders, our troops were to attempt to reach their second objective independently of the action of the troops on our right. On reaching the final objective it became certain that the troops on our right failed entirely to advance from the normal objective. In fact the troops on our right had even failed to reach the normal objective.⁵⁵ This situation left an exposed flank on our right of approximately 2,000 meters. The enemy took advantage of the situation by pressing hard against our right flank, filtering through the gap left open by the failure of the troops on our right to advance. The activity of small groups of the enemy was followed by a counter-attack directed against the exposed right flank. The employment of the battalion in support and the two companies on the extreme right flank was not sufficient to overcome the counter-attack and hold the line at the same time. It became necessary to bend the right flank in an effort to connect up with the extreme left of the Division on our right. In the counter-attack the enemy employed Infantry⁵⁶ assisted by machine guns, played quite heavily with his artillery on our lines and used a large number of airplanes which were flying low and firing directly at our troops. The enemy failed to break up our lines. He was repulsed after inflicting many casualties on us and sustaining more himself. The line was then re-organized with the extreme right flank resting on the line of the normal objective.⁵⁷ The left flank remaining on the second exploitation objective.⁵⁸

That night it was decided to employ another regiment in an advance to the second exploitation objective in coöperation with the Division on our right, which was to make another

effort in the advance in which it failed that day. Accordingly an attack was delivered the following morning through our lines. Our troops retired and formed the reserve for the troops ahead of us.

At the close of the fighting that day the front of the 17th Army Corps ran from a point five hundred meters south of Sivry-sur-Meuse along the northern edge of the Bois de Chaume, through the Bois Boussois, the Bois de Molleville, the Ferme d'Ormont, the northern edge of the Bois d'Hau-mont, the northwestern edge of the Bois des Caures and points 96.80 and 06.76 in that wood, along the southern edge of the Bois de Champneuville, through the Dauphin work, the Bonnet work in La Wavrille and Côte 351 to the north-eastern corner of the Bois les Fosses, beyond Beaumont.⁵⁹

That Wednesday evening witnessed the conclusion of the operations in the front line on the east bank of the Meuse by the forces under Colonel Davis. Their part had been well played. In two days they had advanced into enemy territory more than five kilometers;⁶⁰ they had broken through the Hagen Stellung and the Volker Stellung and had reached the Giselher Stellung, the principal line of enemy resistance. They had captured 20 officers and 760 men—including an Austrian major and 5 lieutenants—13 guns, 3 trench mortars and 113 machine guns.⁶¹ They had met with stubborn resistance, had been heavily pounded with shells and machine-gun fire, and flooded with gas.⁶² They had been attacked by picked German shock troops on their right, which had been left exposed and which it was the mission of the adjoining American brigade to protect; they had lost one officer and 37 men killed, and 11 officers and 315 men wounded.⁶³ Although compelled to relinquish about one kilometer of the ground gained, they were the only troops on the east bank of the Meuse whose

position that evening, even after falling back, was near the first exploitation objective. Allusion has already been made to the gallantry of Captains McCormick and Masoner and the 105 men with them who had been surrounded but heroically defended their position all night.⁶⁴ The machine gun companies, too, displayed exceptional efficiency and courage during the enemy counterattack, thus contributing effectually in breaking it up at a moment when it threatened to become extremely serious.⁶⁵

The instant the report of the enforced withdrawal of these troops reached the Division Commander, he acted with characteristic vigor. As it was manifest that larger forces were required on the east bank, Brigadier General Wolf, commanding the 65th Infantry Brigade, was immediately placed in charge⁶⁶ and reënforcements were hurried across the river. The 3rd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 129th Infantry, had already reached the left bank⁶⁷ and were followed by Company B, 122nd Machine Gun Battalion.⁶⁸ Beginning about darkness, the bridges that night were packed with troops of the 33rd Division marching to the support of their comrades east of the Meuse, the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 131st Infantry,⁶⁹ followed by Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion;⁷⁰ the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 129th Infantry, accompanied by the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry;⁷¹ and Company A, 122nd Machine Gun Battalion.⁷² These movements were effected with unusual rapidity and precision, considering the darkness, the paucity of bridges, and the difficulties of the terrain, and these reënforcements arrived at their allotted positions in ample time for the attack next morning.⁷³

The withdrawal of the 2nd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 131st Infantry, on the night of October 7, coupled with the movement of the 1st and 3rd Battalions to the east bank about 4 P.M. on October 9,⁷⁴ left Company C, 124th

Machine Gun Battalion, in the Bois de Forges the sole occupant of the sector originally occupied by the 66th Brigade. The presence of troops of the 33rd Division directly across the Meuse lessened the necessity of holding that portion of the front strongly; but it was, nevertheless, highly undesirable that this sector should be left without any troops. To prevent such a possibility, the Commanding General of the 65th Brigade issued orders that afternoon for two platoons to occupy the sector between Dannevoux and a point opposite Consenvoye.⁷⁵ The 3rd Battalion and Machine Gun Company of the 129th Infantry had marched to the right bank on the night of October 8-9,⁷⁶ followed on the next night at 8 o'clock by the 1st and 2nd Battalions of that regiment and by the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry.⁷⁷ This reduction in the strength of the 65th Brigade to two battalions of infantry and one of machine guns necessitated a redistribution of these troops, and that night the 2nd Battalion, 130th Infantry, took over the sector in the Bois de Dannevoux formerly held by the 129th Infantry,⁷⁸ while the positions of two of the brigade machine gun companies were modified to meet the requirements which had been thus suddenly altered.⁷⁹

Beyond the routine customary under such circumstances, the day was a quiet one at the P. C. of the 33rd Division until the arrival that afternoon of the report that the troops across the Meuse had been forced to retire from the second exploitation objective. From that minute until long after midnight the dugout at La Hutte bustled with activity. No field order was issued that evening—it was a time for action, not for writing long and detailed instructions—⁸⁰but every effort was bent toward hurrying forward reënforcements and toward making the necessary arrangements for the attack which was to be launched at dawn—6:05 A.M. was the hour set—in conformity with the Division Commander's determination to retake every

inch of ground lost that afternoon. The steps thus taken anticipated, but at the same time harmonized with, the order issued that evening by the Commander of the 17th Army Corps, which prescribed that "the action will be pursued tomorrow, 10th October, along the entire front" and that the "33rd U. S. Infantry Division will assure the possession of the Bois de Chaume in liaison with the 29th U. S. Infantry Division and will push reconnaissances onto the crest of St. Pantaléon and on Sivry." On its right the 29th American Division and the 18th French Division were to continue "the progress toward the objectives of the plan of engagement, notably in the direction of the Bois de la Grande Montagne and in the region Bois de la Reine—Bois d'Ormont—Bois de Moirey, the conquest of which will mark an important result." By reason of the extension of the front, the 57th American Brigade, which had crossed to the right bank of the Meuse, was placed at the disposal of the general commanding the 18th French Division, who was empowered to engage it on the right of the 58th Brigade in such a way that the elements of the 29th American Division would remain grouped together. The 26th and 10th Colonial Divisions (French) were to continue their mission of protecting the right, the 114th Infantry and 110th Machine Gun Battalion (57th Brigade) were retained on the Côte de l'Oie, and the corps artillery was instructed to continue its missions of interdiction, counter-battery, and support of the divisional artilleries.⁸¹

The activities of Thursday, October 10, 1918, began at daybreak with an attack by the 66th Brigade for the purpose of retaking the ground relinquished the day before, and all the reënforcements which had been hurried to the east bank of the Meuse during the preceding night arrived in ample time. The mission assigned to these forces was to clear the Bois de Chaume and the Bois Plat-Chêne and to exploit to

the second exploitation objective of the corps. Consolidation was to be effected on a line from the Tranchée de l'Hôpital along the northern edge of the Bois de Chaume and the Bois Plat-Chêne to Meridian 24. Starting at 6:05 A.M. from the immediate rear of the trenches south of the Bois de Chaume, the attack was to be made directly north by two battalions 131st Infantry, one battalion 129th Infantry, two companies 124th Machine Gun Battalion, and one company 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, these troops being placed under the command of Colonel Sanborn of the 131st Infantry. Two battalions in the front line and one in reserve following and protecting the right flank were to advance, under the protection of a rolling barrage, at the rate of one hundred meters every six minutes. The maintenance of combat liaison with the 115th Infantry (58th Brigade) on the right was confided to the 131st Infantry. The Brigade reserve, composed of one battalion 129th Infantry, one battalion 130th Infantry, and one company 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, was ordered to assemble immediately north of Consenvoye at 5 A.M.,⁸² under the command of Colonel Myer of the 129th Infantry.

Upon reaching the jumping-off line the troops were formed⁸³ shortly before the zero hour; at 6:05 A.M. the barrage came down⁸⁴ and the attack was launched through the line of the forces under Colonel Davis in the Tranchée du Câble.⁸⁵ The enemy was not caught napping; during the night his machine guns had worked around the right and rear of the 132nd Infantry and, while the 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, and the 3rd Battalion of the 129th were forming, machine-gun fire from the Bois de Consenvoye took them in the rear.⁸⁶

On the left of the attacking line the 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry, and Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, encountered thick woods, dense undergrowth, and a succession

of machine-gun nests which it required considerable time to overcome.⁸⁷ Effective use was made of the trench mortars and 37-millimeter gun but rapid progress was impossible in view of the continuous opposition. Into the middle of the Bois de Chaume an open ravine projects from the north and, upon reaching this opening, seven enemy aeroplanes flew low and sprayed the troops with machine-gun fire, while bombs dropped by three aeroplanes resulted in four casualties.⁸⁸ Upon debouching from the northern edge of the Bois de Chaume these troops found themselves boxed in by a counter-barrage along that wood, in the valley Dans les Vaux and on the ridge beyond, which had been put down by the enemy artillery and machine guns. Nevertheless they pushed onward through this barrage and, closely followed by Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, about 10 A.M. reached the crest immediately south of the second exploitation objective, which in the sector of the 66th Brigade was the road from Sivry-sur-Meuse to the Villeneuve Ferme.⁸⁹

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, and Company B, 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, forming the right, had met with similar difficulties in the shape of natural obstacles, were subjected to incessant machine-gun fire, and were further hampered by the exposure of their right flank resulting from the failure of the 58th Infantry Brigade to keep pace with them. So hot was the enemy's fire that the 1st Battalion became somewhat disorganized,⁹⁰ and Companies B and C were so effectually flanked by it that their advance was completely arrested until two companies from the 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, came to their assistance.⁹¹ On the other hand, Companies A and D, which constituted the assaulting echelon, pushed forward and, about 10 A.M., the leading platoons attained the crest overlooking the second exploitation objective.⁹² Their arrival was almost simultaneous with that of

the 3rd Battalion on the west⁹³ and the void between the two was subsequently filled by the major part of Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion.⁹⁴ The ridge was, however, swept by such intense enemy artillery and machine-gun fire that it had to be abandoned within a short time and all the front-line troops had to be withdrawn behind the crest for shelter.⁹⁵ The position ordered to be consolidated ran through the Tranchée de l'Hôpital and thence northeastwardly along the northern edge of the woods to Meridian 24, but was untenable since it was exposed to hostile fire and, furthermore, its vegetation was reeking with gas. After a brief conference the two battalion commanders selected the northern slopes of the valley Dans les Vaux and the Ravin de la Vaux de Mille Mais on account of the protection which they afforded; the troops were ordered to dig in along this line,⁹⁶ their front covered by a chain of outposts composed of automatic rifle squads stationed just north of the crest for the purpose of observation and as a protection against counterattacks.⁹⁷ It was in this sheltered position that they were rejoined sometime later by Companies B and C, 131st Infantry, which had been held up early in the attack and which, upon arriving, were posted on the right of the 1st Battalion.⁹⁸

The 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, which constituted the part of the support for the front line troops and which was to follow five hundred meters behind them in order to protect their right flank, experienced many vicissitudes. When Companies B and C, 131st Infantry, were stopped by machine-gun fire from the east, two companies of the 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, eventually were sent to their assistance. The remaining two companies of this battalion passed through them and continued toward their objective, which they attained about 2 P.M., and took position on the extreme right of the front line, a short distance southeast of the Magenta

Ferme. When the enemy's machine guns had been subdued⁹⁹ sufficiently to permit Companies B and C, 131st Infantry, to resume their movement, Company B of the 129th Infantry continued its advance and about 3 P.M. rejoined the rest of the battalion. After this affair at noon Company L, having been charged to maintain liaison with the 115th Infantry (58th Brigade), made no further advance,¹⁰⁰ and the stragglers did not put in an appearance until the following morning.¹⁰¹

The 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, which formed part of the reserve, was however directed by Colonel Sanborn to follow five hundred yards in the rear of the 3rd Battalion of the 129th and was given special instructions to support the right. Like the others it encountered numerous difficulties. It had scarcely got under way when it was caught in an enemy barrage which descended upon it in the open valley south of the Bois Plat-Chêne. The infiltration of hostile machine guns in the zone through which the 58th Infantry Brigade was presumed to be advancing culminated in an enfilade fire from one enemy nest which was so heavy against the right of this command that the battalion was thrown into disorder and Companies I and K became partly disorganized. Terrestrial fire was not the only thing which had to be contended with; the troops were heavily bombed and machine-gunned by hostile aeroplanes and were even subjected to point-blank fire from some 77s in their right rear. While Company M continued to the objective assigned to the battalion at the northern edge of the Bois de Chaume, Major Bittel remained behind, rallied such men as he could collect, and sent them forward in detachments to rejoin Company M. It was not, however, until the following morning that the stragglers who were scattered throughout the thick woods were assembled and brought back to the command,¹⁰² which had spent the night in the Bois de Chaume in a position on Parallel 82 between the Wuillebau-



CONSENVOYE CAUSEWAY—HEAVY ARTILLERY BRIDGE

bois ravine and the road which separates the Bois de Chaume from the Bois Plat-Chêne.¹⁰³ The necessity for thorough liaison between the units engaged in a combined attack was strikingly illustrated inasmuch as "the failure of the troops on the right to advance subjected this Battalion and all other troops in this advance to terrific artillery fire consisting of high explosive, shrapnel and gas, as well as flanking machine gun fire resulting in many casualties."¹⁰⁴

Three times the front line troops pushed forward to the second exploitation objective, only to be compelled to fall back, since the position was untenable and their right flank was dangerously "in the air."¹⁰⁵ Throughout the day the troops were harassed with fire of every sort and the terrain which they occupied was flooded with gas.¹⁰⁶ The enemy persisted with his infiltration against the exposed right¹⁰⁷ and the situation became such that the brigade commander ordered the 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, and Company A, 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, to advance and to form a defensive flank on the east. This movement was made under a constantly increasing shell and machine-gun fire, and a position *en potence* on the extreme right was taken by these units,¹⁰⁸ their left touching the right of the 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry,¹⁰⁹ near the Magenta Ferme and their front facing east extending directly south across the Vaux de Mille Mais to the eastern terminus of the Ravin du Plat-Chêne. The opposite extremity of the line was held by the Machine Gun Company, 131st Infantry, in the Tranchée de la Vanne, its left resting on the Consenvoye-Sivry road and its right at the northwestern edge of the Bois de Chaume, liaison with the left company of the 131st Infantry being maintained by night patrols. The troops which constituted the reserve of the 66th Brigade—the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 132nd Infantry, the 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry,¹¹⁰ and Company A, 124th

Machine Gun Battalion—remained in their positions south of the Bois de Chaume in the Tranchée du Câble, while in the extreme rear the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, and Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, continued to occupy the trenches near Consenvoye.¹¹¹

The situation at the time and the measures of security taken for the approaching night, which was destined to be the prelude of the days and nights when these troops were so unmercifully punished with every weapon possessed by the enemy,¹¹² are thus described by Colonel Sanborn,¹¹³ who commanded the leading battalions in this attack:

During the afternoon of the 10th it became evident that no support would be forthcoming from troops on our right. Many messages came in reciting the fact that [our] troops were under heavy machine gun fire, shell fire and gas. Nine enemy planes sprayed the lines with machine gun fire for five minutes without opposition. Later the raid was repeated. Enemy troops started working around the right flank in small squads. . .and more or less disorganization existed in some of the three Regimental Detachments and Machine Gun Companies scattered as they were through the woods. After consultation with the Brigade Commander, it was decided to hold a line with detachments and to dig in a defensive position in the valley Dans les Vaux through the woods east to Grid Line 24 [which position was] to be held at all costs.¹¹⁴ All troops except those holding the line and [in the] Brigade Reserve were to be employed on the work.¹¹⁵ Lieutenant Colonel Stansfield, 132nd Infantry, who was with the reserve was given instructions to order the work. It was impossible to complete parts of this line during daylight. Work was continued at intervals when opportunity permitted. Not much progress was made in the way of connecting up the entire line, but individual units dug in the best they could. Major Bittel did especially good work in preparing his position, cutting out underbrush, wiring approaches, etc.

To the 20 officers and 760 men captured by the 132nd Infantry on the two preceding days were added 4 officers and

149 men, besides a considerable quantity of enemy *matériel* of all sorts.¹¹⁶

On the west bank of the Meuse were two units belonging to the 66th Infantry Brigade. The first—Company C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion—remained in reserve in the Bois de Forges,¹¹⁷ whereas the other—the 3rd Battalion, 132nd Infantry—had been detached. As has been seen, it relieved the 58th Infantry and a battalion of the 59th Infantry in the Bois du Fays on the night of October 6–7 and held that difficult position during October 7, 8, and 9. On October 10 two of its companies participated, in the support line, in an advance attack through the Bois de Malaumont and during the night were sent forward into the front line preparatory to a resumption of the attack next day.¹¹⁸

The 65th Infantry Brigade, greatly depleted by virtue of the reënforcements which it had sent across the river—thus reducing it to two battalions of infantry and one of machine guns—spent a comparatively quiet day,¹¹⁹ especially as the enemy shelling was lighter than usual. The taking over of the outpost and defense lines in the Bois de Dannevoux vacated by the 129th Infantry the night before was finished at 3:15 A.M. by the 2nd Battalion, 130th Infantry, and the entire sector in the bend of the Meuse from the Laiterie de Belhame through the Bois de Dannevoux to the western edge of the Bois de la Côte Lemont was therefore thinly held by the 1st and 2nd Battalions of that regiment.¹²⁰ Companies B and C, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, remained in their former positions in the line, but the other two companies were sent that night to join the forces on the east bank.¹²¹

Aside from making two requests to the corps artillery for fire against certain points out of range, ordering one platoon from the 102nd Trench Mortar Battery to be put at the disposal of the commanding officer, 131st Infantry, direct-

ing all available machine guns placed in the Bois de Forges for anti-aircraft missions, and instructing the 105th Field Artillery to do some counterbattery work, the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade spent a rather tranquil day.¹²² The artillery group under Colonel Smith, on the other hand, was busily employed in supporting the troops east of the Meuse with barrages and accompanying fire.¹²³ Frequent allusion has been made to the activity that day of the enemy artillery which pounded the Bois de Chaume in a decidedly lively fashion from 1 to 5:30 P.M. About 8 P.M. it shelled the Bois de Forges in accordance with its almost daily custom and from 11 P.M. until an hour after midnight kept the 130th Infantry awake by bombarding Danneveux and its neighborhood with 105-millimeter shells.¹²⁴

Early in the evening the Corps Commander issued his orders for the operations of the morrow.¹²⁵ Announcement was made that the line attained at the close of the day by the 17th Army Corps ran through the Tranchée de la Vanne across the northern edge of the Bois de Chaume and the Bois Plat-Chêne, through "Hill 371 (west of Richêne),¹²⁶ northern edge of the Bois de Molleville, Bois de la Reine to Point 76.06, southern and southwestern parts of the Bois d'Ormont, southern boundary of the Bois de Moirey, 200 meters west of the Bois la Fosse-à-Terre, southern edge of the Bois de Champneuville, la Wavrille (except the northeast corner)." Instructions were given that "the action will be pursued tomorrow, 11th October, along the whole front under the general conditions indicated by Order No. 4 of the 9th October." "Mission unchanged" were the directions for the 33rd Division, whereas the 29th Division was charged with "progression toward the objectives of the plan of engagement, notably on the Grande Montagne, objective of first importance, which constitutes the base of the exploitation toward the north," as well as "to assure close liaison with the 33rd I. D.

U. S. on the left and the 18th on the right." The same mission was given to the French divisions, while the 10th Colonial Infantry Division was "to maintain at all costs the possession of la Wavrille, which covers the right flank of the attack" and "to assure close liaison with the 26th I. D." and the corps artillery was to continue its interdiction and counter-battery fire in concert with the divisional artilleries.

The P. C. of the 33rd Division at La Hutte in the Bois Bourrus was the scene of considerable activity that day in view of the attack being made on the east bank of the Meuse. Aside from the occurrences connected with the engagement, the principal event of importance was the issuance at 2 P.M. of Field Order No. 29,¹²⁷ which prescribed that the troops on the right should continue their operations next day in accordance with the plan of engagement of the 17th Corps, should hold the sector gained, and assure the possession of the Bois de Chaume and the Bois Plat-Chêne as far as the Ravin du Plat-Chêne. The area of the 33rd Division was divided into two sectors, the right sector lying between the Meuse and Meridian 24, the left sector between the western bank of that river and the left boundary of the division. For the right sector an outpost zone and a main line of resistance were prescribed, and the latter, which was to skirt the northern edge of the Bois de Chaume and follow the wood road running southeast to Hill 371, was ordered to be prepared for defense and to be "held to the last." A mixed detachment was to be established near Hills 371 and 382 (Richêne) for close liaison with the 29th Division, lines of information were to be put into perfect working order to insure proper communication with the division P. C., and other measures were provided for the security of the troops.¹²⁸

On Friday, October 11, 1918, there was no advance, nor indeed any important movement by the 33rd Division, save in

the case of a few isolated units. The day was not, however, wholly lacking in interest and the troops on the east bank of the Meuse were kept decidedly on the *qui vive* by the incessant shelling, machine-gun fire, and gassing to which they were subjected throughout the day and night. Their own artillery responded by firing that morning on Sivry-sur-Meuse, where the enemy was causing them considerable annoyance, and on Haraumont, where the enemy batteries were very active; in harassing the road at the western edge of the Bois de la Grande Montagne leading from La Borne de Cornouille to an enemy dump on a forty-centimeter tramway,¹²⁹ and in requesting the corps artillery for support, particularly against the guns near Haraumont and against the enemy artillery and machine guns in the Bois Plat-Chêne that evening.¹³⁰ It was deemed advisable to have some batteries of 75s belonging to the artillery group under Colonel Smith closer to the troops which they were supporting and, accordingly, during the night of October 11-12, the 1st Battalion, 104th Field Artillery, moved from its position at the southwestern corner of the Bois de Forges to the vicinity of the Tranchée de Heraclée southeast of Consenvoye.¹³¹

The principal events that day affecting the forces on the east bank of the Meuse are thus narrated by the commanding officer of the 131st Infantry.¹³²

The morning of October 11th a message was received from the C. O. 115th Infantry that their second Battalion was about to effect a passage of the lines, with orders to gain the second Exploitation Objective. The movement apparently failed as the left of that organization was located the following morning at 1:50 o'clock 2½ kilometers in rear on Grid 81. It became evident in the early morning [of October 11] that a reorganization and readjustment of the line was necessary.¹³³ The C. O. 131st Infantry was notified by the Brigade Commander that he would be in command of operations between North and South Grid 24 and River Meuse with three

Battalions and Machine Gun Co. 131st Infantry and following attached troops: 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry¹³⁴ and attached machine gun units.¹³⁵ Major Allen, 3rd Battalion, was designated by the C. O. 131st Infantry as his representative, with orders to place Captain Melville in charge of all machine gun units, to check positions and make readjustments where necessary. Troops which are forward of line dug last night [are] to be held by out-posts; other line designated at the same time to be held and the position organized in depth. Liaison to be maintained on right.¹³⁶ Anticipating some act on the part of right flank troops as evidenced by their message at 8 A.M. in which it was stated our second Bn. (115th Inf.) is about to effect a passage of lines to begin the attack. . . . Orders to gain the Second Exploitation Objective,¹³⁷ our forward troops again occupied that portion of the line on our immediate front. Consummation of the intended move was not accomplished. At 11:25 A.M. the Liaison Officer of the 115th Infantry was asked to ascertain where the left of his organization was and what progress was being made, there being no apparent movement. Heavy machine gun fire increasing in volume continued on our right. First Battalion Commander reported situation serious. No report was received to inquiry as to position of the 115th Infantry. . . . During the night of October 11th-12th a conference was held with the Brigade Commander, at which time a decision was reached to consolidate and dig in a line in the general direction east and west of Grid 82 toward the north edge of Chaume Woods,¹³⁸ but conditions during that night made the movement impossible.¹³⁹ It was therefore deferred until the following night. About 500 yards of trenches two feet wide and three or four feet deep were however dug by early morning.

There were no movements on the part of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 132nd Infantry, the 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, and Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, in the trenches south of the Bois de Chaume,¹⁴⁰ or by the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, and Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, in the trenches near Consenvoye;¹⁴¹ but during the day Companies A and D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion,

arrived from the west bank, were placed under the commanding officer of the 129th Infantry, and were sent forward to the line occupied by the 1st and 2nd Battalions of that regiment.¹⁴²

On the right bank of the Meuse were two units belonging to the 66th Infantry Brigade—Company C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, which continued to occupy the Bois de Forges,¹⁴³ and the 3rd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, then operating with the 4th Division. On October 11 this battalion participated in an attack in which it had two companies in the front line and two companies protecting the right flank of the assaulting troops. The objective—the northern edge of the Bois de Forêt—was reached on scheduled time,¹⁴⁴ and the conduct of this battalion throughout its operations was such as to win high commendation from the unit commanders under whom it served.¹⁴⁵

Apart from minor rectification of position, no events of importance occurred in the sector along the river as far as the western edge of the Bois de la Côte Lemont held by the 65th Infantry Brigade, which had been further weakened by the transfer of Companies A and D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, to the Bois de Chaume.¹⁴⁶

Except for routine, that Friday was virtually a *dies non* in the P. C. of the 33rd Division and the only event that need be chronicled was the receipt during the course of the evening of the operation order issued by the 17th Army Corps,¹⁴⁷ which postponed its customary statement of the front held at the end of the day but announced that:

In these 4 days of battle, aside from the losses inflicted upon the enemy (more than 5000 prisoners and a considerable *matériel*), apart from an advance of more than 5 kilometers on a difficult terrain and across formidable organized works, the American and French units belonging to the 17th Army

Corps have lent an efficient assistance to the general action by consuming strong enemy reserves.

It went on to direct that:

Tomorrow, 12th October, the progression will be resumed under the following conditions: *33rd I. D., U. S.* will continue its mission of resistance at the Bois de Chaume and at the Bois Plat-Chêne and of reconnaissance on Sivry and the Côte de St. Pantaléon. It will insure a close liaison with the *29th I. D., U. S.* and will aid, if need be, this latter to outflank the clearing of Molleville and the one to the west (this latter not indicated on the map). *29th I. D., U. S.* will resume its advance on the Bois de la Grande Montagne, insuring the security of its right flank by a suitable echelonment if the *18th I. D.*, more particularly oriented toward the N. E., does not immediately conform to the movement of the *29th I. D., U. S.*

The *18th French Division* was to carry out its operation in the region of the Bois de'Ormont and the Bois de Moirey at 7 A.M. with its infantry; the *26th French Division* was to continue its pressure particularly to the left in order to bring about the fall of Crest 329; while the mission of the *10th Colonial Division* was local resistance at La Wavrille. A footnote referring to the instructions for the *33rd* and *29th American Divisions* announced that "It is understood that the advance prescribed to the *29th I. D. U. S.* is subordinated to the getting into place required by the powerfully fortified work of the Clearing of Molleville and its outskirts."

On Saturday, October 12, 1918, at 1:50 A.M. patrols from the *131st Infantry* located the left of the *115th Infantry* east of the reserve of the *66th Brigade*, which held the Tranchée du Câble south of the Bois de Chaume.¹⁴⁸ This position was behind the normal objective assigned to the *58th Brigade (29th Division)* and nearly two and a half kilometers in the rear of the front line of the *33rd Division* at its right extremity.¹⁴⁹ Subsequent reports, received at 7:30 and 9 A.M., however, announced a position somewhat farther forward and

gave the information that the 57th Brigade on its right was then engaged in an attack.¹⁵⁰

The forces of the 33rd Division on the east bank spent the day in making the prescribed reconnaissances on Sivry-sur-Meuse¹⁵¹ and beyond the ridge where the Chapel of St. Pantaléon and the Magenta Ferme are situated and in holding their positions under intense shell fire, which began about midnight on October 11, and continued almost without interruption until 7 P.M. There was also heavy machine-gun fire, a counter-attack at 2:15 A.M., and frequent attacks by hostile aeroplanes.¹⁵² Indeed, the latter became so bold that machine guns had to be sent to the front lines for anti-aircraft work. The supporting artillery responded, combining counterbattery with its other fire, but without affording much relief to the punishment which the infantry was forced to undergo. It was therefore deemed expedient to move more of the 75s farther forward where their fire would be more effective and the 2nd Battalion, 105th Field Artillery, accordingly changed position that night from the vicinity of the Bois de Forges to the southwestern edge of the Bois Juré.¹⁵³

During the latter part of the afternoon the commanding officer, 131st Infantry, issued orders for a reorganization of the system of defense during the night of October 12-13¹⁵⁴ and directed the construction of a main line of resistance which was to be finished by daylight. This line was to run from the open ground north of the Tranchée de la Vanne midway between the Consenvoye-Sivry road and the northwest corner of the Bois de Chaume, around the edge of that wood and into the ravine where Wuillebaubois is situated, joining with the position of the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, and thence along Grid line 82 to Meridian 24. It was to be laid out under the supervision of Major Bittel and the work was to be done by the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, and Company



REPAIRED BRIDGE OVER MEUSE CANAL, CONSENVOYE

A, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, which were to report at 6 P.M. with the necessary shovels and picks. Upon completion, it was to be occupied by the 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry, on the west, the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, in the centre, and the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, on the east, each battalion accompanied by the machine gun company attached to it. The 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, was to be withdrawn from the front line and was to join the 2nd Battalion of that regiment in the trenches south of the Bois de Chaume, the two to constitute the support. The 1st and 3rd Battalions, 129th Infantry, and the 2nd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, were to form the reserve in the trenches northeast of Consenvoye.¹⁵⁵ The necessary orders were therefore issued by Major Allen, commanding the front line troops, but these were shortly afterwards countermanded, since the commanding officer of the 131st decided to postpone the occupation of the new line until it was entirely ready.¹⁵⁶ Approximately nine hundred yards of shallow trenches had been dug during the day¹⁵⁷ and that night the work was pushed as rapidly as possible under the circumstances.

On the west bank of the Meuse the two units belonging to the 66th Brigade remained in their former positions, Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, in the Bois de Forges¹⁵⁸ and the 3rd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 132nd Infantry, in the Bois de Forêt.

So far as the depleted 65th Brigade was concerned, that Saturday was devoid of interest beyond the usual trench routine, the only incident necessary to mention here being the improvements made to the main line of resistance in the sector occupied before dawn by Company C, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion.¹⁵⁹

In the P. C. of the 33rd Division likewise, there occurred nothing worthy of record until the arrival that evening of the

order issued by the Commander of the 17th Army Corps,¹⁶⁰ which contained much interesting information. It opened with the announcement that:

The line attained at the end of the day passes through the northern edge of the Bois de Chaume, Ravin du Plat Chêne, Richêne, southern edge of la Clairie de la Ferme Molleville, Ravin de Molleville, Ravin de la Reine, southern edge of the Bois de Chênes toward Point 78.07, northern edge of the Bois d'Ormont, at 79.05, a line traversing the wood from this point at 84.02, Tranchée de Koutahia as far as 86.00, thence the line attained the 11th October.

Our progression[s] at the northern and southern edges and in the interior of the Bois d'Ormont have given rise to some very hot actions in which a strong enemy aviation took part.

It then went on to say:

II. The present situation can be summed up as follows: The Exploitation Objective then the Normal Objective have been attained as far as Meridian 28. To the east of the latter there is a struggle for the Normal Objective (Bois d'Ormont, Bois de Moirey). The Intermediate Objective has been approximately realized in the Bois des Caures.

Under these conditions, successive local actions are still to be resumed with the object of reducing the *points d'appui* which are hindering our progress. Starting from strong points already acquired, these actions will be treated like large raids with the occupation of the terrain acquired (precise preparation by artillery, employment of trench mortars, caging by machine guns, etc.).

For the ensuing day, October 13, it was announced that the 33rd Division "will maintain possession of the Bois de Chaume and of Plat-Chêne and will assist the 29th U. S. I. D. when it moves forward. These reconnaissances will endeavor to maintain themselves on the saddle of St. Pantaléon where they will advantageously serve as covering and contact elements." The 29th Division, it was prescribed, "will resume the preparation of its operation on the Grande Montagne, an operation which it is desirable to realize as quickly as possible

since the enemy can only profit by every delay to re-enforce himself. It will make known as soon as possible the date and hour of this operation." The 18th French Division was "first of all to insure the total conquest of the Bois d'Ormont" and, apart from minor actions, to prepare for the major operation which had been fixed for October 14. The 26th French Division was exhorted "to realize the Intermediate Objective" and by thrusting forward its left to aid the 18th. The missions of the 10th Colonial Infantry Division and the artillery remained unchanged, but the latter was charged "to observe scrupulously the orders relative to the consumption of projectiles outside of attacks."

Sunday, October 13, 1918, was marked by increased artillery activity on both sides. Beginning at 1:30 A.M. and continuing until midnight, the enemy guns concentrated at various times on different localities throughout the area occupied by the 33rd Division and from 11 A.M. until 5 P.M. harassed a number of places intermittently. The bridge at Consenvoye, the road leading from that town toward Damvillers and the southern edge of the Bois de Chaume came in for their share, nor did the troops in the trenches escape this fire.¹⁶¹ The corps artillery devoted some attention to the Villeneuve Ferme at 5 A.M. and twelve hours later to a certain enemy battery which was causing considerable annoyance by its activity. The 52nd Field Artillery Brigade was comparatively quiet but made preparations to coöperate in the attack of the 29th Division next day, until announcement was received of a postponement for twenty-four hours.¹⁶² The supporting group under Colonel Smith indulged in considerable harassing fire and in the latter part of the day the "heavies" and the 2nd Battalion, 105th Field Artillery, bombarded Sivry-sur-Meuse quite heavily to cover the emplacement of a portion of the 102nd Trench Mortar Battery on

the ridge near Dannevoux. On October 11 and 12 two battalions of 75s had been moved forward with a view to increasing their effectiveness, and during the night of October 13-14 three batteries of the 106th Field Artillery followed suit by changing position from the Côte d l'Oie to the immediate vicinity of Gercourt-et-Drillancourt.¹⁶³

Under continuous shelling, rendered doubly onerous by constant enemy machine-gun fire, the troops of the 33rd Division in the advanced positions east of the Meuse spent a distinctly uncomfortable day.¹⁶⁴ The work of constructing the trenches constituting the main line of resistance was pushed throughout the night of October 12-13 and during the day.¹⁶⁵ The injunction from the division P. C. "to avoid any ugly salients in the line" resulted in the elimination of the projection caused by following the northwestern corner of the Bois de Chaume, and the modified trace connected the Tranchée de l'Hôpital with the position of the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, and thence ran eastwardly to Meridian 24, so that the entire system was located south of, and more or less parallel to, Grid line 82. During the course of the day it became manifest that these trenches would be ready for occupation as soon as the troops could be safely withdrawn under cover of the darkness but, about 2:30 P.M., the commanding officer, 131st Infantry, decided that two battalions were sufficient to hold this new line provided one battalion were in support and four in reserve.¹⁶⁶ The dispositions announced on the preceding afternoon but postponed for twenty-four hours¹⁶⁷ were accordingly modified by orders¹⁶⁸ designating the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, and the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, as the garrison for the main line of resistance. The former on the east was to extend its right as far as Meridian 24, where it was to connect with the 115th Infantry (58th Infantry Brigade), while the latter on the west,

in addition to the position which it then occupied, was to take over the sector held by the 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry, on the left. The support was to be formed by the 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, in its existing position in the *Tranchée du Câble* south of the Bois de Chaume. The 1st and 3rd Battalions, 131st Infantry, were to withdraw to the trenches south of Consenvoye at the eastern approach to the bridge over the Meuse where, together with the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 129th Infantry, likewise withdrawn from the front line, they were to constitute the reserve.¹⁶⁹ Major Allen, commanding the 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry, was left in command of the line and particular stress was laid upon the fact that "no troops will be in position north of grid line 82."

At 4:30 P.M. Major Allen issued the orders for the withdrawal of all troops from the front line and about 6 P.M. the movement began¹⁷⁰ under protection of the patrols extending as far as the second exploitation objective. The machine gun units accompanied or remained in place with the infantry battalions, depending upon the position assigned.¹⁷¹ Fortunately the enemy's artillery was comparatively inactive that night and the entire operation was successfully effected before daylight without appreciable losses.¹⁷²

Aside from the usual trench routine, that Sunday was a day of rest for the 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, and Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, in the *Tranchée du Câble* south of the Bois de Chaume, as well as for the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 132nd Infantry, Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, and the 1st Battalion, 104th Field Artillery, in the trenches in the neighborhood of Consenvoye.¹⁷³

That night terminated the active operations of the 66th Brigade in the advanced positions on the east bank of the Meuse and, apropos of them, the Colonel of the 131st

Infantry, who was in command of the front-line troops, makes the following trenchant comments in his report:¹⁷⁴

It was unfortunate that the troops on the right in this attack were unable to make progress as their advance would have insured the taking of strong positions on the Haraumont Ridge. Our troops were three times on the final objective overlooking the ridge and were obliged to fall back for lack of support to prevent being cut to pieces. The morning of Oct. 10, enemy forces appeared to be in confusion and hastily fled before our advance.¹⁷⁵ When the advance was not followed up machine gun detachments worked back through the woods on our open flank in continually increasing numbers, becoming very bold. It was not deemed advisable to shell and gas the woods on the right except as a last resort for fear of interfering with troops which were attempting to come forward and also [owing to] the danger of involving other troops occupying lines at the angle.

On the right bank of the Meuse were three units belonging to the 66th Brigade, Company C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, in the sector held by the 130th Infantry and the 3rd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 132nd Infantry, which were detached from the IIIrd Corps and were relieved in the Bois de Forêt during the night of October 14.¹⁷⁶

The depleted 65th Brigade, in the sector facing north along the left bank of the Meuse and extending from the Bois la Ville to the Bois de la Côte Lemont, spent a day of customary trench routine, enlivened by the spasmodic bursts of shelling to which it was subjected.¹⁷⁷ Two platoons from the 2nd Battalion, 130th Infantry, were sent to occupy the position between Dannevoux and the road leading to Consenvoye, and during the night of October 13-14 patrols were sent out along the entire front line,¹⁷⁸ while Company C, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, was withdrawn from the Bois d'en Dela and marched to the trenches half a kilometer south of Consenvoye, arriving about dawn on October 14.¹⁷⁹

The usual routine in the P. C. of the 33rd Division at

La Hutte in the damp Bois Bourrus was relieved by two events which require chronicling. The first was the issuance at 6 P.M. of Addendum No. 1 to Field Order No. 29 of October 10.¹⁸⁰ This addendum ordered the mutual transfer of the 65th and 66th Brigades, together with the command, to the east and west banks of the Meuse respectively.¹⁸¹ For this purpose the necessary reliefs were to begin on the night of October 14-15 and to be effected so long as the darkness continued, such reliefs as were unfinished that night to be completed the ensuing night. Utilizing the Consenvoye bridge, the 132nd Infantry was to relieve the units of the 65th Brigade, which were in turn to proceed directly to the east bank, and a similar relief of the elements of the 66th Brigade on the right bank was to be effected by the 65th Brigade. The two brigadiers were directed to make such adjustment as would return the machine gun units to their respective commands, and the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion was to be placed in reserve in the Bois de Forges. The relief on the east bank was to be under the supervision of the commanding general, 65th Brigade; that on the west bank under the 66th Brigade commander; and all details in connection with these reliefs were directed to be arranged during daylight on October 14. Apropos of the system of defense on the east bank of the Meuse, the construction of which had been ordered on October 10, particular emphasis was laid upon the fact that:

Par. 3 (a) (1), Field Order No. 29, with reference to line of Resistance in right sector, will be strictly carried out, adjustment only being made to connect up with the Line of Resistance of the troops of the 29th Division on the right. Care will be taken to avoid any ugly salients in the Line as assumed.

The second event of importance was the receipt that evening of the corps instructions for the operations of the

morrow, which was sufficiently brief to be quoted *in extenso*. It ran as follows:

HDQRS., the 13 October, 1918.

1ST ARMY U. S.

17TH ARMY CORPS.

STAFF

3RD BUREAU

No. 606-S/3.

ORDER NO. 8

- I. The line attained at the end of the day passes through N. edge of the Bois de Chaume, Ravin du Plat-Chêne, Richêne, South edge of la Clairière de la Ferme Molleville, Ravin de Molleville, Ravin de la Reine, S. edge of the Bois de Chênes as far as the point 78.07, North edge of the Bois d'Ormont at 79.05, line traversing the wood from that point to 84.02, Tranchée de Koutahia as far as 86.00, (and) from this point the line attained the 12th October.
- II. During the course of tomorrow, 14th, the 29th I. D. U. S., the 18th I. D. (and U. S. elements attached to it) and the 26th I. D. will resume the preparations of their particular operations prescribed by Order No. 7 of the 12th October.

The 18th I. D. will be kept informed of the means of fresh infantry which will be given it.
- III. The 10th C. I. D. will continue the organization of the disposition prescribed by Note No. 596-S/3 of the 12th October.
- IV. Mission unchanged for the 33rd I. D. U. S.
- V. Attention is called to the precautions to be taken against enemy firing with gas shells.

It is particularly important that masks be put on and not removed until the proper time and that standing still at points shelled with mustard gas be carefully avoided.

The General Commanding the 17th A. C.
H. CLAUDEL.

Monday, October 14, 1918, was a comparatively quiet day on the front of the 17th French Army Corps, although there was a fair amount of artillery and machine-gun fire on



both sides.¹⁸² In the direction of the Bois d'Ormont there was a comparative lull in the desperate struggle for the possession of that wood, but the enemy artillery was sufficiently active in that direction to cause the 29th Division to call upon the artillery of the 18th French Division¹⁸³ that afternoon for support for its 57th Brigade.

For the 33rd Division the day was likewise quiet and was principally devoted to preparations for the mutual relief to be effected that night between the 65th Brigade on the west bank of the Meuse and the 66th Brigade on the east bank. Aside from the transfer of the P. C. 123rd Machine Gun Battalion from Hill 281 to the trenches south of Consenvoye,¹⁸⁴ there were no changes of position by the 65th Brigade during the hours of daylight, but that morning the 3rd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, which had been operating with various units of the IIIrd Corps since October 4 and which had been relieved in the Bois de Forêt during the preceding night, appeared and took position close to the brigade P. C. at Hill 281, near which was Company C, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion.

On the east bank of the Meuse the withdrawal to the newly constructed main line of resistance and the various reliefs and changes of position made in consequence have already been described. On the morning of October 14, that system of defense was occupied by the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, on the west and by the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, in the eastern subsector,¹⁸⁵ its right in liaison at Meridian 24 with the 115th Infantry of the 58th Infantry Brigade, thus forming a concave arc from the eastern extremity of the Tranchée de l'Hôpital across the Bois de Chaume and the Bois Plat-Chêne to the point where the forty-centimeter line crossed Meridian 24.¹⁸⁶ The line was additionally defended by Companies A and D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion,¹⁸⁷ supplemented later in the day by the machine gun company of the

129th Infantry,¹⁸⁸ and the entire front was covered by patrols extending as far forward as the ridge overlooking the second exploitation objective, as well as on both flanks.¹⁸⁹ The 2nd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 131st Infantry, constituting the support in the Tranchée du Câble south of the Bois de Chaume was completely relieved at 8:20 P.M. by the 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry,¹⁹⁰ which during the day had occupied the trenches south of Consenvoye,¹⁹¹ together with the 1st Battalion of the same regiment,¹⁹² and the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 131st Infantry.¹⁹³ As a matter of fact, the trenches in the neighborhood of Consenvoye were filled that day with troops of the 33rd Division and in the total were included, in addition to the above, the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, Companies A, B, and D; 124th Machine Gun Battalion; the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 132nd Infantry; and three batteries of the 104th Field Artillery.¹⁹⁴

The guns of the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade were silent during the morning with the exception of the 155-millimeter howitzers, which supported the front of the 29th Division with accompanying fire across the Ravin de Moyemont and along the eastern end of La Vaux de Mille Mais from 7:20 to 8 A.M. and indulged in adjustment fire lasting from 9:30 A.M. until 2 P.M.¹⁹⁵ Later in the afternoon there was considerable counterbattery work, especially against the enemy guns near the Villeneuve Ferme, and covering fire to protect the construction of trench mortar emplacements on the Dannevoux ridge, ending after 10:20 P.M. with firing on the Magenta Ferme at the request of the commander of the 158th Field Artillery Brigade (29th Division).¹⁹⁶

At 10:30 A.M. the commanding general of the 66th Brigade issued his orders for the reciprocal relief between his troops and those of the 65th Brigade on the opposite bank,¹⁹⁷ and at 8:20 P.M. the 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, relieved

the 2nd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 131st Infantry, in the trenches south of the Bois de Chaume.¹⁹⁸ The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 132nd Infantry, together with Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, marched across the Consenvoye bridge, were joined later by the 3rd Battalion of that regiment, and relieved two battalions and the machine gun company of the 130th Infantry in the Dannevoux—Bois de la Côte Lemont sector;¹⁹⁹ these units in turn proceeded during the course of the night to Consenvoye;²⁰⁰ and at 8:45 P.M. the command of the entire forward sector of the 33rd Division on the east bank of the Meuse passed from Major Allen to the command of Colonel Myer of the 129th Infantry.²⁰¹ This latter officer had been placed in charge of an operation to be made next day by certain troops of the 65th Brigade acting in conjunction with the 29th Division, which was to undertake to reach its first exploitation objective,²⁰² and that evening issued his instructions accordingly. His operation order directed the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, to advance to an objective which may be described as a line originating at a point on the northern slope of the Ravin de la Vaux de Mille Mais, about four hundred meters southeast of the Chapelle St. Pantaléon, and extending thence past the houses at the western end of La Vaux de Mille Mais to Meridian 24. Combat liaison with the 115th Infantry (58th Brigade) was to be maintained by Company L, 129th Infantry, and a section from Company A, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion. Whenever possible, the movement was to be supported by fire from the left company of the 2nd Battalion and from the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, which were to remain in their actual positions, while the reserve was to be constituted by the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 129th Infantry, less certain detachments in the case of the former and less Companies K and L of the latter.

The troops were directed to be in place at 7 A.M and the zero hour was announced as 8 A.M.²⁰³

Although it was not until the ensuing day that the command of the sector of the 33rd Division east of the Meuse officially passed to the Commanding General of the 65th Infantry Brigade, and in spite of the fact that all the troops of the 66th Brigade did not leave the right bank until the morning of October 15, so far as the latter brigade was concerned its active operations east of the river terminated on the evening of October 14. Its achievements during the seven days commencing on October 8 with the advance of the forces under the command of Colonel Davis, 132nd Infantry, are thus admirably summarized by the commanding general of the 66th Infantry Brigade:²⁰⁴

During the period October 9th to 12th, our troops were three times in force on the final objective (2nd "Exploitation" Objective) and ready to continue their advance but were unable to do so because of our exposed right flank. Each time the enemy saw the opportunity to attack on our right and took quick advantage of it.

Machine Gun Companies attached to our Battalions fulfilled their missions and did excellent work in repelling counter attacks.²⁰⁵

During these operations our liaison throughout the Brigade was excellent and we were at all times able to communicate by telephone with the Battalions engaged.

The Officers and men of the Medical Corps deserve praise from all ranks for their bravery and industry during this action.²⁰⁶

From October 9th to 15th, our troops were constantly subjected to very heavy fire from Artillery and machine guns, gas, airplane attacks and fire from snipers. The difficulty of getting food to those in the line was very great owing to the presence of mustard gas, and to add to their discomfort it rained nearly every day. The above difficulties combined with lack of opportunity to sleep were serious in themselves but the men hung on without complaining and without thought of giv-

ing an inch unless ordered to do so. They showed conclusively the magnificent spirit of the American troops. Their fortitude under adverse conditions will always remain an example of heroic valor worthy of emulation.

During these operations the 66th Brigade was confronted by the 1st Austro-Hungarian Division, supported by German machine guns, gunners, and minenwerfers, the 232nd German Reserve Infantry Regiment and the 105th German "Sturm" Battalion,²⁰⁷ from which approximately 24 officers and 1,002 men were taken prisoners.²⁰⁸ The booty was considerable—2 pieces of heavy artillery, 14 guns (77-millimeter), 4 trench mortars, 11 anti-tank guns, 136 machine guns, 19 Lewis automatic rifles, 205 rifles, 100 rounds of trench mortar ammunition, 1,750 rounds of 77-millimeter ammunition, 30,000 rounds of Lewis gun ammunition, 72,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, 1,000 stick grenades, together with a large quantity of clothing, shoes, and other equipment.²⁰⁹ These results were, obviously, not achieved without loss, particularly in view of the exceptional strength of the enemy positions attacked and the incessant shell and machine-gun fire, gas, aeroplane raids, and counterattacks to which the 66th Brigade was subjected. Two officers and 53 men were killed; 7 officers and 597 men were wounded; but, in addition, gassing, exhaustion and other causes necessitated the evacuation to hospitals of not less than 643 men,²¹⁰ thus making the total casualties for those seven days 1,302.

Beyond the usual routine incident to such circumstances, the principal events of importance that day in the P. C. of the 33rd Division were the issuance of two training circulars²¹¹ and Confidential Memorandum No. 20 laying particular emphasis upon the necessity for economy in the consumption of artillery ammunition, and the receipt that evening of two orders from the Commander of the 17th French Army Corps. The operation order²¹² announced that the line reached that

day was broadly that of October 13, except that there had been an advance in the Bois d'Ormont, and that the "29th U. S. Infantry Division will execute at 8 A.M. the prescribed operation on the Grande Montagne." The 33rd American and the 18th French Divisions were to support this operation; the missions of the 26th French and 10th Colonial Divisions remained unchanged; and the 18th Division was to be relieved by the 26th American Division which had been placed at the disposal of the Corps Commander. The second order²¹³ gave detailed instructions for the operation next day in which the 29th Division, jumping off at 8 A.M., was to get possession by surprise of the fortified area constituting the clearing of the Molleville Ferme and its eastern and western outskirts, and to advance to the first exploitation objective, where it was to organize immediately a line of resistance. The artillery of the 33rd and 18th Divisions was to be coördinated with that of the 29th and supported by the guns of the 17th Army Corps, the preparation fire beginning at 7:30 A.M. The following instructions were given for the flanking divisions:

The 33rd U. S. and the 18th Infantry Divisions, aside from the assistance of their artillery directed in the plan of employment, will push forward respectively their right and left elements so as to accompany the attack of the 29th U. S. Infantry Division and in order to insure the continuity of the new front attained.²¹⁴

VI. OPERATIONS WITH THE 17TH FRENCH ARMY CORPS ASTRIDE THE MEUSE, OCTOBER 15 UNTIL RELIEF

On Tuesday, October 15, 1918, the mutual relief between the 65th and 66th Infantry Brigades was completed. Allusion has already been made to the relief of the 1st and 2nd Battalions and the Machine Gun Company of the 130th Infantry by the 132nd Infantry and Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, during the night of October 14-15.¹ As the distance from the trenches east of Consenvoye to those in the Bois la Ville was about seven kilometers, while those in the Bois de la Côte Lemont were fully four kilometers farther, considerable time was consumed by both the relieving troops and those relieved in covering this distance. It was long after dark when the operation was begun and late when it was finished.² At its completion the 130th Infantry marched by way of the Bois de Forges, crossed by the bridge leading to Consenvoye, turned south, and took position in the Tranchée de Magabe.³

During the night of October 14-15, the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion and Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, had left their stations in the vicinity of Consenvoye and crossed to the Bois de Forges,⁴ where Company C of the latter battalion was in position.⁵

The 131st Infantry left its positions in the neighborhood of Consenvoye, crossed during the morning to the west bank, and at noon Colonel Sanborn, acting for General Wolf, turned over the command of the sector of the 33rd Division east of

the Meuse to General King of the 65th Brigade. As the 131st Infantry was destined to compose the reserve of the 66th Brigade, it had been assigned positions in the Bois de Forges and the trench system extending from the southern point of that wood westward across the Béthincourt—Gercourt-et-Drillancourt road.⁶ Upon reaching their destination, the tired soldiers were made as comfortable as possible; supplies were issued to them, and they were given some much-needed clothing.⁷

Meanwhile, on the east bank, part of the 17th Army Corps was engaged in another attack. At 7:30 A.M. the artillery of the 33rd, 29th, and 18th French Divisions, supported by the corps guns, opened with preparation fire,⁸ and at 8 o'clock the 29th Division launched its attack. Simultaneously, the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, advanced under heavy shell and machine-gun fire to its objective one thousand yards to the front, maintaining combat liaison with the 115th Infantry (58th Brigade) on its right by means of a detachment consisting of Company L and a section of Company A, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion. The left company of that battalion and the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, made no movement but supported the attack by fire, while the 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, joined the 3rd Battalion of that regiment in the trenches south of the Bois de Chaume at 7 A.M. and these two units constituted the reserve. As a matter of fact, the 29th Division encountered such strong enemy machine-gun nests, that it was quite unable to reach its first exploitation objective; indeed, it made practically no advance, except that it did succeed in getting possession of the line of works along the southern edge of the Bois de la Grande Montagne.⁹ In consequence, the advanced position of the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, on its objective was perilously exposed and it had no alternative but to fall back to its former position

near the southern edge of the Bois Plat-Chêne and to make preparations for a resumption of the advance next day.¹⁰

The conclusion of this operation found the advanced troops of the 65th Brigade in the same positions as those which they had occupied early that morning, that is, the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, in the trenches of the main line of resistance extending from the western edge of the Bois de Chaume at the extremity of the Tranchée de l'Hôpital to Grid line 23, its front prolonged eastward to Meridian 24 by the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, and the entire position protected by a distribution of the machine gun company of this latter regiment¹¹ and Companies A and D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion. In their rear the 1st Battalion on the left and the 3rd Battalion on the right occupied the south of the Bois de Chaume and the Bois Plat-Chêne as far east as Meridian 24.¹² The advance that day accomplished nothing except in so far as it served as a diversion; it resulted in a loss of thirty-nine killed and wounded.¹³

The P. C. of the 65th Brigade was transferred from Hill 281 to a dugout in the Tranchée de Heraclée southeast of Consenvoye.¹⁴ In its immediate neighborhood were the 1st and 2nd Battalions and the Machine Gun Company of the 130th Infantry, Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion,¹⁵ and the 1st Battalion Headquarters and three batteries of the 104th Field Artillery.¹⁶

From 6 until 11 A.M. the enemy artillery shelled the neighborhood of Consenvoye and during the afternoon and night devoted considerable attention with his 77s and 150-millimeter howitzers to the Bois de Chaume and the Consenvoye-Étraye road as far as Meridian 24, incidentally flooding that portion just east of the former place with gas about 7:30 P.M. The Allied artillery responded with counterbattery and harassing fire but,¹⁷ in the 33rd Division, the principal

activity was confined to the supporting group, whereas the rest of the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade spent an exceptionally quiet day.¹⁸

The night of October 15–16 was characterized by the relief of Company B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, in the Bois de Dannevoux sector by Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion,¹⁹ and by the transfer of two artillery units to more advanced positions, the 2nd Battalion, 104th Field Artillery, moving from the southwest corner of the Bois de Forges to the wood situated between the Bois Juré and the Bois de Septsarges, north of the Ruisseau de Menomme,²⁰ and the 1st Battalion, 106th Field Artillery (155s), proceeding from its stations north of the Forges-Béthincourt road to the southwestern part of the Bois Sachet.²¹

In the P. C. of the 33rd Division at La Hutte, that Tuesday was singularly devoid of interesting features until the arrival that evening of two communications from the Corps Headquarters at Regret. The first ran as follows:

HDQRS. the 15th October, 1918.

1ST U. S. A.

17TH ARMY CORPS

STAFF

3RD BUREAU

No. 626–S/3

ORDER NO. 10

- I. No change in the line reached the 14th October, except in the region of the Grande Montagne where the 29th I. D. U. S. has realized some progress. (Information still uncertain).
- II. Tomorrow 16th October, *29th I. D. U. S.*: mission will depend upon the results of the action of the 15th.
33rd I. D. U. S.: retains its mission in respect to the 29th I. D. U. S.

18th I. D.: will execute the operation prescribed in its Special Order No. 881/3 of the 14th October, with the object of getting possession of the head of the

ravines to the N. E. of the Bois d'Haumont.

26th I. D.: will support the action of the 18th I. D. under the conditions fixed by the latter.

Will also maintain close contact along its entire front.

The General commanding the 26th I. D. will realize, as quickly as possible, a disposition in depth corresponding to a close frontal contact, and no longer to a mission of attack.

10th C. I. D.: Mission unchanged.

(Signed) CLAUDEL.

By authorization. Chief of Staff
METOURNEUR.

The second communication read thus:

HEADQUARTERS the 15th October, 1918.

17TH ARMY CORPS
STAFF
1ST BUREAU.

GENERAL ORDER NO. 135.

Officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the 29th and 33rd Infantry Divisions, U. S., 18th, 26th Infantry Divisions and 10th Colonial Infantry Division:

You have conquered la Wavrille, the Bois de Caures and that of Haumont. You have attained the crest of l'Ormont and got beyond le Richêne and the Bois de Chaume.

The Austro-Germans have lost, on an arc of 15 kilometers, these arrogant observatories which had defied the heroic defenders of Verdun.

The 8th October you advanced with a magnificent dash over formidable glacis and across powerful and deeply organized works.

On the following days you pursued a stubborn advance which overcame all the enemy's counter-attacks; you compelled him to bring up in haste numerous re-enforcements which did not succeed in taking from you one inch of ground.

5,800 prisoners, more than 50 guns, machine guns and *matériel* not yet counted, are the booty of these fine actions.

All of you, Infantrymen, Artillerymen, Engineers, Aviators, Staffs and Services, have had your part in the success.

American soldiers, French soldiers white and black, you have rivalled one another in valor and in the comradeship of

fighting to loosen the grip which still afflicts our immortal city.

I am proud to have commanded you.

The General commanding the XVII Army Corps,
H. CLAUDEL.

On Wednesday, October 16, 1918, the attack of the 17th Army Corps was renewed and was attended with more success on the part of the 29th Division than heretofore, inasmuch as it managed, after hard fighting, to carry the strongly organized enemy works in the clearing at the Molleville Ferme and to push its left forward to the first exploitation objective.²² Its movement was seconded by its own guns and those of the artillery group under Colonel Smith,²³ the 18th French Division and the corps, while its flanks were protected by advances on the east and west by the troops of the 18th and 33rd Divisions respectively. In the case of the latter this movement was made by the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, beginning at 9:30 A.M., and close liaison was maintained on this occasion with the 58th Brigade. In consequence this battalion reached its objective about 1 P.M. and promptly proceeded to consolidate its new position.²⁴ Its attack was duly supported by the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, and by the 1st and 3rd Battalions of its own regiment,²⁵ and was further protected by Companies A and B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, but none of these made any permanent change in their former positions.

There was likewise no change of station on the part of the 1st and 2nd Battalions and Machine Gun Company, 130th Infantry, nor on that of the 1st Battalion headquarters and three batteries of the 104th Field Artillery in the trenches south and southeast of Consenvoye.²⁶ That morning Company B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, which had been relieved in the Bois de Dannevoux during the preceding night, made a

short halt in this area but later in the day proceeded to a position farther in the rear near Brabant.²⁷

In the left sector of the 33rd Division west of the Meuse the advanced trenches in the Bois la Ville, Bois de Danneveux, and the Bois de la Côte Lemont were held by the 132nd Infantry,²⁸ reënforced by Companies C and D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, the former having relieved Company B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, the night before.²⁹ In their rear the entire 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, with the exception of the 1st Battalion, 104th Field Artillery (75s) near Consenvoye, was grouped within a triangle the apex of which was formed by the wood between the Bois Juré and the Bois de Septsarges and the base by that part of the Cuisy—Gercourt-et-Drillancourt road extending from the latter village westward to a point two kilometers distant and south of the Bois d'en Dela.³⁰ Less than a kilometer west and slightly north of this point is Côte 262, which was occupied that day by Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion,³¹ while the reserve of the 66th Brigade comprised the 131st Infantry in the trenches east of Côte 281 extending as far as the Bois de Forges,³² which was garrisoned by the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion,³³ and south of it Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion.³⁴

Save for the support given to the 29th Division by the special artillery group, divisional guns were in action very little that rainy day.³⁵ The enemy, however, shelled the Bois de Chaume and the front lines east of the Meuse during the afternoon as well as the Bois Juré, the Bois de Forges, and various other spots and roads in the division area on both banks, continuing his firing intermittently throughout the night of October 16–17.³⁶

Aside from an important memorandum dealing with hot meals, blankets, and proper clothing for the troops in the trenches,³⁷ there was no incident in the P. C. of the 33rd Divi-

sion worthy of note. During the evening Order No. 11 was received from the 17th Army Corps,³⁸ which announced the "front unchanged except in the sector of the 29th I. D., U. S. This latter has captured by hard fighting the organized region of the Clearing of Molleville." For October 17 the 33rd Division was directed to "continue to lend by its right the assistance which will be asked of it by the 29th I. D. U. S." which was in turn ordered to "pursue its advance methodically by its left (region of the Ravin de Moyemont and les Rapps) in liaison with the 33rd I. D. U. S." The relief of the 18th French Division by the 26th American Division was to continue; the 26th French Division was to maintain contact as usual; and the 10th Colonial Infantry Division was transferred to the 33rd French Army Corps. The final paragraph contained the following instructions:

III. The present conditions of temperature require that measures indispensable for the conservation of effectives be everywhere taken:

(a) Echelonment of troops—utilization of all shelters—interior reliefs at the proper time.

(b) Make every effort to procure warm food and drinks for all effectives.

On Thursday, October 17, 1918, the 29th Division effected a notable advance through the Bois de la Grande Montagne, which brought it to the summit of those heights. On the east the 18th French Division, in the process of relief by the 26th American Division, lent such assistance as was necessary to protect that flank and similarly on the west the troops of the 65th Brigade secured its left. The rain of the two preceding days continued with little interruption, as did the heavy shell and machine gun fire,³⁹ and the units in the main line of resistance in the Bois de Chaume and the Bois Plat-Chêne spent the day in improving their positions, a number of men being killed or wounded at their work.⁴⁰ That



REVTMENT AND CAMOUFLAGE—FORGES ROAD



CUMIÈRES—FORGES ROAD NEAR FORGES CREEK BRIDGE

night the 1st Battalion, 130th Infantry, relieved the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, in the trenches in the Bois Plat-Chêne,⁴¹ but some casualties resulted from the heavy artillery and machine-gun barrage which the enemy put down from 6 until 9 P.M. during this relief. A hostile aeroplane flew over the forward positions firing its machine gun but, although patrols were sent out to discover the reason, not the slightest movement by the enemy infantry could be detected.⁴²

There were no changes of position by any of the other troops of the 65th Brigade on the east bank of the Meuse nor by those of the 66th Brigade west of that river and, with the exception of some harassing and neutralization fire by the 105th Field Artillery,⁴³ as well as some registration by the howitzers,⁴⁴ that Thursday was a *dies non* so far as the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade was concerned.⁴⁵ On the other hand, the enemy batteries, although quiet during the morning, as was sometimes the case, were increasingly active during the afternoon and evening, shelling the rear as well as the forward areas, the Bois Sachet, Bois Juré, and Drillancourt, and devoting considerable attention to Consenvoye and Gercourt-et-Drillancourt and their immediate vicinities.⁴⁶

In the P. C. of the 33rd Division at La Hutte three events are to be noted: the issuance of Confidential Memorandum No. 22, directing that the practice of exchanging machine guns in a relief be discontinued; the instructions to the commander of the 65th Brigade to send patrols next day to the second exploitation objective and to report the results;⁴⁷ and the receipt that evening of the following order:

AT THE HDQRS. the 17 October, 1918.

1ST U. S. A.

17TH ARMY CORPS

STAFF

3RD BUREAU

ORDER NO. 12

NO. 639-S/3

I. The 29th I. D. U. S., pursuing obstinately its success of

yesterday, has attained by its left the region of the summit of la Grande Montagne (near Côte 370).

Our line ought to be staked from the West to East approximately as follows: Ravin de la Vaux de Mille-Mais—le-Differend—Grande-Montagne—Bois Bultruy (at 60.20)—Ravin de Molleville—the rest of the front without change.

II. Tomorrow 18th October:

33rd and 29th I. D. U. S.—in liaison, will insure the possession of the terrain acquired, will better their situation by the small operations which they deem useful and will have all reconnaissances made with a view to a resumption of the advance shortly.

These reconnaissances should be specially oriented toward the region of the Bois d'Étrayes, Bultruy and l'Houppy.

18th I. D. and 26 I. D. U. S. Completion of the relief; mission of liaison with the 29th I. D. U. S. and of reconnaissances to the North of the ravines of Molleville and de la Reine.

26th I. D.—Without change.

The General Commanding the 17th A. C.
(Signed) CLAUDEL.

B. A. The Chief of Staff
R. KASTLER.

On Friday, October 18, 1918, apart from the sending of patrols to the second exploitation objective for the purpose of reconnoitring the situation in advance of the normal line of patrols and aside from the occasional shelling to which the troops continued to be subjected, no incident of particular importance occurred in the right sector of the 33rd Division east of the Meuse. The relief of the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, by the 1st Battalion, 130th Infantry, during the night of October 17–18 has already been mentioned.⁴⁸ Upon its completion the command of the outpost and defense zones passed from Colonel Myer to Colonel Clinnin,⁴⁹ and the night of October 18–19 witnessed a second relief whereby the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, and Company A, 123rd Machine

Gun Battalion, were replaced in the Bois de Chaume by the 2nd Battalion and Machine Gun Company of the 130th Infantry respectively.⁵⁰ Before dawn on October 18 the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, rejoined the rest of that regiment in position south of the Bois de Chaume and the entire command withdrew to the trenches south of Consenvoye. Thus reunited, they acted as the brigade reserve,⁵¹ but there were no changes of position on the part of the other troops of General King's command that day. For the 66th Infantry Brigade on the west bank of the Meuse that Friday was even more devoid of important episode.

The issuance of a confidential memorandum and two training circulars constituted the principal events of note in the P. C. of the 33rd Division, until the receipt of an order from the 17th Army Corps announcing its relief by the 15th Colonial Division beginning on the night of October 19-20 and terminating on the morning of October 21. Warning orders were consequently sent to the three brigades, the 108th Engineers, the Train Headquarters, and the Division Machine Gun Battalion⁵² and, during the evening, an operation order was received from the 17th Army Corps⁵³ which announced that there were "no changes in the line reached the 17th October" and which gave the following instructions:

Tomorrow, 19th October:

Mission of the Infantry Divisions unchanged: to conform to the provisions of Order No. 12 of the 17th October insofar as concerns the reconnaissances to be effected and the maintenance of close contact. To organize the conquered terrain. The Generals commanding the 26th and 29th I. D., U. S., will draw up the plans of action asked for by Secret Note No. 650-S/3 of the 18th October.⁵⁴

Saturday, October 19, 1918, was a comparatively uneventful day so far as active operations by the 65th Brigade on the east bank of the Meuse were concerned. The relief of the

3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, and Company A, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, by the 2nd Battalion and Machine Gun Company of the 130th Infantry was effected without unusual incident and at its conclusion the 3rd Battalion withdrew to the support positions, occupying the Tranchée du Câble and the Tranchée du Cabestan by two companies and the Ouvrage du Chanois north of Consenvoye by the two remaining.⁵⁵ Company A, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, proceeded directly to the trenches south of Consenvoye,⁵⁶ where the entire 129th Infantry was located; the latter organization was suffering somewhat heavily from the enemy shell fire, which wounded eighty-six men that day.⁵⁷ In consequence of the reliefs effected on the nights of October 17–18 and 18–19, the entire forward positions were held by the 130th Infantry, its outpost line extending in a waving line from a point on the right bank of the Meuse a kilometer southwest of Sivry-sur-Meuse across the northern point of the Bois de Chaume and along the edge of the Bois Plat-Chêne to Meridian 24, while the main line of resistance was occupied by the 1st Battalion on the east and the 2nd Battalion on the west.⁵⁸ This defense system was also held by the Machine Gun Company of that regiment and by Companies C and D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion.⁵⁹ The troops spent the day strengthening their positions and that night patrols were sent to reconnoitre the ridge south of the Sivry-sur-Meuse–Réville road.⁶⁰ In the rear, aside from the movements which have been mentioned, there were no changes of position and the 1st Battalion, 104th Field Artillery, spent a comparatively quiet day in the trenches southeast of Consenvoye, as did Company B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, near Brabant.⁶¹ To the tired troops who had been in the line nearly six weeks came that afternoon the welcome news that they would shortly be

relieved by the 15th Colonial Infantry Division, and the requisite orders were issued accordingly.⁶²

For the troops of the 66th Brigade in the left sector of the 33rd Division on the west bank of the Meuse the day was marked by the preparations for the approaching relief, which was, in the case of the majority of the units, to occur that very night. Upon the arrival of the 5th Colonial Infantry (French) the 3rd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, at Hill 281 formed the head of the column on the road through Béthincourt, Chattancourt, La Claire, and Fromeréville, and marched to Camp Moulin Brulé,⁶³ followed by the 131st Infantry and Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, to the Bois de Nixéville⁶⁴ and the Bois Claude, and by the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion to Camp Moulin Brulé.⁶⁵ The headquarters, one battalion, and the train of the 108th Engineers proceeded by the road along the right bank from Cumières to the Citadel of Verdun.

The enemy artillery, quieter than usual during the morning, shelled the Bois de Chaume, Consenvoye and its neighborhood, Gercourt-et-Drillancourt, the Bois Juré, and the Bois Sachet intermittently during the rest of the day with high explosives, shrapnel, and gas.⁶⁶ The 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, restored to its normal organization by the dissolution of the supporting group which had operated more or less independently since the initial attack east of the Meuse on October 8, was more active than it had been during the days immediately preceding and devoted considerable attention to the vicinity of Vilosnes, as well as concentrating on Sivry-sur-Meuse about 9 P.M.⁶⁷

The division P. C. was more animated that Saturday than it had been for some time and additional warning orders were dispatched to the 66th Brigade, the 108th Engineers, and the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion. The arrangements

for the withdrawal of the troops were embodied in Field Order No. 30, issued that afternoon at 6:15;⁶⁸ the opening paragraph announced that "Under orders of the XVII French Corps this Division will be relieved by the 15th Colonial Infantry Division (French): the relief to be completed the morning of 21st October 1918."

During the evening an operation order was received from the 17th Army Corps,⁶⁹ which announced that there was no change in the line of the front and that on the following day the 33rd Division would make "movements preparatory to the relief." The mission of the 26th French Division was to remain as heretofore, while the 26th and 29th American Divisions were directed to continue their reconnaissances and preparations for a subsequent attack, as well as to effect the necessary work to strengthen the sector.

Sunday, October 20, 1918, was another chilly autumnal day, accompanied by a downpour of rain. About dawn the troops which had been relieved on the west bank of the Meuse during the preceding night reached the various destinations enumerated in the narrative for October 19.⁷⁰ Apart from the usual routine of trench life and preparations for further relief, the activities of the infantry and artillery of the 33rd Division that day were very light; even the guns were almost entirely silent.⁷¹ Similarly in the division P. C. at La Hutte there were only three incidents of importance. The first was the issuance at 3:45 P.M. of Addendum No. 1 to the field order of the previous day,⁷² which opened with the announcement that "Upon completion of the relief and moves directed in Field Order No. 30, this Division will be assembled in the rear zone of the XXXIII French Army Corps where it will remain under command of the XVII French Army Corps." This order was accompanied by a march table setting forth in detail the movements of the night of October 20-21, the fol-

lowing day and night, and the day of October 22, and it was specifically directed that "Movements will be carried out as a rule during the night. If the weather remains misty and dark, movements may begin after 3:30 P.M. and must be completed by 9 A.M."⁷³

The dispositions therein contained were based upon an order from the 17th Army Corps,⁷⁴ which stated that "In execution of the instructions of the General Commanding the 1st U. S. A., the 33rd I. D. U. S. after its relief which is to be terminated on the morning of the 21st, will be re-grouped in the rear zone of the 33rd A. C. [in the] region Faubourg Pavé-Dieue-Génicourt, where it will continue to be under the 17th A. C."

That evening an additional order was received from the corps⁷⁵ announcing that in its sector the situation that day was unchanged and that on October 21 there would be a "continuation of the operations of relief" between the 33rd and the 15th Colonial Infantry Division; that the mission of the 26th French Division remained as before; that the 26th and 29th American Divisions were to continue their "preparations for the operation for which the plans have today been co-ordinated at the Staff of the Army Corps."⁷⁶

With the exception of a few isolated units, all the remaining troops of the 33rd Division on both banks of the Meuse were relieved that night by the 15th Colonial Infantry Division. On the west bank the 1st and 2nd Battalions and Machine Gun Company of the 132nd Infantry, upon the arrival of the French relieving force, withdrew from the trenches in the Dannevoux and Bois de la Côte Lemont sectors and marched to the Bois de Forges, which was likewise occupied that night by Companies A, C, and D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion.⁷⁷ The 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, with the exception of the 105th Regiment which remained

near Gercourt until the following night, started about midnight for the Bois la Ville, the Bois de Nixéville, and Bois Claude.⁷⁸ Farther south the 108th Engineers were replaced in the Citadel of Verdun by Company D of that regiment from the neighborhood of La Claire and by Company E from Cumières, while the supply, ammunition and sanitary trains and the trench mortar battery were concentrated that night at the Casernes Bevaux and in the Faubourg Pavé in the environs of Verdun.⁷⁹

With the solitary exception of Company D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion—which remained in the trenches in the Bois Plat-Chêne until twenty-four hours later—the relief of the entire 65th Infantry Brigade was accomplished in the single night of October 20–21.⁸⁰ The first body of troops to move was a column of the brigade reserve comprising the 129th Infantry and Companies B and C, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, which proceeded about dark from the vicinity of Consenvoye across the river at Brabant to the Bois Delolime and the Bois du Chana, where it arrived about 11 P.M.⁸¹ The 130th Infantry and Company A, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, composed the second column which, upon being relieved in the outpost and defense systems, moved to the Bois Bourrus,⁸² arriving about dawn on November 21.⁸³ The 1st Battalion of the 104th Field Artillery at the Tranchée de Heraclée formed an independent column and that night rejoined the rest of that regiment en route from the Bois Juré to its first staging area south of the Verdun–Dombasle road.

Of the troops which had been relieved on the west bank of the Meuse during the night of October 19–20 and which had withdrawn to staging areas south of this same road, Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, marched from the Bois de Nixéville to Camp les Tamaris, which is situated north of the road from Récourt to Villers-sur-Meuse,⁸⁴ the

3rd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, from Moulin Brulé to Génicourt; and the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion made a long movement which brought it to the village of Rattentout, directly east of Dieue-sur-Meuse,⁸⁵ while the road along the left bank of the river was followed by the headquarters, Companies A, B, C, and D, and the train of the 108th Engineers, which proceeded from the Citadel of Verdun to Dugny, La Falouse and Belleray that night. The 131st Infantry made no movement but remained in the Bois de Nixéville and the Bois Claude until the morning of November 22.⁸⁶

On Monday, October 21, 1918, the P. C. of the 33rd Division was closed in the damp dugout at La Hutte in the Bois Bourrus at 8 A.M. and opened at the same hour in the comfortable Chateau Thomasseau de Cursey⁸⁷ at Dieue-sur-Meuse, ten kilometers south of Verdun, where it was joined by the headquarters troop and the various offices of the staff comprising the second echelon from Lempire. Apart from the usual work connected with such a movement as was then being made by the division, its activities that day were mainly confined to the issuance of a confidential memorandum on the subject of straggling and absenteeism and of a training circular prescribing a period of rest for three days for the purpose of putting the troops into proper condition after their long stay in the trenches, to be followed by a resumption of training.⁸⁸

During the morning Companies D and E, 108th Engineers, proceeded from the Citadel of Verdun to Haudainville and, far in their rear, the 108th Field Signal Battalion and the 108th Train Headquarters and Military Police began their march from Longbut to Ancemont. At 4 P.M. the 129th Infantry and Companies B and C, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, left the Bois Delolime and the Bois du Chana for rest billets in the area of Sommedieue, where they arrived about

midnight⁸⁹ and were joined by the P. C. of the 65th Brigade which was established in that town.⁹⁰ This column was followed by another composed of the 130th Infantry and Company A, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, which marched from the Bois Bourrus to the area of Rupt-en-Woëvre, arriving about 4 A.M. on November 22.⁹¹

Of the 66th Brigade, the 2nd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, and Companies A, C, and D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, started after dark from the Bois de Forges for Haudainville,⁹² followed as far as the Citadel of Verdun by the headquarters and the 1st Battalion of the 132nd. The night of October 21–22 likewise witnessed the relief of the two remaining units of the 33rd Division, 105th Field Artillery, near the Bois Juré,⁹³ in the sector on the west bank where the command had been turned over that morning to the 15th Colonial Infantry Division⁹⁴ and Company D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, in the Bois Plat-Chêne, the former proceeding south to the Bois la Ville and the latter marching to the Bois Bourrus.⁹⁵

On Tuesday, October 22, 1918, the movement of the 33rd Division continued in the direction of the Meuse between Dieue and Tilly. During the day or the course of the ensuing night the troops were grouped as follows: the 65th Brigade was concentrated on the line Sommedieue–Rupt-en Woëvre;⁹⁶ the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion was at Rattentout—where it had arrived during the night of October 20–21;⁹⁷ the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade extended from Dieue-sur-Meuse to the Bois la Ville,⁹⁸ its ammunition train and the trench mortar battery remaining in the Faubourg Pavé at Verdun; the 66th Brigade occupied the area southwest of Souilly within the serrated boundary formed by the roads Les Monthairons-Ferme–Ravigny–Récourt–Rambluzin,⁹⁹ its P. C. being established at Génicourt and Companies A, C, and D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, at le Petit Monthairon,¹⁰⁰ while Com-

pany B remained at Camp les Tamaris. The 108th Field Signal Battalion and the 108th Train Headquarters and Military Police occupied Ancemont, the 108th Engineers remained at Dugny, and the 108th Sanitary Train moved from Thierville to the Faubourg Pavé,¹⁰¹ while the extreme rear was brought up by Company D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, which was given a day of rest in the Bois Bourrus after its relief on the night of October 20–21.¹⁰²

The routine work in the P. C. of the 33rd Division at Dieue-sur-Meuse was enlivened by the receipt of an order from General Blondlat, commanding the 2nd French Colonial Army Corps,¹⁰³ received at 8:50 P.M., which announced that:

By order of the IIInd Army U. S., the 33rd I. D. U. S. now assembled in the zone of Dieue (see table of stations attached) is placed at the disposal of the IIInd C. A. C. so as to relieve the 79th I. D. U. S. in the sector of Troyon.

The movement of relief regulated by the General commanding the 79th I. D. U. S. will commence the 23rd October. . . .

In consequence of this information, warning orders were forthwith dispatched to the commanders of the 65th and 66th Brigades and the 130th and 131st Infantry to apprise them of the fact that the division had been transferred to the Second American Army and assigned to the 2nd Colonial Army Corps, as well as of the dispositions which they were to take in respect to this new relief.¹⁰⁴

Inasmuch as October 22, 1918, marked the termination of the stay of the 33rd Division in the sectors north of Verdun adjacent to the Meuse, a hasty résumé of its operations during that period may not be amiss. The first element of the division had entered the trenches there on the night of September 7–8, and the last unit was withdrawn on the night of October

21-22, a period of forty-four days. In the first instance the command passed to the 33rd Division on September 10 at 8 A.M.; in the latter it passed to the 15th Colonial Infantry Division on October 21, at 10 A.M. During the first few days the Verdun sector maintained its reputation of the preceding months as a "quiet sector" but, after the demonstration fire on September 12 at 1 A.M., it assumed a livelier aspect and the tremendous bombardment on the night of September 25-26 transformed it into as active a sector as existed on the entire Allied front. The attack of September 26, 1918, inaugurated a long and bitter struggle for the heights of the Meuse. During that six weeks, the enemy, heavily reënforced by every available reserve, fought with utmost desperation under orders to hold at all costs¹⁰⁵ the positions, which were vital to his forces, not only in that region but elsewhere on the western front. It was only by the most persistent and determined fighting for every foot of ground that any gain whatsoever was effected.¹⁰⁶ Of extraordinary natural strength and an important strategic point since Roman times, Verdun had been the scene of many a battle in bygone centuries and in 1916, of one of the most heroic struggles in history. For four years the heights north of the town and on both banks of the river had been occupied by the enemy who had fortified them with all the engineering skill that he possessed. The task of driving him from these powerful positions was therefore necessarily attended with heavy losses and, during the period that it was in the line in that sector, the 33rd Division alone suffered to the extent of 10 officers and 358 men killed; 94 officers and 4,569 men wounded, 49 men missing and 6 men captured, a total of 104 officers and 4,982 men. To these figures the attached units, such as the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, added their quota of 3 officers and 106 men, so that the total

losses of the command during its operations at Verdun amounted to 107 officers and 5,088 men.¹⁰⁷

In the attack of September 26, the mission of the 33rd Division was to cross the Ruisseau de Forges and to capture the Bois de Forges as well as the sector extending along the left bank of the Meuse to the Laiterie de Belhame. The Forges Brook, an insignificant stream in the dry season, was at that time much swollen by the constant rains of the preceding week and its approaches, always marshy, had then been transformed into a species of morass. The Bois de Forges, a veritable fortress of machine-gun nests, was one of the most formidable positions in the entire region of Verdun. Yet in spite of its task and notwithstanding the heavy enemy fire of artillery and machine guns, in exactly four hours and thirty minutes after leaving its trenches south of the valley of the Forges the 66th Brigade had covered five kilometers with its right and seven kilometers with its left, the Bois de Forges had been taken, and the entire left bank of the river as far as Dannevoux was in its possession. A frontal attack, combined with a turning movement which took the position in the rear, had proved irresistible and had resulted in the capture in a few hours of this stronghold, which the enemy believed impregnable. So rapid was the advance of the American troops that the enemy found himself surrounded before he awoke to the situation¹⁰⁸ and even the enemy commander narrowly escaped being taken prisoner.¹⁰⁹ It is questionable if any plan other than that actually adopted could have achieved the same result in so short a time.¹¹⁰ Various factors contributed to the success for which the plan was primarily responsible. In addition to its speed, the attack was executed with a precision well-nigh incredible considering the attending circumstances and it was greatly assisted by the artillery support, by the relentless offensive shown by the troops—which, it is consid-

ered, was materially developed by their thorough training in bayonet work—by the judicious employment of such auxiliary weapons as the trench mortars and the 37-millimeter guns, and by the effectiveness of the machine guns. The commanders of these units displayed unusual initiative and resourcefulness in the barrage with which they completely smothered the enemy resistance.¹¹¹ Indeed, in this respect their work marked an innovation of sufficient merit to evoke the following remarks, under the heading, "Machine Guns," in the Notes on Recent Operations No. 3, published for the information of the American Expeditionary Forces:¹¹²

"One division made excellent use of its guns to neutralize a woods which it passed by and later attacked from the rear. A great number of prisoners were thus captured with very small losses."

During the period from September 27 to October 7, 1918, the active operations of the 33rd Division were reduced to the minimum, being confined to trench warfare incident to securing the right flank of the First American Army in its attacks in the vicinity of the Meuse in the so-called Meuse-Argonne battle. This period demanded much patience and fortitude on the part of the officers and men, who were limited to a passive rôle despite the incessant fire of the enemy's artillery and machine guns from the dominating positions on the east bank, as well as gas and aeroplane attacks; and who were without the satisfaction of any activity other than that of trench routine, rendered doubly uncomfortable by the almost constant rain.

On October 6, the 33rd Division was transferred from the IIIrd American Corps to the 17th French Army Corps and two days later part of the 66th Brigade participated in the initial attack of that corps east of the Meuse, in the region which had witnessed the most desperate fighting during the

great battle of Verdun in 1916. This delicate operation—which has already been described in detail—¹¹³was fruitful in its results and on the following day the front of the 17th Army Corps had been advanced almost as far as the front of the IIIrd Corps had been at the conclusion of the second day of its attack nearly a fortnight earlier.¹¹⁴ As was customary with the troops of the 33rd Division, the forces under Colonel Davis attained the objective assigned them—the second exploitation objective—but their exposed right flank, unprotected owing to the inability of the 58th Infantry Brigade (29th American Division) to keep pace with them, invited attack and the enemy was quick to seize the opportunity thus presented. A vigorous counterattack delivered at the close of October 8 by picked German storm troops compelled the 132nd Infantry to fall back to the southern edge of the Bois de Chaume, although its extreme left was not relieved until later. The remainder of the 66th Brigade, reënforced by some units of the 65th Brigade, was at once thrown across the river, and at 10 A.M. next day the ground relinquished had been completely retaken. From that moment the enemy was powerless to dislodge General Wolf's command. Three times the second exploitation objective was reached and a farther advance could doubtless have been made had not the right flank remained exposed and unsupported.¹¹⁵ The dominating positions of the enemy enabled his artillery and machine guns to render this line untenable, but a sheltered position was consolidated a short distance in the rear, sufficiently near this objective to render abortive any attempt by the enemy to retake it. Under the most intense fire of artillery and machine guns, coupled with occasional counterattacks and constant gas and aeroplane attacks, the troops of the 66th Brigade held their ground with unflinching determination, and by so doing they rendered secure the possession of the sector immediately

adjacent to the right bank of the Meuse and served as a pivot upon which the Commander of the 17th Army Corps swung his centre and right northward and northeastward over a terrain which the enemy contested with a resistance frenzied in its desperation.

At the end of seven days the defense of this sector devolved upon the 65th Brigade in consequence of the mutual relief between it and the 66th Brigade. For six days¹¹⁶ its task was performed with similar vigor and determination, and the line in the Bois Plat-Chêne advanced by virtue of an operation on October 16 undertaken in conjunction with the 29th Division on the right.¹¹⁷ Although the lion's share of the fighting in the Verdun sector fell—largely through the chance of location—to the lot of the 66th Brigade, the 65th Brigade had executed its equally important, if less conspicuous, task with an efficiency in nowise inferior and under circumstances exacting great resoluteness on the part of the troops.¹¹⁸ Although restricted to a defensive rôle, patrols and raids were made constantly and, on the west bank of the Meuse, in spite of a decidedly exposed location, the outposts were pushed forward to the river's very edge.¹¹⁹ To the successes achieved the 65th Brigade contributed its full share, notwithstanding the difficult position in which it served. An excellent description of its situation is given by one of its regimental commanders:¹²⁰

The terrain in and around the Outpost Lines on the west bank of the Meuse in the Bois-de-la-Côte-Lemont and Bois-de-Dannevoux was a most difficult one to operate from, although it constituted an exceedingly strong defensive position. To the front and right flank was the low flatland along the west bank of the Meuse. The enemy occupied the woods and high hills to the north and northeast which afforded them superior observation. This coupled with their personal knowledge of the ground gave them a tremendous advantage



REVTMENT, FORGES-CONSENGVOYE ROAD



ERECTION OF REVETMENT WALL OVER SHELL HOLE, FORGES ROAD

over our forces and proved costly to us because of the extreme accuracy of their artillery fire. Our aerial service was hampered because of lack of visibility and in many cases were not as aggressive as would be desired.

The terrain on the east bank of the Meuse occupied by our troops was similar to that on the west bank, our outpost lines being dug in, in the woods on the forward slope of a series of hills with the enemy in a commanding position in the Haraumont Heights where he had the advantage in observation and knowledge as to the exact nature of the ground occupied by our troops, again giving him superior advantage in artillery fire which cost us considerable losses by way of casualties.

In the face of an enemy on commanding heights which afford perfect observation and field of fire, to construct bridges and to force the passage of a river and a canal flanked by extensive marshes is a difficult operation. Yet such a feat was successfully accomplished at Brabant and Consenvoye on October 8 by the forces under the command of Colonel Davis, notwithstanding the presence of the enemy in great strength in the Bois de Consenvoye, the Bois de Chaume, and the dominating positions on the heights of Haraumont. Indeed, one of the most distinguished military writers of the present time has described this achievement as "one of the brilliant feats of the war."¹²¹

That all operations astride a river are of necessity fraught with risk is generally conceded. The difficulty of keeping liaison between the elements of a command separated by such an obstacle is recognized. That any mistake committed in such an operation is likely to prove disastrous if the enemy be powerful and alert has been demonstrated in many a defeat in the past. Nevertheless, from October 8 to 20 the 33rd Division maintained its positions astride the Meuse without the slightest interruption in its means of communication and without the loss of a foot of ground except during the

brief period between the enemy counterattack at the close of day on October 9 and ten o'clock the following morning. Against the vigor of the attack made on October 10 even picked German storm troops were powerless to stand, and their subsequent attempts proved equally unavailing. Throughout the entire time from that morning until its relief, the 33rd Division—in spite of the fact that its troops on the right bank were peculiarly exposed to attack—protected and firmly secured the right flank of the American Corps on the west bank and the left of the 17th French Army Corps on the east bank, thereby contributing materially to the successful issue of the battle that wrested from the enemy positions of exceptional strength of which he had held undisputed possession for more than four years.

VII. IN THE TROYON-SUR-MEUSE SECTOR WITH THE SECOND AMERICAN ARMY AND THE 2ND FRENCH COLONIAL ARMY CORPS

Wednesday, October 23, 1918, was a day of rest for the 33rd Division within the area Sommedieue—Génicourt-sur-Meuse—Rambluzin—Bois la Ville—Faubourg Pavé,¹ where it was rejoined late that afternoon by Company D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, from the Bois Bourrus where it had staged during the day succeeding its relief in the Bois Plat-Chêne on the night of October 21–22.² The tired troops were given such opportunity as the local facilities permitted to bathe and change the clothing which many of them had worn almost continuously for more than six weeks, and the day was spent in cleaning personal effects, equipment, harness, etc.,³ as well as in such reorganization as had become urgent after the long stay in the trenches.⁴ So far as the units were concerned the day was otherwise devoid of incidents worthy of mention, whereas the division P. C. at Dieue-sur-Meuse was the scene of decided activity.

In conformity with the order received on October 22 from the 2nd Colonial Army Corps,⁵ warning orders regarding the relief of the 79th Division were sent to the 65th and 66th Brigades, the 108th Engineers, and 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, followed at 6 P.M. by the issuance of Field Order No. 31,⁶ which directed that the 65th Brigade should relieve the 157th Brigade of the 79th Division in the subsector known as Connecticut, the 130th Infantry taking over the positions

of the 313th Infantry in the front lines and the 129th taking over those of the 314th Infantry in the rest area. Similarly the 66th Brigade was to relieve the 158th Brigade of the 79th Division in the subsector Massachusetts, the 132nd Infantry superseding the 316th Infantry in the advanced lines and the 131st Infantry relieving the 315th in the rest area. The 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, the 108th Engineers, and the 108th Field Signal Battalion were likewise to relieve corresponding units of the 79th Division. The 65th Brigade was to furnish two platoons of infantry and a section of machine guns as a reënforcement garrison at the Fort de Troyon, and the company of the 79th Division at Lavignéville was to be replaced by a similar unit from the 66th Brigade. Announcement was made that special orders concerning the artillery would be issued later⁷ and that the command in the three sectors would pass at 8 A.M. on October 26.⁸ In pursuance of these instructions the necessary orders were issued by the two brigades concerned⁹ and in consequence the 2nd Battalion, 130th Infantry, relieved the 1st Battalion, 313th Infantry, in reserve, including two companies in the Bois de Combres and two in the Bois des Épargés,¹⁰ while the 108th Engineers proceeded from the Dugny area to Rupt-en-Woëvre, Ranzières, and Mouilly where they staged until the following night, these movements taking place during daylight. During the night of October 23-24 the 131st Infantry marched from the area of Camp Monthairons southeast to the village and chateau of Thillombois, Woimbey, and Camp Gibraltar, where it relieved the 315th Infantry of the 79th Division in the rest area at those places,¹¹ and that same night two battalions of the 132nd Infantry advanced from the region of Les Monthairons and Génicourt-sur-Meuse east to Dommartin-sur-Montagne where they staged preparatory to the relief which they were to make next day.¹²

At 9:20 P.M. the following order reached the division P. C. at Dieue-sur-Meuse:

2ND C. A. C. AT THE H. Q. the 23 October, 1918.
STAFF *Secret*
3RD BUREAU MODIFICATION OF SPECIAL ORDER No. 816.¹³
No. 3/396-T/3

By order of the 1st Army U. S., the 52nd Brigade of Field Artillery ceases to be attached to the 33rd I. D. U. S. and passes to the 79th I. D. U. S. The 55th Artillery Brigade ceases to be attached to the 79th I. D. U. S. and passes to the 33rd I. D. U. S.

In consequence:

- 1st. The 52nd Artillery Brigade will retain its present positions in the zone of Dieue.
- 2nd. The 55th Artillery Brigade is not relieved in the sector of Troyon.

By Order. The Chief of Staff,
ALAMBEY.

It was not until Thursday, October 24, 1918, at 10:55 A.M. that the order directing the relief of the 79th Division by the 33rd, which had been issued by the Headquarters of the Second American Army at Toul on the twentieth,¹⁴ reached the division P. C. at Dieue-sur-Meuse. It was followed at 4:10 P.M. by a corrected copy of the same order¹⁵ bearing a like date and identical with the original order except that the first paragraph was modified by an insertion in two places so that it read:

"1. The 33rd Division (less Artillery) will relieve the 79th Division (less Artillery) in the Troyon Sector."¹⁶ Both the original and the corrected copy fixed this relief for the nights of October 24-25 and 25-26, but, as has already been seen, this operation had been begun on the twenty-third pursuant to the orders from the 2nd Colonial Army Corps.¹⁷ However, orders were promptly issued relieving the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade from the 33rd Division and attaching

it to the 79th Division,¹⁸ with which it marched back to Verdun and went back into the line on the nights of October 28 and 29, its positions on the morning of October 30 being all within a radius of less than two miles from the spot where the 1st Battalion of the 104th Field Artillery was relieved on the night of October 20–21.¹⁹

On October 24 all the necessary reconnaissances were made for the reliefs to be effected that night, and the 314th Infantry (157th Brigade, 79th Division) in the rest area of the Troyon sector was relieved before darkness by the 129th Infantry which occupied Ranzières, Ambly, Tilly-sur-Meuse and Récourt.²⁰ The night of October 24–25 witnessed several such operations whereby units of the 79th Division were replaced by similar organizations of the 33rd. On the north, the 2nd Battalion, 313th Infantry, which was holding the Bois des Éparges and the right section of the subsector Connecticut, known as the "Centre of Resistance Augusta," was relieved by the 3rd Battalion of the 130th Infantry²¹ and Company B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, took over a portion of the gun positions of the 311th Machine Gun Battalion (157th Brigade) in the same subsector.²² In the subsector Massachusetts on the south, the 2nd Battalion, 316th Infantry (158th Brigade, 79th Division), in the Centre of Resistance Concord and the 3rd Battalion of that regiment in Le Chanot Bois were relieved by two battalions of the 132nd Infantry,²³ while the remaining battalion of the 132nd moved forward to Dommartin-la-Montagne preparatory to relieving the 1st Battalion, 316th Infantry, on the following night.²⁴ In this same subsector, part of the positions of the 312th Machine Gun Battalion (158th Brigade) near the Longeau Ferme were taken over by the 124th Machine Gun Battalion but, as this latter command had a long distance to march, it was long after daylight before it occupied the support and reserve positions

and, as a matter of fact, the entire relief was not finished until next evening.²⁵ The engineer regiment and train of the 79th Division was relieved in the Grande Tranchée de Calonne—which runs in the rear of, and more or less parallel to, the advanced positions described above—by the 108th Engineers and 108th Engineer Train.²⁶ Still farther in the rear the 108th Field Signal Battalion replaced the corresponding unit of the outgoing division at Troyon-sur-Meuse,²⁷ and on the west bank the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion relieved the 310th Machine Gun Battalion of the 79th Division.²⁸

On Friday, October 25, 1918, there were no movements of importance by the 33rd Division except for the first stage of the relief effected by the 124th Machine Gun Battalion that morning, the reënforcing of the French garrison at the Fort de Troyon by a detachment from the 129th Infantry,²⁹ and the arrival at Troyon-sur-Meuse of the 108th Field Signal Battalion from Ancemont and the 108th Sanitary Train from Faubourg Pavé.³⁰ Incident to taking over a new sector, numerous arrangements were obviously necessary³¹ and during the course of the day instructions were received from General Blondlat, commanding the 2nd Colonial Army Corps, announcing that:

By order of the IInd Army U. S., the 39th French I. D. will be relieved in its sector by the extension of the front of the 28th I. D. U. S. to the west and the 33rd I. D. U. S. to the east as far as the line:

Western edge of the Bois des Haravillers and du Rébois—Hattonchâtel (IVth A. C. U. S.)—Ailly-sur-Meuse (2nd C. A. C.)—Brasselte (IVth A. C. U. S.)—Mécrin (IVth A. C. U. S.) which after the completion of the relief will become the new limit between the 2nd C. A. C. and IVth A. C. U. S.³²

This relief, which was to be regulated by the general commanding the 39th French Infantry Division, to commence on October 27, and to terminate at 8 A.M. on October 29,

entailed the occupation of the outposts and positions of resistance west of this new boundary by one battalion of the 131st Infantry and by the two companies of the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion on the night of October 27-28, while one battalion of the 131st was to be posted in reserve, its staff and three companies at Chaillon and one company and the regimental band at St. Mihiel. The 62nd American Field Artillery Brigade (Brigadier General George W. Burr) at Mesnil-la-Tour was to be utilized, less its howitzer regiment, for the dual purpose of relieving the artillery of the 39th French Infantry Division and of furnishing one group to the 33rd American Division.

The night of October 25-26 saw the relief of the last units of the 79th Division on the Troyon-sur-Meuse sector. At 9 P.M. the 124th Machine Gun Battalion finished taking over the remaining positions of the 312th Machine Gun Battalion near the Longeau Ferme³³ and the 1st Battalion of the 316th Infantry was relieved in the Centre of Resistance Montpelier in the Massachusetts subsector by the battalion of the 132nd Infantry which had spent the day at Dommartin-sur-Montagne. In the Connecticut subsector on the north, the 3rd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 313th Infantry, in the Centre of Resistance Providence was replaced by the 1st Battalion and Machine Gun Company of the 130th Infantry,³⁴ while Companies A, C, and D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, completed the relief of the machine-gun units of the 79th Division in that sector.³⁵

On Saturday, October 26, 1918, at eight o'clock in the morning the P. C. of the 33rd Division closed at Dieue-sur-Meuse and opened at the same hour at Troyon-sur-Meuse, at which time the entire command in the Troyon, Connecticut, and Massachusetts subsectors passed from the 79th Division to the Commanding General, 33rd Division, and to the com-

manders of the 65th and 66th Infantry Brigades respectively.³⁶ During the course of the morning the Division Commander, accompanied by his two Aides-de-Camp and his Adjutant, proceeded to St. Mihiel to report his arrival and to pay his respects to General Blondlat, commanding the 2nd Colonial Army Corps.³⁷

The interest that day in the P. C. of the 33rd Division was confined to the instructions given to the commanders of the 66th Brigade, the 131st Infantry, and the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion in respect to the extension of the front, the relief of the 39th French Division and the movements to be effected in consequence,³⁸ and to the receipt of an announcement from the 2nd Colonial Army Corps that "The Staff of the 62nd F. A. Brigade, U. S., is placed at the disposal of the General comdg. the 33rd I. D. U. S. to whom it will present itself during the course of the 27th October."³⁹

As has been seen, the 58th Field Artillery Brigade, which formed part of the 33rd Division and was trained with it at Camp Logan, Houston, Texas, separated from the division at that camp and, upon completion of its training at Ornans, France, was attached to various other divisions during the continuance of hostilities.⁴⁰ On the British front the 33rd Division was supported by British artillery; in the operations near Verdun the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, belonging to the 27th Division, was attached to it for a period of seven weeks;⁴¹ upon reaching the Troyon sector the 33rd Division was given the 55th Field Artillery Brigade, belonging to the 30th Division⁴² and previously attached to the 79th Division, which was unable to move owing to scarcity of horses. By virtue of its location in the sector, the mission of supporting the 65th Brigade fell to the 114th Field Artillery (Colonel Luke Lea) on the north and a like task in respect to the 66th Brigade to the 113th Field Artillery (Colonel

Albert L. Cox) on the south, while the 115th Field Artillery, 155-millimeter howitzers (Colonel Harry S. Berry), devoted its activities to any point in the entire sector where they were required. The *modus operandi* of the 55th Field Artillery Brigade is thus described by its operations officer:⁴³

The Divisional front extended almost 12 kilometers. The line of outposts were from two to four kilometers in front of the main line of resistance which extended along the military crest of the Côtes de Meuse. On conference with the infantry a plan of Artillery Defense was developed whereby each infantry outpost support was protected by a barrage with density of fire 1 round per minute per 12 meters. The battery positions all being on the heights another barrage could be put down in front of the Line of Resistance in case the infantry had to fall back.

The plan of C. P. O. fire covered all points of assembly, communication trenches, etc. These were called for by name—also the Heavy C. P. O. was fired on barrage signal as part of the barrage. Both barrages and C. P. O.s were arranged as normal and eventuals so as to get concentration in case of local attacks.

A Plan of Reprisal fire was employed. Harassing fire was done mostly at night and according to schedule.

A plan of defense against tanks was developed so that all routes by which tanks could approach would be covered by enfilade fire. . . .

Counter battery work was done when possible. In some instances enemy batteries were located by the Artillery O. P. S. and by the S. R. S. but owing to our infantry operating in the vicinity we were not allowed to fire on them. The enemy employed roving guns which would operate from positions very close to the front line. We likewise used roving guns with considerable success.

The plan mentioned above grew out of a series of conferences beginning on October 27, to which General Bell summoned all his subordinate commanders and at which the endeavor was made to profit by, and to improve upon, the experience gained by other organizations which had occupied

that sector.⁴⁴ The plan thus evolved met with the approval of the Corps Commander⁴⁵ and proved extremely effective throughout hostilities.

For the troops of the 33rd Division, the ten days from October 27 to November 5, 1918, inclusive, afforded little of interest to break the monotony of trench life, except the constant harassing fire to which they were subjected by the enemy artillery⁴⁶ and the unusual activity in the way of continual patrols and frequent raids.⁴⁷ These were initiated as a result of orders from the Corps Commander on October 27 to make such reconnaissances as were necessary to determine the exact front held by the enemy, who was reported to have withdrawn his line of outposts in the sector opposite the 39th French Division.⁴⁸ They were followed next evening by instructions to "have reconnaissances executed this very night destined to sound the enemy lines and to bring back prisoners"⁴⁹ and by orders on October 29 from General Bullard, commanding the Second Army, "to take contact with the enemy by means of patrols" and "to make 1 or 2 raids as soon as possible in order to make prisoners."⁵⁰ The first of these operations took place on the night of October 28-29, and they were of daily occurrence thereafter,⁵¹ as will be seen in the subsequent narrative.

During this period of ten days several events transpired which deserve at least brief mention. On October 27 there was received from the 2nd Colonial Army Corps an important addition to the plan of defense for the zone of St. Mihiel⁵² and, in compliance with General Blondlat's instructions,⁵³ the commanders of the 65th and 66th Brigades were informed of the extension of the division boundary, the new limits were defined, and these officers were directed to make a study of this sector with a view to its reorganization. They were likewise notified that each brigade subsector was to be held by one regiment in the line and one regiment at rest. The commander of

the 55th Field Artillery Brigade was instructed to consult with his fellow brigadiers and to formulate a plan for the employment of his guns and for any change in the location of his units deemed advisable.⁵⁴ On the night of October 27–28 the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion relieved corresponding units of the 39th French Division in the sector to the south.⁵⁵

Monday, October 28, was noteworthy for the issuance of two confidential memoranda by the division P. C., and that night the 2nd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, relieved the 2nd Battalion of the 131st Infantry which proceeded to Deuxnouds, while the 3rd Battalion, with the exception of Company I and the regimental band which marched to St. Mihiel, moved to Chaillon.⁵⁶ During the day a reconnaissance was made by a small party from the 130th Infantry, while that night a similar operation was repeated by the same regiment and a patrol from the 132nd Infantry was successful in taking some prisoners.⁵⁷

Tuesday, October 29, 1918, was characterized by a few events of importance. Only a tentative scheme for the reorganization of the division sector was submitted to the Corps Commander and letters were sent to the commanding generals of the 65th and 66th Brigades informing them that "combat liaison with units of adjoining Divisions and Inter-Brigade and Regimental [units] will be assured by means of mixed posts."⁵⁸ That night the hearts of 1,200 men of the 33rd Division were gladdened when special trains from Villers-sur-Meuse carried them off for a leave of seven days at Aix-les-Bains.⁵⁹ Two daylight patrols by the 130th Infantry⁶⁰ were supplemented during the night of October 29–30 by a reconnaissance by a detachment from that regiment and by four other patrols, one from the 132nd Infantry being successful in taking a few prisoners, whereas another was stopped north of Doncourt-aux-Templiers by a heavy concentration of



TANK MINES AND ROAD OBSTRUCTIONS, TROYON SECTOR

gas.⁶¹ As a matter of fact there were a number of areas which were decidedly "unhealthy" that night owing to the greatly increased activity of the enemy artillery all along the front of the 33rd Division, particularly in the vicinity of Fresnes-en-Woëvre, where it concentrated more than 2,300 gas and high explosive shells between 10:15 P.M. and 1:10 A.M.⁶²

Wednesday, October 30, 1918, was a busier day in the P. C. of the 33rd Division at Troyon-sur-Meuse than those immediately preceding it. Instructions were sent to the Division Engineer Officer to maintain a liaison officer and detachment with each brigade, the latter to assist in the siting, tracing, and construction of positions. The commander of the 55th Field Artillery Brigade was directed to submit daily a report embodying the firing which he contemplated delivering during the ensuing twenty-four hours, together with the objectives proposed, and five confidential memoranda dealing with a variety of subjects were issued.⁶³ A note was received from the Chief of Staff of the 2nd Colonial Army Corps announcing that the Corps Commander approved of the tentative plan of occupation of the front submitted on October 29 but requested a map showing the positions of the troops in the line and the submission before November 5 of a plan embodying the entire program of defensive organizations.⁶⁴

Beyond a slight change of position by Company A, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion,⁶⁵ there were no movements of importance during the day, but that night the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion was relieved by Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion,⁶⁶ and this latter command took over all the gun positions of the subsector Massachusetts.⁶⁷ There were two patrols sent out during the day and one that night; two of these failed to obtain contact with the enemy

but the daylight patrol from the 130th Infantry had a lively fight in the Tranchée du Moulin de Saulx.⁶⁸

Thursday, October 31, was chiefly notable for the receipt of a letter from General Blondlat on the subject of the necessity for protection against gassed areas and for daily reports specifying such localities and the casualties resulting from gas shelling.⁶⁹ This caused the issuing of Training Circular No. 188 on the subject of the "New Gas Discipline" which was to be enforced in consequence,⁷⁰ and was followed by Confidential Memorandum No. 32 requiring all telephone lines in the division to be tested daily.⁷¹ Notification was also received that the 136th Field Artillery (less its 2nd Battalion) was en-route to join the 2nd Colonial Army Corps and upon its arrival would be assigned to the 33rd Division.⁷² At 7:15 A.M. telephonic instructions were received from the corps that the "Alarm Exercise" would begin immediately; the units were promptly apprised of that fact⁷³ and the entire division was held in readiness for any eventuality until 5:30 P.M., when the "recall" was sounded.⁷⁴

An interesting side light on the condition of the enemy forces opposite the 33rd Division was revealed in the interrogatory of two Austrian prisoners taken by the 132nd Infantry, which is thus described in the operations report issued by the division P. C. that day.⁷⁵

Statements of 2 prisoners 63rd Inf. Regt., 35th A. H. Div. This Regt. was stationed at La Beuville and small units sent forward to establish outposts in front of Bois des Épinés. Prisoners stated that at times these outposts were established 400 yds. out of the woods. They also stated that they had orders not to fire on patrols or small armed parties attempting to enter the woods, but to ambush them and take them prisoners. Prisoners stated that the Inf. in this vicinity was mostly Austro-Hungarian, but the Artillery was German. Morale was stated to be very low, food scarce and of poor quality and that the discipline and work exacted from German troops and

officers was unbearable. There has been no withdrawal of any of the positions occupied by the enemy on our front. This was established by observations and daylight reconnaissances. Patrols reported that the enemy is strengthening his positions in the vicinity of Hill 233, work was heard on the suspected posts, 46.8—58.4.

A number of patrols were made during the course of the day and night. The suspected enemy post east of the Woël-St. Benoît-en-Woëvre road at the northwest point of the Bois des Haudronvilles was discovered by patrols from the 130th Infantry to be actually occupied,⁷⁶ but a night patrol from the 132nd Infantry explored the plain in the region of St. Hilaire, Butgnéville, and the Bois de Warville without encountering or even seeing any signs of the enemy.⁷⁷

On the night of October 31–November 1 another detachment of 1,200 men from the 33rd Division entrained at Villers-sur-Meuse for Aix-les-Bains for a leave of seven days.⁷⁸

On Friday, November 1, 1918, aside from the customary daily routine work, the activities of the P. C. of the 33rd Division at Troyon-sur-Meuse were confined to the issuance of two training circulars⁷⁹ and the transmission to the commanders of the infantry brigades of the order from the 2nd Colonial Army Corps respecting reports on the subject of localities shelled with gas.⁸⁰ During the course of the day the following document was received:

AT THE H. Q. the 1st November, 1918.

Secret.

SERVICE NOTE.

The Staff [of Marshal] FOCH makes known that it is possible that the Armistice with AUSTRIA may be concluded shortly.

The Marshal gives the order that endeavor be made to learn what the Austrian Divisions are doing along our front [and]

To watch [them] very closely.

2ND C. A. C.
STAFF
2ND BUREAU
No. 822C/2

H. Q. the 1st November 1918.
True Copy Notified to the General
commanding the 33rd I. D. U. S.

It is therefore necessary to augment the
activity of the patrols and, more than ever,
to capture prisoners.

By Order. The Chief of Staff,
ALAMBEY.

During the course of the day an Austrian deserter gave information that the 63rd and 64th Austro-Hungarian Regiments had been relieved by German organizations. A patrol from the 132nd Infantry penetrated the plain as far as the Bois de Warville without discovering any indications of the enemy.⁸¹ One patrol from the 130th Infantry had a similar experience but the other failed to return that day;⁸² as a matter of fact, it had a variety of encounters which will be noted presently.

On Saturday, November 2, 1918, the division P. C. issued a confidential memorandum on the subject of the assignment of machine gun companies to infantry battalions, a memorandum relating to the grooming of horses, and an important amendment to Training Circular No. 190. The object was to develop leaders among the various units.⁸³

Beyond the relief of Company L, 132nd Infantry, in the outpost positions at Wadonville by Company M of the same regiment, there were no changes of position worthy of mention. The usual patrols were made that day and during the course of the ensuing night—one from the 132nd Infantry skirted the western edge of the Bois de Warville but failed to gain contact with the enemy.⁸⁴ The missing patrol sent out on Friday by the 3rd Battalion of the 130th Infantry returned during the course of the night after a somewhat checkered career and reported that it had found the enemy trenches and dugouts northeast of Saulx-en-Woëvre unoccupied but that it

had discovered extensive and carefully camouflaged works about eight hundred meters farther down the Longeau. An enemy patrol was encountered along this stream and a lively fight ended in its retreat with a loss of two men killed and one wounded. The American patrol then pushed on and at a point about one kilometer southwest of Marchéville collided with another enemy party about forty strong. Another lively fight resulted in the killing of four or five of the enemy who then beat a hasty retreat but formed in considerable strength under cover of machine-gun fire from the copse at the eastern terminus of the Tranchée du Moulin de Saulx. So heavy was this fire that the American patrol had no alternative but to withdraw to its own lines, its losses confined to two men missing.⁸⁵

The commanding officer of the 136th Field Artillery reported his arrival to General Kilbreth,⁸⁶ whose guns continued their customary firing—1,190 rounds being consumed that twenty-four hours ending at 6 P.M.—⁸⁷and that night concentrated heavily on the Bois d'Harville and the Bois de Moulotte in conformity with orders from the Second American Army.⁸⁸

That Saturday afternoon General Blondlat, the corps commander, paid a short visit to General Bell and expressed his wish that the 33rd Division undertake some operations of greater magnitude than the usual normal patrols.⁸⁹

Sunday, November 3, was singularly devoid of interesting events. The issuance of one training circular,⁹⁰ two inter-regimental reliefs,⁹¹ a number of patrols which were wholly unsuccessful in discovering any trace of the enemy,⁹² the usual fire of the divisional artillery, and a heavy enemy bombardment of the neighborhood of the village of Trésauvaux during the night of November 3–4,⁹³ constituted the only happenings worthy of even passing mention.

By contrast, Monday, November 4, 1918, was characterized by a number of episodes of importance. Apart from the daily routine, the division P. C. sent out Confidential Memorandum No. 34 prescribing the precautions to be taken against aerial observation and the securing of proper protection by means of camouflage, and a training circular dealing with the subject of casualties resulting from mustard gas. Orders were also dispatched to the commanders of the 66th Brigade and the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion to send certain detachments to the Fort du Camp des Romains and to the Fort des Paroches as reënforcement garrisons.⁹⁴ At 7:45 P.M. a "secret, urgent" order was received from the Corps Commander directing that reconnaissances strong enough to penetrate the enemy's outposts zone be launched against well-chosen points with a view to securing prisoners.⁹⁵ As a matter of fact, during that day and the ensuing night⁹⁶ numerous patrols were made which scoured most of the plain, especially between St. Hilaire and Jonville, captured or killed a number of the enemy, and secured some important identifications.⁹⁷

At 8:30 P.M. the commanding general of the 65th Infantry Brigade issued orders for a raid against the Chateau et Ferme d'Aulnois to be made by two companies of the 130th Infantry and, in transmitting a copy of this order to G-3 of the division, announced: "If able to pull it off Wednesday morning will do so."⁹⁸

That Monday a notable contribution to human history was made. At 3 P.M. the Austrian plenipotentiaries signed an armistice embodying all the terms imposed by the Allies and a cessation of hostilities between the forces of the Allies and those of the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government on land and sea and in the air was officially announced⁹⁹ and on the following day went into actual effect on the various fronts.

On Tuesday, November 5, 1918, at 8:25 A.M. there was received at the message centre of the 33rd Division at Troyon-sur-Meuse a communication from General Blondlat, the corps commander, emphasizing the necessity for maintaining close contact with the enemy in the event of his withdrawal and specifying the dispositions which he wished to be taken to insure this desideratum.¹⁰⁰ Beyond the usual daily routine, there was substantially no event of importance that day at the division P. C., except that the complete plan of defense of the Troyon-Chaillon sector was finished and delivered to the Corps Headquarters at St. Mihiel.¹⁰¹ At 6 P.M. the 33rd Division passed from the 2nd Colonial Army Corps to the 17th French Army Corps,¹⁰² although the actual notification of this transfer was not received until the following morning.¹⁰³ The fire of the divisional artillery was reduced to a minimum owing to the fact that the front was covered by patrols,¹⁰⁴ but these had scant success in their operations and¹⁰⁵ nine men belonging to one patrol sent out by the 130th Infantry were surrounded by the enemy and captured.¹⁰⁶ The troops devoted a large part of the day to the training prescribed,¹⁰⁷ and the raid against the Chateau et Ferme d'Aulnois by two companies of the 130th Infantry was fixed for 5:45 A.M. on November 6 but was subsequently revoked. Later in the day the commanding general of the 65th Brigade, having completed the arrangements to his satisfaction, ordered it to be carried out on Thursday, November 7, at 5:45 A.M.¹⁰⁸ The 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 132nd Infantry in the front lines were relieved by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 131st Infantry during the night of November 5-6,¹⁰⁹ when the unusual activity of the enemy machine guns and the number of flares displayed in various parts of the opposing lines betokened either nervousness on the part of the foe or the occupation of the sector by new troops. As a matter of fact, the great amount of circulation observed tended to establish the correctness of the latter supposition.¹¹⁰

VIII. IN THE TROYON-SUR-MEUSE SECTOR WITH THE SECOND AMERICAN ARMY AND THE 17TH FRENCH ARMY CORPS

On Wednesday, November 6, 1918, the principal events in the P. C. of the 33rd Division were the issuing of Confidential Memorandum No. 36—which announced the transfer of the division to the 17th French Army Corps at 6 P.M. on November 5—and the arrival of letters for the commanders of the three brigades and the 108th Field Signal Battalion requesting them to submit the names of men to attend the school of liaison between aviation and line troops which had been newly established at Saizerais.¹

Preparatory to the raid on the morning of November 7 two companies of the reserve battalion of the 130th Infantry were moved up to reënforce the 1st Battalion, which occupied the positions of the two companies destined for the raid² and, similarly, Company D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, proceeded from its reserve position to Fresnes-en-Woëvre, where all its guns were in readiness before daylight.³ A patrol from the 130th Infantry narrowly escaped being ambushed in the copse at the extremity of the Tranchée du Moulin de Saulx, but took revenge by killing twelve and capturing one of the enemy, luckily without suffering any loss itself.⁴ On the right a patrol from the 131st Infantry penetrated the plain almost to Butgnéville but met no resistance anywhere.⁵ Such information as had been obtained at that time indicated that the troops immediately in front of the 33rd Division were principally machine gunners but all signs pointed to the fact that

the enemy had no intention of withdrawing at that time.⁶ The Machine Gun Company, 131st Infantry, occupied the Longeau Ferme and the 1st Battalion relieved the 2nd Battalion of the 132nd Infantry⁷ which rejoined its regiment in the rest area.⁸

Thursday, November 7, was ushered in to the accompaniment of considerable activity. From 11:30 P.M. on the sixth until 2 A.M. on the following day the enemy artillery gassed a large area around St. Rémy and thus greatly hampered the bringing up of ammunition for the 55th Field Artillery Brigade. The 113th Field Artillery was the principal sufferer, since the gassing of the terrain in its immediate vicinity prevented three batteries from obtaining the smoke shells needed for the raid and Battery C was completely neutralized by gas shells making direct hits on its casemates.⁹

At 2:40 that morning the "T. S. F." at the P. C. of the 33rd Division picked up the following wireless message from Marshal Foch to the German High Command:

The German plenipotentiaries desire to meet Marshal Foch to ask him for an armistice.

They will have to present themselves at the French outposts coming by the road Chimay-Formies-La Capelle-Guise.

Orders have been given to receive them and to direct them to the point of rendezvous.¹⁰

At 5:45 A.M. occurred the raid against the Chateau et Ferme d'Aulnois, in which Companies A and C, 130th Infantry, participated. Starting from the trenches east of Fresnes-en-Woëvre under cover of a heavy fire from seven batteries of 75s and four of 155s under the immediate command of Colonel Lea¹¹ and supported by the guns of Company D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion,¹² Company A on the right and Company C on the left of the road running north to Ville-en-Woëvre advanced rapidly against the chateau, which is situ-

ated in the midst of the farm of the same name, east of the road just mentioned and about three hundred yards south of the highroad from Verdun through Haudiomont, Pintheville, and Harville to Metz. The Chateau d'Aulnois was occupied by a force of approximately a platoon from the 60th Landwehr Regiment of the 13th German Division, and these defenders were quickly overpowered, nine were killed, one officer and twenty-one men were made prisoners, and two heavy and four light machine guns were captured.¹³ At 6:25 A.M. the raiding companies were safely back in their own trenches, after an operation crowned with success—doubtless due to the fact that the carefully prepared plan for this affair had been carried out with extraordinary precision.¹⁴ In this raid only one man was slightly wounded; indeed the principal losses fell upon the artillery, which suffered seventeen casualties from gas shelling.¹⁵

That same morning two patrols from the 131st Infantry¹⁶ scoured the plain northeast of Doncourt-aux-Templiers but, although one remained out until nightfall, neither was successful in locating the enemy.¹⁷

Aside from the issuance of Training Circular No. 193 announcing the establishment of a course of training in liaison between aviation and line troops at Saizerais, the P. C. of the 33rd Division sent out two very important instructions.¹⁸ Field Order No. 32 announced:

Pursuant to orders from the Second Army, the IV Corps will develop the situation by reconnaissances in force by attacking on D day at H hour, with 2 Brigades of Infantry, in the direction of Bois de Warville.

The 65th Brigade was accordingly directed to attack Marchéville at the appointed time with one battalion, having another battalion in support, and the 66th Brigade was to attack the Bois d'Harville in like manner, while the division



BRIDGE, ST. HILAIRE, TROYON SECTOR



BRIDGE BETWEEN ST. HILAIRE AND BUTGNÉVILLE

artillery was instructed to support these operations by the requisite box and creeping barrages. Two battalions of artillery were to be placed at the disposal of the Commanding General of the IVth American Corps and the commanders of the infantry brigades were directed to submit plans for these raids not later than 5 P.M. that same day.¹⁹

Field Order No. 33 instructed the 129th Infantry to relieve the 130th in the Connecticut subsector beginning on November 9, and in consequence the necessary reconnaissances were made that day by the former regiment.²⁰

At 10:40 A.M. the ensuing telegram was received from the Chief of Staff of the Second American Army:

The following telegram received from G. H. Q. repeated for your compliance:

"H. A. E. F., Nov. 7, 1918, Commanding General, Second Army, A. E. F., November 7, 1918, 6:00 A.M., the following message from Marshal Foch's Headquarters transmitted for necessary action:

'If Parliamentarians present themselves at any point on the front to submit a request to Marshal Foch, they will be stopped at the front line Division. The Division will immediately inform Marshal Foch of their status and the object of their mission. They will be detained at the Division until Marshal Foch has made known his reply.' Acknowledge.

MCANDREWS,"

HEINTZELMAN.²¹

At 8:15 P.M. a communication was received from the 17th Army Corps²² quoting in English a telegram sent at 4:25 P.M. by the Chief of Staff of the Second American Army to the Corps Commander announcing that, inasmuch as the 35th American Division was to arrive in the area of the 17th Army Corps on November 9 and was to be billeted west of the Meuse, General Bullard "directs that all elements of the 33rd Division on the west bank of the Meuse and south of the line Thillombois-Woimbey both exclusive, be moved east of the

Meuse in the 33rd Division area before ten hours November 9th." In transmitting a true copy of the above order to General Bell for execution and the necessary instructions for the evacuation of the zone south of that line, the Chief of Staff of the 17th Army Corps announced that the battalions then cantoned at Récourt, Tilly, and Woimbey were not affected thereby; that the Corps Commander was contemplating a regrouping of the brigade reserve regiments on the right bank of the Meuse and accordingly desired that on November 10 a map be sent him embodying the requisite locations; but that no regiments were to be moved except upon orders of the Corps Commander.

Not to be outdone by his fellow brigadier, General Wolf had issued orders on November 6 to Colonel Sanborn to make a raid against St. Hilaire with two companies of the 131st Infantry, and during the course of November 7 the date and hour for this operation were fixed for November 8 at 5:30 A.M.²³

The night of November 7-8 witnessed the completion of the relief of the 35th Division by the 81st Division (Major General Charles J. Bailey) in the extreme right sector of the First American Army and immediately north of that held by the 33rd Division.²⁴

The night of November 7-8 was also noteworthy for four patrols which were attended with more than average success. Of the two sent out by the 130th Infantry, to operate between Champlon and Marchéville, the reconnoitring patrol was late in returning and achieved but little; the combat patrol cleaned up the copse at the eastern terminus of the Tranchée du Moulin de Saulx, a favorite lurking place for the enemy, and captured one man who was so badly wounded that he died on the way back.²⁵ The first patrol from the 131st Infantry encountered no one, whereas the second captured ten prisoners

and had a lively time getting back under heavy artillery and machine-gun fire.²⁶ Indeed the raid that Thursday morning stirred the enemy artillery into renewed activity²⁷ and that night certain of the divisional batteries were heavily shelled.²⁸

Friday, November 8, 1918, opened with another raid. The attacking force was composed of two provisional companies, numbering one hundred men each, from the 131st Infantry, the whole under the command of Captain William M. Wilson. The party assembled at the road junction in the Bois de Thillot and proceeded at 1:10 A.M. via St. Maurice, Woël, and Doncourt-aux-Templiers to the Ruisseau de Moutru, their movement impeded by a number of hindrances such as wire of various sorts, barricades, and a destroyed bridge. One platoon was sent to the Moncel sawmill southwest of St. Hilaire to cut off escape in that direction and the remainder of the force reached the east bank of the brook southeast of St. Hilaire at 5:35 A.M. Ten minutes later the barrage came down in front of it, stood for fifteen minutes, and began to creep forward,²⁹ whereupon the front rank plunged through the stream and formed on the jumping-off line. A reconnaissance to the front and a short distance forward along the Doncourt-St. Hilaire road revealed no trace of the enemy but a similar operation toward the St. Hilaire-Butgnéville road resulted in a white flare being sent up. This was immediately followed by a burst of enemy machine-gun fire, which forced the troops to take refuge in shell holes, and twenty-six other machine guns promptly opened upon them. This fire was apparently too much for thirty men, who started to fall back, whereupon orders for withdrawal were at once given by the officer in command. The retirement was made in perfect order, with frequent halts to permit volleys to be delivered. The route taken lay across country in order to minimize the casualties, but machine-gun fire was encountered, followed by

heavy shelling of the area in front of Wadonville, while the St. Hilaire-Doncourt road was deluged with "whizz bangs," large shells, and overhead shrapnel. In due time this raiding force got back to the lines of the 131st Infantry with a loss of only one man killed and three wounded. One lone prisoner constituted the sole capture made³⁰ but, inasmuch as he belonged to the 439th Regiment, the order of battle in that sector of St. Hilaire was confirmed.³¹

As a matter of fact the capture of this prisoner, coupled with that of the two noncommissioned officers and eight men of the 210th Regiment of the 45th German Division taken near the Bois de Warville by Patrol No. 5 of the 131st Infantry,³² confirmed the presumed order of battle of the enemy³³ and supplied extremely important information as to the composition of the hostile forces opposite the 33rd Division. This was announced in Bulletin No. 114 issued by the 117th Army Corps that afternoon³⁴ which contained the following account:

ORDER OF BATTLE.

The enemy opposes to our Division in line 3 Divisions on the front Chateau d'Hannoncelles-Jonville.

From the west to the east:—13th Landwehr Division, 94th Division, 45th Reserve Division.

The Order of Battle of the regiments of the 13th Landwehr Division and 94th Division has not changed. . . .

The prisoners of the 210th Regiment captured at the Bois de Wavrille declare that the regiment is in liaison with the 211th (Reserve Regiment) on their left. The 210th has only one battalion in the first line. It is probable that the 45th Reserve Division has its 3 Regiments in line echeloned in great depth.

The Order of Battle of this Division from west to east should be:—210th, 211th and 212th [regiments].

HISTORY OF THE 45TH RESERVE DIVISION.

[This Division] is composed of the 210th, 211th and 212th Reserve Regiments. Recruited in Pomerania.

Formed in September, 1914, the 45th Reserve Division participated in the Battle of Ypres and remained in Belgium until about the middle of 1916. In September it went through, with heavy losses, the British attack at Courcellette and Thiepval.

In 1917 this Division fought on the Aisne and at the Chémin des Dames, then held sectors at Éparges, in Flanders, north of St. Mihiel and in the region of Bohain.

It participated in the German offensive of the 21st March, 1918, in the direction of Ham. It was twice engaged near La Fère-en-Tardennois after the attack of the 27th of May and we found it again in the Argonne where it sought to arrest the American advance in the last days of September. Aside from serious losses in wounded, 412 prisoners remained in our hands during the first fortnight of October.

Relieved about the 20th of October, the 45th Reserve Division was reported in the Woëvre at the beginning of November in the sector of Jonville, previously occupied by the 35th Austro-Hungarian Division.

Until then this Division has been considered as a very good unit but its effectives in line do not now exceed 40 to 45 rifles per Company and it has not obtained any rest after its relief in the Argonne and its re-engagement in the Woëvre. . . .

INDICATIONS OF RETREAT:

The prisoners of the 210th Reserve (Regiment) have not heard any project of retreat mentioned.

Our constant observations report several fires in the region of Conflans and explosions in the region of Chambley and in the outskirts of Marchéville.

The daily routine in the division P. C. was relieved by a few communications out of the ordinary. Two letters were sent to the Corps Commander, one apprising him that the 1st Battalion, 135th Field Artillery (75s), and the 1st Battalion, 136th Field Artillery (155s), had been designated to be placed at the disposal of the IVth American Corps, the other relating to the garrisons for the forts in the sector. Two training circulars³⁵ and the annex to the plan of defense, entitled "Conduct in case of retreat of the enemy,"³⁶ were issued.³⁷ The

following interesting communication emanating from Marshal Foch was received at 8:15 P.M. that day:

Secret. STAFF [at] LAHEYCOURT—8 November 1918—
4 hours to STAFF [at] REGRET.

General Commanding-in-Chief telegraphs the 7th November as follows:

“It can happen that the enemy may spread the rumor that an armistice is signed in order to deceive us. There is none; let no one cease hostilities of any sort without information from the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief.”

IIND A. U. S. 17TH ARMY CORPS STAFF 3RD BUREAU No. 823-S/3 33RD I. D. U. S.	True copy notified for execution to the General commanding the 33rd I. D. U. S. At the H. Q. the 8 November 1918 By Order. The Chief of Staff, R. KASTLER.
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During the hours of daylight that Friday no patrols were sent out by the 131st Infantry, which was engaged in preparations for a new raid against the village of St. Hilaire in conformity with orders from the commanding general of the 66th Brigade, by whom the date and hour were fixed as November 9 at 5:30 A.M.³⁸ On the other hand, the 130th Infantry was decidedly active that day. Company F drove the enemy out of the copse at the eastern extremity of the Tranchée du Moulin de Saulx, which was promptly occupied and held in spite of continuous shelling, while another patrol found Bussy deserted and proceeded to take possession of it.³⁹

For the majority of the troops of the 33rd Division the day was spent largely in the training prescribed and, except for a few minor changes of positions, there were no movements of any consequence. Preliminary to relieving the 130th Infantry⁴⁰ during the night of November 9–10, the 129th Infantry made the necessary reconnaissances and such other preparations as are requisite in an operation of this nature.⁴¹

That Friday was particularly notable for the arrival of

the German plenipotentiaries at the Chateau de Francfort, belonging to the Marquis de l'Aigle, where they were ushered into the presence of Marshal Foch, who was attended by General Weygand, his chief of staff, and Admiral Wemyss of the British Navy. The principal events of that brief conference were picked up by wireless at 12:50 P.M. that day and published to the 33rd Division by a G-2 bulletin which ran as follows:

The German plenipotentiaries have received, Friday morning, at the General Headquarters of the Allies, the conditions of an Armistice. Also gave them the privilege either to refuse or to accept them within 72 hours ending Monday morning at 11:00 A.M. (French time).

The German proposition for an immediate temporary suspension of arms was rejected by Marshal Foch.

A German courier carrying the text of the conditions for an Armistice was sent to Spa, no other way of communication being practical.

Please to acknowledge receipt and transmit as soon as possible, by courier, your latest instructions.

A new committee of delegates is not necessary for the present.

ERTZBERGER.

The German plenipotentiaries for an Armistice beg the German High Command to send immediately the two officers of the Navy and one officer of the General Staff.

Later, on November 8, a second G-2 bulletin was issued, containing the following information for the officers and men of the 33rd Division:

From: GERMAN PLENIPOTENTIARIES to the GERMAN HIGH COMMAND.

The courier, Captain Paul Helldorf, will cross the lines between 6:00 and 8:00 hours in the evening (French time) in a German automobile. He left La Capelle and followed the Haudroy-Roquigny-Fourmis-Trélon road. Please assure his passage.

Officers of the General Staff and 2 Naval Officers have crossed the lines and followed the same itinerary.

Please indicate by T. S. F. the day and hour of their arrival at the French advance posts.

The French High Command will take the necessary measures to assure their passage.

(Signed) VON WINTERFIELD.

A fair example of German methods which, in this instance, proved a temporary obstacle to one of their own plenipotentiaries, was the following wireless message picked up by the division station at 11:35 that evening:

To the GERMAN HIGH COMMAND:

The German Captain, von Helldorf, whose passage has been announced by General von Winterfeld, is waiting for the German fire to cease in order to enter the German lines by the La Capelle-Fourmies Road. The French have ceased firing at 18:00 hours.⁴²

Saturday, November 9, 1918, was an active day for the 33rd Division. At 3 A.M. a strong patrol, composed of an officer and forty other ranks, from the 131st Infantry pushed out into the plain but, upon reaching Wadonville, was confronted by an enemy barrage and therefore returned at 7 A.M. without having encountered any hostile parties or having learned anything of importance.⁴³

The second raid against St. Hilaire was organized by Major Francis M. Allen, commanding the 3rd Battalion of the 131st Infantry and, like the former, was composed of two provisional companies of one hundred men each. As Major Allen was taken ill, the raid was placed under the command of Captain James C. Stockwell. The zone of action, limits, and objective were identical with the raid of the previous morning. At 5 A.M. the divisional artillery opened with destructive fire against St. Hilaire which lasted for forty-five minutes. Smoke and high explosive shells were also thrown on Marchéville, Butgnéville and the southwest edge of the Bois d'Harville, this fire continuing until 6:30 A.M.⁴⁴ At 5:35 the



BRIDGE ON HARVILLE-MANHEULLES ROAD, FORGES SECTOR



BRIDGE AT MARCHÉVILLE, TROYON SECTOR

raiding companies were formed up across the St. Hilaire—Butgnéville road, facing the former village, and at 5:45 A.M. the raid was launched. The advance was made exactly as scheduled, the troops passing through and around the town, which was encircled with wire entanglements except at the point of entrance of the road from Maizeray. At no place was any resistance met and indeed the only enemy seen were two men who beat a hasty retreat at the commencement of the attack. Only wrecked machine-gun posts were discovered and at 8:30 A.M. the raiding companies reached their own positions empty-handed but luckily without having suffered casualties.⁴⁵

Aside from the usual daily routine, the situation and operation reports rendered to the Corps and General Headquarters and two confidential memoranda⁴⁶ constituted the only communications emanating from the division P. C. that Saturday⁴⁷ worthy of recording here. At 11:15 P.M. there was delivered at the message centre Secret Field Order No. 18, issued by the Headquarters Second Army on November 9, 1918, at 18:30 hours; this announced that the “reports received indicate that the enemy is withdrawing progressively on our front, from west to east, leaving a shell to cover his departure” and that “the First Army is pushing forward on our left.” It therefore directed the Second Army to carry out the mission prescribed in Field Order No. 13 under date of November 1,⁴⁸ and ordered this movement to “commence at once.” No change was made in the mission of the VIth Corps, while the following instructions were given for the others:

(b) The IV Corps will advance its left in liaison with the XVII Corps (Fr.) and will take advantage, in advancing its center, of preparations already made to carry out Field Orders No. 14.

(c) The XVII Corps will push the enemy's withdrawal

without delay, maintaining liaison with the right of the First Army (81st Division).

To this order was attached a memorandum which ran thus:

2ND A. U. S.

17TH ARMY CORPS

STAFF

Transmitted for execution

3RD BUREAU to the General commanding the 33rd I. D. U. S.
No. 845 S/3

The raids indicated for tomorrow morning on Marchéville (3cos.) and Warville-Htes. Épines (2cos.) will be carried out in the way that they have been planned. However, the General commanding the 33rd I. D. U. S. should prescribe supporting elements ready to exploit the results of these raids by pushing up to close contact with the enemy.

By order. The Chief of Staff,
R. KASTLER.

On November 9 the 81st American Division on the left (north) of the 33rd launched a general attack against the enemy and advantage was taken of the diversion thus created to send out patrols. The first to start was composed of two officers and forty other ranks from the 131st Infantry, who set out at 11 A.M. for the Bois de Warville. About 350 meters beyond the road from Doncourt-aux-Templiers to St. Hilaire they were greeted by machine-gun fire a point in advance of that wood but drove the enemy into Butgnéville. This movement carried the patrol into a species of pocket where it found itself under machine-gun fire from the front and flanks and an artillery barrage which progressed from the front of St. Hilaire down the road toward Doncourt in its rear under the direction of an enemy aeroplane. The futility of further advance was manifest and the detachment withdrew to its own lines at 4:30 P.M. without effecting any captures and having itself lost three men.

A second patrol, identical in force and composition with

the former, started out from Wadonville at 9:30 P.M. It proceeded to St. Hilaire, which was found flooded; caught sight of an enemy patrol in retreat and an enemy post on the east bank of the Moutru Brook carrying off a machine gun; encountered heavy fire from beyond the St. Hilaire-Butgnéville road; located an empty strong point and some machine-gun emplacements; and returned at 2:30 A.M. on November 10 to its own lines, without having taken any prisoners and with two wounded men.⁴⁹

At 1 P.M. the 130th Infantry began its operations by sending three patrols, an interesting account of which is given by Major Woodward:⁵⁰

On morning of November 9th the 81st Division on our left started a general attack along their front. At about 1:00 P.M. acting under orders of Brigade Commander, three patrols, of two platoons each, were started out from Fresnes, one in direction of Riaville, one to Pintheville, and one to Chateau d'Aulnois. The patrol to Riaville proceeded to within 50 yards of the entrance to [the] town where they were met by heavy machine gun fire and forced to retire, leaving two privates killed, one man severely wounded who was subsequently captured and two men slightly wounded. The patrol to Pintheville also met with heavy machine gun fire and returned without casualties. Patrol to Chateau d'Aulnois had only proceeded some few hundred yards from our out-post line when a German patrol of about sixty men was discovered to their left and rear. It was evident that this patrol had come out with the intention of working around the flank of the 81st Division. A fight ensued, our patrol retiring on our out-post line closely followed by the Germans but here they were repulsed, and our artillery put down a barrage which caught them retreating and inflicted heavy casualties. Immediately, two other patrols were sent out from our out-post line but were driven back by heavy machine gun fire along entire line from Chateau d'Aulnois to Riaville. The night of November 9/10th was marked with no activity with exception of harassing gas shelling by the enemy and our own protective patrols.

Allusion has already been made to the occupation of

Bussy and Saulx on November 8 by the 2nd Battalion of the 130th Infantry.⁵¹

On the morning of November 9th 1918, the Battalion P. C. was moved forward to Saulx. All companies moved forward, occupying dugouts and trenches adjacent to the town. At dusk two platoons of Co. H, under command of Lieut. Rawalt, left to raid Pintheville and two platoons of Co. F and two from Co. H started out to raid Marchéville. The outposts of the enemy were reached and engaged.

In the meantime orders were received to attack and hold Marchéville on the morning of November 10th 1918. Orders were immediately sent out for all troops except the outposts to withdraw to Saulx and preparations were made immediately for the attack on Marchéville.⁵²

The resistance which was everywhere encountered plainly indicated that the enemy positions were held by troops of another calibre from the indifferent Austro-Hungarians who had occupied the sector at the time when the 33rd Division relieved the 79th. This transformation in the nature of the opposition is thus described by Colonel Sanborn:⁵³

Following the signing of the armistice with Austria by the Allies all Austrian troops were shortly thereafter withdrawn from the front. In the sector on our immediate front they were replaced by Prussians and a considerable change was noticed in the character of the resistance as well as the efficiency of the troops. Prisoners did not come forward and give themselves up. Machine gunners were very active in occupying flanking positions and withdrawing promptly when threatened with envelopment. The N. C. O. of one machine gun company stated that he had observed our large patrols, one of which passed close to their nest in the dark without seeing it. He stated that when large patrols passed they kept perfectly quiet [and] afterwards made report of what they had seen. The group were afterwards captured by a night patrol, a member of which heard slight noise in the bushes and went over to investigate it. Localities that were occupied by numbers of machine guns were found deserted at other times. Evidently their efforts were directed in making dispositions which would cut off a patrol. They apparently studied

the routes usually taken. Once at least the enemy was in position on three sides of a patrol which retreated.

The raid and patrols above mentioned were not the only active operations that day. During the course of the day this officer received orders from the commanding general of the 66th Brigade at once to "send out two companies to gain and keep contact with the enemy" and to "clean out the Bois des Htes Épinés and Bois de Warville." From these woods the units in question were to dispatch "strong patrols through Bois Vachère, Bois Vieux, toward Jonville, or until contact is made with enemy, which contact will be maintained." The Bertaucourt Ferme was also to be reconnoitred and emphasis was laid upon the necessity of keeping constant touch with the enemy and liaison with these companies in order to insure the obtaining of "all possible information" in respect to the enemy's strength. That this operation was considered exceptionally important is evidenced by the fact that Colonel Sanborn was notified that it would "be supported, if necessary, by the remainder of the Brigade."⁵⁴ The commanding officer of the 131st Infantry immediately proceeded to comply with these instructions and the sequel is briefly told by him⁵⁵ as follows:

Companies A & B, 1st Battalion, under command of Captain William M. Wilson, were detailed for this duty and left Doncourt about 7 P.M., marching Northeast in the direction of Bois des Hautes Épinés. A detachment from Co. B preceded the column into the woods, followed by the remainder of the company. A few enemy were driven out. Complete possession was gained at 8 P.M. and Battalion P. C. established at 54.1—55.6 [i. e., about 1,100 yards southeast of Butgnéville, on the southern slopes of Côte 227 and just west of the enemy wire].

1st Lt. Herman B. Gegenback with Company A occupied Bois la Vachère about 10 P.M. A detail under 2nd Lt. Burl F. Hall attempted to occupy Bois Vieux, but on account of

wire entanglements and enemy resistance was obliged to withdraw.

2nd Lt. Patrick D. Cronin with a detail of forty men overcame enemy machine gun resistance in Bois de Warville, occupying same at 2 A.M. the 10th.

In addition to these dispositions, warning orders were received at 11:30 that morning from the brigade commander "to prepare for an advance and be ready to move out, fully equipped, when ordered."⁵⁶ This was followed by orders issued at 1 P.M. directing the 2nd Battalion and Machine Gun Company of the 132nd Infantry to move "at once" from Deuxnouds to St. Maurice and the 3rd Battalion from Woimbey to Deuxnouds, while the rest of the regiment was to hold itself "ready to move on instant notice."⁵⁷ Since the operations prescribed by the divisional Field Order No. 32⁵⁸ were destined to take place next day, an order was issued at 10 P.M. prescribing a raid to be made by the 131st Infantry "on 'D' day at 'H' hour in the direction of La Beuville" the mission of which was "to clean out Bois d'Harville, to take prisoners and kill Boches."⁵⁹ Upon receipt of these instructions shortly before midnight, Colonel Sanborn immediately issued orders that his three battalions and two companies of the 124th Machine Gun Battalion assemble at Doncourt next morning at five o'clock.⁶⁰

In the meantime the 65th Brigade had been scarcely less active. The order for an attack on Marchéville by the 130th Infantry issued by the brigade headquarters on November 8 was set in operation by a memorandum at 2:30 P.M. announcing that "'D' day will be November 10, 1918, and 'H' hour 5:45 A.M."⁶¹ During the day warning orders were also sent out to the various unit commanders apprising them of the movements to be made that day, preparatory to the attack of the morrow and in anticipation of a major operation in the near future. The dispositions for the latter were embodied in

Field Order No. 10 issued at seven o'clock that evening,⁶² which announced the withdrawal of the enemy and an advance in the general direction of Conflans by the 17th French Army Corps in liaison with the First American Army. As part of the French corps the 65th Brigade was to move forward through a zone bounded on the west by a line from Fresnes-en-Woëvre through Parfondrupt and on the east by Hannonville-sous-les-Côtes, the western edge of the Bois de Warville, the Bois de Harville, and the village of Bramville-en-Woëvre, but, as was customary, the date and hour for this advance were not fixed until later.

In conformity with the warning orders mentioned above there were a number of movements that day by units of the 65th Brigade. At 6:30 P.M. the entire 129th Infantry, with the exception of the supply company, was concentrated at Ranzières.⁶³ At four o'clock, Company D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, left the Bois de Ranzières for Fresnes-en-Woëvre to participate in the attack next morning by the 130th Infantry⁶⁴ and during the night the 3rd Battalion of that regiment moved up from the reserve to the support position and sent two companies forward to the hill at Combres.⁶⁵ Owing to some uncertainty as to the progress made that day by the 81st Division and particularly as to the exact whereabouts of its right, Colonel Clinnin was directed by a code telephone message at 8:40 P.M. to guard with care his own left flank. Furthermore, to assist his attack next morning General King took the precaution to request General Wolf to keep the neighborhood of St. Hilaire and the road from that place to Marchéville under machine-gun fire during that operation.⁶⁶

That wet, foggy Saturday was characterized by considerable activity on the part of the opposing artilleries. The enemy's guns expended some 1,800 rounds in the sector of the 33rd Division, principally in harassing fire of high explosives

and gas in the region of Fresnes, Trésauvaux, les Éparges, Combres, Saulx and Champlon,⁶⁷ to the manifest discomfiture of the troops of the 130th Infantry.⁶⁸

Sunday, November 10, 1918, was no day of rest in the Troyon-sur-Meuse sector, especially for the Boches. It opened at 5:40 A.M. with a concentration of fire on the town of Marchéville, coupled with a standing barrage in front of the enemy trenches from a point in advance of Côte 233 to another directly south of Marchéville,⁶⁹ executed by nine batteries of 75s and four batteries of 155s of the divisional artillery under the command of Colonel Lea.⁷⁰ Five minutes later had been designated as the "H" hour and at that minute the barrage began to roll forward to protect the 2nd Battalion of the 130th Infantry, which had been selected to make the advance.⁷¹ This attack, in which Company D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, played an important role, is thus briefly but graphically described by Major (then Captain) Gravenhorst, commanding the battalion:⁷²

All men were given a hot meal at 2:00 A.M. November 10th, the ammunition supply replenished and all preparations completed for the attack on Marchéville. The Battalion took up the designated position behind the barrage line and moved forward behind the barrage at 5:45 A.M. The assaulting waves consisted of Companies F and G, Companies E and H in support. As the attack progressed the enemy resistance became stronger, also he brought numerous machine guns into the fight, having machine guns placed in trees and concrete pillboxes. Our troops continued the advance, mopping up trenches, capturing pillboxes and inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. The resistance became so stubborn that it was necessary for Companies E and H to be brought forward at an early stage of the fight and all companies were heavily engaged during the entire day. Marchéville was captured and all the enemy were either killed, captured or driven out of the town by 10:00 A.M. The enemy kept up a heavy machine gun and artillery fire on the town and the trenches captured by our



BRIDGE AT FISMES-EN-WOËVRE



BRIDGE ON HARVILLE-MANHEULLES ROAD, TROYON SECTOR

troops, and launched a counter attack in the afternoon, which was repulsed. The Battalion held the place until relieved by a Battalion of the 129th Infantry at 4:00 A.M. November 11th 1918. The number of prisoners captured by our troops in this attack numbered six officers and eighty-four men.

This modest account scarcely conveys an adequate understanding of the importance of this operation. Marchéville was an integral part of the line of resistance of the enemy.⁷³ Naturally strong, it had been solidly fortified, both the town and the chateau being thoroughly protected by wire entanglements. It was held by the 5th and 6th Companies of the 2nd Battalion and a detachment of the machine gun company of the 365th German Infantry (94th German Division) who had orders to "hold at all costs"⁷⁴ and who were additionally protected by numerous machine guns securely sheltered in houses and concrete emplacements. Although smothered under the fire of the American artillery and apparently taken by surprise,⁷⁵ these troops put up such a stout opposition that two companies of the 3rd Battalion had to be sent to reënforce the attacking units.⁷⁶ Although the enemy suffered heavy casualties, lost twelve machine guns and a 150-millimeter howitzer,⁷⁷ was definitely driven out of Marchéville and his positions north of that place imperiled to such an extent that their abandonment was only a question of a short time, he nevertheless made a stiff resistance and was quick to retaliate.⁷⁸ His ability in the latter respect was manifested by four counterattacks, two of which culminated in driving the two companies of the 130th Infantry occupying Marchéville back to the trench system southeast of the village. Not content with this, he followed it up by two additional counterattacks coupled with terrific shelling but these were repulsed,⁷⁹ partly because of the accuracy of the fire of the divisional batteries which landed their shells squarely in the midst of the German waves.⁸⁰ In spite of this active fighting, which at times

threatened to become serious, several patrols were sent out that day in order to maintain close contact with the enemy and to gain all possible information as to his intentions, and liaison was also kept by means of a patrol with the 324th Infantry,⁸¹ forming the extreme right of the 81st Division, which was engaged in a general attack that day in the adjoining sector on the north.⁸²

In the P. C. of the 33rd Division a busy day was spent in preparations for the important attack against the Hindenburg line in the Troyon sector which, if successful, would open the road to Metz. In consequence of the orders from the Second American Army and the 17th French Army Corps received the previous evening at 11:15,⁸³ Field Order No. 34 was issued at 9 A.M., opening with the announcements that "reports received indicate that the enemy is withdrawing progressively on our front, from west to east, leaving a shell to cover his departure;" that "the 81st Div. is pushing forward on our left;" and that "the 28th Div. on our right and other Divisions of the Second Army pushed forward at 7:00 A.M. today." It then went on to direct that:

The 33rd Division will carry out the mission laid down in "Combat in case of Withdrawal of the Enemy," Annex No. 11, to Defense Scheme, Troyon—Chaillon Sector, dated Nov. 8th, 1918. The movement will commence at once.

The greatest expedition is necessary.⁸⁴

At 11:40 that morning there was received through the 17th Army Corps a true copy of Field Order No. 19 issued by the Headquarters of the Second Army at 1:30 A.M. that day.⁸⁵ It began with the declaration that "it is reported that the enemy, disorganized, is withdrawing along the entire front" and that "the First Army is pushing forward on our left," and stated that the Second Army would "attack at 7 hours, 10th November, and follow closely the enemy in his withdrawal, pushing him with all energy to secure decisive

results, and holding all ground taken." Instructions were given to the VIth Corps to advance "west of the Seille River along the heights on both banks of the Moselle River, in the direction of Corny," while the IVth Corps in the centre was to "attack in the direction of Vionville." The left was to be formed by the 17th French Army Corps, which was instructed to "attack in the direction of Conflans," its zone of action being limited by the western boundary of the IVth Corps⁸⁶ on one hand and the line "Fresnes-en-Woëvre (incl.)—Parfondrupt (excl.)—Lancefontaine (incl.)" on the other.

Aside from the customary daily situation and operations reports rendered to the French Army Corps and to the American General Headquarters, no further orders of major importance were issued during the course of the day, but by telephone and other means close communication with the 65th and 66th Brigades was maintained, so that every detail of their operations was known. At 6:40 that afternoon instructions were received from the 17th Army Corps⁸⁷ quoting the opening paragraphs of the "Order of Operations of the IInd A. U. S. for the day of the 11th"⁸⁸ and adding thereto certain instruction as to the missions to be performed by the 33rd Division next day.⁸⁹ These provisions were promptly embodied in the following order,⁹⁰ which was at once dispatched to all the units concerned and additionally distributed to such other commanders as would in any wise be interested in the operations prescribed:

SECRET
FIELD ORDER
No. 35.

P. C. 33RD DIVISION, A. E. F.,
10 Nov., 1918.....11:00 p. m.

MAPS: VIGNEULLES "A" and "B" 1:20,000
METZ, S. W. & S. E. 1:50,000
COMMERCEY, N. W. & N. E. 1:50,000

1. (a) The attack is progressing on the whole front of the Second Army in spite of stubborn resistance.

- (b) The 28th Div. on our right has captured the northeast edge of Bois des Haudronvilles Bas and Bois des Haravillers.
- (c) The 81st Div. on our left holds the general line Fresnes-en-Woëvre—1 km. south of Ville-en-Woëvre—Southern edge of La Noire Haye Wood—southeastern edge of Bois de Manheulles.
- 2. Tomorrow, November 11, 1918, the 33rd Division will resume its attack and develop with energy the success already obtained.
- 3. (a) The 65th Inf. Brig., keeping liaison with the 81st Div. on its left will seize and hold Riaville, Pintheville, Maizeray and Harville.
- (b) The 66th Inf. Brig., keeping liaison with the 28th Div. on its right, will seize and hold the northeast edge of Bois d'Harville, small wood 1200 meters northeast of la Bertaucourt Fme., Jonville.
- (c) The 55th Field Artillery Brigade will so place its batteries as to support the various attacks.
- (d) The 65th Inf. Brig. will begin its attack at 5:00 A.M. and the 66th Brig. at 5:45 A.M.
- (e) All ground gained will be held and close contact will be maintained with the enemy.
- 4. Administrative details: No change.
- 5. P. C.'s: 33rd Division No change
 65th Brigade Combres after 5:00 A.M.
 66th Brigade No change
 Arty. Comdr. No change.

BELL
Major General.

Meanwhile, apart from its active operations in the region of Marchéville,⁹¹ other events of importance had occurred in the 65th Infantry Brigade. The arrival of the division Field Order No. 34 at the brigade headquarters at Mouilly decided General King to make a slight modification in the order which he had issued the previous evening at seven o'clock⁹² and to announce that it would be put into operation on November 11 at 5 A.M.—both of which were set forth in memorandum orders issued at 3:45 that afternoon.⁹³ Every

preparation was made for the important attack scheduled for the following morning and a thorough understanding of the general plan was obtained from the division Field Order No. 35 received during the night.⁹⁴

Preparatory to relieving the 130th Infantry in the front lines that night and to forming the leading element of the 65th Brigade in the attack next morning, the 129th Infantry started from Ranzières about 2 P.M.⁹⁵ A march of about ten miles brought it to Herbeuville, Fresnes, and Saulx before midnight and two hours earlier Colonel Myer's P. C. was established at the last-named place.⁹⁶ At 4:30 A.M. on November 11 the relief was completed,⁹⁷ with the exception of the 2nd Battalion of the 130th,⁹⁸ and the troops were held in readiness for the approaching attack.

In the meantime the 66th Brigade had contributed its share to the successes achieved that day. The orders hurriedly issued shortly before midnight by the commanding officer of the 131st Infantry⁹⁹ were embodied in formal written instructions covering the contemplated operation¹⁰⁰ and were sent out about 4 A.M. About an hour later the troops destined to make the attack against the Bois d'Harville were all assembled in the neighborhood of Doncourt-aux-Templiers, whence they moved forward to their appointed stations in the Bois des Hautes Épines and the Bois de Warville¹⁰¹—from which the enemy had been driven during the course of the night—¹⁰² and by 7:15 A.M. were reported as in position.¹⁰³

The Bois d'Harville, destined to be the scene of hard fighting that day and the next, is thus described by Colonel Sanborn:¹⁰⁴

This wood lies between the towns of Jonville and Harville, through which towns the enemy trench line extends. The southeastern edge of the wood lies 600 meters northeast from the northeast edge of the Bois de Warville. The wood is from 500 to 600 meters wide, extending northeast 1,700

meters, where it joins the Bois de Montelle. The Jonville—Harville Road crosses the woods in the rear of the enemy trench line about 800 meters from the southwest edge. It was recognized early in the operations of November 10th that this wood was a veritable stronghold, occupied in force. A prisoner stated that it was held by a Regiment of Infantry. Penetration into the wood developed the fact that strong wire entanglements ran through it in every direction, cleverly concealed by brushes and dominated by machine gun nests on the paths as well as on platforms in the trees. Strong wire and machine gun nests on the outer edges made penetration by our patrols impossible.

About daylight St. Hilaire was occupied without opposition by a company from the 2nd Battalion and four machine guns, in conformity with orders received the previous evening.¹⁰⁵ About 9 A.M. the commanding officer of the 131st Infantry directed his battalion commanders to inform him concerning their position.¹⁰⁶ At 10:35 Captain Wilson was instructed to "advance and occupy La Bertaucourt Farm and hold it as a flank protection to the troops attacking Harville Woods,"¹⁰⁷ and ten minutes later the disposition, requiring the 2nd and 3rd Battalions to withdraw after they had attained their objective, was revoked by instructions to Captain Stockwell to "select a position forward in Harville Woods and hold it."¹⁰⁸ To the inquiry as to when he would be ready this last officer made response that he "would attack at 2 P.M."¹⁰⁹

Early that morning the divisional artillery was busily occupied in supporting the attack of the 130th Infantry against Marchéville, and the shelling in the forward area of the 131st was therefore comparatively desultory,¹¹⁰ indeed so much so as to elicit inquiry from the commander of the 1st Battalion as to how long it would continue.¹¹¹ About 10 A.M. a number of the guns were turned on the Bois d'Harville but it was agreed that this fire should cease at eleven o'clock and information to that effect was dispatched to Captain Stockwell.¹¹²

At 11:05 A.M. Captain Wilson received the order to attack La Bertaucourt Ferme and accordingly designated Company A, under Lieutenant Gegenback, for that purpose, ordering it to advance on the right. At the same time Company D under Lieutenant Cronin was withdrawn from the Bois de Warville and directed to attack on the left, but at 11:20 word was received from Captain Magner that he had changed the time for the attack to 11:45 A.M. and both companies were therefore withdrawn to the edge of the Bois les Hautes Épines. At the hour indicated the attack was launched but a heavy flanking fire was met from La Vachère Bois, which had meanwhile been occupied by the enemy. The progress of Company A was completely arrested but, nevertheless, it kept up a lively frontal fire against the farm in order to cover the right of the 3rd Battalion in its attack on the Bois d'Harville. However, when the latter fell back, Company A had no alternative but to follow suit and to take a more sheltered position in the Bois les Hautes Épines.¹¹³

After this attack occurred a lull during which Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, took position in the rear of the forming-up line¹¹⁴ and orders were issued to the commander of Company C to send a platoon of infantry and two machine guns to the northeastern edge of the Bois de Haravillers to establish liaison with the 110th Infantry of the 28th Division.¹¹⁵ At one o'clock Captain Magner was directed to assume command of the assaulting battalion, to attack and capture the Bois d'Harville, and an hour later he reported that his advance had begun.¹¹⁶ The troops had scarcely emerged from the Bois de Warville, about 2:18 P.M., when the enemy sent up a signal for his S. O. S. barrage and they were greeted by such a heavy artillery, machine-gun, and rifle fire that some of the troops were compelled to take to cover. The advance was quickly resumed by means of squad rushes

but about one hundred and fifty yards from the Bois d'Harville the enemy barrage descended in the midst of the leading troops, who retorted by a rush which drove the enemy infantry back and enabled them to seize the edge of the wood. In spite of all opposition, wire, and intense fire of every sort, the 3rd Battalion pushed sturdily forward, broke through the Hindenburg line, and about 3:20 P.M. reached their objective just beyond the sunken road.¹¹⁷

This success was not achieved unaided, for, apart from the protection afforded by Company A near La Bertaucourt Ferme, the first check caused the 2nd Battalion and Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, to be sent forward in support, Company H being sent to the right as an additional protection to that flank. These reënforcements enabled the advance to be resumed and carried the attack forward to its goal,¹¹⁸ so that Captain Magner was enabled to telephone at 3:55 P.M. to Captain Malstrom, the operations officer of the 131st Infantry, that he had "reached objective" designated in the regimental field order.¹¹⁹ One officer and sixty-one other ranks were taken prisoners¹²⁰ and the capture of this portion of the Bois d'Harville, added to that of Marchéville seized by the 65th Brigade that morning, wrested from the enemy "two important elements of the principal line of resistance"¹²¹ which were vital to him in the retention of the Troyon sector.

This achievement, however, was not an unalloyed success for, as Colonel Sanborn remarked:¹²²

Further advance was checked and rendered impossible by heavy wire encountered. Many machine guns were forward of this wire in position, others were enfilading the position from the right and enemy shells were falling in increasing volume. An enemy detachment was observed approaching on the left from the direction of Butgnéville, threatening that flank. Troops held on to the position however until about 6 P.M. at which time gas became so dense that further occu-

pancy either by our own or enemy troops became impossible and they withdrew to the northeast edge of the Bois de Warville.


About six o'clock the enemy, who had infiltrated a considerable force into La Vachère Bois, was seen to be forming in three waves for an attack against the right and rear of the troops in the Bois d'Harville but, in spite of an enemy barrage on its position, Company A, which was still holding its ground opposite La Bertaucourt Ferme, was successful in breaking up this impending attack before it could be launched.¹²³ Its action contributed materially to warding off any interference by the enemy with the withdrawal of the troops in the Bois d'Harville, which began about 5:30 P.M. and terminated about eight o'clock, although two machine-gun platoons were unable to retire until long after midnight, owing to the violence with which the enemy shelled the open terrain between the Bois d'Harville and the Bois de Warville.¹²⁴

Meanwhile various events had occurred in the rear. Allusion has already been made to the movements of the 132nd Infantry on November 9 preparatory to supporting the 131st.¹²⁵ On the evening of November 10 that regiment was ordered forward to positions in the Bois les Hautes Épinés, at Doncourt, Woël, and Avillers where they spent the night of November 10-11.¹²⁶ Company H and a platoon of Company C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, were sent to St. Hilaire¹²⁷ to reinforce Company F, 131st Infantry, and the third platoon of the same machine-gun company which had garrisoned that place during the day.¹²⁸ Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, was to have marched with the 1st Battalion of the 132nd Infantry but underwent a variety of vicissitudes that day, although it eventually reached Woël at 11 P.M. and spent the night at that place.¹²⁹

At 9 A.M. General Wolf issued his orders with a view to

taking advantage of the ground gained in the Bois d'Harville and to attacking Jonville and Butgnéville next day.¹³⁰ Announcement was made that the mission of the 66th Brigade would be "to seize and hold the remainder of the Harville Woods and the village of Jonville and to maintain contact with the enemy." To this end he directed two attacks to be made on the morning of November 11. The first attack was to be delivered at 5:45 A.M. against Butgnéville by the two companies then in St. Hilaire under the command of Captain Wigglesworth. The second attack, scheduled for 8 A.M., was divided into two phases. It was to open with an attack by the 131st Infantry, less two companies, but reënforced by Companies A and B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, which were to "seize and hold the remainder of the Bois d'Harville." The second phase was an attack against Jonville to be delivered by two columns. The 1st Battalion of the 132nd Infantry and Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, on the north, were to pass through the 131st Infantry at the northern edge of the Bois d'Harville and to take Jonville from the rear. On the south the 3rd Battalion of the 132nd Infantry, reënforced by Company C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, was to proceed from the Bois des Épinés along the western edge of the Bois d'Harville, in liaison with the other force and to make a direct assault along the flanks of the enemy trenches against Jonville, which they were directed to seize and hold.

During the course of the evening the necessary orders were issued in conformity with the above instructions,¹³¹ among them directions to Captain Wigglesworth at St. Hilaire to attack and hold Butgnéville at the termination of the artillery bombardment.¹³² During the night of November 10-11 the 114th Field Artillery and the 1st Battalion, 115th Field Artillery, moved down from the heights into the plain in position to support the 65th Brigade next morning.¹³³



WIRE ENTANGLEMENT NEAR HARVILLE WOOD

Throughout the occupation of the Troyon sector, the 108th Engineers had performed most efficiently work of such various kinds as falls to the lot of that arm of the service, and during November 10 had sent forward all necessary material, made all arrangements possible, and the requisite number of engineer companies were with the advanced forward units in readiness for the advance.¹³⁴

"Coming events cast their shadows before;" for several days prior to November 10 rumors had been persistently circulated that an armistice was on the eve of conclusion. That these rumors were not confined to the American and French troops is manifest from the interrogatories of prisoners that day and their testimony was the more interesting in that it revealed the dire straits in which the enemy found himself. A Landwehr lieutenant named Pfeiffer, who was captured at Marchéville and who belonged to the 6th Company, 2nd Battalion, 365th German Infantry Regiment, declared that their rations consisted of "750 grams of bread issued daily while the men are in line, issues in small quantities of butter, lard, marmalade alternate daily. Men are also issued cheese and sausage in small quantities. For the last three days the men in the Vorfeld (outpost) were practically without food. A direct hit had demolished the kitchen in Marchéville, the cook was killed and 11 men wounded. The men about town carried away the food, leaving the men in the outposts without rations."¹³⁵ A soldier named Wetzstein of the 15th Landwehr Regiment in Pintheville stated that the feeling was prevalent that "the soldiers have now come to their own; if war does not end in next few days, if Germany has no notion to quit, the soldiers will. They have no further interest in the war." A "Combat Secretary" named Schraum disclaimed any knowledge of the presence of any reserve except the rest battalion and declared that "peace must come soon" since "the morale of the men will not hold much longer."

The testimony of a Lieutenant Sigush of the 9th Company, 3rd Battalion, 210th Reserve Infantry Regiment of the 45th German Reserve Division, who was captured about 4:30 P.M. in the Bois d'Harville, was particularly valuable. He announced that his company "had already been filled with peace fever, and as a result most of them refused to fight and ran away" but he and a few men held out until surrounded. He made statements to the effect that:

1 extra company of reserve battalion had been sent into front line as punishment. During the past few nights, a battery of artillery was placed close to this infantry company. The infantry believed that the firing of this battery would draw retaliating fire. They requested the battery to move, and when they refused, a free-for-all fight was started. The company, in its entirety, was sentenced to extra duty in the front line. . . .

Prisoner claims that he repeatedly sent up flares, calling for barrage. Artillery did not respond until after the Americans had taken the position. The wire entanglements had not been touched by a shell. He claims that the position was of such strength that if the artillery had responded and his men put up any kind of resistance, it would have been physically impossible to penetrate the line. . . .

The news had spread yesterday afternoon that the armistice was signed and that the cessation of hostilities could be momentarily expected. They were instructed to hold the line and maintain order; that they would soon be permitted to return home. The morale was very low.

The companies of this regiment, with one or two exceptions, were commanded by N. C. O.s. There is a great scarcity of officers in the entire division.¹³⁶

A Pomeranian soldier named Arndt, belonging to the 10th Company of the 210th Reserve Infantry Regiment, confirmed the statements of other prisoners and declared that "the morale of the men was very low; could not be held in check much longer. Food has been of poor quality and insufficient. Men have suffered terribly from hunger."

The strategical importance of the Troyon sector, the

endeavor of the enemy's officers to put as bold a face as possible on their moribund hopes, and the unwitting disclosure that the incessant hammering of the Allies had exhausted the last reserves of their foes are manifest from the résumé at the end of Annex No. 1, already cited.¹³⁷ It ran as follows:

In conversation with a number of officers in an informal way, they maintained that the line in front of us is the key to Metz. It would be foolish to consider the idea of withdrawing this line, as it is generally understood that this is the only well organized position between the Americans and Metz.

A young "Unter offizier" states that they can and will hold this line unless the spirit manifested by the troops in the past four years is broken, a thing which he says is impossible.

There is no intimation from any of the prisoners that this line is to be sacrificed or that there are any reserves available.

Allusion has been made to the relief of the 130th Infantry by the 129th Infantry during the night of November 10-11 and its completion about 4:30 A.M. on the latter date.¹³⁸ The Division Commander had directed an attack to be made at 5 A.M. by the 65th Infantry Brigade, followed by a similar operation by the 66th Infantry Brigade at 5:45 A.M.¹³⁹ To the former had been allotted the task of seizing and holding Riaville, Pintheville, Maizeray, and Harville; to the latter this same mission was intrusted in respect to the northeastern edge of the Bois d'Harville, the little Bois la Dame, and Jonville. The joint operation was indeed a staggering undertaking in that it entailed combined attacks along a frontage of eleven and a half kilometers—approximately 7.2 miles—against five powerfully fortified towns and a formidable wood. The whole, constituting the enemy's principal system of defense in the Troyon sector and forming part of the Hindenburg line, had remained intact throughout four years of war except in so far as the capture of Marchéville and the southern portion of the Bois d'Harville on November 10 had affected

it.¹⁴⁰ To the Germans the loss of this line was synonymous with the fall of Metz and therefore every effort was put forth to hold it until the last extremity.

At 5 A.M. on Monday, November 11, 1918, the attack of the 65th Brigade was launched in a dense fog and without any preliminary artillery preparation, although it was protected by fire against enemy sensitive and strong points by the divisional batteries and by a barrage from all the machine-gun units belonging to the brigade. Supported by two companies of the 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, the 129th Infantry constituted the attacking force, its two battalions in the first line covering the entire brigade front¹⁴¹ which extended more than three and one-half miles. This regiment was formed in two columns, of which the left column—composed of the 2nd Battalion, Company A, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, a platoon of Company D of the 108th Engineers, one section of light trench mortars, and a section of 37-millimeter guns—was given Pintheville as its first objective.¹⁴² The right column—comprising the 3rd Battalion, Company B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion and other elements identical with those of the left column—was directed against Marchéville and St. Hilaire, supported by the 1st Battalion and Machine Gun Company of the 129th.¹⁴³ Additional support was given to these columns by the 1st Battalion and Machine Gun Company of the 130th Infantry moving in the direction of Pintheville and the Chateau d'Aulnois on the left,¹⁴⁴ by the 3rd Battalion of the same regiment and Company D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, in the centre;¹⁴⁵ and by the 2nd Battalion and part of the Headquarters Company of the 130th Infantry, Company C, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, and Company F, 108th Engineers, on the extreme right moving from Herbeuville through Wadonville against St. Hilaire.¹⁴⁶

The heavy fog, the terrain inundated by the enemy, stub-

born resistance from a multitude of enemy machine-gun nests, and heavy fire from the hostile artillery militated against a rapid advance.¹⁴⁷ Indeed so great were the difficulties encountered that it was not until after 8:20 A.M. that the leading troops reached the line Marchéville—St. Hilaire¹⁴⁸ and not until considerably after nine o'clock that the 3rd Battalion of the 129th Infantry was able to force its way into Marchéville.¹⁴⁹ At that hour, however, the 65th Brigade had achieved a notable success. The Chateau d'Aulnois, Riaville, Marchéville, and St. Hilaire¹⁵⁰ were in its possession and all the terrain intervening between these towns and the Verdun-Metz road on a frontage of six kilometers was completely under its control.¹⁵¹

Meanwhile the 66th Infantry Brigade had likewise delivered an attack. As has been noted, General Wolf's purpose, as expressed in his orders of November 10, was to take all possible advantage of the ground gained in the Bois d'Harville.¹⁵² The general plan was a preliminary attack against Butgnéville at 5:45 A.M., followed at eight o'clock by an advance through the Bois d'Harville by the 3rd Battalion of the 131st Infantry. The 1st Battalion of the 132nd was to "leap-frog" at the northern edge of this wood, pivot on its right, capture the little Bois la Dame and, advancing inside the enemy's network of wire, attack Jonville from the rear, while a direct holding attack was to be delivered against that town from the west by the 3rd Battalion of the 132nd Infantry.¹⁵³ The circumstances which attended the final dispositions for these attacks are thus narrated by Colonel Sanborn:¹⁵⁴

Shortly after 4 o'clock the morning of Nov. 11th the Commanding Officer of the 131st Infantry established his forward battle station at Woël, where the Commanding General, 66th Brigade, arrived shortly after.¹⁵⁵ Steps were at

once taken to concentrate the 131st Infantry (less Co. F and four machine guns at St. Hilaire) and Company C which furnished the liaison, detailed to the 110th Infantry and other details for bringing up ammunition, etc. The 131st Infantry Machine Gun Co. reported at Woël during the night [of] November 10–11th. Sent two guns to relieve the detachment of the 124th M. G. Bn. on duty with the Liaison group, on the left of the 110th Infantry, remainder of the company were sent to Doncourt.¹⁵⁶ No changes were made in the general plan of attack except to place progressive artillery fire on the Bois de Harville, northeast of, and along, the Jonville–Harville Road, gradually moving forward and resting on the northeast edge of the woods in support of the advance, also continued fire along the northwest edge of the same wood.

The initial attack of the 66th Brigade was to be delivered against Butgnéville at 5:45 A.M. by the companies of the 131st and 132nd Infantry and the two platoons of Company C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, under Captain Wigglesworth, then occupying St. Hilaire. This gallant but fruitless operation is thus described by the commanding officer of the 131st Infantry:¹⁵⁷

Company F, 1st Lieut. Carrol D. Schnepf commanding, with attached machine guns (2nd platoon Co. H, 132nd Inf. in reserve) left St. Hilaire at 5:20 A.M. the 11th, advancing northeast toward Butgnéville. After crossing the Rau de Moutru the scouts drew enemy fire, the first wave closed on the scout line and advanced. A number of flares were sent up by the enemy and machine gun fire increased. A trench mortar also opened fire on the advancing troops. Machine guns were placed on the flanks and under their fire an advance was made until wire entanglements in front of the town which were still intact were reached. Right of the advance was held up by machine gun fire. As the left advanced it was also met by machine gun fire. Heavy rifle and machine gun fire came from the town. The Company Commander stated he was receiving no artillery support. The shell fire which was supposed to be put on the town fell short and did little if any damage. The machine gun officer states that the barrage never fell and that the enemy outnumbered them. Six machine gun men were five

wounded.¹⁵⁸ Infantry casualties, one officer wounded, three other ranks killed, twenty wounded.¹⁵⁹ Troops returned to St. Hilaire at 9 A.M.

Of the other units of the 124th Machine Gun Battalion, Companies A and B retained their positions of the preceding night in the Bois de Warville and prepared for a resumption of the attack;¹⁶⁰ two platoons of Company C got as far as Doncourt,¹⁶¹ from which Company D, after being held up momentarily by artillery fire, proceeded to the Bois des Hautes Épinés, where they went into position at 8 A.M.¹⁶² The 122nd Machine Gun Battalion was retained west of the Meuse at Camp Thillombois Sud as part of the divisional reserve.¹⁶³

The principal attack of the 66th Infantry Brigade, which was scheduled to take place in the Bois d'Harville and against Jonville at 8 A.M., was launched exactly at the "H" hour and, in spite of tremendous enemy artillery and machine-gun fire from the front and both flanks, the troops were making substantial progress which gave every promise of success in breaking through the Hindenburg line, the last fortified obstacle between them and Metz, when it was suddenly arrested by a most extraordinary event.

Meanwhile, at the P. C. of the 33rd Division at Troyon-sur-Meuse, the radio station picked up at 5:45 that morning the following wireless message in French, sent from the Allied Grand Headquarters at Guise:

MARSHAL FOCH

to the COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF.

Hostilities will be stopped on the entire front beginning the eleventh November eleven hours (French time).

Until further order the Allied troops will not go beyond the line attained on that date and at that hour.

(Signed) Marshal FOCH.¹⁶⁴

At 6:45 A.M. the same message was received in English

and 7:05 A.M. the following radio message in French was picked up:

NO. 18 W 89. GERMAN PLENIPOTENTIARIES to the GERMAN HIGH COMMAND to be communicated to all the authorities interested.

Radio 3,084 and ggg 2 No. 11,386 received.

Armistice has been signed at five o'clock in the morning "French time." It enters into effect at eleven o'clock in the morning (French time). Delay of evacuation prolonged twenty-four hours for the left bank of the Rhine in addition to the five days therefore thirty-one days in total. Modifications of the text compared with the one brought by Helldorf will be transmitted by radio.

(Signed) ERZBERGER No. 9.¹⁶⁵

At 7:50 A.M. a telephone message from Lieutenant-Colonel Kastler, chief of staff of the 17th Army Corps at St. Mihiel, was taken by Captain Roger Bader, one of the French liaison officers, to whom the former read a telegram just received by the Corps Commander from the general commanding the Second American Army, which read thus:

The Armistice is signed and becomes effective the 11th November at 11 o'clock.

At that hour or before, hostilities and the advance are to cease. Hold the line attained and give exact information as to the line attained at that hour. No communication will take place with the enemy. Acknowledge receipt.

By command of General BULLARD:

HEINTZELMAN,
Chief of Staff.

At 10:25 A.M. the exact text of this telegram in French was received in an urgent "Service Note" from the Chief of Staff of the 17th Army Corps¹⁶⁶ by whom it was "notified for execution," and, in the meantime, exactly an hour earlier, Lieutenant Colonel Simpson, G-3 of the 33rd Division, was handed a telegram from the Second Army thus worded:

PATTERSON 7,

Your map received. As soon as possible telephone to G-3, Second Army, the location at the time the front line troops have ceased to advance. If this can be furnished before 11:00 o'clock do it; otherwise before 1:00 o'clock.

G-3, Second Army.¹⁶⁷

Directly upon the receipt of the telephone message from the Chief of Staff of the 17th Army Corps at 7:50 A.M., this important information was transmitted by telephone and otherwise to the brigade commanders, supplemented by specific orders to arrest their advance immediately and to cease all firing absolutely, and two hours later the final instructions were embodied in this form:

G-3 *Secret*

FIELD ORDER
No. 36.

P. C. 33RD DIVISION, A. E. F.,
11th November, 1918

MAPS: VIGNEULLES "A" and "B", 1:20,000
 METZ, S. W. & S. E. 1:50,000
 COMMERCEY, N. W. & N. E. 1:50,000

1. (a) The Armistice has been signed and will become effective November 11, 1918, at 11:00 A.M.
 (b) All hostilities will cease at once and no farther advance will be made. All ground now occupied will be held.
2. No communication will take place with the enemy.
3. (a) The line reached will be organized for defense. The boundary between brigade sub-sectors remains unchanged. Troops in each sub-sector will be distributed in depth.
 (b) Each Brigade will at once make all arrangements to advance in appropriate formation with Advance Guards, in case orders are received to move forward to occupy surrendered territory. In such case troops in the Outpost Zone will constitute the Advance Guard.
4. The Comdg. General, 65th and 66th Inf. Brigades will each detail two officers at once to make a sketch, scale 1:20,000, showing the exact line reached by our troops.

This sketch must be at Division Hdqrs. by 12:00 Noon, November 11, 1918. (today).

BELL
Major General.¹⁶⁸

The information in respect to the signing of the armistice and the Division Commander's orders relative to the cessation of hostilities reached General King at his advanced P. C. on the hill at Combres at 8:21 A.M. and the action which was immediately taken is thus told in the Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade:

3rd Bn., 130th Inf., had reached the village of St. Hilaire at 8:21 A.M., when orders were received that armistice with the enemy had been signed, firing to cease and troops to remain in positions occupied at that time.

Regimental P. C. 129th Infantry, received orders at 9 A.M., that armistice had been signed and to discontinue hostilities at once. Runners were immediately dispatched to the various units, which were steadily advancing through inundated land and overcoming all enemy strong points.¹⁶⁹ Recall was sounded at 9:45 A.M., and all units remained in conquered positions. The enemy continued firing until 11:00 A.M., when all units, except one platoon per battalion, retired to locations of Battalion Headquarters.

The circumstances which attended the receipt of the news concerning the signing of the armistice and the cessation of hostilities are thus narrated by Colonel Sanborn:

While the troops were being assembled in the Bois de Warville, at 8:30 A.M. telephone notice was received that the armistice had been signed, that all firing on our part was to cease at once, except to repel counter attacks, which information was conveyed to troops in position and reinforcing battalions successively as they arrived.¹⁷⁰ The enemy gradually ceased fire from the trenches and machine gun positions,¹⁷¹ but it was not until 11 o'clock sharp that a complete cessation was noticed. One machine gunner ran out into a position and shot at everybody in sight up to the last moment.¹⁷² Artillery fire with shrapnel also did not cease until a few minutes after eleven.

A capital demonstration of the discipline in the 33rd Division was afforded by the fact that, after receipt of the orders to cease firing, literally not one shot left the ranks, some of which had to endure heavy shelling and machine-gun and rifle fire for more than an hour and a half without the satisfaction of replying for the last time. Under this fire a number of casualties occurred, but the wise precaution of the Division Commander forestalled any complaints such as were raised against certain troops on other parts of the Allied front.¹⁷³ The closing scene of this great drama was not devoid of pathos, so far as the 33rd Division was concerned. When the curtain descended at eleven o'clock that fateful Monday morning, 20 of its men lay dead on this its last battle-field, 73 men were wounded, 6 officers and 45 men had been gassed, one officer had been captured, and 28 men were missing.¹⁷⁴

The sequel is thus graphically described by Captain Dodd, commanding Company D of the 124th Machine Gun Battalion:¹⁷⁵

One minute after the hour of eleven A.M., firing of any consolidated nature ceased on the German side and from then on, until the hour of twelve noon, an occasional stray artillery explosion was heard in the distance to right and left. About the hour of one P.M. firing of any nature had ceased and we realized that, this time, the armistice was really and truly a fact.

Upon the cessation of the previously-mentioned machine gun fire upon our positions and just about two minutes after eleven A.M., a body of German soldiers, numbering somewhere in the neighborhood of sixty to one hundred men, ranking as non-commissioned officers and privates, came out of the trenches and positions they occupied directly in front of our line, and came across No-Man's Land towards our positions, cheering in rather a ragged manner and at the same time uttering cries of "America." Some of them cried out in French "La guerre est finie." They came to the advanced

part of our lines and upon finding that we would not hold parley with them, and instead ordered them back where they came from, as per our instructions from Pancake [code word for commanding officer, 132nd Infantry] to Parish [code word for commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 132nd Infantry] they retired to where they came from. But for a period covering perhaps an hour afterwards, prolonged and heavy cheering could be heard from the German positions directly to our front. During the remainder of the time we were in occupation of these positions, stray bodies of German soldiers, numbering from two to three men, came to our rear positions and offered us tobacco, cigarettes and cigars. None of them were accepted by us. They were in all cases ordered back to their own lines and were requested by Parish [i. e., the commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 132nd Infantry] to inform their officers that we were keeping, sacredly, our terms of the armistice and that we expected them to keep theirs, and that any further infiltration on their part would cause them to be taken prisoner. This action of Parish had the desired effect.

During the course of that afternoon and next morning occurred a general readjustment of the positions of the 33rd Division¹⁷⁶ with the twofold object of making the troops as comfortable as possible after their long tour of duty in the trenches in the Verdun and Troyon sectors¹⁷⁷ and of holding them in readiness for an instant advance into the conquered territory in the event that such a movement were ordered.¹⁷⁸

On the afternoon of that momentous Monday, the following communication was published to the command:

HEADQUARTERS 33RD DIVISION,
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES. HSH/fbo
FRANCE, 11th November, 1918.

GENERAL ORDERS:

No. 144.

The Armistice has been signed and hostilities have ceased, at least for the present. The Division Commander takes this opportunity of expressing his appreciation and pride to all ranks for their efficient and effective work.

Shortly after leaving New York in May, 1918, the Divi-



VIEW FROM GERMAN TREE OBSERVATION POST, COVERING BUTGNÉVILLE

sion took station with the British in the defense of Amiens. On the morning of July 4th, 1918, part of it attacked, and Americans for the first time in history were associated on the battlefield with Australians, winning the victory of Hamel—described by the Commanding General of the Australian Corps as “an historic event of such significance that it will live forever in the annals of our respective nations.” The dash and gallantry displayed on this occasion was recognized by the British Commander-in-Chief and rewarded by the King. The engagement had far reaching results. On the 9th of August at Gressaire Wood and Chipilly the Division materially assisted the beginning of what developed into the final British advance and were again honored by the British nation. On September 26th and October 9th as part of the First American Army, it carried all its objectives in the Verdun Sector and held the territory won on both sides of the Meuse. It has been awarded decorations by our Government and our former French Corps Commander has asked that recommendations be submitted for the Croix de Guerre. Such is the record of this Division.

The Commanding General congratulates officers and men, soldiers of the Great War, on these things done by them in the service of their country.

This order will be read to the troops at the first formation after receipt by the Commanding Officer of each unit.

By Command of Major General BELL:

William K. NAYLOR,
Brigadier General, General Staff.
Chief of Staff.

Official:

H. S. HOOKER,
Major, A. G.,
Act. Div. Adjutant.

During the brief period more than a month later when the 33rd Division formed part of the Army of Occupation and was on the march into Germany, its officers and men were gratified that to the tributes received from British and French commanders under whom they had served on the Somme and

the Meuse¹⁷⁹ had been added the following, which was thus officially announced to them:

HEADQUARTERS 33RD DIVISION,
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES. FLH—grj
LUXEMBOURG, 16th December, 1918.

GENERAL ORDERS:

No. 150

1. The following letter is published to the Division in recognition of its work in the Troyon Sector:

“HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY
AMERICAN E. F.,
FRANCE, 12 December, 1918.

From: COMMANDING GENERAL, Second Army.

To: COMMANDING GENERAL, 33rd Division, American
E. F.

Subject: Activity of the 33rd Division prior to the Armistice.

1. Upon the transfer of the 33rd Division, from the Second to the Third American Army, I desire to express to you my gratification at the vigorous and successful activities of your division during the period of active operations preceding the Armistice.

2. The 33rd Division, although occupying a broad front, was called upon to advance toward Conflans, and was engaged in the performance of this mission at the time hostilities ceased.

3. On November 6 to 7, when accurate information of the enemy's intentions was greatly desired, raiding parties from your Division penetrated to Chateau d'Aulnois and captured 21 prisoners, including one officer. On November 7 to 8, your reconnaissance patrols entered Bois d'Harville and St. Hilaire and brought back 8 prisoners. On November 9 and 10, you drove the enemy from the towns of St. Hilaire and Marchéville and, at the time of cessation of Hostilities, your division had occupied these towns, as well as the towns of Butgnéville and Riaville.

4. The conduct of the 33rd Division exemplified its ability to execute promptly and thoroughly the tasks which were given to it. There was shown, on the part of both

officers and men, an efficiency and fighting spirit which are highly commendable.

(Signed) R. L. BULLARD,
Lieutenant General, U. S. A."

II. This order will be read to the troops at the first formation after receipt by the Commanding Officers of each unit.

By Command of Major General BELL:

Official: WILLIAM H. SIMPSON,
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff,
FREDERIC L. HUIDEKOPER, Chief of Staff.
Lieut. Colonel, A. G.,
Division Adjutant.

Later in the same month the 33rd was included, together with twenty-one other combatant divisions, in the thanks conveyed to them by the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in the following communication:

(*Corrected Copy*)

(Destroy all previous copies.)

(For Official Circulation Only.) (G. O. 232.)

G. H. Q.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
GENERAL ORDERS)

No. 232.)

FRANCE, Dec. 19, 1918.

It is with a sense of gratitude for its splendid accomplishment, which will live through all history, that I record in General Orders a tribute to the victory of the First Army in the Meuse-Argonne battle.

Tested and strengthened by the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient, for more than six weeks you battered against the pivot of the enemy line on the western front. It was a position of imposing natural strength, stretching on both sides of the Meuse River from the bitterly contested hills of Verdun to the almost impenetrable forest of the Argonne; a position, moreover, fortified by four years of labor designed to render it impregnable; a position held with the fullest resources of the enemy. That position you broke utterly, and thereby hastened the collapse of the enemy's military power.

Soldiers of all of the divisions engaged under the First, Third and Fifth American Corps—the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 26th, 28th, 29th, 32nd, 33rd, 35th, 37th, 42nd, 77th, 78th, 79th, 80th, 81st, 82nd, 89th, 90th and 91st American divisions, the 18th and 26th French divisions, and the 10th and 15th French Colonial divisions—you will be long remembered for the stubborn persistence of your progress, your storming of obstinately defended machine gun nests, your penetration, yard by yard, of woods and ravines, your heroic resistance in the face of counter-attacks supported by powerful artillery fire. For more than a month, from the initial attack of September 26th, you fought your way slowly through the Argonne, through the woods and over hills west of the Meuse; you slowly enlarged your hold on the Côtes de Meuse to the east, and then, on the 1st of November, your attack forced the enemy into flight. Pressing his retreat, you cleared the entire left bank of the Meuse south of Sedan, and then stormed the heights on the right bank and drove him into the plain beyond.

Soldiers of all army and corps troops engaged—to you no less credit is due; your steadfast adherence to duty and your dogged determination in the face of all obstacles made possible the heroic deeds cited above.

The achievement of the First Army which is scarcely to be equalled in American history, must remain a source of proud satisfaction to the troops who participated in the last campaign of the war. The American people will remember it as the realization of the hitherto potential strength of the American contribution toward the cause to which they had sworn allegiance. There can be no greater reward for a soldier or for a soldier's memory.

This order will be read to all organizations at the first assembly formation after its receipt.

JOHN J. PERSHING,

Official:

ROBERT C. DAVIS,
Adjutant General.

General, Commander in Chief,
American Expeditionary Forces.

IX. OPERATIONS OF THE 58TH FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE

Meanwhile, the 58th Field Artillery Brigade, under the command of Brigadier General Henry D. Todd, Jr.,¹ had had decidedly varied experiences. Its departure from Camp Logan occurred during the second week of May, 1918, following that of the rest of the 33rd Division, from which it was separated for eight months. The first stage of its movement terminated at Camp Merritt, Montclair, New Jersey, where it remained until the beginning of the fourth week in May. On the twenty-sixth of that month it sailed from Hoboken in a convoy comprising four transports, the *Kashmir*, the *Scotian*, the *Melita*, and the *City of Poona*, which arrived at Liverpool on June 8. As has been seen,² General Todd and his brigade headquarters followed in the *Mauretania*, reaching Liverpool on June 11. Upon its arrival in England, this brigade proceeded to Winchester and, after a brief stay, moved to Southampton, where it embarked and crossed the Channel to Havre, arriving on June 13. At Havre it entrained and proceeded to the artillery training areas of Valdahon and Ornans, which are situated in the eastern part of France about ten miles south of the fortress of Besançon. Two months were spent in training of the most intensive sort under French instructors, with the result that the 58th Field Artillery Brigade was brought to a high state of theoretical and practical efficiency, as its subsequent career demonstrated. On August 20, 1918, it started for the Toul sector, where it was attached to the 89th Division (Major General Winn). Its future activities until the armistice are recounted in the

following narrative, which was specially prepared for this history by First Lieutenant Leon Dessez, operations officer of the brigade.

Between the formal training of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade at Valdahon and its first real battle, the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient, a period of three weeks was spent in learning the real business of war in the first sector held by American troops—a sector northwest of Toul extending from Beaumont to Bouconville. The non-motorized organizations entrained at Valdahon and Besançon on August 21 and 22 and detrained at Foug and Pagny-sur-Meuse on August 24 and 25. The motorized organizations traveled overland to the same towns. From these towns the entire brigade marched into the Forêt de la Reine, where it was to remain hidden until the big attack of September 12. The brigade P. C. was established in Boucq. In this sector the brigade became well used to gas attacks, to the hardships of traffic jams on the roads during the night, when all the motor- as well as the horse-drawn vehicles traveled without showing lights and without sounding klaxons, and learned so to work in the daytime that German aerial observers could find nothing of value for the German information service and no targets for German machine-gun fire. On August 26, supporting the 89th Division, in the IVth American Army Corps, the 1st Battalion of the 122nd Field Artillery—Major Frank R. Schwengel commanding—took over the defense of the sector from a battalion of the 321st Field Artillery. Battery C took position south of Rambucourt (maps St. Mihiel-c-Mort Mare, scale 1/20,000), while Battery B and Battery A went into position in Le Joli Bois, southeast of Raulecourt. Cannoneers from Battery B, under command of First Lieutenant Oscar N. Schjerven took over one platoon of 90-millimeter guns, and a like group of men from Battery A, under command of First



BRIGADIER GENERAL HENRY D. TODD, JR.

Lieutenant John W. McCarthy, took over another platoon of 90-millimeter guns, both gun positions being in the northern end of the Forêt de la Reine, southeast of Rambucourt. On September 3, the two platoons joined at the Schjerven position. The guns were fired for registration and, during several days prior to the infantry assault, they dealt harassing fire on roads and trenches and also shelled the crossroads at Lahayville. Battery C—Captain Robert E. Myhrman, commanding—made an adjustment of fire from Observation Post No. 21 in Rambucourt. The battery delivered counteroffensive preparation fire and harassing fire daily on roads and trench crossings, made an adjustment of fire with aeroplane observation on the crossroads in Richecourt, and at all other times was ready to shield our infantry with a defensive barrage. In delivering this fire, all the gun squads of the battalion served at the pieces. On September 4 a few positions of the 122nd and 123rd Field Artillery were heavily shelled from hour 17:30 to hour 19:30 and two men of the 123rd Field Artillery were killed. All the regiments of the brigade were quietly digging gun pits under the camouflage in preparation for the attack and, aided by the 108th Ammunition Train, were hauling ammunition to the new positions.

When the Allied High Command determined to reduce the German salient at St. Mihiel, it chose for that task the Vth American Army Corps, the 2nd French Colonial Army Corps, the IVth American Army Corps, and the 1st American Army Corps, forming the First American Army. The Vth Corps on the west of the salient was to push forcefully over the hilly ground east of Les Éparges, the IVth Corps on the south of the salient was to make a thrust northward from Beaumont, the 1st Corps was to swing the attack on its hinge at Pont-à-Mousson, and the 2nd Colonial Army Corps was

to mop up the heights at the tip of the salient and to have the honor of taking the town of St. Mihiel.

The 58th Field Artillery Brigade, supporting the 1st Division, was at the far left of the IVth Corps sector. It was a sector in which an attack was very difficult. From the forest of Apremont on the west where the lines passed over the wooded hills of Le Mont, all the dominating heights were in the hands of the enemy. But the ambition of the American Army increased even the natural difficulties. It was desired not only to capture the ground of the St. Mihiel salient, but to capture a great number of German soldiers as well, and to accomplish this result the attack of the 2nd Colonial Army Corps was held back until one hour after the two American corps on its flanks had gone forward, when it was to proceed at a slower rate of advance. Thus, not only were the enemy observatories able at the outset to see the American assault, but for several hours they were to suffer no threat of attack. To blind and destroy these lines and thoroughly to defend our exposed left flank and, at the same time, to give our attacking infantry thorough and effective aid required not only a great massing of guns but a complicated and skillful plan of attack as well.

The divisional artillery of the 1st Division, under command of General Todd, was made up of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade, the 1st Field Artillery Brigade (Colonel Butner commanding), the 76th Regiment Field Artillery, 44th Regiment Colonial Army Corps, and French Artillery and was formed into five groupings: the Davis grouping, the Kennedy grouping, the Butner grouping, the Rivers grouping, and the Hackett grouping. The Davis grouping consisted of one battalion of 8-inch howitzers (44th Regiment Colonial Army Corps) and the 2nd Battalion of the 123rd Field Artillery (155-millimeter howitzers); the Kennedy grouping consisted

of the 5th Field Artillery. These two groupings of heavy guns were charged with the demolition of known strong points and of observatories, and in the preliminary bombardment the 155-millimeter guns were intrusted with the duty of delivering enfilade fire on the important *boyaux* and the 8-inch guns were to deliver fire on the chief trenches. The two groupings of direct support (the Butner grouping, consisting of the 6th and 7th Field Artillery and the Rivers grouping, consisting of the 76th Field Artillery and 122nd Field Artillery) were given the mission of cutting wire and firing the rolling barrage behind which the infantry were to advance. Because of the hindrances which were expected in crossing the Rupt-de-Madt and other difficult places, and because of the continuance of German observation from the western range of hills, a large proportion of smoke shells was to be used in the firing. In order to assure depth in the barrage, one battalion of each grouping was to fire two hundred meters beyond the line on which the other battalions were firing. The Hackett grouping (124th Field Artillery and the 2nd Battalion of the 123rd Field Artillery) was to enfilade certain German trenches in the Richecourt sector, supply a rolling barrage on the western edge of the sector, blind and destroy the observation posts on Mont Sec, and shield the left flank of the division from an expected counterattack from the west.

To perform these missions, the gun positions were very carefully chosen. The Hackett grouping was placed, roughly speaking, west of Bouconville, the Rivers grouping between Bouconville and Rambucourt, and the Butner grouping between Rambucourt and Beaumont. The Kennedy grouping was placed behind Rambucourt and the Davis grouping behind Beaumont and Bouconville. The reconnaissance of these positions, the digging of gun pits, and the laying in of two and one-half days' fire allowance of ammunition are operations

much easier to relate than they were to accomplish. The fine weather, the clear air, and the nearness of the German observation posts made necessary the performance of all work by night. But even night work was hard to do. Rockets and flares dropped by hostile aircraft cast intermittent floods of light on fields and roads. To avoid undue traffic congestion the circulation of vehicles took a counterclockwise direction, from the ammunition dump in the Forêt de la Reine, to Beaumont, Rambucourt, Bouconville, Broussey, and back again to the Forêt de la Reine. On the nights of September 8, 9, 10, and 11, the guns were drawn from the echeloned positions into the prepared gun positions and on September 11, the brigade P. C. was moved to Beaumont.

On September 12 at one o'clock in the morning the preliminary bombardment of four hours began. This bombardment, which included a large proportion of gas shells, was continuous and fierce. The enemy troops were so unnerved by it and so confused by the deadly and obscuring barrage fire that the advancing troops met with but scattered and futile resistance. The observation posts on Mont Sec were partly obscured by smoke and their telephone lines were cut. The troops reached their objectives on scheduled time, and on the second day the 26th Division of the Vth Corps, which had advanced eastward from Les Éparges, met the 1st Division near Vigneulles-lès-Hattonchâtel.

The battle had been won. Thousands of prisoners had been taken, the salient had been demolished. The counter-attack never came, and the regiments had no further occasion to fire. All the spectacular action was at an end, but much precautionary work had still to be done and this was exacting and exhausting business. From September 12 to September 14, the artillery regiments moving in echelon successively took up advanced positions to guard against the still threatened

attack from the west, until all the organizations, with caissons and wagons full of ammunition, reached Nonsard—a total advance of more than eleven kilometers over obstructed and shell-ruined roads. The disorganization of the German resistance in itself was proof of the excellence of the artillery fire, but General Summerall—whose command, the 1st Division, was reputed to be one of the best divisions in the Army—made official record of the brigade's accomplishments. He cited each of the three regiments in General Orders No. 58, September 19, 1918:

For great devotion to duty and efficiency in advancing over muddy and difficult roads under the worst weather conditions and rendering at all times invaluable support to the attacking infantry in the advance of September 12–13, 1918.

The importance of the battle in which the brigade took such a brilliant part is shown in the following telegram. It was sent by General Pershing to Major General Dickman, commanding the IVth American Army Corps:

Please accept my sincere congratulations on the successful and important part taken by the officers and men of the 4th Corps in the first offensive of the First American Army, on September 12th and 13th. The courageous dash and vigor of our troops has thrilled our countrymen and evoked the enthusiasm of our allies. Please convey to your command my heartfelt appreciation of their splendid work. I am proud of you all.

The junction of the 26th Division and the 1st Division resulted in the withdrawal of the 1st Division from the line. It was ordered to the Bois de la Belle Oxière for rest, reorganization, and reëquipment and along with it was to go its divisional artillery. The artillery organizations were in great need of rest. For three weeks they had been encamped in the wet woods, subjected to gas and bombing attacks; and in the latter part of that period men and animals had become well

tired out, the cannoneers from digging gun emplacements, the drivers and horses from hauling ammunition. Besides this they had had the added fatigue of the attack and subsequent and frequent changes of position. Before the regiments began to move, however, the order came detaching the 58th Field Artillery Brigade from the 1st Division and ordering it to report to the Second French Army. So, instead of rest, the brigade was to go through one of its most exacting experiences in the war, a period of long and tedious night marches and of day encampments in the wet woods, from St. Mihiel to the Argonne.

On September 14 the organizations marched from Nonsard to the woods near Broussey; September 15, they marched via Gironville, Mécrin, and Koeur-la-Petite to the woods near Koeur-la-Grande; September 16 they moved to Pierrefitte and towns nearby—Belrain, Nicey, and Villotte; September 17 and 18, going by way of Beauzéc, Deuxnouds, Seraucourt, Fleury, and Froidos, they moved into the woods west of Autrécourt. On September 21 they finally reached the Bois de Parois. The total distance covered in the week was 104 kilometers.

The First American Army made three distinct efforts to pierce the German lines north of Verdun. The first, lasting from September 26 to October 4, and the second from October 4 to October 31, constituted a slow, creeping fight of great ferocity. The Germans were driven back from the organized defenses of their trench system to partly organized, but very effective natural defenses. Range on range of steep wooded hills separated by sharply-cut ravines, lent aid to the machine-gun defense of the enemy. The third, beginning November 1, was the mighty thrust which broke down the German organization and cut the Metz-Mézières Railroad, one of the two main lines of supply of the German Army. The 58th Field Artillery Brigade believes it was the first organiza-

tion to fire on the Metz-Mézières Railroad, which it attacked November 5. These three operations are called the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.

Roughly, the American sector was divided as follows: the 1st Corps attacked in the Aire Valley, and the Vth and IIIrd Corps in the west and east parts of the Grand Couronne. The 91st Division, supported by the 58th Field Artillery Brigade, was the left division of the Vth Corps, with the 37th and 79th Divisions on its right and on its left the 35th Division of the 1st Corps.

Opposite the 91st Division the situation was this: The German supply lines ran down deep ravines, perpendicular to the front; they had the cover afforded their artillery by successive ranges of wooded hills; their machine guns could enfilade all approaches. In some places they had organized these natural defenses with barbed wire and shallow trenches, as in the Kriemhild and Freya Stellungen. The experienced German Army Staff took advantage of every inch of this difficult terrain and organized an admirable defense, depending upon isolated machine guns and artillery of all calibres.

On the other hand, the American lines of supply were never particularly good, and during the advance their condition became steadily worse. Our troops in advancing were often in full view of the concealed German machine gunners and artillery observers. Our artillery advanced over the worst possible roads and only by superhuman efforts was it able to keep up with our attacking infantry. Our forces were under another disadvantage; they were operating in this sector for the first time.

The divisional artillery of the 91st Division, General Todd commanding, was organized in four groupings. The Trench Mortar grouping, under the command of Captain C. J. Kraft, consisted of the 108th Trench Mortar Battery, the

308th Trench Mortar Battery, and the 17th and 20th Batteries of the 176th Regiment of French Trench Artillery. It was to deliver enfilading and destructive fire on the highly organized trench systems just west of Avocourt and to cut gaps in the first wire entanglements. There were two groupings of heavy artillery, the 155-millimeter grouping, which consisted of the 123rd Field Artillery and the 36th Battery of the 8th Regiment of French Foot Artillery, under command of Colonel Charles G. Davis, and the 9.2-inch grouping, the 65th Regiment, Colonial Army Corps, under command of Colonel Howell. These units were to deliver preparation fire upon machine guns, dugouts, strong points, and the trenches farther back. During the attack they fired the covering barrage. The light artillery grouping, under command of Brigadier General Fleming, was in turn divided into two subgroupings, the Foreman subgrouping and the Hackett subgrouping. The former comprised the 122nd Field Artillery and the 1st Battalion of the 124th Field Artillery and supported the 181st Brigade in the right of the sector. The latter was made up of the 322nd Field Artillery and the 2nd Battalion of the 124th Field Artillery and was to support the 182nd Brigade in the left of the sector. The entire grouping was to deliver interdiction and harassing fire and during the preparation was to cut gaps in the wire entanglements. During the attack it was to furnish the rolling barrage. All the groupings were placed within the division sector in the Forêt de Hesse, midway between Vauquois and Avocourt, and those farthest back were within three kilometers of the enemy's front line trenches.

General Todd received instructions for the attack from the Corps Commander, Major General Cameron, and from the Corps Artillery Commander, Major General Alexandre, September 19 at the Vth Corps Headquarters in Ville-sur-

Cousances. On September 20 battery positions were reconnoitred and on September 21 the delivery of ammunition to the battery positions commenced. Because of the scarcity of trucks and the exhausted condition of the horses, the delivery of ammunition was one of the most serious problems faced. Great credit should be given to Lieutenant Colonel Fisher of the 108th Ammunition Train, Lieutenant Julien of General Alexandre's staff, First Lieutenant A. G. Ford of the brigade staff, and to the personnel of the brigade for putting the complete allowance of ammunition in place in so few days. On September 21 and 22 the 1st Battalion of the 124th Field Artillery took over the defense of the sector from the French. The brigade P. C. was moved to Bertramé Ferme, September 23, and on September 24 the division plan of attack was received. On September 26 at 2:30 A.M. the preliminary bombardment commenced; it continued until 5:30 with an intermission of five minutes, from 4:15 to 4:20, to permit the sound-ranging section to locate acting German batteries. From 4:20 to 4:30 German positions were gassed. At 5:30 the infantry attacked.

The day's objective for the division was the heights northwest of Gesnes. This meant an advance of fourteen kilometers over the most difficult sort of ground and beyond the fire of the divisional artillery. The troops did not reach this objective. The heights were finally captured about October 15. Although the division did fail to reach its goal, it fought well. It advanced six kilometers through the dense woods of Cheppy, through barrier after barrier of wire entanglements and resisted by nest after nest of machine guns, to the ridge northwest of Véry.

The advance of the infantry was remarkable, but the advance of the artillery was more so. It is quite reasonable that the infantry attack should succeed as long as the artillery

kept it in range. The artillery's successful effort to increase its range promptly by moving forward was the outstanding feature of the attack. Before dusk of the first day, three battalions of 75-millimeter guns had passed with full supplies of ammunition over a road pronounced impassable—the road through Avocourt—had gone into position from one-half to one and one-half kilometers behind the infantry outpost lines, had oriented their guns, and had laid them for fire. The next day the remaining battalion of the 124th Field Artillery and the 123rd Field Artillery with its attached French battalion moved into the same neighborhood, two kilometers southeast of Véry. Here the regiments fired upon all obstacles to the infantry advance, upon machine-gun nests, upon enemy batteries, and upon concentrations of enemy troops. On September 29, Colonel Horatio B. Hackett, commanding the 124th Field Artillery, while gallantly directing his regiment under heavy fire, was seriously wounded by shell splinters and was evacuated to the hospital.

By September 29 the infantry advance had warranted the further displacement of the regiments northward. The 2nd Battalion of the 124th Field Artillery moved to a position one-half kilometer west of Épinonville and the rest of the brigade moved to positions between Véry and Épinonville. The 123rd Field Artillery occupied positions just off the road connecting these towns. The 2nd Battalion of the 124th Field Artillery was in position west of the road and all the positions of the 122nd Field Artillery were east of the road. Here the brigade remained until October 11 and 12, when it was withdrawn for rest and reëquipment. The infantry supported by the brigade was making slow progress. This was not due to any fault of the infantry or to the lack of artillery support. At one time the left divisional flank was exposed for a kilometer and a half and only the strength and quickness of

a heavy defensive barrage saved our infantry from encirclement. Again, on September 30, behind a rolling barrage by the 58th Field Artillery Brigade, the 181st Infantry Brigade advanced and took Gesnes. The exposure of the flanks again threatened and our troops had to retire.

On October 4, the 91st Division Infantry was relieved by the 32nd Division, to which the 58th Field Artillery Brigade was then attached. The following extract from a letter from the Corps Commander gives the reasons for its relief:

Under orders from First Army, the 91st Division will be relieved from the front line tonight and placed in Corps Reserve.

The Corps Commander wishes you to understand that this relief results solely from a realization by higher command that your Division has done its full share in the recent success, and is entitled to a rest for reorganization. This especially as during the past three days it has incurred heavy casualties when circumstances would not permit either advance or withdrawal.

At a time when the divisions on its flank were faltering and even falling back, the Ninety-First pushed ahead and steadfastly clung to every yard gained.

In its initial performance, your Division has established itself firmly on the list of the Commander in Chief's reliable fighting units. Please extend to your officers and men my appreciation of their splendid behavior and my hearty congratulations on the brilliant record they have made.

GEO. H. CAMERON,
Major General, Commanding.

The 32nd Division continued to attack daily and the 58th Field Artillery continued to render assistance. At this time the second great German defensive system was pierced. The world-renowned Kriemhild Stellung, which bestrode the precipitous wooded slopes north of Gesnes, fell before the Allied troops after a bitter fight.

Throughout the whole period, the liaison officers with

the infantry units always displayed bold initiative and a fine courage and because of their efficient service, immediate and effective fire was brought to bear upon all the obstacles hindering our infantry advance. Deserving of special mention in this respect is the work of First Lieutenant Latimer Johns of the 122nd Field Artillery. Lieutenant Johns directed the supporting fire of his regiment for the attacking infantry from the initial assault of September 26 until his death; and during all the trying days he displayed an intrepidity which is shown only by the bravest of men. He was killed by shell fire on September 30 at Gesnes.

The high favor in which the artillery was held may be judged by two letters to General Todd from the 32nd Division Infantry Brigade commanders; the one from Brigadier General E. B. Winans, the other from Brigadier General Frank McCoy:

I desire to express my utmost satisfaction with the artillery support by your 58th Artillery Brigade in connection with the successful attack and capture by the 64th Infantry Brigade of the Bois de la Morine, the Bois du Chêne Sec, and the town of Gesnes. In this operation the barrage was precise and exactly timed, the destructive and the counter-battery fire effective, and the fire on fleeting targets prompt and accurate. The efficient liaison established by your liaison officers, Lieutenants Shields and Hunter, is deserving of high commendation. It will no doubt gratify you to know that not a single report of friendly "shorts" was received during this operation.

(Signed) WINANS.

During the first few days of the operation of my Brigade against the Kriemhilde Stellung in front of Romagne, I had the very effective support of your Brigade of Field Artillery, and I wish to express my appreciation to both yourself and your Colonels. I was keenly conscious of this support, not only when asked, but of the quick and fine initiative of yourself and staff, which made it a pleasure and satisfaction to work together.

(Signed) MCCOY.



CUMIÈRES-RAFFECOURT ROAD, CUMONT RAVINE



CUMIÈRES-RAFFECOURT ROAD

Two defensive systems had been crushed. The third was to fall later.

The brigade had been working to the point of exhaustion. Accordingly, on October 11, when the infantry advanced beyond the range of our guns, the brigade was relieved from line duty and was sent to the area in and near Ville-sur-Cousances for refitting. So great had been the losses of horses that the journey was made in easy stages. Brigade headquarters and the 123rd Field Artillery went to Ville-sur-Cousances, the 122nd Field Artillery to Jubécourt, the 124th Field Artillery to Brocourt, the 108th Ammunition Train to Brabant, and the 108th Trench Mortar Battery to Vraincourt.

After an inspection on October 17 by Major General McNair, and according to instructions from the Army, the 123rd Field Artillery turned over to the 122nd Field Artillery and to the 124th Field Artillery its rolling stock and animals. It began to move October 22 for the training area at Doulaincourt, where it was motorized. By this transaction the two light regiments became well horsed.

On October 23 the brigade was joined by the 11th Field Artillery (155-millimeter motorized), Colonel W. G. Peace commanding. The brigade went back into the familiar sector, the area north of Gesnes. It was still in the Vth Army Corps, but this time in support of the 89th Division. The brigade P. C. was located in Gesnes, which had been abandoned and subsequently retaken by the 32nd Division supported by the brigade. North of Gesnes and northwest of Romagne the regiments were placed in the well-defiladed, wooded valleys of the great Kriemhild Stellung. The enemy had organized the Bois de Hazois and La Dhuy Ferme as strong points of first resistance. Behind towered the formidable heights of Barri-court, thickly wooded and bristling with enemy batteries.

The regiments moved into position on the night of October 25 and from that time to the first of November engaged in harassing, interdiction, and counterbattery fire. The chief targets for harassing and interdiction fire were the woods of Hazois, L'Épasse, and Andevanne; for harassing fire only, the farms of La Bergerie, La Dhuy, and La Tuilerie and the town of Rémonville; for interdiction fire, the road crossings between Bantheville and Rémonville. During this period the information reports of Lieutenant K. K. Richardson of the 122nd Field Artillery were of great value not alone to the brigade, but to the army corps as well.

On October 30, General Todd, with his aide, Lieutenant Leon Dessez, and Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Schwengel of the 122nd Field Artillery, and accompanied by Brigadier General Edward A. Millar, while making a personal reconnaissance of the roads and bridges which were to be used in the expected advance, went beyond the infantry outpost line in the western edge of the Bois de Bantheville. His party was immediately the target of observed enemy shell fire, and a shell splinter wounded the general in the face. Fortunately he was not killed; although weak from loss of blood he continued his reconnaissance and upon returning to his headquarters issued to the regimental commanders the instructions based on his reconnaissance. He refused to allow himself to be sent to the hospital until the brigade was about to move forward on November 1.

The artillery concentration for the offensive of November 1 was one of the greatest, if not the greatest, massing of guns of the war. The entire 57th and 58th Brigades and the 203rd French Regiment comprised the divisional artillery of the 89th Division. Besides, there was located in the sector a great number of guns of the corps and army artillery. In the divisional area two kilometers wide there were, along with

some large calibre railway guns, 32 batteries of 75-millimeter rifles, 9 batteries of 105-millimeter rifles, 21 batteries of 155-millimeter howitzers, 6 batteries of 155-millimeter Schneider rifles, 6 batteries of 155-millimeter G. P. F. rifles and 4 batteries of 8.2-inch howitzers, a total of 78 batteries. All the divisional artillery of the 89th Division was under the command of Brigadier General Irwin, commanding the 57th Brigade, until the battalions began to move forward, when only the 58th Brigade and the 203rd French Regiment were to constitute the divisional artillery of the 89th Division under the command of Brigadier General E. A. Millar, 6th Field Artillery Brigade, who temporarily succeeded General Todd in command.

At 3:30 A.M. the preliminary bombardment started and at 5:30 the infantry attack began. The heavy guns fired upon known strong points and upon sensitive points at great range. The 155-millimeter howitzers furnished the accompanying barrage and the 75-millimeter rifles fired the rolling barrage. The rolling barrage was quite remarkable. One battery in each battalion fired shrapnel only, and one-fourth of all the guns fired smoke shells. At 7:30 the rear battalion of the 122nd Field Artillery ceased firing and advanced to a position near La Dhuy Ferme. It was followed a half hour later by the forward battalion, which advanced also to La Dhuy Ferme and went into position there. From these positions the regiments took up the rolling barrage at 12:30 according to schedule and continued it to and beyond the day's objective. The 124th Field Artillery commenced to move at 11:30 and was ready to fire from positions northeast of La Dhuy Ferme by the middle of the afternoon. The 11th Field Artillery left its position northwest of Romagne in the afternoon and marched to its new position south of Rémonville before day-break November 2. In the afternoon, General Millar's head-

quarters moved to La Dhuy Ferme. The day's attack was conspicuously successful along the entire front of the army. The Allied troops reached all their objectives and in doing so pierced the last German defensive system before Sedan, the Freya Stellung on the heights of Barricourt. The 89th Division with the support of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade captured 1,500 prisoners, many machine guns, fieldpieces, and great quantities of ammunition, and was one of the divisions which made the greatest progress of the day. Brigadier General Dwight B. Aultman, chief of artillery of the Vth Corps, wrote to General Millar:

I transmit herewith letter of commendation from the Corps Commander regarding the action of the Artillery in the Operations of November 1st. In transmitting this letter I desire to add my own thanks and appreciation to you and to the officers and men of your Brigade for the hearty coöperation that has resulted in such a brilliant success. To have enabled our infantry to advance in one day over a distance of nine kilometers, with small losses, capturing over a hundred guns, two hundred machine guns and more than two thousand prisoners is an achievement which the artillery may well be proud of, and I congratulate your entire command on having so well performed its share in the operation. I desire that the contents of the letter of the Corps Commander be made known to the officers and men of your command, as well as my own appreciation of their own splendid conduct.

The letter referred to, from Major General Summerall, commanding the Vth Army Corps, was as follows:

I desire to convey to you and to the officers and soldiers of all artillery serving in this Corps my profound appreciation and my admiration of the brilliant manner in which the artillery of all classes has performed the difficult part allotted to it, especially during the advance of November 1st. Although the artillery has been constantly in action day and night, sustaining the battle since the beginning of the present offensive, it has responded with self sacrificing devotion to duty with superb efficiency that is beyond all praise. While our daunt-

less infantry have advanced against the enemy's prepared positions with a courage that elicits our greatest admiration, it must be recognized that without the powerful and skillful operation of the artillery it would have been impossible to accomplish the results which they have so brilliantly achieved. The tremendous volume of fire, the skillful arrangement of all objectives, and the perfect coördination with the infantry and machine guns have made the action of November 1st a model of completeness, and it must stand as a tribute to the able administrative officers who conceived the plans and to the technical ability and fidelity to duty of those who executed them. I beg that you convey to the officers and soldiers of all units of all artillery the foregoing sentiments and assure them of my abiding wishes for their continued success in the campaigns that lie before them.

On November 2 the 122nd Field Artillery advanced again to positions near Rémonville. At 5:30 A.M. the infantry continued the attack protected by the rolling barrage of the two light regiments and the covering fire of the 11th Field Artillery. During the rest of the day the two light regiments in liaison with the infantry fired on all targets reported, while the 11th Field Artillery and the corps artillery shelled sensitive areas and counterbattered enemy guns reported in action. The day's advance was five kilometers.

From this time until November 6, the advance continued rapidly, the infantry pressing ahead all the while, the advancing batteries occupying position after position. With effective artillery support the infantry penetrated and captured the Forêt de Dieulet and reached the Meuse. The brigade P. C. moved from La Dhuy Ferme to Rémonville, then to Barri-court, and then to Tailly. On November 5 General Todd returned from the hospital and resumed command of the brigade. The same day the 203rd French Regiment attached to the brigade opened fire on the main artery of the German communication in the east, the Metz-Mézières Railroad. On November 7, in anticipation of supporting the river crossing,

all regiments took up positions northwest of the Laneuville-Beaumont road. The 11th Field Artillery took up and continued to fire on the Metz-Mézières Railroad. Ammunition was brought up and all the regiments were well stocked with supplies, General Todd completed the artillery plan of attack.

On the night of November 10 a crossing of the Meuse was to be forced from Pouilly on the left to Stenay on the right. The eastern heights of the river were to be seized. To support this movement the divisional artillery was divided into three tactical groupings: the Foreman grouping, composed of the 122nd Field Artillery and 1st Battalion of the 124th Field Artillery; the Rogers grouping, composed of the 2nd Battalion of the 124th Field Artillery and the Battalion of the 203rd French Field Artillery; and the Peace grouping, or the 11th Field Artillery. The commanders of the first two groupings arranged with the infantry commanders for the support of the left and right crossings respectively. The Peace grouping remained under the control of the Divisional Artillery Commander. It was planned to have it pass to the control of the Corps Artillery Commander after the objectives had been reached, but the armistice ended hostilities before this happened.

The attack started at 21:30 hours on November 10. By the morning of November 11 the troops were mopping up Pouilly and Stenay and were on the heights north of Pouilly. On November 11 at 11:00 hours the guns were silent. Germany had agreed to the terms of the Allied armistice. Announcement of the German acceptance reached brigade headquarters at 9:30; at 10:45 the light guns ceased fire and at 11:00 hours the Peace grouping ceased fire. An unknown calm came upon the country.

The time between November 5 and November 11 was most trying for the brigade. The only route of supplies and



CUMIÈRES-RAFFECOURT ROAD, CONSTRUCTION OVER TRENCH



CUMIÈRES-RAFFECOURT ROAD, CONSTRUCTION NEAR TRENCH
INTERSECTION

ammunition was through Laneuville, a route constantly subjected to murderous enfilade shell fire. That it was possible to keep the regiments supplied was due only to the dauntless bravery of officers and men alike.

A word of special praise is due to First Lieutenant Joseph Z. Burgee, brigade communications officer. Throughout the advance, brigade headquarters kept in constant touch with the regiments and with the infantry. For one day at least all the division communications were sent over the brigade telephone lines. In handling this troublesome problem and by maintaining lines through heavily shelled areas, Lieutenant Burgee displayed not only initiative and daring, but great brilliancy as well.

Adequately to assess the accomplishment of the first of November offensive, it is again necessary to quote Major General Summerall:

The announcement of a general armistice with the enemy brings to a temporary suspension the brilliant advance of the 5th Corps which commenced November 1st. The Corps Commander, therefore, takes this occasion to congratulate the officers and soldiers of the troops engaged with the Corps upon the fortitude, the courage, the endurance, the skill and the determination that characterized their conduct throughout the operation. The Corps Commander further desires to express his gratitude for the loyalty with which the troops have responded to every demand which has been made upon them and to assure them of the deep sense of his pride and the honor that has come to him in commanding such superb organizations.

Commencing November 1st the troops have advanced more than thirty kilometers against the strongest opposition that the enemy could offer by his best troops. They have broken through the last vestige of the Hindenburg Line and the Freya Stellung, captured many prisoners, numerous guns, large quantities of war material and have dispersed and destroyed the enemy organizations. On the very night preceding the armistice the troops of this Corps made a brilliant

passage of the river Meuse and occupied the high ground constituting the bridgehead to the east of that river.

Notwithstanding that since the last days of August these troops have been constantly marching and fighting, sleeping in the open and even at times going without their regular supplies of food, and subjected to rain, cold, and exposure in the mud, there has been no fault nor complaint, but with a singleness of purpose they have devoted themselves to the great mission that devolves upon them.

By their progress they have contributed immeasurably to the total defeat of the enemy and compelled him to sue for terms. Prior to the advance, the Corps Commander took occasion to assure the troops that great results must follow upon their actions and that they must expect to capture large numbers of prisoners and booty. The success in compelling the enemy to sue for peace has been beyond our greatest expectations. History will accord to the troops of this Corps their abundant share in the fruits of victory. All officers and soldiers who participated in this campaign must feel a just pride in the privilege that came to them and the place they must occupy in the gratitude and affection of our people. To those of our comrades that have laid down their lives, or who have suffered wounds or sickness, we and our nation will ever afford those sentiments of reverence and honor that they have justly earned.

X. OPERATIONS OF THE 33RD DIVISION FROM THE ARMISTICE UNTIL ITS DEPARTURE FROM LUXEMBOURG

On Tuesday, November 12, 1918, the 33rd Division was definitely established in the positions which it was destined to occupy, with few modifications, for nearly a month.¹ Every effort was exerted to make the troops as comfortable as possible as well as to locate them in such a manner as to be in readiness for any advance.² The day was chiefly spent in organizing the positions and in picketing the lines so as to prevent fraternization on the part of the enemy, who seemed determined to establish friendly relations in spite of the stringent order received to prevent any communication between the opposing forces.³ That Tuesday inaugurated a period of routine camp duties and constant training throughout the division which lasted until the first week in December and which was devoid of special interest so far as the troops were concerned except for a few changes of position and for the days devoted to salvaging and policing the areas occupied.

The night of November 11-12 was characterized by an illumination caused by pyrotechnics of every description, which extended along the enemy lines for miles; it was accompanied by sounds strongly akin to those of drunken revelry which floated across No Man's Land from the German positions. Beginning at 4 P.M. on November 12 and lasting until midnight, and again shortly before dawn on November 13 similar phenomena were witnessed.⁴

On Wednesday, November 13, the following telephone message was received from the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Second Army at Toul:

Instructions [have been] received from G. H. Q. that any Italians, Poles or Russian prisoners released by the Germans on our front and come into our lines be received and treated with kindness and given shelter, food and medical attention, if needed. They are, however, to be kept segregated and not allowed to wander around or mingle with our men and they are to have no communication whatever with our soldiers.

They will at once be investigated by G-2 and a report made direct to Army Headquarters, giving result of investigation. Particular attention will be given by G-2 to ascertaining the section of the country from which these people came and every effort will be made to determine whether they manifest any Bolchevism tendencies.

G-2.

As a matter of fact, these unfortunates were beginning to present themselves in considerable numbers and at 3 P.M. that day 7 Russians, 30 French, and 367 Italians had been received on the division front.⁵

During the course of the day several important communications were received from the Headquarters of the 17th French Army Corps. One announced that at 8 P.M. the 33rd Division, exclusive of the 62nd Field Artillery Brigade, would be transferred to the IVth American Corps;⁶ another directed the immediate withdrawal of that brigade which was to be cantoned near the Troyon-St. Mihiel Railway and the detail of sufficient personnel from the 55th Field Artillery Brigade to accompany the motor transport proceeding to it from the 167th Field Artillery Brigade;⁷ the third gave instructions relative to the transmission of reports from the enemy respecting the location of mines;⁸ and the fourth contained specific directions concerning the treatment of German soldiers and bearers of flags of truce.⁹

The principal communication of importance on Thursday, November 14, was the following telegram which was

received at 8 A.M. from the Chief of Staff of the Second Army:

WABASH Nov. 13-18.

C. G. 33rd Divn.

A. E. F.

19:30 hours. Number 172 G-3. Following telegram received this afternoon from G. H. Q. is repeated for your information and guidance quote: In accordance with the terms of the Armistice, certain German officers carrying documents relative to the release [of] establishments of the line of communication [railroad, water-ways, telegraph and telephone] are [to] confer with French authorities at the railroad station at Nancy at 14:00 hours on the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth of November. The French authorities request that if the German representatives arrive at any point of the American Army such representatives be given all facilities of crossing the lines and that they be accompanied by an officer to the railroad station of Nancy. You will then comply with the request of the French authorities in the event the German representatives present themselves before your lines. By orders. CONNER.

HEINTZELMAN.

The influx of released prisoners continued unabated along the entire division front and some difficulty was experienced in supplying them as was desired. Some valuable information was obtained from them and, according to their statements, "it appears that the greater part of the territory for 30 kilometers east of Woël has been evacuated and that only a few Germans remain in this area," while others declared that "Conflans is being evacuated today."¹⁰

November 15 passed without event of importance save the issuance from Division Headquarters of two training circulars and orders for a thorough policing next day of all billets, camps, horse-lines, and the areas adjacent to them.¹¹ Some relief was obtained in the locations congested by the numbers of released prisoners by sending 439 of them to the inclosure of the IVth Corps at Woinville, near St. Mihiel.¹²

At 5 A.M. on Sunday, November 17, the 33rd Division passed out of the IVth American Army Corps and into the Second Army Reserve.¹³ At that same hour the newly-created American Army of Occupation—officially designated as the Third Army—began its advance toward Luxembourg en route into Germany and took over the fronts of the First and Second Armies, which were destined to remain in reserve and to devote their time to training.¹⁴ Reports of poisoned wells and various diabolical devices employed by the enemy caused a warning to be given to the entire Second Army against the indiscriminate handling of boxes abandoned by the Germans.¹⁵

November 18 was chiefly notable for the orders issued for the salvaging of the entire division area, for the appointment of Lieutenant Colonel William H. Simpson as acting Chief of Staff of the division, in place of Brigadier General W. K. Naylor, who had been made the Chief of Staff of the IXth Corps, and the appointment of Major Roane Waring, adjutant of the 65th Infantry Brigade, as G-3 of the division to fill the place vacated by Lieutenant Colonel Simpson.¹⁶ Major O. T. Troster also succeeded Lieutenant Colonel William C. Gardenhire as G-1 of the division.

Salvaging and policing formed the main interest of the division during the ensuing four days.¹⁷ On November 23, however, additional instructions were issued respecting the training to be pursued during the next four weeks.¹⁸ General Bell spent part of that afternoon at Stenay in conference with General Todd of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade and, upon his return to Troyon-sur-Meuse that evening at 9:20, received a stinging reprimand from the Commander-in-Chief, dated November 20, 1918,¹⁹ for "the condition of the billets and camping area at La Fourche, Le Calvaire, Benoitte Vaux and Route de Issoncourt."²⁰ The 33rd Division, it was stated, "occupied the aforesaid billets and area just prior to October

14 and 15, 1918" and "left the billets and the camping area in a most disgraceful, unsanitary condition." General Bell was censured for his lack of control, administration, and the discipline of his command, and was informed that "the reports referred to and this letter are now a part of the official records" at General Headquarters. This communication terminated with this sentence: "The receipt, without further remark or explanation on your part, will be acknowledged at once by courier letter addressed to the Chief of Staff, A. E. F., A. P. O. 706."

On October 14 and 15, 1918, the entire 33rd Division was hotly engaged on both banks of the Meuse north of Verdun, as has already been seen.²¹ At no time during its existence did the 33rd Division occupy the billets and camping area specified. The charges made by the Commander-in-Chief were therefore without the slightest foundation in fact. The number and volume of the papers connected with these groundless accusations are such as to preclude their incorporation in the text. They have accordingly been inserted in appendix 37, where the reader who is interested in this case can examine them in detail.

The remaining days of November, 1918, possessed little of interest save the transfer of the division from the IVth to the IXth Corps on November 26,²² the innovation in the appointment of an executive officer in all regiments and companies, several tactical manoeuvres, certain changes of position by some of the units, and further policing of the area occupied by the command.²³

This work was continued throughout the opening days of December until the entire division area had been thoroughly policed.²⁴ On the first of the month the 65th Infantry Brigade was concentrated in rest billets in the area of the Fort de Troyon.²⁵ On December 2 orders were received to send a

battalion to Metz to participate in the review to be held there on December 8 by President Poincaré.²⁶ The following day division, brigade, and regimental commanders and most of the Division Staff motored to Toul, where they were conducted through the Headquarters of the Second Army and a demonstration was given them of the proper functioning of an army headquarters.²⁷ On December 4, the entire 33rd Division participated in a manoeuvre in the Troyon sector.²⁸ On December 5 notification was received that at 3 P.M. that day the division would be transferred out of the IXth Corps and placed in the Army Reserve, and warning orders were issued for the movement of the command from its present area to that of Étain and Conflans.²⁹ On the following day, in conformity with instructions from the Second Army,³⁰ there were issued Field Order No. 37, the March Tables for the advance on December 7 and 8, and three memoranda bearing upon this movement.³¹

The advance toward Luxembourg of the Third Army, which was destined to become the American Army of Occupation in Germany,³² has been mentioned. To provide the Third Army with the necessary transport the First and Second Armies were stripped of a large number of trucks, so that the 33rd Division found itself reduced to about one-half the transport authorized by the Tables of Organization.³³ Prior to its departure from the Troyon sector, every effort was made to put this transport into the best condition possible under the circumstances and to procure such spare parts as were most urgently needed.³⁴ These endeavors were attended with scant success,³⁵ and the movement of the division was correspondingly handicapped.

The advance toward Luxembourg began Saturday, December 7, 1918³⁶—a cold, wretched day—and that afternoon the line Thillot-Labry was reached.³⁷ The next day the move-

ment was continued and the Étain–Conflans area attained, the Division Headquarters being transferred from Troyon-sur-Meuse to Conflans.³⁸ Orders were issued that day by the Headquarters of the Second Army for detachments of the 33rd to relieve all elements of the 5th (Regular) Division doing guard and police duty in the Hollerich area and the detachments at Esch, Remich, Bettembourg,³⁹ and near-by places. By all odds the most important event of that Sunday was the formal occupation of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, which took place at Metz and was attended by President Poincaré, M. Clémenceau, the French premier, Marshals Joffre, Foch, and Pétain, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Lord Derby, and other notable personages. This historic ceremony opened, about 9:30 A.M., with an inspection of the troops by the President of the French Republic and his party, who were received with full honors. The color bearers then formed in the Place de la République opposite the reviewing stand and were addressed by the President, who thereupon summoned General Pétain and invested him with the baton of a marshal of France. A grand review followed, the procession being composed almost wholly of battalions from famous French divisions. The only body of foreign troops was a provisional battalion of 32 officers and 735 men from the 131st Infantry, under the command of Colonel Joseph B. Sanborn, selected out of the entire American Expeditionary Forces to represent the United States, and to it was accorded the place of honor at the head of the parade.⁴⁰ It is gratifying to be able to record that the appearance of the American troops was in keeping with their conspicuous achievements and excited favorable comment.⁴¹

The movement of the 33rd Division was resumed Monday, December 9, and the line Norroy–Mancieulles was reached.⁴² The principal episode of importance was the

receipt of a telegraphic notification that the division had been transferred from the Second to the Third Army but that the actual date of the passing of command would be arranged between the commanders of those two armies.⁴³

The march of December 10, 11, and 12, was attended by very disagreeable weather—cold with rain and fog—which did not add to the comfort of the troops. On December 10 the division P. C. was transferred from Conflans to Aumetz and two days later to Esch. Instructions were received on December 11 from the VIIth Corps countermanding the original destination and directing that the 33rd Division remain south of the line Luxembourg–Remich until further orders.⁴⁴ At the termination of the advance made during these three days the entire command was located in a sector roughly resembling a crescent and extending from the northeast to the west of the city of Luxembourg, between it and the Moselle. At noon on December 12, the 33rd Division passed into the VIIth Corps and became part of the Third Army, better known as the American Army of Occupation.⁴⁵

Friday, December 13, 1918, was a day of rest for the weary troops, who were decidedly fatigued after six days of continuous marching over muddy roads in a never-ceasing downpour of rain; the only movement on this day was that of the 108th Train Headquarters and Military Police from Berchem to Hesperingen. In accordance with instructions from the Headquarters of the Third Army, the necessary orders were issued for the advance of the division to the Saarburg area in Rhenish Germany, accompanied by a march table for the first day.⁴⁶

The movement was resumed Saturday, December 14, and that afternoon the leading units reached the Moselle River, which constitutes the boundary between the Grand

Duchy of Luxembourg and the German Palatinate of the Rhine.⁴⁷

The first fair weather encountered since leaving the Troyon sector came on Sunday, December 15,⁴⁸ when the advance of the division carried the 66th Infantry Brigade across the Moselle and into the picturesque valley of the Saar, while the artillery reached Remich and the 65th Infantry Brigade got beyond Manternach. About noon, however, telegraphic instructions from the Third Army, transmitted by the VIIth Corps, were received, announcing that, inasmuch as the number of divisions to enter Germany had been restricted to eight, the 33rd would be transferred at a subsequent date to the Second Army; in consequence its advance was to be immediately suspended and any units which had crossed the German frontier were to be withdrawn into Luxembourg.⁴⁹ The necessary orders were at once issued,⁵⁰ and that afternoon General Bell, accompanied by the Division Adjutant, motored from Esch to Saarburg in order to make certain that General Wolf had received instructions to withdraw all elements of the 66th Infantry Brigade west of the Moselle. Saarburg was found swarming with French troops, who were apparently greatly relishing the occupation of German territory after a lapse of forty-eight years.⁵¹

On Monday, December 16, 1918, a cloudy day with some fog,⁵² practically the entire division stood fast in the positions which had been reached the day before. As a precautionary measure, the orders of the preceding day were supplemented by telegrams directing that all elements which had crossed the German frontier be withdrawn.⁵³ The 66th Infantry Brigade *in toto* had attained the region of Saarburg, as has already been seen, but only two of the leading units of the 65th Infantry Brigade had got over the Moselle on Sunday. Upon receipt of these telegraphic instructions, the latter were

promptly countermarched across the river;⁵⁴ owing to the congestion of troops in the Saarburg area and the scarcity of supplies resulting from the lack of transport, however, the entire 66th Infantry Brigade was not withdrawn from German territory until next day. In view of the unexpected turn in events, General Bell deemed it advisable to ascertain in person from General Haan, the Commander of the VIIth Corps, or from his Chief of Staff, the exact conditions and status of the 33rd Division and, accordingly, motored that Monday afternoon to Trèves, where he obtained the information desired.⁵⁵

To the tributes already received from British and French commanders under whom the 33rd Division had served was added the following letter, which reached General Bell on December 15 and which was published to the command on the next day in General Order No. 150:

HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY

AMERICAN E. F.

FRANCE, 12 December, 1918.

From: COMMANDING GENERAL, Second Army.

To: COMMANDING GENERAL, 33rd Division, American E. F.

Subject: Activity of the 33rd Division prior to the Armistice.

1. Upon the transfer of the 33rd Division, from the Second to the Third American Army, I desire to express to you my gratification at the vigorous and successful activities of your division during the period of active operations preceding the Armistice.

2. The 33rd Division, although occupying a broad front, was called upon to advance towards Conflans, and was engaged in the performance of this mission at the time that hostilities ceased.

3. On November 6 to 7, when accurate information of the enemy's intentions was greatly desired, raiding parties from your Division penetrated to Chateau d'Aulnois and captured 21 prisoners, including one officer. On November 7 to 8, your reconnaissance patrols entered Bois d'Harville and



BEGINNING OF NEW CUMIÈRES-RAFFECOURT ROAD



ARTILLERY BRIDGE, CUMIÈRES-RAFFECOURT ROAD

St. Hilaire and brought back 8 prisoners. On November 9 to 10, you drove the enemy from the towns of St. Hilaire and Marchéville and, at the time of cessation of Hostilities, your division had occupied these towns, as well as the towns of Butgnéville and Riaville.

4. The conduct of the 33rd Division exemplified its ability to execute promptly and thoroughly the tasks which were given to it. There was shown, on the part of both officers and men, an efficiency and fighting spirit which are highly commendable.

(Signed) R. L. BULLARD,
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.

At noon Tuesday, December 17, 1918, the 33rd Division passed out of the VIIth Corps and the Army of Occupation and became part of the reserve of the Second Army.⁵⁶ The entire 66th Infantry Brigade was withdrawn from German territory and was concentrated just west of the Moselle in the neighborhood of Remich, which was somewhat congested that night, having been occupied since December 14 by the 55th Field Artillery Brigade. The eventual destination of the division was a region in the northern part of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg extending from the Moselle to Arlon in Belgium, and the advance in that direction was inaugurated that Tuesday by the transfer of the division P. C. and Headquarters Troop from Esch to Grevenmacher. Orders were issued that four of the units, which were located in the direction of this new advance, reach their final destinations December 18,⁵⁷ and that Tuesday afternoon the Division Commander made a personal reconnaissance of the region as far as Diekirch, Colmar-Berg, Mersch, and Larochette with a view to ascertaining what facilities for billets were offered.⁵⁸

On Wednesday, December 18, the Engineer Regiment, the Field Signal Battalion and the Train Headquarters and Military Police moved from their former positions to Medernach, Heffingen, and Diekirch respectively, while the rest of

the division remained in its billets, well sheltered from the deluge of rain which continued throughout the day and night.⁵⁹ Having acquired the habit, as it were, of being transferred from one corps or army to another, the passing of the 33rd Division from the Second Army Reserve to the VIth Corps, which took place at noon that day,⁶⁰ scarcely excited comment. Orders were issued for a general movement of all three brigades next day, followed on December 20 by the march of the 66th Brigade and Division Machine Gun Battalion to their ultimate destinations.⁶¹ The principal communication received that day from higher authority was a telegram to the Commanding General of the 33rd Division from the Chief of Staff of the Second Army, the date of which, December 16, 1918, plainly showed delay in transmission. It ran as follows:

15.15 hours period Number 339 G-3 period Instructions will be issued you shortly assigning to your Division an area for guard and police comma including the portion of the American zone within the Duchy of Luxembourg north of the line Remich to Rédange both inclusive period It is desired that your Division be held within that area pending further instructions as to billeting zone to be assigned you period Third Army reports your headquarters are at Grevenmacher period Esch is within billeting area assigned to Fifth Division and is not available for your Division period Acknowledge
HEINTZELMAN.⁶²

The miserable weather of the preceding days continued throughout Thursday, December 19, when the major portion of the 33rd Division advanced into the northern part of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and occupied the region where it was destined to spend four months. The Division Headquarters were installed at Diekirch, which was likewise occupied by the Headquarters Troop, the 108th Field Signal Battalion, the 108th Train Headquarters and Military Police—the latter having arrived the day before—and by the 108th

Sanitary Train. The 65th Infantry Brigade was located a short distance farther west, its headquarters being established at Ettelbruck, about three kilometers from Diekirch, while farther east Medernach was occupied by the 108th Engineers and Remich by the 55th Field Artillery Brigade. In the territory adjacent to Remich was the 66th Infantry Brigade and at Canach the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, neither of which made any movement that day.⁶³ The march was devoid of any unusual feature and, indeed, the only event of special importance that Thursday was the brief visit of Lieutenant General Bullard, commanding the Second Army, who reached Diekirch within an hour of General Bell's arrival, held a conference with him, and expressed his approval of the dispositions which had been made for the occupation of the area.⁶⁴

The movement of the 33rd Division into the Diekirch area terminated Friday, December 20, 1918, the various elements of the 65th Infantry Brigade reaching their destinations⁶⁵ and the 66th Infantry Brigade resuming its advance, which carried it from Remich to the region surrounding Schonfels, General Wolf's P. C. being established at the Chateau de Meysembourg.⁶⁶ The southern part of the duchy was occupied by the 5th Division, with headquarters in the city of Luxembourg, and, as reciprocal action between the two commands was essential to carry out the instructions from higher authority, Major General Hanson E. Ely motored to Diekirch for a conference with General Bell and lunched with him that day.⁶⁷ Two important communications were received from the Second Army; one directed the requisite precautions to quell any disturbances which might arise, especially in the neighborhood of Echternach,⁶⁸ and the other instructed General Bell to assume command of the VIth Army Corps.⁶⁹ Frequent requests for food on the part of civilians had already caused the issuance of orders prohibiting

supplies being given to them in view of the agreement between the French and American authorities. There was, apparently, no abatement in these requests, so that definite action was taken by Brigadier General Moseley, G-4 of the American Expeditionary Force, and his specific instructions were published to the 33rd Division in General Order No. 152 on December 20.⁷⁰

From December 21 until the last day of the year the troops were given as much rest as possible and their activities were confined to the ordinary routine duties, a thorough cleaning of all equipment, and such training as was prescribed.⁷¹ As a matter of fact, beginning with Christmas a respite of seven days was enjoyed, in conformity with instructions from the Second Army.⁷² On December 21 General Bell proceeded to Saizerais to assume command of the VIth Corps, but returned for a few hours two days later⁷³ and reported by wire to the Army Commander that the situation in the region of Echternach was well in hand and that no trouble need be apprehended there. The response made that day merely called his attention to the orders from General Headquarters requiring him to "stand ready to suppress any disorders in that vicinity should they occur."⁷⁴ General Bell's tenure of office as Corps Commander was decidedly brief, being cut short by a telegram on December 24 announcing that it had been decided at General Headquarters that "no Corps Commander will be designated" and that the VIth Corps would accordingly function under the immediate command of Lieutenant General Bullard pending the appointment of a corps commander by General Headquarters.⁷⁵

Christmas was a joyous day for the officers and men of the 33rd Division, who found themselves established in unusually comfortable billets in an interesting country, among people who showed remarkable friendliness. On

December 26 it was visited by Lieutenant General Bullard, who was accompanied by his Aide-de-Camp and by Colonel Edgar T. Collins, chief of staff of the VIth Corps.⁷⁶ On the following day orders were received from the Second Army directing the 58th Field Artillery Brigade to rejoin the 33rd Division and detaching the 55th Field Artillery Brigade, which was instructed to join the 28th Division in the area of Woinville.⁷⁷ On December 28, Lieutenant John Pettit, General Todd's aide-de-camp, arrived from Stenay and reported the condition of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade;⁷⁸ the day following notification was received that the movement of that brigade had been delayed,⁷⁹ and on December 31 General Todd arrived in person from Stenay, conferred with General Bell respecting the billets to be occupied by his command upon its arrival, and reported its condition in detail.⁸⁰ That same day notification was received of the reassignment of the 55th Field Artillery Brigade,⁸¹ and the Headquarters of the Second Army issued orders detaching it from the 33rd Division and directing that its movement to join the 28th Division begin on January 6, while the delayed movement of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade was to commence on January 4.⁸²

The opening of the year 1919 found the units of the 33rd Division occupying the positions in the northern part of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, where they were destined to remain for four months.⁸³ Certain minor changes of location were subsequently made and during the first fortnight of January important movements by two brigades occurred, but these will be alluded to at the proper time.⁸⁴

To stimulate interest in the transport of the various organizations a series of horse shows took place, beginning on New Year's Day with an excellent exhibition by the 130th Infantry at Bettendorf. The following day Lieutenant General Bullard, commanding the Second Army, paid a visit to

General Bell,⁸⁵ and two days later announcements were made that a period of training lasting for four weeks would begin on January 6 and that the horse transport of the units would be subjected to a succession of inspections at which the animals, leather, vehicles, and equipment would be marked according to their merit and the ratings of all organizations subsequently published, the purpose being to bring the entire transport of the division to the highest possible standard under the stimulus of competition.⁸⁶ Indeed the month of January, 1919, was characterized by a number of inspections either by officers of the division or by others from the Corps, Army, or General Headquarters, the first of the latter category being made on January 6 and 7 by Colonels James B. Gowen and Lewis W. Cass of the G-5 (Training) Section of General Headquarters.⁸⁷

On January 4, the 58th Field Artillery Brigade (Brigadier General Henry D. Todd, Jr.) began its march from Stenay to rejoin the 33rd Division,⁸⁸ from which it had been separated since the departure of both commands from Camp Logan, Houston, Texas, in May, 1918; and on the day following the 55th Field Artillery Brigade (Brigadier General Oliver L. Spalding, Jr.) started for Woinville to join the 28th Division.⁸⁹ On January 8 the latter had left the division area and the former had arrived,⁹⁰ although it was not until January 10 that all the elements of General Todd's command reached their final destinations and were billeted at Schonfels, Bissen, Lintgen, Berschbach, and Tuntingen.⁹¹ The separation of eight months was terminated at last, to the delight of both commands, and the 58th Field Artillery Brigade returned to its own with an enviable reputation for efficiency, gallantry, initiative, and *esprit de corps* acquired under peculiarly difficult circumstances.

On January 8 an official announcement was received con-

taining the sad news of the death of Theodore Roosevelt, former president of the United States, and that afternoon full honors were paid to his memory.⁹²

The friendliness manifested by the inhabitants of Luxembourg toward the 33rd Division—partly attributable, no doubt, to an appreciation that the prompt arrival of the first American troops had prevented the Grand Duchy from being pillaged indiscriminately by the Germans in their retreat—took a delightful form in a dance given by the people of Diekirch to the officers of the division in the Hotel de l'Europe at Diekirch on the evening of Thursday, January 9. This proved to be a most enjoyable affair, and was the precursor of many other dances given during the ensuing weeks while the 33rd Division remained in that area.⁹³

On January 11, the 66th Infantry Brigade moved from the vicinity of Meysembourg to the region of Echternach, where its headquarters were established.⁹⁴ So far as the troops were concerned the month of January, 1919, was largely devoted to drill, training, and special rifle instruction, varied by terrain exercises and such manoeuvres as the wet weather and restricted areas not under cultivation would permit. Division educational schools were established in the picturesque medieval village of Vianden⁹⁵ and the courses were largely attended by officers and men. Frequent inspections of transport, which were virtually horse shows, were held and the keenest of competition was excited thereby, each unit exerting every possible effort to attain the highest rating. In addition to the division theatrical troupe, similar troupes were organized in the various units and their entertainments afforded abundant diversion and amusement to officers and men alike.⁹⁶

The closing days of the first fortnight in January were marked by the receipt of five telegrams from the Chief of

Staff of the VIth Corps bearing upon certain conditions then existing in Luxembourg; but, inasmuch as they dealt mainly with the internal politics of the Grand Duchy, they are not germane to a purely military history and will not, accordingly, be inserted here.

During the last fortnight in January, 1919, interest was centered principally in the subject of decorations awarded to officers and men of the 33rd Division. Orders were issued on January 19 directing the following soldiers to report to the Adjutant General at General Headquarters on or before January 25 to receive the Medal of Honor:

First Sergeant Johannes S. Anderson, Company B, 132nd Infantry,

First Sergeant Sidney G. Gumpertz, Company C, 132nd Infantry,

Sergeant Willie Sandling, Company A, 132nd Infantry,

Private Berger Loman, Company H, 132nd Infantry,

Private Clayton K. Slack, Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion.⁹⁷

These orders were published to the entire command that day.⁹⁸

The same day was also notable for the arrival of Brigadier General C. M. Wagstaff of the British Expeditionary Forces, who had been delegated to present the British decorations awarded by the King of England to certain officers and men of the 131st Infantry for their gallantry at Chipilly Ridge and Gressaire Wood on August 9, 1918, when the attack of that regiment penetrated the German line in the valley of the Somme and gained the first noteworthy success in the great British offensive. He arrived about noon at the Division Headquarters, where the division and brigade commanders were awaiting him, lunched with General Bell, visited several of the units, and dined with the Division Commander, Generals Todd, Wolf, and King being invited to meet him.

On Monday, January 20, at 10 A.M. at the village Larochette, General Wagstaff inspected the 131st Infantry, which was formed on three sides of the principal square. The inspection over, the men who were to receive the decorations were drawn up in line in front of the regimental colors and were addressed by General Wagstaff. In an extremely graceful speech, he expressed to them the thanks of the King who had delegated him to confer the decorations in token of His Majesty's appreciation for what they had done. Colonel Sanborn was then decorated with the Distinguished Service Order and Second Lieutenant George W. Sherwood with the Military Cross; to three men the Distinguished Conduct Medal was given⁹⁹ and fifteen others received the Military Medal.¹⁰⁰ At the termination of the ceremony, General Wagstaff took leave of General Bell and the officers accompanying him and, as his automobile drove away, the band of the 131st Infantry struck up "Auld Lang Syne" in memory of the days when the 33rd Division had fought in the valley of the Somme side by side with its British friends and comrades in arms.¹⁰¹

The last week in January, 1919, was chiefly noteworthy for the issuance of a corrected copy just received from General Headquarters of General Pershing's thanks to the troops which had fought under his command;¹⁰² during the same period orders came from the Headquarters of the VIth Corps defining its area in Luxembourg as well as the areas assigned to the 33rd, 5th, and 7th Divisions and to the French 11th Army Corps.¹⁰³

For the troops the month of February, 1919, was almost the counterpart of January so far as drills, training, and amusement were concerned.¹⁰⁴ Terrain exercises were held by the 66th Infantry Brigade on February 6 and by the 65th Infantry Brigade next day, by the entire division on February 13, by the 129th, 130th, and 131st Infantry a week

later, and by the 132nd on February 21.¹⁰⁵ The third period of training prescribed by General Headquarters began February 3.¹⁰⁶ Two weeks later announcement was made that tactical walks would be substituted for brigade terrain exercises,¹⁰⁷ and on February 27 the schedule of training for March was issued.¹⁰⁸

Interest in schools was greatly stimulated during the month, until the number of officers and men detached from the units and sent to schools of various sorts either within the division or elsewhere reached very large proportions. Mention has already been made of the opening on January 13 of the schools embraced in the Division Training Centre at Vianden.¹⁰⁹ On February 11 announcement was made of the conditions under which officers and men would be permitted to enter French and British universities¹¹⁰ and a considerable number hastened to avail themselves of the opportunity thus offered. On February 25 the scheme of an infantry training school for enlisted men of the ammunition, supply, and sanitary trains and of the transport sections of such of those units as were equipped with animal transport was made known to the command.¹¹¹ Three days later two telegrams from General Headquarters were published, one relating to the American Expeditionary Forces universities for officers and men established at Beaune, Côte d'Or, the other respecting officers and men qualified to act as instructors in these institutions, and announcement was made that all applications either to attend these universities or to act as instructors must be delivered to G-3 by noon on March 4.¹¹² The number who made application further depleted many units, capping the climax which had been reached on February 22 when, pursuant to instructions from the VIth Corps, 28 officers and 29 enlisted men, all but one sergeants or corporals, were ordered to report on February 24 to General Bjornstad at Ménil-la-Tour, France, for a

course of instruction at Royaumeix, Meurthe-et-Moselle, in a new species of game called "Doughboy."¹¹³

The month of February, 1919, was characterized by a number of other events of sufficient importance to merit chronicling. On February 1 a report made on January 4 by Major M. B. Southwick, commanding the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, on the subject of the condition of the motor transport issued to his battalion, was forwarded to the Army Commander by General Bell; in his indorsement to this report the latter gave a succinct but striking account of the motor transport of the division, pointing out the difficulties encountered in his constant endeavor to keep it in the best possible state.¹¹⁴ Since good motor transport is vital to proper functioning of any command in the field, the reader who is interested in this extremely important auxiliary will find both the report and the indorsement given in full in appendix 38.

On February 3, Major M. B. Southwick was designated as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, to replace Major Waring, who had been ordered to the United States for discharge.¹¹⁵ There was also published to the command a telegram from General Cronkhite expressing his congratulations on the excellence of the theatrical troupe of the 33rd Division and requesting that the appreciation of the Headquarters of the VIth Corps be conveyed to the members of the troupe for the "splendid performance" given at Villerupt; to this the Division Commander added his own felicitations.¹¹⁶ On February 4 General Bell assumed command of the VIth Corps, which he retained two weeks while General Cronkhite was absent on leave.¹¹⁷ On February 7 orders were issued by that corps defining the modifications in its area and in that of the 33rd Division, which were to go into effect two days later.¹¹⁸

So successful had been the results obtained from the competition between the various units in the rating of their

animal transport¹¹⁹ that the Division Commander resolved to apply the same method to the troops themselves with a view to attaining the highest possible standard in their appearance, the condition of their equipment, and their knowledge of the School of the Soldier. To that end instructions were issued on February 12¹²⁰ for the necessary inspections and for the system of marking to be used.¹²¹

On February 20 announcement was made that the shortage in hay had become critical, since there was only a week's supply in all France, and that the hay rations would accordingly be reduced one-half.¹²² Three days later the following letter and the indorsement by which it was forwarded were published to the division "in recognition of its work in the Verdun Sector while it formed a part of the IIIrd (American) Corps:"

HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
OFFICE OF COMMANDING GENERAL

18th February, 1919.

From: LIEUTENANT GENERAL R. L. BULLARD,
To: MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE BELL, JR., Command-
ing 33rd Division
(Through Commanding General, VI Corps).
Subject: Commendation of the Commanding General, 33rd
Division, and of his Division.

1. I desire to make of record the fact that as Commanding General of the III Corps in the battle of the Meuse-Argonne I repeatedly took occasion between September 26, and October 7, to commend in high terms your own command of the 33rd Division and the valiant and efficient conduct of that Division in the great battle in which you were taking part at that time. Every duty, every mission assigned to you and to your Division was executed with zeal, skill, smoothness and valor that deserved the highest commendation. I so stated to you at that time, as you will remember, but you and your Division on October 7 were unexpectedly to me detached from the III Corps. I then expected and hoped that in a few

days you would be returned to my Command and that I would have opportunity then to commend the conduct of your Division in this battle; but I myself was separated from this Command unexpectedly a few days later and this opportunity thus never came. I take it now.

I would appreciate it, if you will communicate this to your Division.

R. L. BULLARD,
Lieut. General, U. S. A.,
Commanding 2nd Army.¹²³

RLB:s

201.1-Commendations. Ist Ind.

HDQRS. VI ARMY CORPS. APO 783, AMERICAN E. F.,
20 February 1919,—

To the COMMANDING GENERAL, 33rd Division, American E. F.

1. It gives me great pleasure to forward this acknowledgment of the service rendered by your division, knowing that the commendation has been justly earned.

The esprit which enabled the accomplishment of such marked success in active service, still maintains the division, in time of peace, at a standard of efficiency excelled by none.

A. CRONKHITE,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

Two days later the following communication was made known to the command:

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

G-5
HRR

FRANCE, February 17th, 1919.

15924-A 139

From: THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, American E. F.,
To: THE COMMANDING GENERAL, 2nd Army,
Subject: Condition of the animals and transport of the 33rd
Division.

1. In connection with a general inspection and supervision of the instruction of the divisions of the A. E. F. in matters pertaining to the care of animals and the upkeep of leather equipment and the transport, the Staff Officer at these Headquarters charged with this duty, reports as follows:

"The 33rd Division was inspected December fifth. There was a well organized system of supervision of the care of animals, a sympathetic attention to their every need in such matters as grooming, feeding, watering, shelter, shoeing and standings, which began with the Division Commander and extended through all the grades down to the riders and drivers. The Division Commander was familiar with every detail of this important phase of instruction and administration in his command, very especially with the efforts of all concerned to ameliorate conditions and the difficulties encountered by them. Great credit is due him personally for the splendid state of affairs in his Division on that date, (December 5th, 1918)—which stood as a perfect model of the standards that ought to exist in these matters throughout the army."

2. The regiment inspected was the 130th Infantry, Colonel John V. Clinnin, Commanding.

By Command of General PERSHING:

J. M. WOOLFOLK,
Adjutant General.¹²⁴

On Thursday, February 27, 1919, the horse show of the 33rd Division took place in the principal square of Diekirch, beginning at one o'clock in the afternoon. In spite of the cold and a downpour of rain, the affair was a remarkable success, and was rendered doubly interesting by the presence of Her Royal Highness, the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, and a number of members of her immediate suite, who were received with full honors, conducted by Colonel Henry A. Allen of the 108th Engineers from their automobiles through an avenue formed by the Guard of Honor to the place where General Bell, accompanied by Generals Todd and King and certain officers of his staff, welcomed them and escorted them to their boxes. Somewhat later they were followed by the Corps Commander, the Chief of Staff of the Second Army, General Bullard's Aide-de-Camp, and Colonel Henry R. Richmond, from General Headquarters.¹²⁵ The horse show was managed with exceptional ability by Lieutenant Colonel Frank



CUMIÈRES-FORGES ROAD



FORGES

R. Schwengel of the 122nd Field Artillery and the officers acting under his supervision,¹²⁶ the awards of the judges received universal approval and the affair was enlivened by music furnished by combined bands and trumpeters of the three brigades massed in different places outside the ring. At the conclusion of the last class, the "Major General George Bell, Jr., Trophy," a handsome miniature bronze statue of Napoleon, given for the best team of six horses shown to a *fourgon*, was formally presented by the Division Commander to Colonel Foreman as the representative of the Headquarters Company of the 122nd Field Artillery by which it had been won.¹²⁷ The brigade bands were then massed in front of the boxes and played the national anthem, while the Grand Duchess, escorted by General Bell and General Cronkhite, proceeded through the lines of the Guard of Honor to the adjoining street where her automobile was awaiting.¹²⁸

The drills and training of the troops during the month of March, 1919, repeated in large part the experiences of February.¹²⁹ There were a number of terrain exercises, the principal one, in which the entire division participated, taking place on March 28.¹³⁰ The matter of schools was paramount throughout the month and formed the subject of a large number of circulars and orders. On March 4 Major George E. Roth, of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters, was appointed Division Education Officer and as such assumed charge of the 33rd Division Educational Centre at Vianden.¹³¹ Every Saturday a detail of enlisted men was sent to the Division Infantry School at Redingen,¹³² where a sanitary school was in addition inaugurated on March 17,¹³³ and a riding and driving school was established at Dommeldigen under the supervision of the commander of the Headquarters Troop.¹³⁴ There were post and division schools, a motor mechanics' school, a school for illiterates,¹³⁵ and so many others that the

division was rapidly coming to resemble an English university in the number and variety of its schools. The attendance was not confined to schools within the division; on March 10, 148 men were sent to the American Expeditionary Forces University at Beaune, Côte d'Or, France, as students, followed by one officer and five men as instructors; a week later a number of officers left for the Second Army School for the Care and Management of Animals; and at the end of the month other officers were sent to the Army Artillery School at Valdahon.¹³⁶

Great numbers of leaves to enlisted men—especially the so-called "Class C" leave¹³⁷ of three days in Paris, exclusive of travel—continued to be granted.¹³⁸ Every effort was made to stimulate entertainment,¹³⁹ and the division theatrical troupe achieved a notable success in Paris, where it played for several weeks to houses crowded to overflowing. On March 20, the VIth Corps held a horse show in the city of Luxembourg at which the 33rd Division carried off the honors, winning more prizes than the 5th or 7th Division or the Corps Troops.¹⁴⁰ The horse show of the Second Army had to be called off on account of the transfer of the divisions composing that army,¹⁴¹ but on March 27 the 33rd Division held a very successful motor transport show at Diekirch.¹⁴²

A number of events occurred during the month which deserve special mention. On the first, information was received by telegraph from the Chief of Staff of the VIth Corps that, in conformity with Marshal Foch's arrangements, the entire Belgian territory embraced between the British zone on the north, the American zone on the south, the Luxembourg frontier on the east, and the French frontier on the west would be turned over to the Belgian army, thus bringing that army and the American forces into juxtaposition.¹⁴³ On March 4, Lieutenant General Bullard arrived for a conference with

General Bell, spent the night at Diekirch, and left next day for Toul.¹⁴⁴ On March 9, the following letter was published to the division:¹⁴⁵

HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
OFFICE COMMANDING GENERAL.

3 March, 1919.

From: COMMANDING GENERAL, Second Army.
To: COMMANDING GENERAL, 33rd Division.
Subject: Horse Show.

1. The reports that have come to me of the splendid success of your Divisional Horse Show at Diekirch last Thursday, 27th February, have given me the greatest pleasure.

2. Please accept my congratulations for yourself and all officers and men of your Command, not only on the zeal and efficiency with which the show was managed and the generally creditable appearance and high class of all exhibits and exhibitors, but also on the magnificent appearance of your chosen Guard of Honor and the military smartness of all concerned. The show was in itself proof of thorough and far-seeing plans well made and of a most praiseworthy attention to details.

3. It was truly a task well done and my only regret is that I could not have been personally present.

(Signed) R. L. BULLARD
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.

On the evening of Monday, March 10,¹⁴⁶ boxing and wrestling matches for the championship of the VIth Corps were held at Esch and a large number of officers and men took advantage of the special train provided to carry them to Esch.¹⁴⁷ On March 12 the ratings of the various units as established by the inspections of their horse transport were announced, the highest being that of the 33rd Military Police Company, with a total of 279.48 out of a possible 300.¹⁴⁸ The same day unit commanders were directed to report when all precautions had been taken to prevent explosives of any sort from coming into the possession of unauthorized persons.¹⁴⁹

On March 13, orders were issued that all historical documents no longer needed be forwarded through channels to the Historical Section at General Headquarters; similar action was to be taken in the case of one copy of all histories of regiments or other organizations, the writing of which, it was stated, was encouraged by the Division Commander, and it was suggested that units which had not already undertaken such a work do so at an early date.¹⁵⁰

Awards of decorations—American, British, and French—to officers and men of the 33rd Division had been made in constantly increasing numbers during the months of January, February, and March, and the presentation of Medals of Honor to five men at Chaumont on February 10 has already been mentioned.¹⁵¹ On March 17, the Division Commander officially published four letters from the Adjutant General containing the citations upon which the Medal of Honor had been awarded to the following men, Captain George H. Mallon, 132nd Infantry, Corporal Ralyn Hill, Company H, 129th Infantry, Corporal Jake Alex, Company H, 131st Infantry, and Corporal Thomas A. Pope, Company E, 131st Infantry, and announced that on that date nine Medals of Honor had been granted to members of the 33rd Division.¹⁵²

The last event of importance during March was the announcement made on March 29 that the division, as part of the VIth Corps, would be transferred to the Third Army on the first of April.¹⁵³

The month of April, 1919, was noteworthy for a number of events of vital interest to the officers and men of the 33rd Division. On the last day of March the troops began their final period of training under the conditions prescribed by General Headquarters;¹⁵⁴ on April 16 a divisional competition in rifle and pistol shooting was held for the purpose of

developing individual entrants for the American Expeditionary Forces matches;¹⁵⁵ on the following day a competition between infantry platoons from the 65th and 66th Infantry Brigades took place at the rifle range of the 130th Infantry at Erpeldingen; machine gun matches were held in each infantry brigade and in the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion; and in addition individuals were selected from each infantry regiment to compete at the automatic rifle match at Le Mans.¹⁵⁶

As in the preceding months, the various schools were the object of much attention. On April 1, announcement was made of the courses in mechanical trades given at different plants under the supervision of the Services of Supply; the next day the status of the post schools were reported to G-3 of the VIth Corps; on April 3 a telegram was sent to the Third Army specifying that there were three hundred applicants for the courses in mechanical trades at service of supply plants; on April 5 announcement was made that instruction in the preparation of food would be given to mess sergeants and cooks—a thing sadly needed in the American army;¹⁵⁷ and on April 7 the scope of the Division Education Office was extended and applications were solicited from officers and men desiring employment in civil life upon their discharge from military service.¹⁵⁸ On April 8, however, orders were suddenly issued directing the dissolution of the Division Training Centre at Vianden, the Sanitary School at Redingen, and the Riding and Driving School at Dommeldingen on the following day, and the discontinuance of the Infantry Training School at Redingen on April 10.¹⁵⁹

During the course of the month several important movements of troops occurred. On April 3, the 272nd Military Police Company, having been detached from the VIth Corps on March 31, left the division area by truck for Longwy, where its arrival was reported to the Provost Marshal of the

Second Army.¹⁶⁰ The receipt, on April 4, of a notification that the Headquarters of the VIth Corps would occupy Echternach caused the evacuation of that place by the headquarters of the 66th Infantry Brigade, which was transferred to Dommeldingen at 3 P.M. on April 7, while the 1st Battalion of the 108th Engineers and the Engineer Train were moved from Echternach to Remich, with the exception of Company B, which was ordered to Steinsel. Companies B and C of the 131st Infantry likewise evacuated Wasserbillig and Grevenmacher and were billeted in or near Wormeldingen. The 130th Ambulance Company was directed to proceed from Echternach to Steinsel on April 11, but a notification, received April 10, that the transfer of the Corps Headquarters was not to be effected caused a revocation of this order.¹⁶¹ On April 14, seven service of supply units, which had been on duty with the division, were detached to the Third Army,¹⁶² but three days later, the transfer of Mobile Veterinary Section 110 having been revoked by the Third Army, it was instructed to rejoin the division preparatory to returning to the United States.¹⁶³ On April 15 came a telegram from the advanced embarkation section containing the welcome news that the movement of the 33rd Division to Brest¹⁶⁴ would commence on April 24.¹⁶⁵

On April 10, orders were received from the Third Army transferring the 33rd Division from that army and from the VIth Corps to the service of supply on April 12, and this information was published to the command next day,¹⁶⁶ together with the announcement that although there would be no cessation in the training, it would be subordinated to the preparations for embarkation.¹⁶⁷ In view of the approaching departure, dispositions had necessarily to be taken to relieve the detachments guarding various dumps of ammunition and

other material, so that several reports were made and orders issued respecting them.¹⁶⁸

During the month the decorations awarded to officers and men of the division formed the subject of keen interest. On the morning of Sunday, April 6, General Desticker, first assistant chief of staff of Marshal Foch, arrived at Diekirch and formally presented the Croix de Guerre of various classes to nine officers and twenty-five men of the 33rd Division.¹⁶⁹ On April 10 the announcement was made of the posthumous award of a Distinguished Service Cross to Corporal Victor A. Cleveland, Company L, 130th Infantry, for "extraordinary heroism in action in the Bois-de-Chaume, France, October 12, 1918," where he was killed in the endeavor to rescue a wounded officer.¹⁷⁰ On April 16 the Division Commander published the War Department citations whereby Distinguished Service Crosses were granted to Captain Fred G. Givens, Corporals Herman B. Bartels and Vincenzo Caserta of Company F, and Private (first-class) Elmer J. Kilcher of Company D, all of the 130th Infantry.¹⁷¹

During the early part of April, there was distributed to every officer and man a printed pamphlet of thirty-two pages entitled *33rd Division, A. E. F.*, giving in condensed form the history of the command¹⁷² and accompanied by a short introduction by General Bell.¹⁷³ During the course of the month,¹⁷⁴ the Division Commander reviewed the 66th Infantry Brigade at Junglinster on April 9 and the 65th Infantry Brigade at Ettelbruck on the following day;¹⁷⁵ on April 11, the VIth Corps held a motor show at Luxembourg; in which the 33rd Division carried off the premier honors;¹⁷⁶ and at the International Horse Show, which formed part of the "Carnival" given by the Third Army at Coblenz, Germany, April 23-27, the 33rd—which was the only entrant as a division—was

awarded second place, scoring a total of twenty-eight points to the winner's thirty-two.¹⁷⁷

That the Commander-in-Chief made a practice of inspecting and reviewing divisions before their departure for the United States was generally known among all the troops and in February it was ascertained that the 33rd Division was destined to follow the 42nd and 32nd Divisions to the port of embarkation.¹⁷⁸ Preparations for a review had been begun on April 9¹⁷⁹ and were accordingly well under way when, on April 16, a telegram was received from General Headquarters announcing that the Commander-in-Chief would inspect and review the 33rd Division on Monday, April 21.¹⁸⁰ The final arrangements were completed forty-eight hours before his arrival, a day later than originally expected.

This event was one of the notable episodes in the history of the 33rd Division. On the afternoon of Tuesday, April 22, 1919, at Ettelbruck in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in France, General John J. Pershing, reviewed the entire 33rd Division in the presence of a large assembly; among the spectators were such distinguished personages as His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Leopold of Belgium, the Honorable Newton D. Baker, secretary of war, and Major General Kepel-Bethel of the British Expeditionary Forces. The troops presented a magnificent appearance and excited unusual praise. At the termination of the review, the Commander-in-Chief personally presented to each officer and man the decoration awarded to him. To Major General George Bell, Jr., the division commander, and Brigadier General Paul A. Wolf, commanding the 66th Infantry Brigade, were given the Distinguished Service Medal;¹⁸¹ to Sergeant Jake Alex, 131st Infantry, Sergeant Ralyn Hill, 129th Infantry, and Corporal Thomas A. Pope, the coveted Medal of Honor; and the Dis-

tinguished Service Cross was presented to twenty-two officers and eighty-one enlisted men. During this presentation Secretary Baker strolled about the command inspecting or asking questions of various officers and men. At the conclusion of the ceremony, General Pershing and the members of his party left for Trèves.

Late that same evening General Order No. 50 was issued, specifying the decorations bestowed and the name, grade, and organization of each recipient. It also announced that the British Commander-in-Chief had awarded the Military Medal to two officers and two men of the division; that the Commander of the French Armies of the East had conferred the Croix de Guerre upon three officers and one man; that His Majesty, the King of the Belgians, had bestowed the Belgian Cross (Chevalier de l'Ordre de la Couronne) upon one officer; and that, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, streamers would be placed upon the colors of the four infantry regiments, the 108th Engineers, the three machine gun battalions, the 108th Field Signal Battalion, and the three regiments of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade.¹⁸²

That the Commander-in-Chief had found conditions to his liking is attested by the letter that he wrote next day, which, in its corrected form,¹⁸³ ran as follows:

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

FRANCE, April 23, 1919.

MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE BELL,
Commanding 33rd Division,
American E. F.

MY DEAR GENERAL BELL:

It afforded me great satisfaction to inspect the 33rd Division at Ettelbruck on April 22nd, and to extend at that time, to the officers and men of your command my congratulations on their fine appearance and appreciation of their splendid record while in France.

The Division has had an interesting and varied battle experience. One of those to be schooled with the British Expeditionary forces, it arrived in France towards the end of May, 1918, where it trained with the 4th Army. Although, as a Division, it did not enter the line here, yet the majority of the organizations had hard fighting experience before they left the British Sector. On July 4, parts of the 131st and 132nd Regiments of Infantry, brigaded with Australian troops, successfully attacked Hamel and the Hamel and Vaire woods. On August 9, the 131st Infantry, under the 58th British Division, successfully attacked Chipilly Ridge and the Gressaire Woods, an operation made especially difficult by the character of the terrain. Towards the end of August the division joined the First American Army in the Toul Sector, remaining in reserve until September 5th. On September 10th, it relieved a French Division in the Blercourt area, southwest of Verdun. It took part in the opening of the great Meuse-Argonne offensive, capturing the Bois de Forges, and occupying the sector facing the Meuse River. Beginning with October 8th, it participated in the operations east of the Meuse, pressing vigorous attacks on the 11th, 12th, 13th in the vicinity of Consenvoie and the Bois de Chaume and the Bois de Plat Chêne. It remained astride of the Meuse until it was relieved on October 21st, during which entire period it was constantly subjected to heavy artillery and machine gun fire from the heights of the west bank, and was continually in action. On October 26th, it re-entered the line in the Troyon Sector where it took part in the attack of the Second Army, driving the enemy from the towns of St. Hilaire and Marchéville and occupying the towns of Butgnéville and Riaville. The Division was advancing when hostilities ended with the Armistice.

It is gratifying to see your troops in such good physical shape and still more to know that the moral tone of all ranks is so high. I believe that they will return with this high standard to perform in the same way whatever tasks may lie before them in civil life. They should go home proud of themselves and of the part they have played, and conscious of the respect and admiration of their comrades throughout the American Expeditionary Forces,

Sincerely yours,
JOHN J. PERSHING.



CONSTRUCTION OF FORGES-CONSENOVOYE ROAD



CONSTRUCTION OF FORGES-CONSENOVOYE ROAD, FORGES

On April 23, the hearts of all ranks of the 33rd Division were gladdened by the issuance of Field Order No. 39, which opened with the following announcement:

This Div. with attached units moves to Brest, France, for return to the U. S. Div. will entrain commencing 24th Apr. Entraining stations, Mersch and Ettelbruck. The move will be made by rail; duration of journey, three days.¹⁸⁴

It was not until April 25, however, that the first trains were available and that the leading units started for Brest. This operation was continued throughout the six days terminating on April 30, and by the first day of May the entire 33rd Division had left the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg,¹⁸⁵ where it had spent more than four months—a sojourn so filled with charming memories of the kindness and hospitality received from the inhabitants and of the friendships formed that it made the parting painful in spite of the delight at being homeward bound.

The journey to the port of embarkation was without particular incident and the stay at Brest was devoid of interesting features save for the ceremony which took place on May 7, when Vice Admiral Moreau conferred the Legion of Honor upon Generals Bell, Wolf, and King, and Colonel Sanborn,¹⁸⁶ and for the receipt of the following letter:

FRENCH REPUBLIC.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL
Minister of War.

PARIS, the 5th May, 1919.

TO the GENERAL COMMANDING THE 33RD DIVISION.
MY DEAR GENERAL,

At the hour when the 33rd Division is embarking for the United States, I am thinking with gratitude of the battles in which it has been engaged and displayed so much valor.

After having seen its initial service with our British Allies, it was near Verdun that the 33rd Division first came under fire with its French comrades. The capture of the Bois

de Forges, on the 27th of September, revealed its dash. Several days later, at the Bois de Chaume, the 8th of October, the 33rd Division asserted its tenacity in repulsing by stubborn counter-attacks the enemy who was endeavoring in vain to re-take the ground lost.

Of this spirit of enterprise your Division again gave an example during the last days before the Armistice when it was at the heels of the adversary in retreat.

We shall treasure in memory the exploits of your splendid soldiers. I here tender to them the expression of the gratitude of the Government of the Republic, which unites in the same thought of thankfulness the living and the dead.

Believe, my dear General, in the assurance of my very devoted sentiments.

For the PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL
and by his order,
The Commissioner-General of the
Franco-American War Affairs.

ANDRÉ TARDIEU.

PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL

(Seal)

Com. Gen. of F. A. W. A.

The embarkation began on May 9, when the Division Commander, together with his Staff, the 132nd Infantry, and the 122nd and 124th Machine Gun Battalions, sailed in the *Mount Vernon*.¹⁸⁷ The other units followed in rapid succession¹⁸⁸ and on May 18 the last transport carrying troops of the 33rd Division left Brest.¹⁸⁹

The homeward voyage was without unusual incident and on the morning of Saturday, May 17, 1919, the *Mount Vernon* entered New York Bay. On this day General Order No. 54, quoting the letters from General Pershing and Monsieur André Tardieu, was issued and a printed copy was given to every officer and man of the command.¹⁹⁰ At Staten Island the ship was met by a delegation of Illinois officials, headed by Governor Lowden, who in behalf of the people of the state welcomed the 33rd Division home. Upon reaching Hoboken,

the troops were promptly disembarked and proceeded to Camp Mills, Long Island.¹⁹¹ That afternoon a reception to General Bell was given by the women of the Illinois Welcome Committee at 107 East 34th Street, New York, and on the following morning the leading newspapers of Chicago, New York, the principal cities of the east and indeed all over the country published long accounts of the "Prairie Division" and its splendid achievements. During the following week, General Bell spent three days in Washington on official business but rejoined the troops before the departure of the first contingent on May 25.

Notwithstanding every effort on the part of Governor Lowden and other Illinois officials, the War Department refused permission for a review of the entire division but consented to three smaller reviews to be held as the successive increments reached Chicago. The dates of these reviews and the troops participating in them were as follows:

Tuesday, May 27, 1919:

Division Headquarters (Major General George Bell, Jr.),

Headquarters Troop (Captain Herbert W. Styles),

65th Infantry Brigade Headquarters (Brigadier General Edward L. King),

132nd Infantry (Colonel Abel Davis),

130th Infantry (Colonel John V. Clinnin),

124th Machine Gun Battalion (Major Floyd F. Putnam),

123rd Machine Gun Battalion (Major Albert L. Culbertson),

122nd Machine Gun Battalion (Captain E. C. Daly),

Railhead Detachment (First Lieutenant

108th Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop Clay M. Donner).

Monday, June 2, 1919:

66th Infantry Brigade Headquarters,

131st Infantry (Colonel Joseph B. Sanborn),

129th Infantry (Colonel Edgar A. Myer),
108th Train Headquarters and Military Police (Colonel Charles D. Center),
108th Ammunition Train (Lieutenant Colonel Walter A. Fisher),
108th Supply Train (Major William Hendrie).

Thursday, June 5, 1919:

58th Field Artillery Brigade Headquarters (Brigadier General Henry D. Todd, Jr.),
122nd Field Artillery (Colonel Milton J. Foreman),
123rd Field Artillery (Colonel Charles G. Davis),
124th Field Artillery (Lieutenant Colonel Joseph A. Rogers),
108th Engineers (Colonel Henry A. Allen),
108th Engineer Train (First Lieutenant Magnus P. Thompson),
108th Field Signal Battalion (Major Milan A. Loosley),
108th Sanitary Train (Lieutenant Colonel George C. Amerson).

Upon detraining at various stations in Chicago,¹⁹² the troops in each instance marched to Grant Park, where a reception, lasting an hour and a half or more, was held by their relatives. At 11 A.M. began the parade, headed in each case by General Bell and his Staff and reviewed by the Governor of Illinois from a stand erected at the Art Institute on Michigan Avenue.¹⁹³ Never in the history of the state have Illinois troops been given such a welcome as that which marked these three processions; their line of march was ablaze with flags and decorations of every sort and the enthusiasm of the crowds which packed the streets beggared description. The troops, wearing service uniforms and trench helmets—marked with the yellow cross, the insignia of the 33rd Division—and equipped with rifles, bayonets, and light packs, presented a magnificent appearance. Each parade was followed by ban-

quets for the officers and men at the "Loop" hotels, and during the afternoon the troops entrained and proceeded to Camp Grant, Rockford, Illinois.¹⁹⁴

At that camp all officers and men who were not of the Regular Establishment and who had not expressed a desire to remain in the Army were speedily and "honorably discharged" from the military service of the United States. Before the end of June, 1919, this demobilization had been completed and the "Prairie Division" passed into history.

XI. CONCLUSION

In certain respects the 33rd Division was unique. It was the only division in the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe—and, therefore, in American history—which fought with, and under, the British, the Americans, and the French. It was the first American division to be engaged along with the British in a battle of any magnitude,¹ and the first to fight by the side of the Australian troops.² It was the only American division to have its officers and men decorated by the King of England in person.

During its twelve months in Europe, the 33rd Division served in five armies and twelve army corps, in some of them more than once.³ It was the sixteenth of the American divisions to reach France, and was one of the twenty-nine combat divisions.⁴ In the number of kilometers advanced against the enemy, it has been officially rated as the ninth among the American divisions; in the number of prisoners captured, it was placed fourth; in the number of its own troops killed in action, it was the twentieth on the list; and in the number of its wounded, it was ranked the twelfth—⁵these last two classifications affording proof of the skill with which it was handled in battle.⁶ The German High Command evidently considered it decidedly efficient since they included it among the five American divisions which they rated as “first-class.”

From June 22 until November 11, 1918, a period of nearly five months in which was included the long movement by rail from the British front to the Toul sector,⁷ there were only eighteen days when the 33rd Division, in whole or in

part, was not actually occupying a portion of the Allied line on the western front. Apart from minor operations such as Hamel, it participated in the beginning of the British Somme offensive, of which the first notable success was achieved by the 131st Infantry at Chipilly Ridge and Gressaire Wood on August 9, 1918. It was originally destined to take an active part in the St. Mihiel offensive commencing on September 12 but was subsequently placed in reserve in that major operation. In the Meuse-Argonne battle, it was actively engaged and held a portion of the American front-line trenches from September 26 until the armistice, except for the two days which elapsed between its withdrawal from the Verdun sector and its occupation of the Troyon-sur-Meuse sector.⁸ Upon its departure from the British front, after three months of training and fighting there, General Sir Henry Rawlinson, commanding the Fourth British Army, prophesied that it would "render brilliant service to the Allied cause wherever . . . employed as a fighting Division in the face of the enemy."⁹ In the Meuse-Argonne battle, every mission intrusted to it was—to quote the words of Lieutenant General Bullard—"executed with zeal, skill, smoothness and valor that deserved the highest commendation."¹⁰ Never once in all its desperate fighting did the 33rd Division appeal for reënforcements or help. It was the boast of the soldiers of the 33rd that they were never given an order in battle which they did not execute and that they were never assigned an objective which they did not take on scheduled time. Their claim is justified by the facts.

Perfection, particularly in war, is beyond human power to attain; nevertheless, in the 33rd Division the machinery functioned and was able at all times to cope with the situation, no matter how difficult. Throughout its active operations there were very few occasions when the men in the trenches were not fed hot meals. Rations were always furnished in

abundance, even under the most critical circumstances, and the supply of artillery and small-arms ammunition never ran short of requirements.

The death rate in the 33rd Division while at Camp Logan was the lowest in the American army. In Europe, its health rate was among the very highest in the American Expeditionary Forces. During active operations it was conspicuous for its care and management of the sick and wounded.

The discipline and spirit in the 33rd Division were of the highest order. From the date of its departure from Texas until the armistice—a period of nearly six months—no enlisted man was tried by a general court-martial and only two officers were thus tried—an enviable record for any command of similar size.

It is a well-known maxim in war that the infantry constitutes the backbone of an army. Irresistible in attack, tenacious to the last degree in defense, efficient in everything it undertook, the infantry of the 33rd Division proved itself superb. Hamel, Chipilly Ridge, and Gressaire Wood, the Bois de Forges, the Bois de Chaume, the Bois Plat-Chêne, and the successes in its operations during the last days before the armistice are achievements which will long endure in the history of American arms.

On the British front, the 33rd Division was supported by British and Australian artillery; at Verdun, by the 52nd Field Artillery Brigade (Brigadier General George Albert Wingate), belonging to the 27th Division; and in the Troyon-sur-Meuse sector by the 55th Field Artillery Brigade (Brigadier General J. W. Kilbreth), of the 30th Division. For loyalty, team play, and service efficiently rendered, these artillery units earned the deepest gratitude of the infantry whose operations they so effectually protected. The 58th Field Artillery Brigade, under Brigadier General Henry D. Todd, Jr.,

formed part of the 33rd Division but was separated from it during the eight months following its departure from Camp Logan. After a period of training at Valdahon and Ornans, this brigade fought with four different divisions¹¹ and was subsequently attached to a fifth.¹² It was not until January 10, 1919, that it rejoined the 33rd Division in Luxembourg to the delight of both commands, having acquired a most enviable record for efficiency, gallantry, initiative, and *esprit de corps*.

The machine gun units in the 33rd Division were conspicuous for their energy, resourcefulness, and originality. They were the first in this war to make use of a machine-gun barrage to neutralize the enemy nests in a wood while the infantry turned the position.¹³ The manner in which their machine guns were kept in the very front of the infantry during the various attacks was extraordinary. In no two operations did they employ the same method, with the result that the enemy was constantly at a loss to know how to meet them—a fact repeatedly attested by the prisoners captured. To their daring and originality are to be attributed in large measure the remarkable successes achieved by these units.

The 108th Engineers proved themselves one of the most efficient organizations of that arm of the service in the American Expeditionary Forces. Indefatigable, resourceful, always a model of cheerfulness, and eager to undertake any task no matter how difficult, every mission intrusted to them was performed with signal ability and thoroughness. Apart from innumerable other tasks, their construction of the bridges at Brabant and Consenvoye on October 8, 1918, was an extraordinary feat. Indeed, in everything they undertook they fully earned the Division Commander's encomium that "the work of the 108th Engineers has been magnificent."

The 108th Field Signal Battalion, the signal corps, and

liaison detachments belonging or attached to the various units, and the 108th Train Headquarters and Military Police all showed remarkable efficiency and deserve high praise for the manner in which they rendered their excellent service.

To the officers and men of the 108th Engineer Train, the 108th Supply Train, the 108th Sanitary Train, and the ammunition trains serving with the 33rd Division—especially to the truck and ambulance drivers—the highest possible credit is due. In the blackness of the night, in rain and storm, without lights to guide their way, often under shell fire of the heaviest sort, and subjected to hardships untold, their difficult tasks were performed with a fidelity, zeal, and courage for which no praise is too great. Without the excitement which stimulates the fighting man, denied the glamor with which his deeds are always invested, through their splendid devotion to duty they rendered a service without which the efforts of the fighting men would have been in vain.

Equally meritorious was the work of the officers and men of the 108th Sanitary Train, the field hospitals, and ambulance companies, particularly those at the dressing stations and in the ambulances. By their self-sacrifice and steadfast adherence to duty under the most trying circumstances many a life was saved and the sufferings of many a wounded man were alleviated. The stretcher-bearers, too—many of them bandsmen who were employed or who volunteered for this dangerous service—showed a devotion and heroism often unrewarded but none the less superb.

In the 33rd Division the officers of the staff were at all times imbued with a realization that their rôle was wholly and solely that of servants of the fighting men. Frequently worked to the limit of human endurance, confronted by obstacles apparently insurmountable, they labored unceasingly for the welfare of the troops. Whatever their shortcomings,

their functions were performed in such a manner as to elicit from the French Corps Commander at Verdun¹⁴—who had abundant opportunity to test them under distinctly critical conditions—the declaration that “General Bell had an excellent Staff” and that its work was “most satisfactory.”¹⁵ The Division Staff is indebted for a large measure of this success to the army field clerks and the enlisted men attached to the various staff departments, who never failed them under any circumstances.

To the British and French officers and men who acted as instructors at Camp Logan, and to those who were attached to the division in Europe, the utmost gratitude is due for the inestimable service rendered by them which contributed so much toward developing the efficiency of the command.

No relations could have been more cordial, more amicable, or more satisfactory than those which prevailed between the 33rd Division on one hand and, on the other, the officers and other ranks of the British and French forces with which it served and fought on the Somme, at Verdun, and in the St. Mihiel salient. The kindness, consideration, invaluable training, timely suggestions, and never-failing assistance received at their hands, coupled with genial comradeship, created mutual admiration and affection which rarely failed to ripen into lasting friendships. In those brief months ties were cemented which will endure for the good of the world during generations to come.

As was the case with their Allies and other American troops, the bravery displayed by the officers and men of the 33rd Division was often sublime. Every meritorious case was recommended for a suitable decoration, but a large number of officers and men were refused by the Decorations Section at General Headquarters the recognition to which, after thorough investigation, it was considered in the division that

they were justly entitled. Three hundred and eighty officers and men were, however, rewarded with decorations of various sorts, American and foreign.¹⁶ Of these the most coveted was the Congressional Medal of Honor, which is conferred for extraordinary heroism only. During the war, seventy-eight Medals of Honor were granted by the American military authorities, sixteen of these being posthumous awards; of the sixty-two conferred upon living men, nine were bestowed upon officers and men of the 33rd Division—a number exceeded by only one other division in the American Expeditionary Forces.¹⁷

In efficiency, gallantry, devotion to duty, indomitable resolution, cheerfulness under every condition, and in *esprit de corps* the officers and men of the 33rd Division proved themselves worthy rivals of the soldiers of Illinois who fought in former wars of the United States. The Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces declared that theirs was a “splendid record while in France. . . . They should go home proud of themselves and of the part they have played, and conscious of the respect and admiration of their comrades throughout the American Expeditionary Forces.”¹⁸ Eight months earlier the division had been thanked for its “brilliant successes” on the British front¹⁹ and the French were equally appreciative. In a charming letter of farewell to General Bell, when the command was about to embark at Brest, Monsieur André Tardieu, the French Commissioner-General, wrote: “We shall treasure in memory the exploits of your splendid soldiers. I here tender to them the expression of the gratitude of the Government of the French Republic, which unites in the same thought of thankfulness the living and the dead.”²⁰

In the pamphlet history of the *33rd Division, A. E. F.*, the Division Commander, in his brief introduction, declared

that he was "proud to have had the honor and the privilege of commanding such men." What they achieved is chiefly to be attributed to the complete weeding out of those officers and men who were not up to the standard required in war, to the thorough training, the severe discipline enforced, the vigilant supervision, the magnificent spirit instilled into them, and the skill with which they were invariably handled by their admired and beloved commander, Major General George Bell, Jr.

CHAPTER I

¹Paragraph 197, Special Order No. 197, War Department, August 24, 1917, made the following assignments: Brigadier General Henry R. Hill, 2nd Brigade Illinois National Guard, to command the 65th Infantry Brigade; Colonel Henry D. Todd, Jr., to command the 58th Field Artillery Brigade; Brigadier General David J. Foster, 1st Brigade, Illinois National Guard, to command the 64th Infantry Brigade; Major F. L. Huidekoper, Adjutant General, Officers' Reserve Corps, as division adjutant; Major William C. Gardenhire, Infantry, National Army, as division quartermaster; and Major Charles C. Allen, Infantry, National Army, as assistant chief of staff.

2		OFFI-	ENLISTED
DATE OF ARRIVAL	UNIT	CERS	MEN
August 17, 1917	Company E, 2nd Illinois Infantry.....	3	81
	Company H, 2nd Illinois Infantry.....	3	134
	Company A, 7th Illinois Infantry.....	3	102
August 18, 1917	Company C, 3rd Illinois Infantry.....	3	142
	Company F, 4th Illinois Infantry.....	3	123
	Company E, 5th Illinois Infantry.....	3	139
August 19, 1917	Company E, 1st Illinois Engineers.....	4	164
	Battery A, 2nd Illinois Field Artillery.....	5	189
August 20, 1917	1st Illinois Field Hospital.....	6	80
	Company G, 8th Illinois Infantry (colored)...	3	137
TOTAL.....		36	1,291

³Aides-de Camp, Captain William H. Simpson and Captain John P. Lucas; Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel William K. Naylor; Assistant Chief of Staff, Major Charles C. Allen; Adjutant, Major Frederic L. Huidekoper; Judge Advocate, Major Burnett M. Chipfield; Quartermaster, Major William C. Gardenhire; Surgeon, Lieutenant Colonel L. M. Hathaway; Assistant Surgeons, Major Gustavus M. Blech and Major H. H. Tuttle; Ordnance Officer, Captain James Spiers; and Assistant Ordnance Officer, First Lieutenant W. Morton Kelley.

⁴Diary of the Division Adjutant.

DATE OF ARRIVAL AT CAMP LOGAN	UNIT	COMMANDER	STRENGTH
Sept. 10, 1917	2nd Illinois Field Artillery	Col. Milton J. Foreman	36 officers, 1076 men
Sept. 11, 1917	1st Illinois Engineers (less Companies A and E)	Col. Henry A. Allen	22 officers, 719 men
Sept. 12, 1917	6th Illinois Infantry (less Companies B and M)	Col. Charles H. Davis	34 officers, 1149 men

DATE OF ARRIVAL AT CAMP LOGAN	UNIT	COMMANDER	STRENGTH
Sept. 12 and 13, 1917	2nd Illinois Infantry	Col. John J. Garrity	54 officers, 1994 men
Sept. 16, 1917	3rd Illinois Infantry	Col. Charles H. Greene	51 officers, 1961 men
Sept. 16, 1917	2nd Illinois Field Hospital	First Lieut. Norman Zolla, M.C.	5 officers, 79 men
Sept. 16, 1917	3rd Illinois Field Hospital	Major Frederick C. Fred- erickson, M.C.	5 officers, 80 men
Sept. 16, 1917	4th Illinois Field Hospital	Major James J. McKin- ley, M.C.	4 officers, 80 men
Sept. 16, 1917	Company A, Illinois Signal Corps	Capt. Alvin H. McNeal	3 officers, 75 men
Sept. 16, 17 and 18, 1917	5th Illinois Infantry	Col. Frank S. Wood	52 officers, 1853 men
Sept. 20 and 21, 1917	3rd Illinois Field Artillery	Col. Gordon Strong	28 officers, 1082 men
Oct. 2, 1917	7th Illinois Infantry	Col. Daniel Moriarty	51 officers, 1913 men
Oct. 2, 1917	1st Illinois Ambulance Com- pany	First Lieut. George U. Lipschutz, M.C.	4 officers, 141 men
Oct. 2, 1917	2nd Illinois Ambulance Com- pany	First Lieut. Henry C. Johannes, M.C.	3 officers, 133 men
Oct. 2, 1917	3rd Illinois Ambulance Com- pany	First Lieut. Charles S. Kubik, M.C.	2 officers, 120 men
Oct. 2, 1917	4th Illinois Ambulance Com- pany	First Lieut. Raymond B. Kepner, M.C.	2 officers, 121 men
Oct. 3, 1917	Company A, 1st Illinois En- gineers	Capt. Curtis C. Saner	3 officers, 163 men
Oct. 4, 1917	1st Illinois Infantry	Col. Joseph B. Sanborn	56 officers, 1881 men
Oct. 12, 1917	4th Illinois Infantry	Lieut. Colonel E. P. Clay- ton	56 officers, 1805 men
Oct. 14 and 16, 1917	8th Illinois Infantry (Colored) (Less Co. G)	Col. Franklin A. Denison	52 officers, 1862 men
Oct. 26, 1917	Company B, 6th Illinois In- fantry	First Lieut. Charles B. Myatt	3 officers, 129 men
Oct. 26, 1917	Company M, 6th Illinois In- fantry	Capt. Harris F. Hall	3 officers, 230 men

⁶According to the Tables of Organization issued by the War Department on August 8, 1917, an infantry division, exclusive of the noncombatant troops, was composed of four regiments of infantry of 103 officers and 3,652 men each; three regiments of field artillery, two regiments (3-inch guns) of 55 officers and 1,424 men each, and

one regiment (6-inch howitzers) of 63 officers and 1,703 men; one regiment of engineers of 49 officers and 1,617 men, besides a field signal battalion, three machine gun battalions, etc. At that time the Illinois National Guard comprised eight regiments of infantry (one colored), three regiments of field artillery—one of which formed part of the 42nd ("Rainbow") Division—one regiment of engineers, and certain other smaller units.

⁷The following are excerpts from a memorandum prepared by the Division Adjutant on September 16, 1917:

"The General [General Bell] wants the First Illinois Infantry here. When he asks that it be sent, he is informed that the Secretary of War has given General Barry [commanding the 86th Division] permission to retain it at Camp Grant until one month after the first increment of drafted men has reached it. Preliminary instruction is thus delayed just that long, and General Foster finds himself in command of a Brigade existing on paper only, whereas more than one thousand miles separate one part from the other.

"Slightly over a week ago, request was made that General Hill's Brigade Headquarters be sent here. This request was refused for the insuperable reason that it lacked one pyramidal tent and one field range. General Hill at that time had seven men at Camp Logan occupying eight tents which are supposed to hold at least six men apiece, and his A.D.C., Lieut. Sadler, personally showed me an order for a field range which he took out of his pocket. At last, the authorities were persuaded that we could take care of this Brigade Headquarters and it was eventually sent here, to the delight of General Hill, who had cooled his heels here for nearly three weeks without any Headquarters and only a handful of troops."

⁸General Orders No. 23, Headquarters 33rd Division, October 10, 1917, prescribed the following organization for the 33rd Division, which was to take effect at midnight on October 11, 1917, 2:6.

The 1st and 2nd Regiments of Infantry, Illinois National Guard, became the 131st and 132nd Regiments of Infantry respectively. These two regiments, together with the 124th Machine Gun Battalion, composed the 66th Infantry Brigade.

The 3rd and 4th Regiments of Infantry, Illinois National Guard, became the 129th and 130th Regiments of Infantry respectively and, together with the 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, constituted the 65th Infantry Brigade.

The Illinois Field Hospitals Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 became Field Hospitals Nos. 129, 130, 131, and 132 respectively. The Illinois Ambulance Companies Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 became Ambulance Companies 129, 130, 131 and 132 respectively. These four Field Hospitals and four Ambulance Companies comprised the Sanitary Train.

Company A of the 5th Illinois Infantry, and Companies A, B, C, D, E and F of the 7th Illinois Infantry formed the 108th Ammunition Train.

Companies G, H, I, K, L and M of the 7th Illinois Infantry became the 108th Supply Train.

Company M of the 5th Illinois Infantry became the 108th Engineer Train, and Companies B and H of that regiment composed the 108th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

The 122nd Machine Gun Battalion—the Division Machine Gun Battalion—was constituted of Companies E, I and K of the 5th Illinois Infantry and of the Machine Gun Company of the 7th Illinois Infantry.

The 123rd Machine Gun Battalion—belonging to the 65th Infantry Brigade—was made up of Companies F and G and the Machine Gun Company of the 5th Illinois Infantry.

The 124th Machine Gun Battalion—66th Infantry Brigade—was formed of Companies C, D and L of the 5th Illinois Infantry.

The Machine Gun Company of the 6th Illinois Infantry—which had been transformed into the 123rd Field Artillery became the 108th Trench Mortar Battery, and the following consolidations were made, viz: Headquarters Company of the 5th Illinois Infantry with the Headquarters Company of the 129th Infantry; Supply Company of the 5th Illinois Infantry with the Supply Company of the 130th Infantry; Headquarters Company of the 7th Illinois Infantry with the Headquarters Company of the 132nd Infantry; and Supply Company of the 7th Illinois Infantry with the Supply Company of the 131st Infantry.

⁹On October 9, 1917, the Liberty Loan “drive” had been definitely launched at Camp Logan. On October 10, instructions were received from The Adjutant General to institute a vigorous recruiting campaign in case a sufficient number of drafted men were not received to fill the division to maximum strength. On October 24, which was designated as “Liberty Loan Day,” General Todd reviewed from the balcony of the Rice Hotel, Houston, a parade composed of the 65th Infantry Brigade and the 8th Illinois Infantry (colored).

¹⁰The 5th and 7th Illinois Infantry.

¹¹The first contingent from Camp Grant arrived on October 25.

¹²See table, 1:309, n. 22.

¹³Diary of the Division Adjutant.

¹⁴The 8th Illinois Infantry (colored) subsequently became the 370th Infantry and formed part of the 185th Infantry Brigade under the command of Brigadier General A. S. Blanding. The headquarters of this brigade and the greater part of the 370th Infantry left Camp Logan on March 6, 1918, for Newport News, en route overseas.

¹⁵The 1st Illinois Infantry Brigade under Brigadier General David J. Foster was originally the 64th Infantry Brigade. Subsequently it was discovered that this number had been assigned by the War Department to an infantry brigade in the 32nd Division and, in consequence, General Foster’s command was renumbered the 66th Infantry Brigade.

¹⁶It was not until November 21, 1917, that authorization was given from Washington to install a heating plant in the Base Hospital, and not until December 5 that plumbing and sewerage was authorized. As a matter of fact, all three had been secretly installed weeks before.

¹⁷“How to create an Artillery Brigade with only two Regular officers, virtually no guns, little or no ammunition, no competent instructors, totally green men or Cavalry or Infantry transformed is a problem. . . . A week ago General Todd was ordered to report to the Commanding General of the Southern Department at San Antonio for duty. It was subsequently discovered that this duty was as a member of the court-martial for the mutinous negroes of the 24th Infantry who were concerned in the shooting affray on August 23rd; that this board would not assemble for a fortnight at least; and Heaven knows how long General Todd would be kept on this duty, in spite of the fact that he was then the only Regular officer of the Artillery Brigade here and that the regiments which were to compose his command were either *en route* or shortly

to arrive. By dint of much protestation to Washington, this order was revoked." Memorandum prepared by the Division Adjutant on September 16, 1917.

¹⁸The memorandum already quoted stated that, on August 16, 1917, so far as the 33rd Division was concerned,

"As for guns, there are none. The War Department is making some arrangements to supply the immense number of one battery of 3-inch guns, but its plan is still incomplete. . . .

"At the beginning of September, General Bell made inquiry of the Chief of Ordnance as to what types of machine guns and automatic rifles would be sent here, and he recommended that one of each be expressed to this camp for instruction purposes. The answer was that the present supply would not permit any to be sent to National Guard cantonments for several months; that the particular type which would eventually be supplied could not be announced insomuch as some twelve types were under procurement and the rate of completion would be the factor to determine how they would be distributed."

¹⁹Diary of the Division Adjutant. The first contingent from the 88th Division at Camp Dodge, Des Moines, Iowa, arrived on November 4, 1917.

²⁰General Bell to The Adjutant General of the Army, December 11, 1917, on the subject of a "letter of Honorable M. D. Foster, M. C., relative to 130th Infantry." See 2:8.

²¹"An analysis of the men listed as Alien Enemies shows that . . . four hundred and seventy-four came from approximately fifty six hundred (5,600) drafted men sent here from the 86th Division, Camp Grant, Rockford, Ill.; thirty one (31) from the approximately one thousand (1,000) men sent from the 88th Division, National Army, Camp Dodge, Iowa. . . ." General Bell to The Adjutant General of the Army, December 7, 1917, on the subject of alien enemies.

²²"33RD DIVISION TROOPS

Category	Drafted	
	From Camp Grant	Camp Dodge
A. Physically unfit.	371	62
B. Unsuitd.	170	23
C. Worthless.	99	19
D. Non-English speaking.	296	32
E. Illiterates.	221	35
F. Venereally diseased.	79	18
TOTALS.	1,236	189"

Report of the Division Statistical Officer (First Lieutenant George G. Shor) to the Division Adjutant, December 15, 1917, consolidating the data received from the various units of the 33rd Division, in compliance with a memorandum issued by Division Headquarters on December 11, 1917.

²³Report of Major J. M. Willis, commanding Base Hospital, February 18, 1918.

²⁴The British Military Mission was composed of Captain E. M. Barlow, 5th Royal Fusiliers; First Lieutenant R. G. W. Callaghan, Connaught Rangers; First Lieutenant E. R. Robinson, 7th King's Liverpool Regiment; and First Lieutenant J. L. Thorman, 18th Durham Light Infantry.

The French Military Mission comprised Captain Joseph Flipo, 161st Infantry; Captain Henri Léonard Raichlen, 315th Infantry; Lieutenant Émile Robert, 297th Infantry; Lieutenant Léon Dufour, 8th Engineers; and Lieutenant Léon Tournier, Artillery.

²⁵General Todd and the Division Staff; Troop D, 14th U. S. Cavalry; 66th Infantry Brigade (less one regiment); 65th Infantry Brigade, with the 8th Illinois Infantry (colored) attached; 108th Engineers, with the 5th Infantry Band attached; 58th Field Artillery Brigade; and the trains, exclusive of the regimental trains. General Order No. 34, Headquarters 33rd Division, November 6, 1917.

²⁶Diary of the Division Adjutant.

²⁷*Ibid.*

²⁸See I:3, 4.

²⁹See I:3.

³⁰Apart from reports transmitted by mail, the following is a partial list of the most important telegrams sent by General Todd respecting certain subjects. Organization: 21 telegrams between September 26 and December 5, 1917; construction at Camp Logan: 9 telegrams between September 26 and November 20; ordnance: 8 telegrams between October 20 and November 30, 1917; drafted men: 7 telegrams between October 10 and December 4, 1917; clothing and blankets: telegrams on October 10, 11, and 12, 1917. This partial list is taken from the Diary of the Division Adjutant.

³¹An instance of this sort was the refusal of the Commanding General of the 86th Division to furnish the 33rd Division with certain men possessing special qualifications, notwithstanding the explicit orders of The Adjutant General of the Army. General Bell to The Adjutant General, December 11, 1917, 2:8.

³²Diary of the Division Adjutant. It was not until December 10 that the last units of the 33rd Division in the oil regions were ordered to be relieved by the 57th Infantry.

³³A fair example was the office of the Division Adjutant, the organization of which was modified three times before the middle of November, 1917; on October 18, instructions were received to establish a personnel office, and subsequently a bureau of war risk insurance.

³⁴Diary of the Division Adjutant.

³⁵As late as December 6, 1917, a telegram from The Adjutant General of the Army announced that the internment of aliens was forbidden to department and division commanders, and that a presidential warrant, issued by the Department of Justice alone, was requisite for the internment of an enemy alien.

³⁶Diary of the Division Adjutant.

³⁷*Houston Chronicle*, December 8, 1917; Diary of the Division Adjutant.

³⁸Allusion has already been made to the prohibition of the internment of aliens without a presidential warrant. See above, n. 35. On December 8, instructions were received forbidding the separation, segregation, or interning of Austro-Hungarians. On December 11, the War Department called for a report on the Germans, Austro-Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Turks who had taken out first papers but who were not yet naturalized. On December 12, a list of those same subjects who had been naturalized was called for. On December 15, directions were received to take no steps respecting Austro-Hungarians, since congressional action concerning them was shortly expected. Diary of the Division Adjutant.

³⁹Considerable difficulty was experienced in effecting the new organization prescribed for the 123rd Field Artillery. In November, 1917, it had been learned that the regiments of heavy artillery (6-inch howitzers) were to be motorized but that the necessary tractors could not be delivered "for some months." See above, 1:8. During December orders had been received to reduce the personnel of the 123rd Field Artillery but it was not until December 24 that the Quartermaster General was informed by the Ordnance Department that additional animals would not be supplied to the 6-inch howitzer regiments, which would, however, retain such horses as they had until tractors were furnished. This information was not communicated to the Division Commander and was only ascertained in consequence of personal interviews with certain War Department officials by the Division Adjutant who was on leave in Washington. The net result was that the 123rd Field Artillery had to be completely reorganized and trained with horse-drawn howitzers, notwithstanding that its fighting was to be done with tractor-drawn guns.

⁴⁰Colonel Joseph B. Sanborn, 131st Infantry, and Colonel Milton J. Foreman, 122nd Field Artillery.

⁴¹Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁴²*Ibid.* The four units eventually selected after competitive drill in each regiment were Company K, 129th Infantry, Company F, 130th Infantry, Company E, 131st Infantry, and Company G, 132nd Infantry. They were designated as the "Model Companies," were reviewed by a board consisting of the Chief of Staff and Captains Lucas and Simpson, were formed into a provisional battalion, were excused from guard duty and fatigue, were filled up to full strength of 250 men each, and were given an intensive course of training. This provisional battalion was placed under the command of Major H. C. Ridgway and the general supervision of its training was intrusted to Captain William H. Simpson. This battalion was fully provided with new equipment and soon became conspicuous for its efficiency. All four of these companies distinguished themselves in action in France, Company E, 131st Infantry, and Company G, 132nd Infantry, being especially selected for the engagement at Hamel on July 4, 1918. The arduous training given them proved its worth by their efficiency in battle.

⁴³General Bell had urgently recommended that Colonels Sanborn and Foreman and Lieutenant Colonel Hackett, the last of the 123rd Field Artillery, be exempted from attending the Brigade and Field Officers' School at San Antonio. On January 11, 1918, a telegram from The Adjutant General announced that this recommendation had been disapproved. The Division Commander promptly renewed his recommendation by telegraph, on the ground that these three officers were "most valuable" for the very purpose for which Regular colonels had been sent to the regiments; that he considered it "decidedly to interest of service that Efficiency Boards in an Illinois Division be composed solely of Illinois officers, particularly when this work can be performed by officers of such calibre as those mentioned above who command respect both in Division and in State of Illinois. . . who have obtained high efficiency. . . are men of education and force and can be relied upon to discharge their duties without regard to State interests;" and that "all Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels of Infantry and Artillery belonging to this Division except three officers above mentioned and Colonel Strong, who is absent sick, are now at San Antonio."

On January 14, instructions were received from The Adjutant General to send

to the Brigade and Field Officers' School enough officers to complete the division's quota of fourteen.

⁴⁴Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁴⁵On January 15 a telegram was received from Colonel Gordon Strong tendering his resignation because of physical unfitness for active service resulting from a serious illness. He was succeeded in command of the 124th Field Artillery by Lieutenant Colonel Horatio B. Hackett. This officer was promptly recommended for promotion to a colonelcy and on January 24 notification was received from The Adjutant General that this recommendation had been approved.

⁴⁶Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*

⁴⁸On January 26, General Bell reported that there were exactly "6 gallery practice rifles on hand in this Division, 4 serviceable and two unserviceable." On January 31 he was informed by The Adjutant General that 159 gallery practice rifles had been ordered shipped to the 33rd Division.

⁴⁹Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁵⁰See 1:7, 10, 13-14.

⁵¹Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁵²*Ibid.*

⁵³Division Commander to Acting Chief of Staff, February 11, 1918, on the subject of "Designation of the 33rd Division as a Replacement Division." The sequel was contained in the following communication: "320. (Misc. Div.) 1ST IND. WAR DEPARTMENT, A.G.O., February 21, 1918.—TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL, 33rd Division, Camp Logan, Texas.

It is regretted that the Commanding General, 33rd Division has placed the interpretation upon the designation of his division as a replacement division that this communication would appear to indicate.

Under the scheme of organization calling for replacement division, it devolved upon the War Department to so designate certain divisions, and the efficiency of these divisions is as vital to the success of the whole plan as that of any others.

The Division Commander is assured that this designation of his division was made without intent to reflect in the slightest upon his efficiency or that of the men whom he commands.

By order of the Secretary of War:

JOHN S. JOHNSTON,
Adjutant General.

3 Incls.

(Syn. made)

RHM

⁵⁴*Trench and Camp*, February 22, 1918.

⁵⁵On February 15, instructions were received from The Adjutant General to transfer to the Quartermaster Corps 350 men with slight physical defects, and to send 250 of them to the School for Cooks and Bakers at Fort Riley, Kansas, and 100 to the Presidio, San Francisco. On the morning of February 19, these detachments left Camp Logan.

⁵⁶Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*

⁵⁸See 1:9.

⁵⁹On February 21, instructions were received to report the number of non-commissioned officers surplus in the divisions, since they could be utilized in the formation of corps and army troops. On February 28 a report was rendered that there were only three sergeants surplus.

⁶⁰Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁶¹That the unusual amount of time devoted in the 33rd Division to all details of shooting was in harmony with the plan of the War Department was attested by the receipt on February 28 of the following telegram from The Adjutant General:

"Reports of inspectors indicate that in many Divisions there is a neglect of the necessary training preliminary to small arms firing on the target range. It is vitally important that every man armed with rifle or pistol be taught how to shoot during preliminary training and that the firing of ball ammunition is merely an application of that which has been learned."

⁶²Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁶³*Ibid.*

⁶⁴*Ibid.*

⁶⁵On March 13, Major William C. Cowles arrived from the headquarters of the Central Department at Chicago and assumed the duties of Division Inspector, *vice* Major Clyde R. Abraham, who had been ordered to the 81st Division at Camp Jackson, Columbia, South Carolina. On March 15, instructions were received to send the 7th Illinois Infantry Band to Leon Springs, Texas, for assignment to the 305th Cavalry. The departure of this band was attended with much regret and its spirited playing of the favorite air, "Illinois", was greatly missed. On March 17, notification was received that the letter issued by The Adjutant General's office on March 10 was not intended to apply to the 33rd Division, which was to retain all rifles of the model of 1903.

⁶⁶This School of Operations was inaugurated by Training Circular No. 62, dated Headquarters 33rd Division, March 19, 1918. Broadly speaking, the course was planned to embrace the following subjects: (1) organization of a division and army corps; (2) division and corps staff; (3) distribution of staff work; (4) duties of staff work; (5) duties of staff officers (a) in active operations and (b) with respect to the training of a division; (6) quartering of a division; and (7) supplying a division in quarters.

⁶⁷Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁶⁸The band of the 5th Illinois Infantry was assigned to the 305th Cavalry, likewise at Leon Springs, Texas, and together with the band of the 7th Illinois Infantry left for the new station on March 20.

⁶⁹On March 24, the Division Commander was directed to report at once by telegram the number of men in each grade who were unsuited physically for over-sea service but fit for duty within the United States.

⁷⁰Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁷¹*Houston Daily Post*, March 27, 1918; Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁷²On March 26, orders were received relieving Colonel B. C. Smith, National Army, a Regular officer temporarily commanding the 123rd Field Artillery, and directing him to proceed to Camp Lewis, Washington, as soon after April 1 as practicable. On March 27 two telegrams were received, one of which ordered Lieutenant Colonel H. W. Huntley to Camp Gordon, Georgia, while the other sent Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Frankenberger to Camp Travis, Texas. The Division Commander thereupon

wired The Adjutant General that these officers had left Camp Logan about January 30 by virtue of paragraphs one and two, Special Order 28, current series, these headquarters, issued in compliance with telegraphic instructions from the War Department on January 27.

⁷³Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁷⁴*Ibid.* Colonel Garrity was succeeded in command of the 132nd Infantry by Lieutenant Colonel Abel Davis, who was promoted to a colonelcy on May 3. On April 24, the resignation of Colonel Garrity was forwarded to The Adjutant General and was accepted a few days later; he was succeeded in command of the 130th Infantry by Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Lang. A detachment of "misfits" arrived from the 21st Field Artillery, only one of whom was not venereally diseased or out of the guard house and the following receipt for them was given by the Division Adjutant to the officer who brought them:

"HEADQUARTERS, 33RD DIVISION, CAMP LOGAN, HOUSTON, TEXAS, April 4, 1918.

Received from C. O., 21st F. A., 24 enlisted men, these 24 men being transferred to this Division by Par. 13, Special Order No. 74, Headquarters Camp MacArthur, Waco, Texas, April 2nd, 1918—4 men, i. e., Dewey E. Hutchinson, Emil Lahti, James S. Morrison and William G. Tewilliger, enumerated in the order, not accompanying the detachment.

Of these 24 men, 16 have been sent to the Base Hospital with a view to discharge on S. C. D., 8 were sent to the Division Stockade, 5 of the above 24 men having been liberated from the Guard House at Camp MacArthur according to the statement of 1st Lieut. Russell Scott, accompanying the detachment."

⁷⁵*Houston Daily Post*, April 6, 1918.

⁷⁶This table is compiled from data in the Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁷⁷Division Commander to The Adjutant General of the Army, on the subject of "Supply of clothing for overseas service," April 11, 1918.

⁷⁸Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁷⁹See 1:26.

⁸⁰Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁸¹Pursuant to paragraph 3, Special Order No. 103, Headquarters Camp Logan, (confidential), dated April 19, 1918. On April 25, a telegram from The Adjutant General of the Army relieved Colonel Mathew C. Smith from duty with the 33rd Division and ordered him to "join his proper station without delay." To this General Bell responded: "Replying to your telegram relieving Colonel Mathew C. Smith from further duty comma inform you that this officer left here about February thirteenth in compliance with your telegraphic instructions February eleventh." Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁸²See 1:2, 9, 17-18, 20, 22, 23, 28.

⁸³Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁸⁴See 1:18.

⁸⁵On April 27, Captain Phillip G. Shearman, former Assistant Adjutant of the 80th Division and Camp Adjutant of Camp Lee, Petersburg, Virginia, arrived and reported for duty as Camp Adjutant, thus relieving Major Huidekoper, who had acted as both Division and Camp Adjutant since the organization of Camp Logan. On April 29, General Bell requested action in the case of the French officers who had then received no orders from the French Military Mission to accompany the division,

whereas the British officers had had official instructions to do so. During the last days of April, 1918, detailed instructions were received from The Adjutant General respecting the disposition of alien enemies and conscientious objectors, and the report to be rendered specifying the number of men needed to bring the division up to maximum strength for foreign service. As a matter of fact, the question of conscientious objectors had been solved months before (see 1:15) and all alien enemies had been sent to Camp Lewis on April 25.

⁸⁶The following entry from the Diary of the Division Adjutant will afford a fair understanding of the labor involved by the arrival of the recruits on the eve of the departure of the division:

"On April 21st about 2,600 had been received from the 86th Division at Camp Grant and were distributed [among various units]. On April 23rd 100 from the same camp arrived and were distributed by April 28th. On April 28th, about 3,300 recruits from the 88th Division at Camp Dodge and 84th Division at Camp Taylor were assigned. On April 29th, 1,000 recruits were received from the Depot Brigade of the 86th Division. On April 30th about 850 of these last 1,000 men were assigned, the Division being at approximately full authorized strength that afternoon, including approximately 7,000 recruits assigned within the ten days preceding. On April 25th, 704 alien enemies had been sent to Camp Lewis, American Lake, Washington. A number of physically unfit and other aliens had been assigned to a Casual Detachment or Provisional Regiment. During the fortnight prior to the departure of the Division from Camp Logan, more than 9,400 transfers were made in compliance with War Department instructions."

⁸⁷To replace Major H. C. Castor, who had been found physically unfit for over-sea service and recommended for honorable discharge, a new Assistant Division Adjutant was secured in the person of Major Henry S. Hooker, one of the Adjutants General on duty at the War Department.

⁸⁸General Todd to the Commanding General, 33rd Division, May 8 and 10 (telegrams). In the latter telegram, General Todd stated that he was "receiving many conflicting orders from War Department, Hoboken, and railroad officials but we are doing our best."

⁸⁹Partial list showing the movement of units of the 33rd Division from Camp Logan, Houston, Texas, to Camp Upton, Yaphank, Long Island, New York, in May, 1918, preparatory to sailing overseas.

UNIT	DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM CAMP LOGAN	DATE OF ARRIVAL AT CAMP UPTON
Headquarters Detachment and Headquarters Troop.....	May 1, 1918, noon	May 5
122nd Machine Gun Battalion.....	May 1, 6 and 6:55 P.M.	May 6, 1:40 P.M.
Companies A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H, 129th Infantry.....	May 2	May 7
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 130th Infantry.....	May 3, noon	May 7, 11:30 P.M.
Companies I, K, L, and M, 129th Infantry.....	May 3, noon	May 8, 12:45 A.M.

UNIT	DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM CAMP LOGAN	DATE OF ARRIVAL AT CAMP UPTON
Companies A, B, C, D, E, and F; Supply Company and Machine Gun Company, 130th Infantry.....	May 4	May 8, 2:30, 4:30 and 1 P.M.
Companies G, H, I, K, L, and M, and Sanitary Detachment, 130th Infan- try.....	May 4	May 9, 2 and 2:30 P.M.
124th Machine Gun Battalion.....	May 5	May 10, 12:35 A.M.
Companies A, B, C, D, E, and F, 132nd Infantry.....	May 5, P.M.	May 10, 6:30 P.M.
Companies G and H, 132nd Infantry..	May 6	May 10, 9:45 P.M.
Companies I and K, 132nd Infantry..	May 6, 11:40 A.M.	May 11, 6:40 P.M.
Supply Company and Machine Gun Company, 132nd Infantry.....	May 7, 12:30 P.M.	May 11, 8:10 P.M.
Headquarters Company, 132nd Infan- try.....	May 6, 2 P.M.	May 12, 6:50 P.M.
Companies L and M, 132nd Infantry..	May 7, noon	May 12, 11:05 P.M.
Companies A and B, 131st Infantry...	May 7, 4:20 P.M.	May 12, 12:45 P.M.
Companies C and D, 131st Infantry...	May 7, 6:10 P.M.	May 12, 12:45 P.M.
Companies I, K, L, and M, 131st Infan- try.....	May 8, 2:10 and 4 P.M.	May 13, 12:30 P.M.
Military Police.....	May 9, 11 A.M.	

The above data is taken from the Diary of the Division Adjutant but is necessarily incomplete since he left Camp Upton on May 14, at 5:30 A.M.

⁹⁰The 58th Field Artillery Brigade proceeded to Camp Merritt, New Jersey.

⁹¹On May 9, Major Oakes, the division ordnance officer, reported to General Bell that on the previous day, at the office of the ordnance officer at the port of embarkation, he complained of the impossibility of obtaining the ordnance promised to the 33rd Division and asked to be shown the official records. His examination of these records disclosed that up to May 8, 1918, the United States had shipped abroad only ten Browning automatic rifles; that it contemplated shipping twelve more automatic rifles; but that no Browning machine guns had then been shipped overseas. Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁹²These movements and the composition of each detachment were prescribed by paragraphs 1, 3, 4, and 5, Special Order No. 120, Headquarters 33rd Division, issued on May 7, 1918, and by paragraph 2, Special Order 121, dated May 8, 1918.

⁹³Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁹⁴At 5:30 A.M. on May 14, a detachment under Lieutenant Colonel E. J. Lang, 130th Infantry, composed of Company M, 129th Infantry, and a number of officers, left Camp Upton for Hoboken in compliance with paragraph 5, Special Order No. 124, dated May 11, 1918. It was followed on May 15, by the 132nd Infantry (less Companies K and L) and the 130th Infantry (less Company M), and on May 16 by the following units: 33rd Division Headquarters; Headquarters Troop; Companies K and L, 132nd Infantry; 124th Machine Gun Battalion; 66th Infantry Brigade Headquarters; Company M, 130th Infantry; Company I, 129th Infantry; 123rd Machine

Gun Battalion; and the surplus officers of the 132nd Infantry. These movements were directed by paragraph 6, Special Order No. 124, dated May 11, 1918.

⁹⁵Captain Lloyd, the personnel officer representing the port of embarkation at Camp Upton, officially stated that, of all the divisions which had passed through that camp since October, 1917, the 33rd was unique in the accuracy and completeness of its records, and that the first perfect passenger list submitted to him was that of the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion. Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁹⁶The details connected with the over-sea movement of the 33rd Division are fully set forth in appendix 1, but for the convenience of the reader the information therein contained is here repeated.

The 108th Engineers (Colonel Henry A. Allen) and the 108th Engineer Train sailed from Hoboken, New Jersey, on May 8, 1918, in the transport *George Washington* and arrived at Brest, France, on May 18. The headquarters of the 65th Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General Henry R. Hill) and the 129th Infantry (Colonel Charles H. Greene), less the 3rd Battalion and Company H, sailed on May 10, 1918, in the *Covington*, reaching Brest on May 23. The 122nd Machine Gun Battalion (Major David R. Swaim) sailed on May 10 in the *Lenape*, arriving at Brest on May 23. Company H, 129th Infantry, sailed on May 10 in the *President Lincoln*, and likewise reached Brest on May 23. On May 16, the Division Commander (Major General George Bell, Jr.), the Division Staff, the Headquarters Detachment, the Headquarters Troop, (Captain Herbert W. Styles), the 132nd Infantry (Colonel Abel Davis), and the 124th Machine Gun Battalion (Major Floyd F. Putnam), sailed in the *Mount Vernon*, arriving at Brest on May 24. The headquarters of the 66th Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General Paul A. Wolf), the 130th Infantry (Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Lang), and the 123rd Machine Gun Battalion (Major Albert L. Culbertson), sailed on May 16 in the *Agamemnon* and likewise reached Brest on May 24. The 131st Infantry (Colonel Joseph B. Sanborn), the Headquarters Train and Military Police (Colonel John V. Clinnin), and the 108th Supply Train (Major Frederick S. Haines), sailed in the *Leviathan* on May 22 and arrived at Brest on May 31. The 58th Field Artillery Brigade sailed on May 26, 1918, in four transports which reached Liverpool, England, on June 8. In the *Kashmir* were the 122nd Field Artillery (Colonel Milton J. Foreman), the 108th Trench Mortar Battery (Captain Charles Kraft), and the 108th Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop (First Lieutenant T. Worthington, Jr.); in the *Scotian*, the 123rd Field Artillery (Colonel Charles G. Davis); in the *Melita*, the 124th Field Artillery (Colonel Horatio B. Hackett), and the 108th Field Signal Battalion (Major John P. Lucas); and in the *City of Poona*, the 108th Ammunition Train (Major Samuel N. Sorenson). The headquarters of the 58th Field Artillery Brigade (Brigadier General Henry D. Todd, Jr.) sailed in the *Mauretania* on June 4 and arrived at Liverpool on June 11. The 108th Sanitary Train (Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Orr), sailed on June 4 in the *Adriatic* and reached Liverpool on June 15.

⁹⁷The convoy composed of the *Mount Vernon* and the *Agamemnon*, which sailed on May 16, 1918, was the first to carry a fifty per cent surplus of troops overseas. Each ship, although only 20,000 tons burden, carried within a few men of 5,000. So successful was this experiment that it was put into practice on subsequent transports.

⁹⁸Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁹⁹Statements of Colonels Sanborn and Clinnin, Major Hendrie and Lieutenant Biederman.

CHAPTER II

¹"May 24th, 1918: Brigade Headquarters (6 officers, 23 men) and 129th Infantry, less Co. H, and 3rd Battalion (68 officers, 2,282 men) debarked from U. S. S. 'Covington', at Brest, France, Base Section No. 5, at 12:00 o'clock noon. All troops marched five kilometers to Pontanezen Barracks. Owing to the fact that the barracks were overcrowded and that there were a number of cases of scarlet fever within the regiment, troops made shelter tent camp on Plots 17, 19 and 21, near the main road $\frac{1}{2}$ kilometer northeast of the barracks. Plot 21 was designated as a quarantine camp and all contact cases were assigned to that plot.

"Co. H, 129th Infantry (5 officers, 235 men) debarked from the U. S. S. 'President Lincoln' at Brest, France, at 3:00 P.M., and marched to Plot 17, Camp Pontanezen, arriving at 7:00 P.M." Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:563.

²See 2:19.

³Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁴*Ibid.*; Operations of the 66th Infantry Brigade, Brigadier General Paul A. Wolf, from May 16 to November 11, 1918, 3:26.

⁵Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:565.

⁶"May 27th. Upon arrival in Abbeville, Brigade Headquarters were bombed by enemy air-planes, thus making an interval of eighteen days between leaving original point of departure in U. S. and coming under enemy fire—a record." Operations of the 66th Infantry Brigade, 3:26.

⁷Training Circular No. 117, Headquarters 33rd Division, June 4, 1918; Operations of the 66th Infantry Brigade, 3:26.

⁸War Diary, 33rd Division, June 26, 1918, 2:315.

⁹Diary of the Division Adjutant.

¹⁰See Field Order No. 1, Headquarters 33rd Division, June 8, 1918, 2:137. Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:567; Operations of the 66th Infantry Brigade, 3:26.

¹¹Diary of the Division Adjutant.

¹²As directed by Training Circular No. 120, June 8, 1918. The strength of the division on June 12, 1918, was 504 officers and 15,198 enlisted men available for duty.

¹³The training followed during this period was prescribed in detail by Training Circulars, Nos. 116 to 124, June 4–June 12, 1918. See also Operations of the 66th Infantry Brigade and Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, appendixes 20 and 16. A comprehensive account of this training will be found in the Report of the Division Commander to the Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F., on "Training higher commanders of divisions with British," August 12, 1918. See 2:342.

¹⁴A list of the officers and men of the 33rd Division who were sent to various schools will be found in appendix 6.

¹⁵On June 12, 1918, the Assistant Chief of Staff, the G-1, the G-2, the Division Adjutant and two captains were ordered to the Army General Staff College at Langres.

¹⁶War Diary, 33rd Division, June 14, 1918, 2:312; Report of the Commanding Officer, 108th Engineers, November 26, 1918, 2:539.

¹⁷On June 15 the 108th Field Signal Battalion rejoined the 33rd Division and was

stationed at Eu. On that same day the Headquarters, Companies A, D, G, Headquarters Company, Supply Company and Medical Detachment of the 129th Infantry arrived. Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:569.

¹⁸Field Orders, 33rd Division, Nos. 2 and 3, June 19, 1918, 2:140,145; War Diary, 33rd Division, 2:313; Operations of the 66th Infantry Brigade, 3:26; Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:570. The headquarters of the 90th and 198th Infantry Brigades, British Expeditionary Forces, and the British Battalion *cadres* accompanied the 33rd Division. On the other hand, the artillery, the 108th Engineers, the engineer, sanitary, ammunition, and supply trains did not follow the movement.

¹⁹On June 26 the 108th Sanitary Train rejoined the 33rd Division.

²⁰Subsequently named by the British the "Illinois Line."

²¹Instructions were received from the Chief of Staff of the Fourth British Army to transfer the 66th Brigade to the area of the IIIrd Corps and the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion to the Long area (Order No. 10/26 (G), Fourth British Army, B. E. F., June 27, 1918), but these dispositions were revoked before the movements took place.

²²War Diary, 33rd Division, July 2, 1918, 2:316.

²³On June 21, 1918, the colonels of the 129th, 130th, 131st and 132nd Infantry Regiments were sent to Grantham, England, to attend the fifteenth senior officers' course at the Machine Gun Training School. See Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:570. On June 27, sixty officers and sixty-eight men were sent to the Infantry Specialists' School at Langres, and on July 1 two officers were sent to the Army Engineers' School at the same place. See 2:347.

²⁴Training Circulars, Nos. 125 to 136, Headquarters 33rd Division, June 13 to July 1, 1918; Division Commander's report, August 12, 1918, 2:342; War Diary, 33rd Division, 2:312-316; Operations of the 66th Infantry Brigade, 3:26; Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:569-572.

²⁵See report of the Division Commander to the Commanding General, IIInd Corps, July 8, 1918, 2:425.

²⁶The 1st Platoon of Company A, 131st Infantry, was assigned to Company A, 42nd Australian Battalion, the 2nd to Company B, the 3rd to Company C, and the 4th Platoon to Company D. Of Company E, 131st Infantry, the 1st Platoon was assigned to Company B, the 2nd to Company C, the 3rd to Company A, and the 4th Platoon to Company D, all of the 43rd Australian Battalion.

In the case of Company A, 132nd Infantry, which was attached to the 13th Australian Battalion, and of Company G, 132nd Infantry, attached to the 15th Australian Battalion, the 1st Platoon was assigned to Company A, the 2nd to Company B, the 3rd to Company C, and the 4th Platoon to Company D.

²⁷Report of the Division Commander, July 8, 1918, 2:425; 131st Infantry: Engagement at Hamel, July 4-5, 1918, 2:361.

General Sir Henry Rawlinson's response to Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig was apparently based upon the firm stand taken by Lieutenant General Sir John Monash, commanding the Australian Army Corps. In his remarkably interesting and valuable book, *The Australian Victories in France in 1918*, Sir John declares (page 44) that the absence of an Allied offensive of any real magnitude on the British fronts since Passchendaele in the autumn of 1917 demanded a demonstration to the enemy "that there

was still some kick left in the British Army." He therefore broached the question of an offensive against "the Hamel re-entrant" which had been a source of annoyance and anxiety to him for two months. At General Rawlinson's request, he submitted a concrete proposal in writing and, upon receiving prompt approval, took exceptional care in planning all the details of this important action (pages 44-51).

The *contretemps* which occurred within twelve hours of the time set for the attack as well as the events connected with it are thus graphically described by Sir John (pages 51-54):

"The final Corps Conference for the battle of Hamel was held at Bertrangles on June 30th, and the date of the battle itself was fixed for July 4th. This selection was prompted partly by the desire to allow ample time for the completion of all arrangements; but there were also sentimental grounds, because this was the anniversary of the American national holiday, and a considerable contingent of the United States Army was to co-operate in the night.

For some weeks previously the 33rd American Division, under Major-General John [George] Bell, had been training in the Fourth Army area, and its several regiments had been distributed, for training and trench experience, to the Australian and the III. Corps. I had applied to the Fourth Army and had received approval to employ in the battle a contingent equivalent in strength to two British battalions, or a total of about 2,000 men, organized in eight companies. [The original plan contemplated the use of the "equivalent of one battalion" from the 33rd Division, i.e., ten companies or 2,500 men]. The very proper condition was attached, however, that these Americans should not be split up and scattered individually among the Australians, but should fight at least as complete platoons, under their own platoon leaders.

All went well until three days before the appointed date, when General Rawlinson conveyed to me the instruction that, the matter having been reconsidered, only 1,000 Americans were to be used. Strongly averse, as I was, from embarrassing the Infantry plans of General MacLagan, to whom I had entrusted the conduct of the actual assault, it was not then too late to rearrange the distribution.

The four [six] companies of United States troops who, under this decision, had to be withdrawn were loud in their lamentations, but the remaining four companies were distributed by platoons among the troops of the three Australian Brigades who were to carry out the attack—each American platoon being assigned a definite place in the line of battle. The dispositions of the main body of Australian infantry were based upon this arrangement.

In the meantime, somewhere in the upper realms of high control, a discussion must have been going on as to the propriety of after all allowing any American troops at all to participate in the forthcoming operations. Whether the objections were founded upon policy, or upon an under-estimate of the fitness of these troops for offensive fighting, I have never been able to ascertain; but, to my consternation, I received about four o'clock on the afternoon of July 3rd, a telephone message from Lord Rawlinson to the effect that it had now been decided that *no* American troops were to be used next day.

I was, at the moment, while on my daily round of visits to Divisions and Brigades, at the Headquarters of the Third Division, at Glisy, and far from my own station. I could only request that the Army Commander might be so good as to come at once

to the forward area and meet me at Bussy-lès-Daours, the Headquarters of Maclagan—he being the Commander immediately affected by this proposed change of plan. In due course we all met at five o'clock, Rawlinson being accompanied by Montgomery, his Chief-of-Staff.

It was a meeting full of tense situations—and of grave import. At that moment of time, the whole of the Infantry destined for the assault at dawn next morning, including those very Americans, was already well on its way to its battle stations; the Artillery was in the act of dissolving its defensive organization with a view to moving forward into its battle emplacements as soon as dusk should fall; I well knew that even if orders could still with certainty reach the battalions concerned, the withdrawal of those Americans would result in untold confusion and in dangerous gaps in our line of battle.

Even had I then been ready to risk the success of the battle by going ahead without them, I could not afford to take the further risk of the occurrence of something in the nature of an 'international incident' between the troops concerned, whose respective points of view about the resulting situation could be readily surmised. So I resolved to take a firm stand and press my views as strongly as I dared; for even a Corps Commander must use circumspection when presuming to argue with an Army Commander.

However, disguised in the best diplomatic language that I was able to command, my representations amounted to this: firstly, that it was already too late to carry out the order; secondly, that the battle would have to go on either with the Americans participating, or not at all; thirdly, that unless I were expressly ordered to abandon the battle, I intended to go on as originally planned; and lastly, that unless I received such a cancellation order before 6.30 p.m. it would in any case be too late to stop the battle, the preliminary phases of which were just on the point of beginning.

As always, Lord Rawlinson's charming and sympathetic personality made it easy to lay my whole case before him. He was good enough to say that while he entirely agreed with me, he felt himself bound by the terms of a clear order from the Commander-in-Chief. My last resource, then, was to urge the argument that I felt perfectly sure that the Commander-in-Chief when giving such an order could not have had present to his mind the probability that compliance with it meant the abandonment of the battle, and that, under the circumstances, it was competent for the senior Commander on the spot to act in the light of the situation as known to him, even to the extent of disobeying an order.

Rawlinson agreed that this view was correct provided the Commander-in-Chief was not accessible for reference. Repeated attempts to raise General Headquarters from Bussy eventually elicited the information that the Field Marshal was then actually on his way from Versailles, and expected to arrive in half an hour. Thereupon Rawlinson promised a decision by 6.30, and we separated to rejoin our respective Headquarters.

In due course the Army Commander telephoned that he had succeeded in speaking to the Field Marshal, who explained that he had directed the withdrawal of the Americans in deference to the wish of General Pershing, but that, as matters stood, he now wished everything to go on as originally planned. And so—the crisis passed as suddenly as it had appeared. For, to me it had taken the form of a very serious crisis, feeling confident as I did of the success of the forthcoming battle, and of the far-

reaching consequences which would be certain to follow. It appeared to me at the time that great issues had hung for an hour or so upon the chance of my being able to carry my point."

²⁸The position is thus described in the report of the commanding officer, 131st Infantry:

"The town of Hamel is located about 2000 yards south of the River Somme, 5000 yards east of the town of Corbie and about 5500 yards a little south of west of the town of Chipilly. . . . The object of this battle was to take a triangular piece of territory about 5000 yards long and about 2000 yards deep at its northern end which constituted a dominating piece on the ridge just east of Hamel from which the enemy had good observation on our front line system. The taking of this salient would also straighten out our lines crossing the Somme River at Saily-Laurette, thence extending along the top of the ridge southeast of Hamel."

²⁹The 4th Australian Division was composed of the 4th and 6th Australian Brigades. The 11th Australian Brigade was attached for this particular operation.

³⁰See map 20, volume 4.

³¹131st Infantry: Engagement at Hamel, 2:361; 15th Battalion Order No. 45, July 2, 1918, 2:397.

³²The troops in the 6th Australian Brigade were not the only ones to suffer from defective barrage. A large proportion of the casualties in Company E, 131st Infantry, which operated with the 11th Australian Brigade was due to the same cause. See Report of Captain James W. Luke, Company E, 131st Infantry, on action of July 4-5, 1918, 2:369.

³³Report of Division Commander, July 8, 1918; 131st Infantry: Engagement at Hamel; Report of Operations of 132nd Infantry, Hamel and Vaire Woods, July 4, 1918; Narrative of Commanding Officer, 15th Australian Battalion; Report of Captain C. M. Gale, Company C, 131st Infantry, on action of July 4-5, 1918; Report of Captain James W. Luke, Company E, 131st Infantry, on action of July 4-5, 1918; Report of Captain J. R. Weaver, 132nd Infantry, on operations of July 4-5 at Hamel and Vaire; Report of Captain William J. Masoner, Company G, 132nd Infantry; Report of Captain Robert G. Hagan, Company I, 132nd Infantry, on operations of July 4-5, 1918, at Hamel and Vaire; Report of Captain George H. Mallon, 132nd Infantry, on operations of July 4-5, 1918, at Hamel and Vaire; Report of First Lieutenant Frank E. Schram, Medical Corps, attached to 132nd Infantry, on operations of July 4-5, 1918, at Hamel and Vaire. All these report will be found in appendix 7. A brief but most excellent account of the battle of Hamel is given by Lieutenant General Sir John Monash, in *The Australian Victories in France in 1918*, pp. 55-61.

³⁴131st Infantry: Engagement at Hamel; Narrative of Commanding Officer, 15th Australian Battalion, 2:399; War Diary, 33rd Division, July 4, 1918, 2:316.

³⁵It was in this engagement that the Americans raised the shout of "Lusitania" as they charged. After this battle, a story was widely circulated throughout the British Army and in England that the Australians, when asked their opinion of the American troops, replied, "They are good soldiers, but a bit rough." A similar story is also told by General Ludendorff in his narrative of the war. As the American companies were returning to their commands the day after Hamel, they were met by an Australian colonel who began to address them in a decidedly formal manner but ended by blurting out: "Yanks, you're fighting fools, but I'm for you!"

³⁶War Diary of the General Staff, Headquarters Australian Corps, 2:380; Operations by the Australian Corps against Hamel, Bois de Hamel, and Bois de Vaire, 4th of July, 1918 (British official document, Staff Sheet 218, July, 1918), p. 10; Lieutenant General Sir John Monash, *The Australian Victories in France in 1918*, p. 57.

³⁷The American losses were: Companies C and E, 131st Infantry: Officers, none killed, 3 wounded—one very severely; other ranks, 7 killed, 47 wounded, 4 missing; Companies A and G, 132nd Infantry: officers, none killed, 5 slightly wounded; other ranks, 17 killed, 76 wounded, 17 missing.

³⁸The success gained at Hamel contributed to an extraordinary degree to restore the morale of the British, which had necessarily been greatly affected by their reverses in March and April, 1918. Moreover, this operation—which was remarkable for its precision and which was executed absolutely according to plan—was notable for the brilliant work of the tanks, of which sixty-four participated (i.e., sixty fighting tanks and four infantry supply tanks) and only five were disabled. The Australians had had an unfortunate experience with the tanks at Bullecourt in 1917 and were skeptical as to their efficiency, but Hamel effectually dispelled all doubts on that score. The restoration both of the British morale and the confidence of the infantry in the tanks—both of which were in turn dependent upon securing proper coördination between infantry, artillery, tanks and aeroplanes—was a necessary prelude to success in any offensive on a grand scale. A series of minor operations, initiated for that purpose by General Sir Henry Rawlinson at the instigation of Lieutenant General Sir John Monash, commanding the Australian Army Corps, achieved the desired result and exercised a correspondingly depressing effect upon the Germans. Hamel, which was the most notable of these operations, marked the turn of the tide which reached its flood when the British Somme Offensive—"The Hundred Days"—terminated at Mons on November 11, 1918, after one of the most remarkable campaigns in the annals of war.

Sir John Monash declares, (page 64), apropos of Hamel, that "The moral results both on the enemy and on ourselves were far more important, and deserve far more emphasis than do the material gains.

"It was, as I have said, the first offensive operation, on any substantial scale, that had been fought by any of the Allies since the previous autumn. Its effect was electric, and it stimulated many men to the realization that the enemy was, after all, not invulnerable, in spite of the formidable increase in his resources which he had brought from Russia. It marked the termination, once and for all, of the purely defensive attitude of the British front. It incited in many quarters an examination of the possibilities of offensive action on similar lines by similar means—a changed attitude of mind, which bore a rich harvest only a very few weeks later.

"But its effect on the enemy was even more startling. His whole front from Ancre to Villers-Bretonneux had become unstable, and was reeling from the blow. . . ."

In his brilliant and most interesting work entitled, *The Last Four Months: How the War was Won*, Major General Sir Frederick Maurice, former Director of Military Operations of the British General Staff, declares (page 89) that, as a result of Hamel, "when the crisis came both men and material were ready. Tanks made surprise, that greatest weapon of generalship, much easier than it had been; they saved life and economised troops, and, therefore, that quick succession of punches for which Foch

was seeking his opportunity became possible." The logical sequel of Hamel was the battle of Amiens, which began on August 8, 1918, the blackest day of the war for Germany, according to General Ludendorff. In that battle, the plan of attack was based, to a large measure, "on the experience gained at Hamel;" "the moral ascendancy established by tanks, artillery and infantry working in combination"—of which Hamel was the first instance—"affected both private and general in the German army" and the victory achieved was attributable to the fact that "the lessons of Hamel had been applied on a great scale, and with complete success."

³⁹Sir John Monash asserts (page 59) that the troops of the 33rd Division who fought at Hamel "acquitted themselves most gallantly and were ever after received by the Australians as blood brothers—a fraternity which operated to great mutual advantage nearly three months later."

The commander of the 15th Australian Battalion reported that "The Americans attached to us deserve special mention for their part in the operation. They behaved magnificently, but were rather anxious to get too close to our barrage (a very common fault with new troops). There is not the slightest doubt that they possess all the qualities required to make first rate fighting troops."

⁴⁰These three communications were published to the 33rd Division in General Orders Nos. 105 and 106 on July 5 and 6, 1918, respectively.

⁴¹Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:573; Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:636.

⁴²Reports of Captains Gale, Luke, and Weaver on action of July 4-5, at Hamel and Vaire, 2:368, 370, 373.

⁴³War Diary, 33rd Division, 2:319.

⁴⁴This training was prescribed in detail by Training Circulars, Nos. 125 to 184, issued by the Headquarters of the 33rd Division.

⁴⁵See report of Division Commander, August 12, 1918, and other papers in 2:342. See also War Diary, 33rd Division, 2:318ff. Operations of the 66th Infantry Brigade, 3:27; Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:574ff.

⁴⁶See 1:41-42. Brigadier General Henry R. Hill was relieved from the command of the 65th Infantry Brigade on July 16 and was succeeded by Brigadier General Edward L. King on July 30. Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:575.

⁴⁷The 175th Infantry Brigade (British) was composed of the 9th, 10th, and 12th Battalions of the London Regiment, the 3rd Battalion of the 132nd Artillery Regiment and the 175th Trench Mortar Battery. The 174th Infantry Brigade comprised the 6th, 7th, and 8th Battalions of the London Regiment and the 174th Trench Mortar Battery. These two Brigades formed part of the 58th London Division, the 174th being the Reserve Brigade.

⁴⁸The casualties in the 131st Infantry were:

August 9-10.

Killed: Officers, 5; enlisted men, 46.

Wounded: Officers, 9; enlisted men, 325. Total 385.

August 11-16.

Killed: Officers, 1; enlisted men, 26.

Wounded: Officers, 4; enlisted men, 339. Total: 370. Grand total, 755.

⁴⁹Report on Operations of 131st Infantry, August 8-9-10, 1918: Gressaire Wood Engagement, August 18, 1918; Report on 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, August 9, 1918; Letter of Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, to Commanding General, 33rd Division, August 19, 1918; Memorandum on "The Fight for Chipilly Ridge and Gressaire Woods" on August 9, 1918, prepared by the Chief of Staff, 33rd Division; letter of Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, to Lieutenant Colonel Frederic L. Huidekoper, November 21, 1918. See appendix 8.

⁵⁰This telegram and letter were published to the 33rd Division in General Order No. 115, August 11, 1918.

⁵¹War Diary, 33rd Division, 2:322-324.

⁵²See Report of Division Commander, August 12, 1918, 2:342.

⁵³Training Circulars, Nos. 155 to 160, Headquarters 33rd Division.

⁵⁴Between June 27 and August 15, 1918, 99 officers and 260 enlisted men were sent to such schools as the Machine Gun Training Centre at Grantham, England, the Machine Gun School at Havre, the Infantry Specialists', the Infantry Candidates' and the Army Engineer Schools at Langres, and the Gas Defense Schools at Chaumont and Gondrecourt.

⁵⁵War Diary, 33rd Division, 2:324; Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:584-585. The principal features of the work each day at the Headquarters of the 33rd Division were summarized in the Journal of Operations, 2:463.

⁵⁶The correspondence in connection with the King's visit and the names of the officers and men decorated by him on that occasion will be found in 2:428.

⁵⁷"August 18th, 1918: . . . Col. C. H. Greene relieved from command of the 129th Infantry. Colonel Edgar A. Myer assumed command of the regiment." Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:585.

⁵⁸Field Order No. 16, Headquarters 33rd Division, 2:175.

⁵⁹Cf. Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:585-586.

⁶⁰For the letter from Major General Higginson, commanding 12th Division, British Expeditionary Forces, commending the excellent work of the 108th Engineers, see 2:446. This letter was published to the 33rd Division in General Order No. 128, September 11, 1918. A brief account of the work of this regiment while on the British front is given in the Report of the Commanding Officer, 108th Engineers, November 26, 1918. See 2:537 ff.

⁶¹These letters were published to the 33rd Division in General Orders No. 119, August 22, 1918, 2:444.

⁶²Memoranda furnished by the Assistant Division Adjutant, Major Henry S. Hooker—in civil life a law partner of Mr. Roosevelt; Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:586; Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:641.

⁶³Less the artillery, and the ammunition and supply trains, none of which had rejoined.

⁶⁴War Diary, 33rd Division, for August 29, 1918, 2:325. The positions occupied that day by the 33rd Division were as follows: Division Headquarters, Headquarters Troop, 108th Field Signal Battalion, Train Headquarters and Military Police, Tronville; 108th Sanitary Train, Ménil-sur-Saulx; 108th Engineers, Géry; 65th Infantry Brigade, Velaines; 66th Infantry Brigade, Guerpont.

⁶⁵Training Circular, No. 161, dated August 26, 1918.

⁶⁶Confidential Memoranda, Nos. 1 and 2.

⁶⁷War Diary, 33rd Division, August 31, 1918, 2:326.

⁶⁸See Addendum to Field Order No. 16, 2:182.

⁶⁹Confidential Memoranda, Nos. 3 and 4.

⁷⁰War Diary, 33rd Division, September 2, 1918, 2:326; Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:587.

⁷¹See 3:207.

⁷²War Diary, 33rd Division, September 4, 1918, 2:326; Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:588.

⁷³Paragraph 1, Special Order No. 134, Headquarters First Army, September 5, 1918, 2:27.

⁷⁴War Diary, 33rd Division, September 5, 1918, 2:326; 17th French Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, General Order No. 792, 2:27.

⁷⁵Field Order No. 17, Headquarters 33rd Division, September 5, 1918, 8 P.M., 2:185.

CHAPTER III

¹War Diary, 33rd Division, 2:327; Operations of the 66th Infantry Brigade, 3:27; Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:589.

²War Diary, 33rd Division, 2:327; 17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, General Order, No. 792, September 6, 1918, 2:27.

³Field Order, No. 18, Headquarters 33rd Division, September 7, 1918, 6 P.M., 2:193.

⁴War Diary, 33rd Division, 2:327; Operations of the 66th Infantry Brigade, 3:27; General Wolf's report on the Operations in the Mort Homme Sector; Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:589. On September 9, the Division Commander made a thorough reconnaissance of the sector which his troops were about to occupy.

⁵On September 10 at 8 A.M., the 33rd Division definitely passed under the 17th French Corps by virtue of 17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, (Order) No. 394-S/3, dated September 7, 1918, 2:30.

⁶War Diary, 33rd Division, 2:327.

⁷*Ibid.*; Addendum No. 4 to Field Order No. 18, 2:199.

⁸Operations of the 17th Army Corps in front of Verdun, September and October, 1918 (1st American Army, 17th Army Corps, Staff, 2nd Bureau, No. 3399/2, October 31, 1918); War Diary, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade; Diary of the Division Adjutant; General Order No. 794, 17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 402/S/3, September 8, 1918, 2:31, fixed the details of this operation which was to consist of counterbattery, interdiction and demonstration fire. Secret Memorandum, 17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, September 11, 1918, 2:37, announced the zero hour as 1 A.M. September 12, and this information was conveyed to the units concerned by Confidential Memorandum, No. 6, Headquarters 33rd Division, September 10, 1918.

⁹Confidential Memorandum No. 7, September 13, 1918, prescribed that all men should be familiarized with the tactics and use of machine guns, Stokes mortars, 37-millimeter guns, rifle grenades, and all instrumentalities of liaison.

¹⁰By Special Order No. 3518/3, Second French Army, the 79th Division was placed at the disposal of the 17th French Army Corps on September 12. The relief of the 157th French Division was made in compliance with General Order No. 797, 17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, September 11, 1918.

¹¹See 1:56.

¹²By virtue of G-3 Order No. 75, P. C. Third Army Corps, September 12, 1918, 2:40, and Special Order No. 3537/3, 3rd Bureau, IIInd French Army, September 10, 1918. The passing to the IIIrd American Corps was published to the 33rd Division by Addendum No. 5 to Field Order No. 18, September 14, 1918, 2:204. The above-mentioned Special Order No. 3537/3 of the Second French Army was cited in Special Order No. 440-S/3, 17th French Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, September 12, 1918, 2:37, which announced that, beginning at noon September 14, the following would be the limits between the IIIrd American Army Corps and the 17th French Corps:

"The Meuse, up to 21 kilometers west of Vacherauville-La Madeleine farm (3rd

Army Corps, U.S.)—Chana Fort (17th Army Corps)—Sartelles Fort (17th Army Corps)—Sartelles Wood (3rd Army Corps, U.S.)—Camps Augereau, Galliéni, Davoust (3rd Army Corps, U.S.)—Nixéville Wood (3rd Army Corps, U.S.)—Chevillemont Wood (17th Army Corps)—Queue de Mala cross road—Road from Verdun to Bar (common to both Army Corps)—the village of Lemmes (17th Army Corps) as far as the fork of the Senoncourt road.”

¹³War Diary, 33rd Division, 2:328.

¹⁴Training Circular No. 169, Headquarters 33rd Division, September 14, 1918.

¹⁵1st Battalion, 108th Engineers (less Company C) and Engineer Train from Bois de Nixéville to Souhesmes-la-Grande; Company C, 108th Engineers, from Montzéville to Souhesmes-la-Grande during the night of September 15–16, as prescribed in Field Order No. 19, Headquarters 33rd Division, September 15, 1918, 2:205. During the night of September 16–17, 122nd Machine Gun Battalion from Camp de Placey to Longbut; 130th Infantry from Bois des Clair-Chênes to Bois de Béthelainville; and Company F, 108th Engineers, from Longbut to Montzéville. During the nights of September 15–16 and 16–17, 108th Supply Train from Blercourt and Souhesmes to Frana Ferme; and 102nd Ammunition Train from Camp de Nixéville to the Bois des Sartelles, as directed by Field Order No. 20, September 15, 1918, 11 P.M., 2:206. Compare Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:590–591.

¹⁶War Diary, 33rd Division, 2:329.

¹⁷Confidential Memoranda Nos. 8 and 9; Training Circulars Nos. 170 and 173, and Addendum to Training Circular No. 173.

¹⁸War Diary, 33rd Division, 2:329.

¹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰Confidential Memoranda Nos. 9 and 10.

²¹Company C, 132nd Infantry, was relieved by the 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry and by the 2nd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, of which Company F was in turn relieved by Company I, 129th Infantry; and Company D, 132nd Infantry, was relieved by the 3rd Battalion of the same regiment. The three companies relieved went back into other positions. See Field Order No. 21, September 20, 1918, 2:209.

²²The reliefs and movements which took place in compliance with Field Order No. 22, September 21, 1918, 3:30 P.M., 2:210, were as follows: The 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, at the camp southeast of Montzéville was relieved by a battalion from the 4th Division, and the 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry, at the Bois Bourrus (Ouest) was relieved by a battalion of the 80th Division. The 130th Infantry moved from the Bois de Béthelainville to Camp Augereau; the 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, was placed at the disposal of the 79th Division and took position at Chattancourt; the 123rd Machine Gun Battalion (less Companies A and B) proceeded from Béthelainville to Camp F, Bois des Sartelles; and the 108th Supply Train and the 108th Sanitary Train moved from Frana Ferme and Sivry-la-Perche respectively to Thierville. Cf. Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:592.

²³See 2:236.

²⁴Diary of the Division Adjutant.

²⁵See 2:219, 220, 249.

²⁶War Diary, 33rd Division, September 25, 1918, 2:330.

²⁷The location of the principal units of the 33rd Division on the afternoon of September 25, 1918, was as follows: Division Headquarters and headquarters 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, P. C. La Hutte; headquarters 65th Infantry Brigade, Béthel-ainville; headquarters 66th Infantry Brigade, near Chattancourt; 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, point 216.739, Verdun "B"; 108th Engineers, point 238.637, Verdun "B"; 108th Sanitary Train, Thierville; 108th Field Signal Battalion, Fromeréville; Headquarters Troop and 108th Train Headquarters and Military Police, Lempire.

²⁸September 12: to Army Candidates' School, at Langres, 1 officer as instructor and 34 men; to IIIrd Corps School, 16 men.

September 14: To Army Candidates' School, 2 officers as instructors.

September 20: To Motor Transport School, at Decize, 3 officers and 18 men.

September 21: To Army Signal Candidates' School, at Langres, 3 men.

September 24: To the Army General Staff College, Langres, 3 officers; to the Army Line School, Langres, 4 officers.

²⁹Training Circulars Nos. 165 to 177, September 7-19, 1918.

³⁰"Sept. 9th to 25th. Sector became gradually more active, many patrols sent out. Enemy artillery active from 14th to 15th." Operations of the 66th Infantry Brigade, 3:27.

³¹In the forward areas of the subsectors of Hill 304, Mort Homme, Cumières and Côte de Talou, the 108th Engineers "did an enormous amount of work in the repair of roads, construction of strong points, strengthening Principle Line of Resistance, repairing dugouts, and furnishing duckboards and other materials for bettering the condition of Infantry in the trenches." Report of the Commanding Officer, 108th Engineers, 2:540.

³²Chief of Staff, IIIrd Corps, to Commanding General, 33rd Division, September 13, 1918; Commanding General, IIIrd Army Corps, to Commanding General, 33rd Division, September 14, 1918; G-3 Order No. 81, P. C. 3rd Army Corps, A. E. F., September 15, 1918, 11:00 A.M.

³³General von der Marwitz' order to the Fifth German Army, dated October 1, 1918, quoted in Operations of the 17th Army Corps in front of Verdun, September and October, 1918.

³⁴Field Order No. 15, Headquarters First Army, A. E. F., France, September 17, 1918, 15 hours, announced the following assignment of divisions to corps, effective at noon September 20, viz: To the Ist Corps, 28th, 29th, 35th, 77th, and 92nd Divisions. To the IIIrd Corps, 1st, 4th, 33rd, and 80th Divisions. To the IVth Corps, 2nd, 5th, 42nd, 78th, 89th, 90th American Divisions, and 69th French Division. To the Vth Corps, 32nd, 37th, 79th, 82nd, and 91st Divisions. To the 2nd Colonial Corps (French) 2nd, 26th, and 39th Dismounted Cavalry Divisions (all French), and 26th (American) Division.

³⁵See 1:65.

³⁶Field Order No. 18, P. C. 3rd Army Corps, A. E. F., September 21, 1918, 9 Hour, 2:43.

³⁷Field Order No. 23, P. C. 33rd Division, September 24, 1918, 9 A.M., 2:212.

³⁸This turning movement, which would result in surrounding the Bois de Forges on three sides, sought to avoid a frontal attack in force against that extremely formidable position which the Germans boasted could never be taken by a direct assault, and

against which large forces might readily have been used without success. This plan was suggested by a French liaison officer at the Headquarters of the IIIrd Corps, Commandant Bertier de Sauvigny, formerly French Military Attaché at Washington, and so obvious were its advantages that it was accepted as by all odds the best method which could be devised.

³⁹Field Order No. 16, 66th Infantry Brigade, prescribed that the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion should station one company in the Vaux-Setif Trenches and three companies on the Haute de la Côte de l'Oie. See 3:34.

⁴⁰Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁴¹Report of the Commanding Officer, 108th Engineers, November 26, 1918, 2:537. A very thorough and interesting description of the work of the 108th Engineers in crossing Forges Creek bottom September 26, 1918, contained in the Report of the Commanding Officer, 108th Engineers, December 26, 1918, will be found in 2:501 ff.

⁴²Operations in the Mort Homme Sector; Reports of the Commanding Officers of the 131st and 132nd Infantry, 3:70, 148.

⁴³Report of the Acting Division Signal Officer, 2:552.

⁴⁴In the case of the 33rd Divisional artillery, the preparation fire consisted of concentrations by the 155-millimeter howitzers on the enemy front line and sensitive points in the zone of advance, lifting as the infantry approached. Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, November 15, 1918, 3:253.

⁴⁵*Ibid.* The standing and rolling barrages which were to be put down on the front of the 131st Infantry were assigned to two battalions of the 212e Régiment d'Artillerie de Campagne (75s), while the 104th and 105th Field Artillery performed a similar mission for the 132nd. The 3rd Battalion of the 212e Régiment was to lay a standing and rolling barrage of limited duration extending from the right of the 132nd Infantry to the village of Forges in order to deceive the enemy as to the front of attack. The 106th Field Artillery and the 1st Battalion, 308e Régiment d'Artillerie Lourde (155s) were to concentrate on various sensitive points in the sector of the 33rd Division, lifting as the advance progressed.

⁴⁶The machine-gun barrage for the 33rd Division consisted of forty guns manned by one platoon of Company A and Company B, 122nd (Divisional) Machine Gun Battalion, and by Companies C and D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion (66th Brigade). This barrage was put down upon the enemy trenches and strong points along the entire division front, beginning at the zero hour and lasting for sixty minutes on the left and seventy minutes on the right. Four guns from Company A, 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, were posted in the Ravin des Caurettes for protection against hostile aircraft, and one section (2 guns) was placed in a bend of the Meuse southwest of Regnéville to assist the raid made by the 18th French Division on the east bank, the 4th section being held in reserve. Companies A and B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, accompanied the 132nd and 131st Infantry respectively, and Companies C and D, after finishing their barrage, followed with the support battalions of those regiments. After completing the barrage, the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion remained in its position to cover the right flank which was open, after the initial attack, to enemy fire from Samogneux to the north of Brabant. See 2:556.

⁴⁷Furnished by Company A, 1st Gas and Flame Regiment. This unit was pro-

vided with mortars and thermite shells to attack strong points, but the batteries were unable to keep pace with the infantry advance.

⁴⁸The distance from the American trenches to the Béthincourt-Forges road was about 1,100 yards.

⁴⁹Operations in the Mort Homme Sector, 3:29-30; Reports of the Commanding Officers of the 131st and 132nd Infantry, and of the 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, 3:70, 80-81, 149.

⁵⁰Report of the Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, 3:70.

⁵¹At 5:55 A.M. the standing barrage moved forward three hundred meters and remained for twenty minutes while the infantry formed. Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:253. The barrage took twelve minutes to cover these three hundred meters.

⁵²The formation from west to east was: 3rd and 2nd Battalions, 131st Infantry, with 1st Battalion in the rear; 2nd and 1st Battalions, 132nd Infantry, the 3rd in support. The leading battalions had two companies in the front line and two companies in support, these companies being formed in line of platoons. The Moulin de Raffecourt was the point of demarcation between the 131st Infantry on the west and the 132nd Infantry on the east.

⁵³Report of the Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, 3:70; Operations in the Mort Homme Sector, 3:29. The latter report, which was signed by General Wolf, commanding the 66th Infantry Brigade, states that:

"The unit on the left was the 80th Division—this unit was not in position when the attack began at H hour, (5:30 A.M.) September 26th, 1918, and no connection with them could be established until some time after our objective was reached.

"The failure of this Division to support our left flank necessitated the putting in of the support Battalion of the 131st Infantry to clean up a portion of the sector assigned to the 80th Division, also for the protection of the flank which was exposed during the entire movement."

⁵⁴Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:253. The barrage for the 131st Infantry, fired by six batteries of the 212th French Field Artillery Regiment, was at the rate of one hundred meters in four minutes for three hours and five minutes. Upon reaching Gercourt-et-Drillancourt it was slowed down to a rate of one hundred meters in five minutes and continued thus for two hours and ten minutes.

⁵⁵Operations in the Mort Homme Sector, 3:30.

⁵⁶At point 194.799.

⁵⁷"At 10:10 A.M. message was sent by runner back to Pliable from 198-810 reading as follows: 'Have reached road Belhaine and am consolidating. No troops to my front or flanks. Signed—Gale.'" Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, 3:79.

⁵⁸" . . . Found about 50 Boche fleeing across the flat from all directions toward the bridge at Écluse, fire was opened on these dropping several, upon which about half those nearest stopped threw up their hands and came back, the others escaped across the bridge and disappeared, cleaning up parties were sent through the dug-outs and houses on the side of the cliff and collected together with those brought back from the flat a total of eight officers including one Colonel and one hundred and thirty-

eight other ranks. About fifth [fifty] others were chased up the valley into the territory of the 132nd U.S. Infantry." Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, 3:79.

⁵⁹"In the stores along the cliff were discovered large quantities of arms, ammunition, fireworks, military papers, maps, including one one-pound gun, three anti-tank guns, forty-one new M. G.'s boxed, high power Artillery Binocular periscope signal station complete with high power lights, typewriter, bicycles, etc." *Ibid.*, 3:79.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, also Report of the Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, 3:71, and Operations in the Mort Homme Sector, 3:29.

⁶¹Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:184.

⁶²Report of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry, which goes on to say: "Lt. Shantz informed me that he had found one platoon of Co. C. Haddie [code word for 319th Infantry of the 80th Division], in our rear and that the officer had told him that he was lost. I immediately took charge of them and made them part of my support," 3:82-83.

⁶³"The advance was held up for 20 minutes by machine gun fire from guns of the 80th Division, which put on a barrage over our own sector for that length of time after our own machine gun barrage had ceased." Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:184.

⁶⁴"While going up the slope of Hill 227 the sun came out and as we reached the top of the hill loud cheers were heard, the fog had lifted and a remarkable scene greeted us, everywhere could be seen the advancing troops and scattered here and there groups of prisoners under guard being taken to the rear. The 'Moppers-up' could be seen doing their work and doing it well. It was at this point that we connected with Haddie [code word for the 319th Infantry of the 80th Division] who were too far out of their position." Report of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry, 3:83.

⁶⁵"About 250 yards south of Gercourt Battalion P. C. was met by a fire from a M. G. at about 186-791 and snipers in church in Gercourt. Lt. Bourdon of Co. B, 124th M. G. Bn. and Corp. Linnenkahl of Co. L attacked the M. G. nest and killed the two Germans operating M. G. Corporal Koerper in charge of Bn. runners crept up to the church and captured four snipers." Report of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry, 3:83.

⁶⁶Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:184.

⁶⁷Cf. Operations in the Mort Homme Sector, 3:30.

⁶⁸Most of these prisoners were taken in the trenches along the Bois Juré.

⁶⁹Report of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry, 3:83.

⁷⁰See map 24, volume 4.

⁷¹"Reached objective at 11:00 to 11:30 A.M. and took positions to cover consolidation on left bank of Meuse valley, the 3rd platoon took position protecting left flank, as the 319th Infantry did not reach its objective until following evening. Casualties: 3 killed, 7 wounded." Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:184.

⁷²Four hundred shovels, 900 picks, 8,000 stands of barbed wire, 10,000 pieces of cut lumber, 14,000 spikes, 800 3-inch shells, 7,990 grenades, 130,500 rounds of rifle ammunition, 750 Werf grenades, 4,150 signal cartridges and flares, besides enormous

quantities of supplies, including railway ties, wire, wire screens, duck boards, etc. Report of the Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, 3:75.

⁷³Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, 3:81.

⁷⁴Report of the Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, 3:71.

⁷⁵The time of their arrival on the objective is fixed by the Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, in which it is stated that "About 3/4 hour later [after 10:10 A.M.] Company E and F arrived and took up a position several hundred yards to our rear, the Third Battalion appeared to our left." See 3:80.

⁷⁶Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, 3:81, which states: "Our Mopping-up parties did wonderful work. As a matter of fact they worked so fast that the advance was never held up."

⁷⁷Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry; Report of the Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, 3:71.

⁷⁸Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, 3:80.

⁷⁹Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry; see also Report of the Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, 3:71.

⁸⁰Memoranda furnished to the author by the Operations Officer, 131st Infantry.

⁸¹Three 6-inch howitzers, two 105-millimeter guns, eight 77-millimeter guns, three anti-tank guns, 15 light machine guns, 11 heavy machine guns, 26 heavy machine guns turned over to the 318th Infantry, one Red Cross ambulance, a narrow-gauge railway, 14 cars, 5 small and 3 large box cars, 14 four-wheel flat trucks, and 5 gravel trucks.

Report of the Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, 3:74.

⁸²Report of the Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, 3:75.

⁸³See 1:63; also Field Order No. 23, 2:214.

⁸⁴"Our troops were in position at H-2 with first battalion on the right, 2nd battalion on the left, and third battalion in support. Each battalion had two companies in line, and two companies in support. Companies were organized in two waves each.

"Each battalion had attached to it a section of the 37 mm. and Trench Mortars. The first Gas Regiment detailed a section to each battalion to form a smoke screen.

"Machine Gun Companies were assigned as follows, and advanced with their respective battalions:

Co. D, 124th M. G. Battn—1st Battalion

Co. A, 124th M. G. Battn—2nd Battalion

M. G. Co., 132nd Infantry—3rd Battalion

"Two companies of 108th Engineers were attached to the regiment." Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:148.

⁸⁵See 1:75.

⁸⁶"The barrage in front of the 132nd Infantry (about 1300 meters in width) fired by the 104th and 105th Field Artillery Regiments, 1/2 by each, lasted for 3 hours and 15 minutes, progressing at a rate of 100 meters in 4 minutes for 1 hour and 25 minutes, and 100 meters in 5 minutes for 1 hour and 50 minutes. The barrage on the right of the 132nd Infantry (1500 meters in width) was placed to deceive the enemy. It progressed at a rate of 100 meters in 4 minutes for 1 hour and 17 minutes." Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:253.

⁸⁷Operations in the Mort Homme Sector, 3:31; Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:150; Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 132nd Infantry, 3:161.

⁸⁸Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:149. Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, 3:163.

⁸⁹Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:149.

⁹⁰Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 132nd Infantry, 3:160.

⁹¹*Ibid.*; Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:150.

⁹²Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:150. Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, 3:163.

⁹³Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:150. Report of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, 3:164.

⁹⁴See 1:74.

⁹⁵Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:150.

⁹⁶Reports of the Commanding Officers of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 132nd Infantry, 3:161, 163.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*; Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:183.

⁹⁸Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:150-151. Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 132nd Infantry, 3:161.

⁹⁹Operations in the Mort Homme Sector, 3:31. Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:150.

¹⁰⁰The Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, enumerates the captured *matériel* as follows: Four howitzers (6-inch), a large quantity of ammunition; 10 field pieces, a large quantity of ammunition; 10 trench mortars; 109 machine guns, a large quantity of ammunition; 2 anti-tank guns; a large quantity of small-arms ammunition, grenades and pyrotechnics; a dump of engineering material; 1 wagon load of signal apparatus; 8 railway cars (60-centimeter); many other miscellaneous stores.

¹⁰¹Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:151.

¹⁰²Operations in the Mort Homme Sector, 3:32.

¹⁰³"The Machine Gun Companies accompanying the Battalions gave splendid assistance. . . . During the entire battle our plans of liaison worked perfectly. At all times there was telephone communication with each Battalion in the attack and the Brigade Commander was kept constantly informed of the progress of the troops." Operations in the Mort Homme Sector, 3:31. "The barrage which preceded the troops was laid down by the 212th French Artillery, and was perfect in its plan and execution." Report of the Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, 3:70. See also Reports of the Commanding Officers of the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion and 108th Field Signal Battalion, 2:547, 556 ff.

¹⁰⁴Operations in the Mort Homme Sector, 3:31.

¹⁰⁵See Field Order No. 23, Headquarters 33rd Division, in 2:213 ff. Also 1:63.

¹⁰⁶See 1:63. An interesting account of the work of these machine guns will be found in the Report of Operations, 122d Machine Gun Battalion, 2:556 ff.

¹⁰⁷Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:643; Report of the Commanding Officer, 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:16.

¹⁰⁸Report of the Commanding Officer, 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:17.

¹⁰⁹Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:594.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*; Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:670; Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:594.

CHAPTER IV

¹American Official Communiqués; Operations Reports, 33rd Division.

²"Sept. 27th to October 6th, 1918. During this period we held the line on the west bank of River Meuse at Bois de Forges and strengthened it for defense. The front was actively patrolled and reconnoitered from Consenvoye to Brabant in anticipation of attack by our troops involving the crossing of the River Meuse. On account of commanding positions and dominating heights held by the enemy our troops in the valley were under direct observation and harassed by enemy fire." Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:151.

³"Following the engagement north of Mort Homme on the 26th September, 1918, the 131st Infantry held a forward line on the west bank of the Meuse River from the evening of that date to the 18th of October, 1918. That line consisting of outposts on the edge of the river, supports in immediate rear and one battalion in reserve west of Forges woods extending from a point east of Dannevoux south to the Consenvoye Crossing, a distance of nearly three kilometers. . . . During the occupation of this line . . . [the] troops were subject to intermittent shell fire, gas attacks at night and rainy weather resulting in some casualties and sickness nearly every day." 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, October 10-14, 3:83. Also Operations of the 66th Infantry Brigade, 3:44. The detachments from Company A, 1st Gas Regiment, were relieved on September 27. See Memorandum to Commanding General, 66th Brigade, P. C. 33rd Division, September 27, 1918, 11:35 A.M., 2:250.

⁴Compare Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:184.

⁵See Memorandum to the Commanding General, 65th Brigade, dated P. C. 33rd Division, September 27, 1918, 6:20 P.M., 2:250, issued in compliance with Field Order No. 19, P. C. Third Army Corps, September 27, 1918, 2:30 A.M., 2:54.

⁶Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade; Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:594.

⁷Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:643.

⁸Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:671.

⁹Operations of the 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:17.

¹⁰Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:671. The movement of the 65th Brigade that day is summarized in the Chronological Record of Events, 2:594.

¹¹Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:254.

¹²Operations Reports, 33rd Division, September 27 and 28, 1918.

¹³*Ibid.*, September 28 and 29, 1918.

¹⁴Report of Operations, 122d Machine Gun Battalion, 2:557.

¹⁵Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:671-672.

¹⁶Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade; Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:594. The order will be found in 2:251.

¹⁷Reports of the Commanding Officers, 129th and 130th Infantry, 2:643 and 2:672; Operations of the 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:17.

¹⁸Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade in Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:594; Field Order No. 24, P. C. 33rd Division, covering this relief, the preparation of the line for defense, the artillery, and combat liaison, was issued on September 28, 1918, at 10:30 P.M. (2:251), in pursuance with G-3 Order No. 115, P.C. IIIrd Army Corps, A. E. F., September 27, 1918, 8:30 A.M. (2:55). These last two orders were modified by G-3 Orders No. 116, P. C. IIIrd Army Corps, A. E. F., September 27, 1918 (2:56); which prescribed that "The actual relief directed in G-3 order No. 115 for the night of Sept. 27-28 will not be carried out until orders to that effect from these Headquarters." These orders were, however, issued by the IIIrd Corps on September 28.

¹⁹Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:643.

²⁰Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:672.

²¹Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:254.

²²Report of the Commanding Officer, 108th Engineers, January 23, 1919, 2:511.

²³Operations Reports, 33rd Division.

²⁴Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:643; Operations of the 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:17.

²⁵Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:595; Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:672.

²⁶"The First Battalion 130th Infantry occupied the right half-sub-sector, and the Third Battalion occupying the left half-sub-sector in the Wood Sector, Bois de la Côte Lemont. Second Battalion was in reserve along the north edge, two companies in the Bois-d'en-Dela, and two companies in the Bois-des-Septesarges." Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:672.

²⁷Operations of the 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:17.

²⁸Addendum 2 to Field Order No. 24, P. C. 33rd Division, September 29, 1918, 5 P.M., 2:256. Addendum No. 1 was issued at 2:30 P.M. that day.

²⁹Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:255.

³⁰Operations Reports, 33rd Division, September 30, 1918.

³¹Report of the Commanding Officer, 108th Engineers, January 23, 1919, 2:511.

³²Report of Operations, 122d Machine Gun Battalion, 2:557.

³³Operations Reports, 33rd Division.

³⁴*Ibid.*

³⁵Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:255.

³⁶"16:30. Ordered Commanding Officer, 212th R. A. C. to fire on all observed batteries on front between left flank of his sector to Consenvoye and respond to all requests for fire from 131st Infantry." *Ibid.*

³⁷"On the 30th September, 1918, the Colonel of the 66th. French Infantry requested us to fire from 18,000 to 20,000 rounds, harrassing fire, on Brabant, and after securing the authority from C. G. this division request was complied with, although after firing 6,000 rounds the French requested us to cease firing as they had decided not to attempt the operation on that day." Report of Operations, 122d Machine Gun Battalion, 2:558.

³⁸Operations of the 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:17.

³⁹Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:672.

⁴⁰See 2:50.

⁴¹"September 30th. 80th Division Artillery placed at disposal of 4th Division (on brigade left). Very heavy enemy artillery fire from west, north and east; high explosive and mustard gas shells used. Some casualties resulted." Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:595.

"Sept. 30, 1918. Consolidation and improvement of positions. Very heavy enemy artillery fire from West, North and East; H. E. and Mustard Gas shells used. Our artillery did not seem to neutralize the enemy's fire. Casualties—seven (7) men killed, fifteen (15) men wounded." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:644.

"30th September, 1918: No change in attachment of companies. Co. D located in Bois des Septsarges. Companies B and C organized for defense in their respective locations. Casualties: Wounded, slight, 3." Operations of the 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:17.

⁴²Report of the Commanding Officer, 108th Engineers, 2:511-512.

⁴³Map to illustrate the Argonne Meuse Battle, issued by General Headquarters.

⁴⁴Operations Reports, 33rd Division.

⁴⁵In compliance with Field Orders, No. 25, 2:259.

⁴⁶Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:255.

⁴⁷War Diary, 33rd Division, for October 1, 1918, 2:332.

On October first, Major Carl C. Oakes, the Division Ordnance Officer, and Lieutenant Colonel William S. Cowles, the Division Inspector, proceeded to Langres to attend the fourth course at the Army General Staff College. Neither of these officers rejoined the 33rd Division subsequently.

⁴⁸Operations Report, 33rd Division.

⁴⁹"1st October, 1918: No change in disposition of companies. Work carried on improving gun emplacements. Co. B fired harassing fire on enemy strong points between 9:00 and 10:00 P.M. 1000 rounds of ammunition expended. Casualties: None." Operations of the 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:17.

⁵⁰"Oct. 1, 1918. Several prisoners taken; 5th B. I. D. A large amount of material salvaged. All prisoners turned over to Military Police. Heavy enemy shell fire continues; casualties—two (2) men killed, seven (7) wounded." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:644.

⁵¹Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:595.

⁵²Map to illustrate the Argonne Meuse Battle, issued by General Headquarters; War Diary, 33rd Division, for October 2, 1918, 2:332.

⁵³Operations Reports, 33rd Division.

⁵⁴Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:255.

⁵⁵Report of Operations, 106th Field Artillery, 3:282.

⁵⁶Report of Operations, 105th Field Artillery, 3:275.

⁵⁷Apart from the ordinary routine, October 2 was also without event of note in the P. C. of the 33rd Division, the most important communication issued that day being Confidential Memorandum No. 14, which embodied the following from Headquarters First Army:

(c)

"Complaints are being received here that our pursuit and reconnaissance planes are being shot up by our anti-avion guns.

"The impression seems to be prevalent among some divisions that they are at the mercy of German aeroplanes, when frequently the aeroplanes they see are our own.

"You are directed to take steps to vigorously combat this impression which is highly detrimental to morale."

⁵⁸"Oct. 2, 1918. Enemy shell fire becoming increasingly accurate and effective; the enemy having direct observation from three sides. Third Battalion (minus Co. 'K') withdrew to Bois Rond and Bois Juré in support of line. Co. 'K' holding that part of sector facing East, on the Meuse River. Casualties—three (3) men killed, eleven (11) men wounded. Gas Projector attack by Co. 'F' First Regiment Gas and Flame Engineers—fifty projectors thrown on Vilosnes." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:644.

⁵⁹"2nd October, 1918: No change in disposition of companies. Gun positions and shelters for men completed and improvement on same being carried out. At 5:15 A.M. enemy put down barrage in square 16.82 gradually fire to 17.82, lasting until 6:00 A.M. 12 Mustard Gas Shells fell in vicinity of Co. B's gun emplacements. Co. B fired harassing fire on enemy positions between 9:00 and 10:00 P.M. 1000 rounds of ammunition expended. Enemy aircraft active. Some movement of enemy in Vilosnes-sur-Meuse. Casualties: Wounded, slight 16." Operations of the 123d Machine Gun Battalion.

⁶⁰Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:596.

⁶¹"October 3rd, 1918. Mixed position combat group liaison established with the 131st Infantry (on brigade right) by the 129th Infantry. Harrassing fire concentrated by Machine Gun companies in line in the general direction of Teton Trench. Brigade P. C. and immediate vicinity heavily shelled throughout the day. Enemy plane with pilot and observer, brought down in Brigade Sector at 5:20 PM." *Ibid.*

"Oct. 3, 1918. Mixed post established with 131st Infantry (66th Inf. Bde). on our right. Usual trench routine. Casualties—one (1) officer killed, one (1) man killed, twelve (12) men wounded." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:644.

"On the 3rd October 1918, the Third Battalion 130th Infantry was relieved from the front line in the Bois de la Côte Lemont (Field Orders № 18, Hq. 130th Infantry) by the First Battalion 130th Infantry who extended their lines to the left, including the entire sector." Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:672.

⁶²Operations Reports, 33rd Division.

⁶³The new road from Cumières to Raffecourt, which had been opened at 6 P.M. on October 1 to horse transport, was in condition on October 3 for heavy artillery. It was substantially a two-way road and on the very day of its completion no less than five hundred vehicles, including fifty-six heavy guns, caissons, and ammunition trucks, passed over it without material injury. See Report of the Commanding Officer, 108th Engineers, January 1, 1919, 2:512.

⁶⁴Report of Operations, 105th Field Artillery, 3:275.

⁶⁵"3rd October, 1918: No change in disposition of companies during the day. Two left guns of Co. B fired harassing fire from 9:30 P.M. to 10:15 P.M. Expended 950 rounds of ammunition. Sneezing gas thrown on Hill 294. Light shelling throughout the day. Enemy aircraft active.

"Orders received from P. C. 65th Infantry Brigade at 10:00 P.M. to take two Machine Gun Companies to Bois de la Côte Lemont, for the purpose of neutralizing hostile opposition and breaking up counter attacks between Bois de Briulles, Bois de Forêt, and Briulles-sur-Meuse. Also to assist fire of 4th Division on left. Companies A and B were used for this work and were moved into position during the night. Co. D on Hill 281. Co. A in reserve. Casualties: Killed 2 Wounded, Slight, 9 Wounded, Serious, 1". Operations of the 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:18.

⁶⁶See 2:262.

⁶⁷See Secret Memorandum, P. C. 33rd Division, October 3, 1918, 11:10 P.M., 2:265. Also Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, 2:469.

⁶⁸Compare Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:151.

⁶⁹"On night of Oct. 3-4, pursuant to orders from Division Machine Gun Officer, Cos. A & D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, were relieved from positions in Bois de Forges and ordered to support the 4th Division from vicinity of Hill 280 and Bois de la Côte Lemont, to be in position by daylight morning of 4th October.

"Transportation did not arrive until nearly midnight and both companies used Company A's transportation, leaving Forges Wood about 12:30 A.M. Oct. 4th. All roads were heavily shelled by the enemy, the night was extremely dark and orders gave no information concerning location of enemy or our own troops, notwithstanding which the companies arrived at Hill 280 and had guns in position by 7:30 A.M. On the road the companies had to pass through gassed areas and lost four mules and one horse, and 2 enlisted men from shell fire." Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:184.

⁷⁰Map to illustrate the Argonne Meuse Battle, issued by General Headquarters.

⁷¹"On October 4th, 1918, we were withdrawn from the line and placed in Corps Reserve per Field Order No. 26, 33rd Division." Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:151; also Operations of the 66th Infantry Brigade, 3:27.

⁷²"On the 3rd and 4th of October the 132nd Infantry which occupied the extension of the lines to the south were withdrawn and our line prolonged on the east of the Forges Wood, nearly five additional kilometers connecting with French troops south of the town of Forges. This additional line was lightly held by outposts. The entire line was within the lines of the comprehensive defensive scheme abandoned as subsequent events developed.

"During the occupation of this line covering a period approximating 14 days troops were subject to intermittent shell fire, gas attacks at night and rainy weather resulting in some casualties and sickness nearly every day." 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:83-84.

⁷³"The machine guns of these companies were first in position and did harassing fire on Briulles and Teton Trench in support of our 4th Division." Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:184-185.

"4th October, 1918: Guns of Co. D in position on Hill 281 on N. W. edge of Bois de la Côte Lemont by day break. Co. A held in reserve, 4th Division on left to resume advance at 5:25 A.M. Our artillery opened fire and put down a barrage at 5:00 A.M. Companies C. & D. 123 M. G. Bn. opened fire on Briulles-sur-Meuse, points along river and high ground N. W. of Briulles protecting the 4th Division right flank. Fire carried on until 11:00 A.M. Two companies of 124th M. G. Bn. and

M. G. Co. 130th Infantry came under command of Commanding Officer, 123 M.G. Bn. for any use in any emergency that might arise. Five Machine Gun Companies in all available for protection of 4th Division right and 65th Infantry Brigade left. Disposition of Co. B unchanged. Heavy shelling by enemy in Bois de la Côte Lemont and Bois de Dannevoux. Our aircraft very active throughout day. Sneezing gas thrown over by enemy near positions of Co. B in Bois de Dannevoux. Casualties: Killed 4 Wounded, slight, 12 Wounded, serious, 3." Operations of the 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:18.

⁷⁴Report of Operations, 105th Field Artillery, 3:275; Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:257. The 131st Infantry was heavily shelled during the night of October 4-5. Operations Report, 33rd Division, October 5, 1918.

⁷⁵Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:596.

⁷⁶See also Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:672.

⁷⁷That the enemy retaliated is evident from the Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry (2:644), which contains the following entry: "Oct. 4, 1918. Enemy continues extremely heavy shelling, using Gas and H. E. No casualties."

⁷⁸Confidential Memorandum No. 16 prescribed that "Telephones and service buzzers will not be used within three kilometers of our front lines, except in case of grave emergency." Confidential Memorandum No. 17 enjoined the utmost care in the distribution of telephone wire, of which there was a decided shortage, and the recovery of all wire not in actual use.

⁷⁹At 1:45 P.M. the commander of the 65th Brigade was directed to send patrols to ascertain the situation at Briulles and in the Tranchée de Teton, 2:266. At 7:55 P.M. a G-3 order from the IIIrd Corps was received by telephone which prescribed that "Tonight, Patterson [code word for 33rd Division] will filter machine guns and auto-rifles groups into the Trench de Teton, to hold Briulles and the ridge one kilometer northwest of Briulles under machine gun fire tomorrow. Artillery and machine guns now in the Bois de la Côte Lemont will remain in place." At 9:30 P.M. the necessary instructions were issued to the Commanding General, 65th Brigade, 2:265.

⁸⁰G-3 Order No. 701, IIIrd Corps, October 5, 1918, 2:68.

⁸¹Operations Reports, 33rd Division, October 6, 1918.

⁸²Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:258.

⁸³Operations Reports, 33rd Division.

⁸⁴"The following day, Oct. 5th, Companies A & D were placed under orders of C. O. 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, and remained in position on Hill 280 protecting the left flank of our 65th Brigade. From these positions harassing fire and direct fire was carried on at intervals until the companies were ordered to withdraw to Bois de Forges on evening of October 6th by the Division Commander." Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:185.

⁸⁵"5th October, 1918. Orders received at 10:40 P.M., 4th October, 1918 from P. C. 65th Infantry Brigade for a joint patrol from 130th Infantry and M. G. Co. 124th M. G. Bn. to reconnoiter Trench Teton for purpose of infiltrating machine guns and automatic rifles into this position in order to fire on Briulles and ridge N. W. of that point Co. A, 124th M. G. Bn. and 130th Infantry furnished required number of men for this patrol. Patrol reported it impossible to occupy Trench Teton. Harassing fire carried on by Co. D, 123 M. G. Bn. and Companies A and B 124th M. G. Bn. throughout the day on Briulles-sur-Meuse and ridge N. W. of Briulles-sur-Meuse.

Disposition of Companies B and C unchanged. Enemy shelling woods throughout entire day and night. Enemy aircraft active during morning. Briulles reported burning. Casualties: Killed 3 Wounded, slight 3 Wounded, serious 1". Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:15-16.

⁸⁶Operations Reports, 33rd Division, October 5 and 6, 1918.

⁸⁷Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:146.

⁸⁸"October 5th: Gas projector attack on the town of Vilosnes not carried out account unfavorable wind. First Battalion 129th Infantry, suffered heavy casualties (5 officers and approximately 374 men) account prolonged enemy gas attack throughout the day. There was heavy hostile artillery activity in the vicinity of the Brigade P. C." Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:597.

"Oct. 5, 1918. First Battalion heavily shelled with Yellow Cross and Phosgene Gas mixed with shrapnel and H. E. First Battalion ordered to withdraw to South Slope of Hill 281. Company 'K' relieved and rejoined Third Battalion. Second Battalion now holding entire Regimental Sector, from Vilosnes to Consenvoye on west bank of Meuse River. Regiment now organized in depth for defense. Casualties—three (3) men killed; three hundred and seventy-one (371) men wounded and gassed. Movements by Operation Orders Nos. 22 and 23, 129th Infantry, 5th October, 1918." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:644.

⁸⁹Confidential Memorandum No. 18, P. C. 33rd Division, October 5, 1918.

⁹⁰Map to illustrate the Argonne Meuse Battle, issued by General Headquarters; G-3 Order No. 701, IIIrd Corps, October 5, 1918, 2:68.

⁹¹Operations Reports, 33rd Division, October 6 and 7, 1918.

⁹²Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:258.

⁹³Order to Commanding Generals, 65th Infantry Brigade and 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, Headquarters 33rd Division, October 6, 1918, 11:45 A.M., 2:267.

⁹⁴Report of Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:258; Report of Commanding Officer, 104th Field Artillery, 3:264.

⁹⁵"From these positions harassing fire and direct fire was carried on at intervals until the companies were ordered to withdraw to Bois de Forges on evening of October 6th by the Division Commander. This order was received too late for the change to be made before daylight, so the Division Commander directed no move until darkness following night." Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:185.

"6th October, 1918: No change in disposition of companies. Harassing fire carried out by Co. D, 123 M. G. Bn. and Companies A and D 124th M. G. Bn. on Briulles-sur-Meuse, ridge N. W. of Briulles-sur-Meuse, and Trench de Teton. Guns from above three companies reopened fire on targets named at 6:00 P.M., assisting artillery barrage. Orders received from P. C. 65th Infantry Brigade for raid by two companies of the 130th Infantry on Trench de Teton. M. G. Companies to assist overhead fire. Preparations made for this. Raid not carried out as planned. Orders received from P. C. 65th Infantry Brigade at 7:45 P.M. to have Companies A and B, 124th M. G. Bn. withdraw and proceed to Bois de Forges, reporting to G-3, 33rd Division. Enemy shelling heavy in woods. Enemy aircraft active throughout day. Some Mustard Gas in neighborhood of positions of Co. B in Bois de Dannevoux. Casualties: None." Operations of the 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:19.

⁹⁶131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:84.

⁹⁷G-3 Order No. 156, P. C. Third Army Corps, October 6, 1918, twelve o'clock. This order also attached one company from a brigade machine gun battalion of the 33rd Division to the 4th Division and the necessary orders were issued to the commanding general, 65th Brigade, but at 4:20 P.M. this order was rescinded. See 2:268.

⁹⁸"While Regiment was in Corps Reserve in vicinity of Malancourt the 3rd Battalion was attached to 4th Division and reported to C. O., 59th Infantry Regiment October 6th, 1918. On the night of October 6th-7th it relieved the 58th Infantry and a battalion of the 59th Infantry in position at Bois de Fays." Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:151-152.

⁹⁹G-3 Order No. 162, P. C. Third Army Corps, October 6, 1918, 21:20 (hours), 2:87.

¹⁰⁰Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:597.

¹⁰¹"Oct. 6, 1918. Commanding Officer, Third Battalion, with Commanding Officer, Machine Gun Company 129th Infantry, ordered by Division Commander to report at once to Commanding General 65th Infantry Brigade. Combat Liaison Group with 66th Infantry Brigade released and rejoined Battalion; Operation Order No. 24, 129th Infantry 6th Oct., 1918. Extremely heavy artillery shelling by enemy. No casualties reported." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:644.

¹⁰²See 2:267. Confidential Memorandum No. 19, relating to wireless and the operation of wireless stations, was issued that day "To all Signal Officers and Radio operators in the Division."

¹⁰³17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 548-S/3, Special Order, dated October 6, 1918. See 2:82. This attack of the French 17th Army Corps "on the front Beaumont inclusive—the Meuse river inclusive" had been prescribed by Field Orders No. 39 of the First Army, A. E. F., issued on October 5, 1918, at 14 hours, which announced that "The enemy's lines on the heights east of the Meuse held by three divisions have been flanked by our advance" and that "The 1st American Army will seize the heights east of the Meuse."

¹⁰⁴17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 551 S/3, Special Order, dated October 6, 1918, 2:83.

¹⁰⁵17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 546-S/3, October 6, 1918, 2:80. This plan of exploitation was based upon the "Plan of Engagement" formulated two days previously. 17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 532-S/3, October 4, 1918, 2:62.

¹⁰⁶See 2:88; Field Order No. 48, First Army, A. E. F., announced that "The 33d Division is placed under the command of the 17th French Corps, to take effect at 19:00 Hours, October 7th, 1918," but these latter field orders were not issued until October 7, 1918, at 18 hours.

¹⁰⁷G-3 Order No. 168, P. C. Third Army Corps, A. E. F., October 6, 1918, 24 hours. The retention of the 33rd Division under the IIIrd Corps for administration and supply was likewise directed by Field Order No. 50, First Army, Am. E. F., October 8, 1918, 10 hours.

¹⁰⁸In compliance with Field Order No. 23, P. C. Third Army Corps, October 6, 1918, 19:30 o'clock, and G-3 Order No. 163, P. C. IIIrd Army Corps, October 7, 1918, 12:30 o'clock, 2:84, 88.

¹⁰⁹Operations Reports, 33rd Division, October 7 and 8, 1918.

¹¹⁰Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:258.

¹¹¹"13:00. Issued our Field Order # 6, for co-operation in the attack of the 17th French Corps on the right bank of the Meuse A detachment consisting of 104th Field Arty., 2nd Battalion, 105th Field Arty., and 2nd Battalion 106th Field Arty., under the orders of Colonel E. T. Smith, 106th Field Artillery, was formed and placed under the orders of the Commanding Officer, Infantry Detachment, 33rd Division which was to attack between the Meuse and Parallel # 24. This attack was to be made at 5:00 hrs., Oct. 8th, 1918; battery positions fixed by 17th Corps." *Ibid.*

¹¹²*Ibid.* Report of Operations of 105th Field Artillery, 3:276.

¹¹³"This [withdrawal from the Bois de la Côte Lemont to the Bois de Forges] was done on evening of Oct. 7th, the companies reaching Forges Wood about 9:00 P.M. and reporting to their battalion commander. During practically all the period covered by this report these companies received heavy shell fire and much gas. On the withdrawal, Sergeant Castle C. Williams was killed. Total casualties: Co. A, *Killed*, 1; *Wounded*, 1." Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:185.

¹¹⁴"7th October, 1918: No change in disposition of companies. Companies A and B, 124th M. G. Bn. left for Bois de Forges early in morning. Harassing fire carried on by Co. D on Briuelles, and ridge N. W. of Briuelles. Visibility poor. Bois de Forêt reported burning. Light enemy shelling throughout day. Light concentration of sneezing gas. Casualties: Wounded, slight 6." Operations of the 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:19.

¹¹⁵See above, 1:338, n. 61.

¹¹⁶"The night of October 7th the 2nd Battalion and the 131st M. G. Co., Major Ridgway commanding, was detailed to the 132d Infantry and were used as supporting Battalion of the force which attacked under orders of Colonel Davis at 11:00 A.M., October 8th. The afternoon of October 7th orders were received that the 108th Engineers were to build bridges across the Meuse river that night both north and south of Consenvoye bridge." 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:84.

¹¹⁷G-3 Order No. 162, P. C. IIIrd Army Corps, October 6, 1918, 21.20 hours, 2:87.

¹¹⁸Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:185.

¹¹⁹The Division Machine Gun Battalion was also in position at the Côte de l'Oie, where it had remained since September 26. The Report of Operations made by its commanding officer states that "At 8.30 P.M. 7th October, 1918, the Division Commander directed that I detach one of my companies and have the C. O. report to the C. G. 66th Inf. Brigade for duty. This he did immediately but did not move until 10:35 A.M., 9th October, 1918," 2:558.

¹²⁰See above, 1:97.

¹²¹Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:152.

¹²²"Oct. 7, 1918. No movements. Third Battalion and attached Machine Gun Company 129th Inf., concentrated at Bois Rond to facilitate any movement. Heavy enemy shell fire. Casualties—three (3) officers wounded, one hundred and six (106) men wounded. (Gassed and shell fire)." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:645.

¹²³“October 7th: For the purpose of operations covered by Field Orders, No. 27, Headquarters 33rd Division, and by direction of the Division Commander, 3rd Bn., 129th Infantry, with 129th Machine Gun Company attached, ordered to report to Commanding General, 66th Infantry Brigade on the east bank of the River Meuse for temporary duty. Effective strength of 1st Bn. 129th Infantry reported, as result of enemy gas attack October 5th, as 17 officers, 305 men. Investigation at once started to determine the actual number of serious cases, with a view to having returned to duty those not seriously gassed.” Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:597. See also Report of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry in 2:658.

¹²⁴An order, dated October 7, 1918, was received from the Chief of Staff, IIIrd Corps, directing “a series of small operations such as combat patrols, raids and bombardments to be made against the enemy’s trenches known as the Trench du Teton and against the nose that runs northeastward therefrom so as to make this trench and this ridge untenable by the enemy.”

¹²⁵See 2:91; also Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, 2:470.

¹²⁶Diary of the Division Adjutant, who at that time was acting as liaison officer from the 33rd Division to the 18th French Division, and who accompanied General Andlauer. The preparations to be made and the execution of instructions from the 17th Army Corps prescribed by Secret Message to the Commanding General, 33rd Division, issued by the Headquarters IIIrd Army Corps (G-3, No. 709) on October 7, 1918, had thus been anticipated, 2:89.

¹²⁷Field Orders No. 39, First Army, A. E. F., dated October 5, 1918, gave the 17th French Army Corps as composed of the 10th and 15th French Colonial Divisions, the 18th and 26th French Divisions and the 29th American Division, 2:67.

¹²⁸17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 532-S/3, Plan of Engagement, October 4, 1918, 2:64-65.

¹²⁹17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 546-S/3, Personal and Secret Note for the Generals commanding the 29th and 33rd Divisions, U. S., October 6, 1918, 2:80.

¹³⁰Field Order No. 39, 1st Army, A. E. F., October 5, 1918, 14 hours, 2:66.

¹³¹*Ibid.*; G-3 Order No. 159, P. C. IIIrd Army Corps, October 6, 1918, 4:30 P.M.

¹³²See description of the work of the 108th Engineers, in Report of the Commanding Officer, 108th Engineers, December 26, 1918, 2:516.

¹³³Diary of the Division Adjutant.

¹³⁴Report of the Acting Division Signal Officer, 2:547.

¹³⁵During the period from September 22 to October 7, 1918, inclusive, apart from the usual routine work and from the various orders and memoranda to which allusion has been made in the course of this narrative (see also Journal of Operations, 2:468-471), the Headquarters of the 33rd Division issued four training circulars, namely: Nos. 178, 179, 180, and 181.

CHAPTER V

¹In conformity with the Plan of Engagement issued on October 4, 1918, by the 17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 532-S/3, 2:62. There was no creeping barrage but fixed barrages applied to sensitive points and lifting as the infantry progressed (Plan of Engagement of the 18th Infantry Division, 18th Division Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 840/3, October 5, 1918, 2:69.)

²The 58th Infantry Brigade (29th American Division left its cantonments at 6 P.M. on October 7, and during the night assumed the following positions.

115th Infantry: 1st Battalion on the southern slopes of the Côte des Roches between the quarries five hundred meters southeast of Brabant and the ravine twelve hundred meters southeast of that place, facing north; the 2nd Battalion behind the 1st in the dry bed of the canal south of the Samogneux-Brabant road; and the 3rd Battalion at Regnéville in readiness to cross the Meuse.

116th Infantry: 1st Battalion south of the above-mentioned ravine and north of the road from Samogneux to Haumont, its right on that road, its left on the Meuse Canal, facing north; the 2nd Battalion in its rear in the bed of the canal, its left touching the left of the 1st Battalion and its right extending toward Samogneux; and the 3rd Battalion in reserve in the bed of the canal south of Samogneux and about fifteen hundred meters northeast of Neuville.

These positions were assumed pursuant to orders from General Andlauer, under whose command the attack was made (Addition to the Plan of Engagement, 18th Division, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 843/3, October 6, 1918, 2:77) and their occupation was covered by a company from the 66th French Infantry which took station at the Côte des Roches and Brabant at nightfall on October 7.

³The 116th Infantry on the right next to the 77th French Infantry and the 115th Infantry on the left adjacent to the Meuse. Each regiment had one battalion in the first line, one in support, and one in reserve. The front line battalions had two companies in the first line and two in support. The support battalions were five hundred meters behind the front line battalions and the reserve battalions one thousand meters in the rear of the support battalions.

⁴Reports of the Liaison Officer of the 33rd Division with the French 18th Division (the author of this history) October 8, 1918, 6:15 and 7:20 A.M.

18th French Division 58th American Brigade

⁵First or intermediate objective Bois d'Haumont Malbrouck

Second or normal objective Bois d'Ormont Molleville Ferme

⁶Report of the Liaison Officer, 33rd Division, October 8, 1918, 8 A.M.

⁷Plan of Engagement of the 18th Infantry Division, 18th Division, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 840/3, October 5, 1918, 2:72.

⁸Report of the Commanding Officer, 108th Engineers, 2:517 ff. "Over these two bridges were crossed all the Infantry of the 33rd Division except two battalions that participated in the attacks of the Division in the subsequent operations north of Consenvoye. Much credit is due to the 108th Engineers who constructed and repaired these bridges in the face of heavy shell fire and difficulty of operation." 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:84.

⁹"The Division was ordered to attack and advance across the Meuse River on the morning of October 8th. At this particular point the river runs almost East and West,

and the Germans were strongly entrenched on the North side, the river itself being in No Man's Land. In order that there would be no break in communication after our infantry advanced, it was desired that a cable be put across the River. Lieut. Russell A. Schmidt, with a detail from Company B, laid a wire up to the river under cover of darkness on the night of October 7th-8th. While running out the wire the detail encountered a German Patrol of two men which they promptly captured and sent back. This was an all night [task], however, Lt. Schmidt, Corporal Venerable and Private Morou crossed the river with the cable. Private Schroeder remaining on our side. They got the cable in place but day was now breaking and the Germans discovered them. They were subject to heavy rifle fire from the German outpost and Lt. Schmidt, Corporal Venerable and Private Morou were wounded and taken prisoner. Private Schroeder on our side of the River evaded capture and injury and got back to our lines. The cable was across however, and when the first wave of our infantry crossed the river shortly afterwards they had communication back to their Regimental P. C. . . . Our infantry before eleven o'clock that morning had retaken Lt. Schmidt, Corp. Venerable and Private Morou and returned them safely to our field hospital." Report of the Acting Division Signal Officer, 2:553-554. See also Record of 108th Field Signal Battalion, 2:549.

¹⁰The forces under Colonel Davis' command consisted of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 132nd Infantry; the 2nd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 131st Infantry; Companies A and D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion; 2 companies, 108th Engineers; 2 battalions, 104th Field Artillery; the 2nd Battalion, 105th Field Artillery; and the 2nd Battalion, 106th Field Artillery. Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:153.

¹¹"Our advance started at 9:00 A.M. On notice from the Division that the French Corps had reached its normal objective. The 2nd Battalion, 132nd Infantry leading, crossed the River Meuse over the bridge at Brabant, and was followed over the same bridge by the 1st Battalion, 132nd Infantry." *Ibid.* See also Reports of the Commanding Officers, 1st and 2nd Battalions, 132nd Infantry, 3:172, 176.

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³Mention of the method first used by the 33rd Division is made in Notes on Recent Operations, No. 3 (Confidential No. 1376, G-5), G.H.Q., October 12, 1918.

¹⁴"Co. A: Reported to battalion commander, 2nd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, on the morning of 8th Oct., 1918 at 8:00 A.M., on the East edge of Forges Wood. Platoons were assigned their tasks and the two platoons that had tasks with the attacking Infantry were formed up with those companies, and the support platoon was formed up with the Infantry support. The battalion was formed in single file and marched Southeast toward Brabant, where they crossed the Meuse on a newly constructed bridge under desultory enemy artillery fire which played along the valley of the Meuse. After crossing the River, the battalion formed up two companies in the front line, two companies in support, with a machine gun platoon assigned tasks with each attacking company and with one machine gun platoon held in support, its place being 100 yards in front of the infantry support, infantry being formed in artillery formation or squad column, machine gun platoons taking same formation.

"The task given to machine gun platoons with the attacking troops was as follows: They were to take a formation well out to the right and left flanks and in rear of the front line, assisting the infantry in the advance in every way possible by overhead fire,

flanking fire, etc., and on arriving on the objective to take positions that would give them command of the ground in front and to the flanks of the new line and cover the infantry while this new line was being consolidated. The support platoon was under control and to await orders of the machine gun company commander." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company A, in the Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:185.

¹⁵"Co. D: Reported to C. O. 1st Battalion, 132nd Infantry on evening of October 7th upon return from Bois de la Côte Lemont. Battalion and M. G. Company formed up on camouflaged road West of Meuse River at about 8:00 A.M., Oct. 8th, and, at about 10:00 A.M. crossed the Meuse South of Brabant under quite heavy shell fire, but without casualties. From there advance was taken up, the machine gun platoons being assigned tasks with certain waves of the infantry and advancing with infantry formation, i. e., squad columns. 25 ammunition carriers were assigned from the infantry and most of these men did splendid work during the advance." Report of Commanding Officer, Company D, in Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:188.

¹⁶Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:153.

¹⁷"Co. B: As a result of hard work during the night of Oct. 7th-8th, this Company placed 12 guns in position at about Forges 198-808 as per barrage scheme. Fire was opened at 10:30 A.M., Oct. 8th, upon the edge of Chaume Wood and the copse along that slope toward the River. The order to cease firing came at 10:45 A.M., as the attack had been held up near the starting point." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company B, in Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:187.

¹⁸Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:184.

¹⁹Report of the Liaison Officer at the P. C. of the 18th French Division, October 8, 10:15 A.M.

²⁰Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:153-154.

"About 500 yards South of Consenvoye met with machine gun fire from Southwest of Consenvoye. Two machine guns and a group of infantry stopped this fire and captured 40 prisoners. Some opposition was met in Consenvoye at the church, where about 70 prisoners and 8 British Lewis guns were taken." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:188.

²¹During the advance, the progress of the attacking waves was arrested by harassing machine-gun fire from the Bois de Consenvoye on the right, and Second Lieutenant Arvid W. Gulbrandsen was ordered to cover the right flanks with a detachment of fifteen men. After proceeding some distance in the direction of the fire, he discovered that it came from a strong machine-gun nest. Realizing that further advance by the attacking wave was dependent upon the elimination of this obstacle, he and his detachment surrounded the nest and, in spite of the great odds against them and the stubborn resistance encountered, attacked the enemy position. So skillful were his dispositions and so concentrated the fire delivered by his detachment that the enemy was deceived into believing that the attack of the leading elements of the American forces was being made against the woods. The enemy's fire was consequently shifted from the main line to Lieutenant Gulbrandsen's force and the former was thus enabled to continue its movement. In this fight against desperate odds every one of the detachment was

killed, but the sacrifice which these sixteen men willingly made permitted the other troops to attain their objective. Apart from the extraordinary heroism displayed by Lieutenant Gulbrandsen and his men, their conduct was a splendid example of a thorough understanding of a soldier's mission in battle.

²²Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:154; Reports of the Commanding Officers, 1st and 2nd Battalions, 132nd Infantry, 3:171, 172. "The battalion [i.e., 2nd Battalion, 132nd Infantry] advanced to the road running East out of Consenvoye which was known as the first objective, where they awaited the artillery barrage. About 12:30 P.M., 8th Oct., 1918, we were attacked on our right flank by machine gun fire. One infantry platoon and one section of machine guns were sent to clean up these enemy machine guns. The infantry platoon, one machine gun team and part of the other one were captured." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:186.

²³Reports of the Liaison Officer with the 18th Division, October 8, 1918, noon and 1:50 P.M.

²⁴Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:154.

²⁵"15:00 1st Battalion, 106th Field Artillery, ceased firing. From this time, artillery support of attack by Infantry Detachment, 33rd Division was furnished by the Artillery Detachment under command of Colonel E. T. Smith, 106th Field Artillery." Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:259.

²⁶"The artillery barrage was started at the proper hour but fell from 300 yards to 500 yards short, and caused our troops to withdraw. We then received an order from C. O. 132nd Infantry to advance until 4:45 P.M. We started the advance about 2:30 P.M. and advanced to a point about 200 yards south of the Bois de Chaume, where we dug in." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:186.

"After a halt of about 4 hours awaiting orders as to H hour, such order was not received, so the 1st and 2nd Battalions formed up on road running Northeast from Consenvoye and battalion commanders went into a conference. At this time our artillery barrage opened and fell upon our troops, forcing them to withdraw towards the South to a small ravine, which was accomplished by the machine gunners in good order and without casualties. The advance was taken up about 4:30 P.M. and continued until darkness, at which time had reached about 1 kilometer North of Consenvoye, where halt was made for the night." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:188-189.

The advance actually began at 4 P.M. as stated by Colonel Davis. That was the time fixed by the P. C. of the 33rd Division and the hour at which the barrage came down according to the Report of the Commanding Officer, 104th Field Artillery, 3:264.

²⁷Reports of the Commanding Officers, 1st and 2nd Battalions, 132nd Infantry, 3:170-172. See Field Order No. 28, 33rd Division, October 8, 1918, 11:45 P.M., 2:283.

²⁸*Ibid*; Order No 3, 17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 571-S/3, October 8, 1918, 2:89. Report of Liaison Officer of the 33rd Division with the French 18th Division, October 8, 1918, 6 P.M.

²⁹Operations of the 66th Infantry Brigade, 3:41.

³⁰"General here is going to start exploitation by his left and the 132nd (Infantry) may therefore push farther north than Brigade of 29th Division which, when last heard from, was on Normal Objective, with orders to push forward patrols. This information is given for the purpose of explaining manoeuvre which General commanding 18th French Division now proposes to make." Report of Liaison Officer, 33rd Division, at P. C. Neptune, October 8, 1918, 2:45 P.M.

³¹"The afternoon of October 8th orders were received to assemble the two remaining battalions of the regiment as reserve in case of the troops under command of Colonel Davis needed support. The 1st Battalion was assembled along the east edge, the 3rd Battalion along the north edge of Forges Wood under cover, and remained in positions until the night of October 9th-10th." 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:84.

³²Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:187, 189. The 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:92, states that "During the attack of October 8th and until the evening of the 9th the companies of the 124th Machine Gun Bn and the M G Co of the 129th Infantry were located along the western edge of the Meuse river on the rise overlooking the flats in their immediate front and the rising ground east of the river. Their function was to support the attack by delivering harassing fire upon the enemy's position."

³³"October 8th: By direction of the Division Commander no further Infantry Operations in the direction of the Trench de Teton were to be made. 130th Infantry pushed forward its troops in Outpost Zone to the immediate south bank of the River Meuse." Chronological Record of Events, 2:598.

³⁴"Oct. 8, 1918. Third Battalion ordered to East side of Meuse River to reinforce the 132nd Infantry, (66th Infantry Brigade). Movement complete at 2.00 A.M. 9th October. V.O.C.O. 132nd Infantry. Remainder of Regiment held line. Extremely heavy shell fire. Casualties, two (2) officers wounded, one hundred and seventy-six (176) men wounded. (Gassed and shell fire)." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:645.

"On October 8th I reported my Battalion under verbal orders of Colonel Sanborn to Colonel Davis, 132nd Infantry, who ordered me to move at once from Bois-Rond to Bois de Forges. Move completed at 4:00 A.M. October 9th." Report of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:660.

"October 9th—Left Hill 281 for Bois de Forges woods near Drillancourt arriving about daylight." Report of the Commanding Officer, Machine Gun Company, 129th Infantry, 2:662-663.

³⁵"8th October, 1918. Companies A and D, 123 M. G. Bn. pass to the command of Commanding Officer 130th Infantry. Disposition of Companies B and C unchanged. No operations carried on. Heavy enemy shelling at intervals during the day. Great number of Mustard and Sneezing Gas shells thrown into Bois de Dannevoux and Bois des Moriaux. Casualties: Wounded, slight 2." Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:19.

³⁶"On October 8th, 1918, while in command of the 3rd Bn., 130th Infantry, acting as Reserve for the 65th Brigade, U. S. A., and in the trenches to the left of Hill 281 in front of Béthincourt, I received verbal orders to report my battalion to the Commanding Officer, 129th Infantry, in the vicinity of Drillancourt and to come under the command of the Commanding Officer, 129th Infantry, said move being completed on the

night of October 9th, 1918." Report of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, 2:693.

³⁷Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:259; Operations, 106th Field Artillery, 3:284.

³⁸First and 2nd Battalions, 104th Field Artillery, southwest of the Bois de Forges; 2nd Battalion, 105th Field Artillery, on the southern slopes of the Côte de l'Oie; and the 2nd Battalion, 105th Field Artillery (155-millimeter howitzers) northwest of Chattancourt.

³⁹Report of Operations of 105th Field Artillery, 3:276.

⁴⁰Report of the Commanding Officer, 104th Field Artillery, 3:264.

⁴¹"From 15H50 to 17H25 accompanying fire in conjunction with attack of Colonel Davis' detachment. 1674 rounds on areas designated by Operations Order No. 11, Hdqrs. 106th F. A." Operations, 106th Field Artillery, 3:284.

⁴²Operations Reports, 33rd Division, October 8 and 9, 1918.

⁴³17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 571-S/3, Order No. 3, dated October 8, 1918, 2:89.

⁴⁴See 2:284.

⁴⁵First and 2nd Battalions, 132nd Infantry; Companies A and D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion; and the 2nd Battalion and Machine Gun Company, 131st Infantry, in support, all under the command of Colonel Abel Davis, 132nd Infantry.

⁴⁶Report of the Commanding Officer, 104th Field Artillery, 3:269; Report of Operations of 105th Field Artillery, 3:276.

⁴⁷"At 9.40 A.M. received phone order to fire another barrage immediately at a point 300 meters beyond previous barrage at a slow rate of fire until ordered to cease firing. Ordered to cease firing at 11 A.M." Report of the Commanding Officer, 104th Field Artillery, 3:264; see also Operations, 106th Field Artillery, 3:284.

⁴⁸Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:155; Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 132nd Infantry, 3:173.

"During night orders were received to advance the following morning and that barrage would begin at 6:00 A.M. At 5:30 A.M., Oct. 9, 1918, 1st Battalion moved up about 500 yards to right front to join 2nd Battalion and there awaited lift of barrage. At 6:00 A.M. barrage opened and fell short upon our own men, forcing them to withdraw and await the lift. After barrage lifted, advance was taken up. Was held up several times by machine gun fire from Bois de Chaume, but this was overcome and final objective was reached about 11:55 A.M. The machine guns were here disposed of, covering consolidation and with guns laid on points from which counter-attack was expected." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:189.

⁴⁹Before 9 A.M. the 58th Brigade was counterattacked on its right by the 167th Infantry of the 32nd German Division and its progress completely arrested.

⁵⁰Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:155. Also Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, which gives a graphic picture of this advance and the predicament in which the troops found themselves upon reaching the second exploitation objective where "the enemy planes came over and obtained photos of our position and dove down close to the positions firing upon our men, who returned the fire with rifles. . . . the enemy's fire was terrific and continuous. All we

could do was seek cover and await darkness. After the lapse of about one hour the enemy planes again came over and delivered a terrific machine gun fire, dropped a signal and immediately a heavy enemy barrage was laid down on our front line forcing the men to retire back half way down the reversed slope of the ridge." See 3:177.

"The battalion commander issued orders to the effect that we would continue the advance the following morning [October 9] and carry out the same plans with the exception that the H hour would be at 6:00 A.M. unless orders to the contrary were issued. We were on the forming line at 6:00 A.M. the following morning when the artillery barrage fell short again, causing our troops to withdraw about 300 yards. As the barrage lifted the advance was started, and the troops advanced to the first exploitative objective, which was the North edge of the Bois de Chaume, and awaited the standing barrage to lift. As the barrage lifted the advance was continued [by patrols] to the second exploitative objective. On arriving at the first exploitative objective, I consulted the infantry battalion commander and was informed that if it was impossible to hold the advanced positions the advanced troops would be withdrawn to the first exploitative objective and that this position would be held.

"We started the advance that morning with 10 guns. One platoon was lost in the heavy fog and woods, leaving us with 6 guns. Our right flank being open, I endeavored to protect it with these 6 guns echeloned in depth. At 11:00 A.M. a report came back from the front line stating that the enemy was attacking on our right flank." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:186.

⁵¹Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:155.

⁵²"The enemy encountered in this operation belonged to the 1st Austro-Hungarian Division. These troops were of poor quality and low morale. They were supported by German machine guns and minenwerfers." *Ibid.*, 157.

⁵³*Ibid.*, 157; Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, 3:171.

⁵⁴58th Brigade of the 29th Division, U. S. A.

⁵⁵During the first part of the morning the following order was issued by the Commander of the 18th French Division (18th Division, 3rd Bureau, Special Order No. 864/3, P. C. October 9, 1918):—

"The 58th Brigade, U. S. has been counter-attacked this morning in the southwestern part of the Fme. Molleville. It has been obliged to retire slightly its elements in this direction.

"The mission of the 58th Brigade for the day of 9th October consists in retaking the ground lost and in attaining the Normal Objective everywhere.

"The Commander of the Brigade disposes of the total of his six battalions for this purpose.

"The fog and the combat in the woods should permit the American Infantry, in a hand to hand attack, to show its entire superiority over the infantry of the adversary.

"Send frequently officers to reconnoitre the exact location attained by our first line. Immediately transmit all the information obtained to the General commanding the 18th Infantry Division.

ANDLAUER."

At 11:25 A.M. the Liaison Officer of the 33rd Division reported: "The 58th Brigade

has attained the Normal Objective where its left is, whereas its right was momentarily driven back by a counter-attack . . . There is a little uncertainty about the 58th Brigade. The 58th Brigade claims to be on the Normal Objective and is starting to push forward . . . ”

That the entire 58th Brigade did not reach its normal objective—which included the Molleville Ferme—that afternoon is evidenced by Special Order No. 869/3, issued by the 18th French Division, October 9, 1918, about 5 P.M.

“Information from an aviator states that at 16 hours a barricade of khaki uniforms was across the road from Consenvoye to Réville, to the east of Richêne at (Point) 48.17.

“The 58th Brigade, U. S., will seek to exploit its success by capturing the Molleville Fme., the object being always to outflank from the west to the east the resistance which is stopping the progression toward the north of the 18th Infantry Division. Report as soon as the Molleville Fme. has been occupied by the 58th Brigade.

“The heights of Richêne, which is an observatory of the highest importance for the enemy as well as for us, ought to be held at all costs.

ANDLAUER.”

⁵⁶232nd Reserve Infantry Regiment and the 105th Sturm Battalion. Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:157.

⁵⁷See also Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 132nd Infantry, which describes how all trace was lost of Captain McCormick and five men of Company F, and Captain Masoner and one hundred men of Company G; how these officers and men, completely surrounded by the enemy, gallantly held their advanced position throughout the night; and how they were discovered next morning by the 131st Infantry still in possession of the position on the objective which they had defended against such odds, 3:178.

“After numerous counter-attacks by the enemy on our right and right center, these attacks being launched between 11:00 A.M. and 2:30 P.M., we received a message from the front line stating it would be impossible to hold that line. The infantry battalion commander [i.e. 2nd Battalion] at once called a conference and decided to withdraw from the advanced positions to the first exploitative objective. I at once sent one machine gun section, consisting of two guns, to the right center of the advanced line to cover the withdrawal of the infantry. These guns were both lost. The infantry battalion commander ordered me to report to the C. O. 132nd Infantry and report the situation. On reporting to the P. C. 132nd Infantry, I found the Commanding Officer had gone to the front, and reported to the Commanding General, 66th Brigade. He ordered me to report to the P. C. 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, where I would find the C. O. 132nd Infantry. I there found the infantry battalion commander to which I was attached, and also found that the battalion had been withdrawn to the South edge of the Bois de Chaume into the positions we had left that morning.

“At 7:00 P.M. on Oct. 9th, 1918, I received a report that the support companies which were holding the first exploitative objective had not withdrawn, and that one section of machine guns and two Boche machine guns manned by members of my company were still in action and holding that position. It has been reported that these machine gun teams which stayed in their positions caused the enemy severe losses and broke up their attack. These teams were withdrawn the following morning and took positions in reserve at the South edge of Bois de Chaume after the advance of

fresh troops. About 10,000 rounds of ammunition were expended, 5 guns put out of action by artillery fire, and 1 gun lost.

"Casualties: Killed—1 Officer, 1 Private, Wounded—13, Gassed—2, Missing—19." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:186.

⁵⁸Also report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 132nd Infantry, 3:175, which states that "About 10 P.M. a message was received ordering our evacuation of the front line position, and retirement to a line south of the Bois de Chaume. . . . We reached our new position about 2 A.M. still under shell fire."

"Here they [i.e. the machine guns] remained until about 8:30 P.M., when the battalion commander ordered all forward companies to withdraw to the support line towards left of Bois de Chaume, which was done, as liaison with 2nd Battalion on right had been lost. About 11:00 P.M., Oct. 9th, were ordered to withdraw to Consenvoye, which was done during the night. Casualties: Killed 1, wounded 7, gassed 1." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:189.

⁵⁹17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 578-S/3, Order No. 4, October 9, 1918, 2:90.

⁶⁰Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:157.

⁶¹*Ibid.*; Operations Reports, 33rd Division, October 9 and 10, 1918; List of Captures made by the 33rd Division, 3:361-362.

⁶²Compare 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:85.

⁶³Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:152.

⁶⁴See above, 1:352-353, n. 57.

⁶⁵"Mention must also be made of Captain Krigbaum, Co D, 124th M. G. Bn. . . . Most of his machine guns had been knocked out and many of his men were casualties. He volunteered and guided other machine gunners to position and checked over the forward line and made report on same and by his coolness and energy helped maintain the lines against the enemy." 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:92-93.

⁶⁶Operations on East Bank of the Meuse (66th Brigade), 3:41.

⁶⁷See above, 1:110.

⁶⁸"10:35 A.M. 9th October, 1918. . . he [Commanding Officer, Company B] received orders from C. G. 66th Inf. Brigade to report to C. O. 132nd Inf. They started at once, carrying all guns, tripods, ammunition, etc., from Forges to trenches south of Consenvoye, via Brabant, arriving there about 4:30 P.M. same day. At 7:00 P.M. the C. G. 66th Brigade directed this company to report to C. O. 131st Inf. in trenches north of Consenvoye which they did, arriving there at 9:30 P.M. same day. The C. O. 131st Inf. attached the company to the 1st Battalion of his regiment and they attacked with this battalion the following morning at 6:05 A.M., this being the 10th of October, 1918." Report of Operations, 122d Machine Gun Battalion, 2:558.

⁶⁹"In the meantime Colonel Davis's command was obliged to withdraw to trenches south of Bois de Chaume by reason of lack of support, the troops on his right flank being unable to advance. His troops met with stubborn resistance harassing fire from artillery and gas. The necessity of their withdrawal was apparent, and at 11:45 P.M., October 9th orders were issued to the Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, to attack through his lines at 6:05 A.M. 10th October 1918, with the following units:

d)

1st and 3rd Bns, 131st Infantry, in line
 3rd Bn, 129th Infantry, in support
 Co. B, 124th M G Bn
 Brigade Reserve: 3rd Bn, 130th Inf. less one company
 1st Bn, 129th Inf.
 2nd Bn, 132d Inf.
 2nd Bn, 131st Inf.

(To remain in position in Câble trenches until further orders)

Anticipating orders, the attacking battalions were ordered to cross the Meuse river and assemble in readiness in trenches immediately south of Consenvoye, which was accomplished shortly after dark, October 9th, with the exception of a battalion of the 129th Infantry which arrived later in the night." 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:84.

The 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, should have been accompanied by Company C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, but, owing to one of those contretemps which occur at times in war, it was left on the west bank of the Meuse. The episode is thus described in the Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:189.

"On Oct. 9th this company was attached to 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, under command of Major Coady. During the day orders were received from Brigade Commander that this company would be detached from the 1st Battalion for other duty, and the C. O. 124th Machine Gun Battalion was instructed to so advise the C. O. 131st Infantry, and that a company from the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion would be substituted. This information was given to C. O. 131st Infantry by 'phone and to 'C' Company by runner. Shortly afterwards on the afternoon of the same day, the Brigade Commander telephoned that the order was cancelled and that Co. C would remain attached to the 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry. This information was immediately sent by runner to the company commander of Co. C and given to the C. O. 131st Infantry by the C. O. 124th Machine Gun Battalion in person. Co. C prepared to report to the 1st Battalion as soon as notified it was wanted by Major Coady, in accordance with former arrangements, but never received any orders and remained in readiness in Forges Wood until Oct. 10th, when it was notified it was in reserve. Major Coady stated later that he was never informed of the cancellation of the order substituting a company of the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion in lieu of Co. C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, and it also seems that neither was the C. O. or company commander of the 122nd Machine Gun Battalions, hence, when the 1st Battalion moved from Forges Wood to cross the River Meuse on the night of Oct. 9th-10th, it was accompanied by a company of the 122nd Machine Gun Battalion."

This misunderstanding is mentioned in 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:92, which says, apropos of the machine gun companies on the west bank of the Meuse:

"When ordered to withdraw and rejoin Battalions to whom they were assigned, they came out after dark and got mixed up and one company of the 124th M G Bn which did not get into action at all."

The orders for the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 131st Infantry to cross to the Tranchée de Heraclée were issued at 12:35, 12:45 and 2 P.M.

⁷⁰"On Oct. 9th at 6:15 A.M. this Company received orders to fire harassing fire on Sivry and that vicinity until 8:00 A.M., which was done. About the middle of that

afternoon orders were received to join the 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry at once. This Company moved immediately to Forges Wood, thence to the trenches Southeast of Consenvoye, where it joined the above named battalion at about 11:00 P.M." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:187.

⁷¹"Oct. 9, 1918. Regiment (Minus Third Battalion 129th Inf. and plus Third Battalion 130th Infantry) moved at 8:00 P.M. to East side of Meuse River to assist in the attack of XVII French Corps, in accordance with Verbal Orders, Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade and 66th Infantry Brigade, F.O. No. 27, 33rd Division, 7th October, 1918, and F. O. No. 28, 33rd Division, 8th Octo. 1918. Our Third Battalion with 66th Infantry Brigade. All troops under Colonel Myer, (First, Second Bn. 129th Inf. and Third Bn. 130th Inf. Co. 'A' 122nd Machine Gun Bn., and Co's 'A' and 'D', 123rd Machine Gun Bn.) in trenches immediately south of Bois de Chaume. No casualties—Regimental P. C. at 22.2—79.5." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:645. The statement in respect to Companies A and D, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, is in error inasmuch as they did not cross to the east bank of the Meuse until October 11. See 1:129-130.

⁷²"At 8:00 P.M. 9th October, 1918, the Division Commander directed that I report with the remaining company to the C. G. 66th Brigade which I did and received orders to proceed to the trenches northeast of Consenvoye. The Company left the P. C. Alexander at 9:00 P.M. carrying all guns, ammunition, etc., to Consenvoye via Brabant arriving in the trenches there at 5:00 A.M. morning of the 10th October, 1918." Report of Operations, 122d Machine Gun Battalion, 2:558.

⁷³Compare Reports of the Commanding Officers, 1st and 2nd Battalions, 129th Infantry, and 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, 2:654, 657, 672-673.

⁷⁴See above, 1:99, 110, 111, 113.

⁷⁵"October 9th. . . Warning Order issued at 13:02 hours for two platoons 129th Infantry to take over at once the line held by the 131st Infantry from Dannevoux to Consenvoye." Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:598. As a matter of fact this particular sector was occupied after 9 P.M. that day by two platoons from Company L (3rd Battalion), 130th Infantry, under Lieutenants Wood and Gunther. See Report of First Lieutenant Hamilton L. Wood, 130th Infantry, 2:696.

⁷⁶The 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, upon reaching the Bois de Forges at 4 A.M. on October 9, was directed to furnish two companies as carrying parties for the 132nd Infantry. Companies L and M were selected, but the guide led them into a friendly barrage, they suffered some casualties and "these two companies returned about noon not being able to find anyone who knew where line was, and unable to deliver ammunition." At 1 P.M. orders were received to occupy the Heraclée and Baillis Trenches between Consenvoye and Brabant, but upon reaching the river the operations officer of the 132nd Infantry directed the battalion to the Tranchée du Cabestan, west of the Bois de Consenvoye, which it occupied during the night of October 9-10 thereby filling in the void between the 132nd Infantry after it had fallen back and the 115th Infantry (58th Brigade) on the right. See Report of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:659.

"October 9th—Left Hill 281 for Bois de Forges woods near Drillancourt arriving about daylight. Left woods 2 P.M. and passed to the right of Consenvoye and went Over the Top at 5 P.M. Withdrew at 6:30 P.M. and stayed alongside road until day-

light." Report of the Commanding Officer, Machine Gun Company, 129th Infantry, 2:662.

⁷⁷See above, 1:110, 116.

⁷⁸"On this same date, 9/10th October the Second Battalion 130th Infantry relieved the 129th Infantry in the Defense Line in the Bois de Dannevoux, taking over the Dannevoux Sector of the Defense and Outpost Lines. Relief completed at 3:15 A.M. [on October 10] . . . The regiment (less Third Battalion) held the entire line from the bend in the Meuse River east of Dannevoux to the western edge of the Bois de la Côte Lemont." Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:673. Mention of this relief is made in the Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry.

⁷⁹"9th October, 1918. Companies A and D withdrawn from N. W. edge of Bois de la Côte Lemont and Hill 281. Co. F occupied positions backing up the defense of sector held by Companies of 2nd Battalion 130th Infantry. Disposition of Companies B and C unchanged. Enemy shelling heavy, Light concentration of gas in Bois de Dannevoux. Enemy aircraft active over Bois des Moriaux. Casualties: None." Operations of the 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:20.

⁸⁰The verbal instructions thus given were subsequently reduced to writing and embodied in detailed orders.

⁸¹1st U. S. Army, 17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 578-S/3, Order No. 4, October 9, 1918, 2:91.

⁸²Field Order No. 19, 66th Infantry Brigade, October 9, 1918, 11:45 P.M., 3:46.

⁸³At 1 A.M. the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 131st Infantry, left the Tranchée de Heraclée and were formed with the 1st Battalion on the right and the 2nd on the left, each being provided with two trench mortars and one 37-millimeter gun. The 3rd Battalion had Companies I and M in the assaulting line, and Companies K—less one platoon—and L in support. "One platoon of Co. K was directed to mop up the west edge of Bois de Chaume, and send patrols as far as the Meuse River." 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:86.

"The C. O. 131st Inf. attached the company to the 1st Battalion of his regiment and they attacked with this battalion the following morning at 6:05 A.M., this being the 10th of October, 1918." Report of Operations, 122d Machine Gun Battalion, 2:558.

"At 1:00 A.M., Oct. 10th, this company moved forward with the 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry through Consenvoye to the South edge of Chaume Wood, where it formed for attack." Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:187.

The 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, which had spent the night of October 9 in the Tranchée du Cabestan, formed the reserve for the 131st.

⁸⁴Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:259; Reports of the Commanding Officers, 104th and 105th Field Artillery, 3:264, 276; Operations, 106th Field Artillery, 3:284.

⁸⁵Operations on East Bank of the Meuse (66th Brigade), 3:42; 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:86.

⁸⁶"Enemy machine guns during the night of Oct. 9-10th had worked around to the rear of the positions held by the 132d Infantry and 3rd Bn 129th Infantry in forming up received their fire from the direction of Consenvoye wood." 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:87.

⁸⁷"At 6:45 A.M. [6:05 A.M.] these troops moved forward through Chaume Wood, the advance being rather slow on account of the thick undergrowth, the well concealed enemy machine guns, and the lack of artillery support." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:187.

⁸⁸Operations on East Bank of the Meuse, 3:42; 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:86.

⁸⁹"Upon arriving at the Northern edge of Chaume Wood, practically all of the guns of this Company were able to deliver very effective fire upon enemy machine gun positions and bodies of enemy fleeing over the opposite ridge.

"This Company then moved forward with the infantry to the top of the opposite ridge under extremely heavy artillery and machine gun fire from the front and both flanks, which resulted in many casualties and the loss of 4 guns." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:187.

⁹⁰131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:86.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, 87; Report on Operations of 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:660.

⁹²131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:87. "Company B was attached to the 1st Bn. 131st Inf. on Oct. 10th and attacked from trenches south of Bois de Chaume (22.6—810) (235—812). Went forward thru the Bois de Chaume and Bois du Plat Chêne taking up position on the crest of the hill north of these woods. (Approximately along the 23rd Grid line from 225—829 to 229—831). Stayed in this position on Oct. 10, 11, 12 and 13." Report of the Adjutant, 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, 2:562.

⁹³At 10 A.M. the commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, reported to his regimental commander: "1½ Platoon Co. A. 1 Platoon Co. B. 1 Platoon Co. C, have reached objective. Co. I, 3rd Bn., 131 [Infantry] on left. Not in touch on my right, cannot get in touch with rest of Bn." Record of Messages Sent and Received, 131st Infantry, 3:97.

⁹⁴"One section moved to the right to support the 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, and delivered fire which silenced several enemy snipers and put to flight parties of the enemy assembling on the extreme right, apparently for a counter-attack. During the afternoon the remainder of the company was organized into 6 gun squads and took up position in the gap between the two battalions on the top of the ridge." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:188.

⁹⁵At 10:50 A.M., October 10, 1918, the commanding officer, 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry sent the following message to the regimental commander: "Our troops gained the objective but could not hold it on account of intense shelling and M. G. fire. Am trying to gather troops who are in the underbrush and will establish a new line in Lavannes trench. West of Bois de Chaume. Can you send re-enforcements to join on my right. Shelling is of H. E. and Gas." Record of Messages Sent and Received, 131st Infantry, 3:95.

⁹⁶Statement of operations officer, 131st Infantry. At 12:53 P.M. the commanding officer of the 3rd Battalion reported the position to the regimental commander as follows: "227—825 to Meridian 24. General [Wolf] directs we dig in on this line and if necessary we may be able to fall on it." Record of Messages Sent and Received, 131st Infantry, 3:95. The positions of the troops are given in detail in the Report on Field Operations from October 10, 1918, made by Major Allen, commanding 3rd Battalion—131st Infantry, 3:115—116.

⁹⁷Operations on East Bank of the Meuse, 3:42; 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:86.

⁹⁸131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:87.

⁹⁹Following the method upon which such stress was laid in the training of the 33rd Division, "Stokes Mortars of Third Battalion 130th Infantry [were] used by the Commanding Officer Third Battalion 129th Infantry to good advantage against enemy Machine Gun nests." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:645-646.

¹⁰⁰131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:87.

¹⁰¹"Remained in that position that night, and 6:00 A.M. Oct. 10th advanced in support of the 1st and 3rd Bn. 131st Inf. with orders to maintain liaison with the 115th Inf. The left Bn. and part of the right Bn. reached the objective, ridge directly east of Sivry-sur-Meuse, but two Co.s of the right Bn. were held up by machine gun fire. About 12:00 o'clock I took two of my Co.s with assistance of 1 L.T.M. flanked the machine guns, and with further assistance of our own artillery which was falling short I advanced and gained the objective, arriving about 2:00 P.M. The two Co.s 131st I passed through were to follow in support, but did not and I arrived on the objective with only my two Co.s. L Co. and the 4 machine guns maintained contact with 115th Inf. which did not advance. I afterwards used them for liaison between my right flank and the left of 115th in line right; 4 P.M. Capt. Burgheim C.O. 1st Bn. 129th Inf. with Hqs. and Co. A, 122 Machine Gun Bn. 10 guns attached arrived. They were all put in the line.

"8:00 A.M. Oct. 11th combination Co. A-C-D arrived and were put in line on right of B Co." Report on Operations of 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:660.

¹⁰²Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, Report of Operations, October 9 to 14, 1918, and his appendix to this report. See 2:695, 697.

¹⁰³The outposts and machine guns of this battalion remained on the northern edge of the Bois de Chaume to cover the position.

¹⁰⁴131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:88.

¹⁰⁵"Objective has been reached three times. Troops on right have been forced to fall back to prevent enflanking movement. Line now holds thinly in spots. Troops have had no water or food since yesterday evening and are exhausted, but holding good." Operations Officer, 131st Infantry, to Adjutant, 66th Brigade. Message received at 3:50 P.M. Record of Messages Sent and Received, 131st Infantry, 3:98.

¹⁰⁶131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:85-88; Report of Operations 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, 2:696; Report of Operations, 122d Machine Gun Battalion, 2:558.

¹⁰⁷Operations on East Bank of the Meuse, 3:43; Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:645.

¹⁰⁸"At noon of the same day the Bn. supported by Co. 'A,' 122nd M. G. Bn. advanced in a north-easterly direction thru the Bois de Chaume. On the night of Oct. 10th Co. 'B,' 129th Inf. occupied a front line position on the right of Co. 'I,' 129th Inf. Co's. A, C and D (consolidated company) remained just inside the northern edge of the Bois de Chaume." Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:654.

"At 5:30 A.M. same day [10th October] I reported to C. O. 129th Inf. and at 11:30 A.M. he ordered this company (Co. 'A') forward with the 1st Battalion of his regiment

and they arrived on the advanced line which was 3 kilometers in advance of the line in the morning, between 4:00 and 4:30 P.M.

"The advance was made through heavy shell and machine gun fire which increased in intensity as the company moved through the Bois-de-Chaume and the Bois-du-Plat Chêne." Report of Operations, 122d Machine Gun Battalion, 2:558.

¹⁰⁹Compare Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:598.

¹¹⁰Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:152; Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:187.

¹¹¹Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:646; "Operations Second Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:657; Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:187.

¹¹²"The troops from 6 A.M., October 10th to the night of October 14th-15 were subjected to shell fire, machine gun fire, gas, aeroplane attacks and fire from snipers incessantly in some parts of the line. Very few were able to obtain any needed rest or sleep. To add to their discomfort it rained nearly every day, frequently food could not be transported to parts of the line, sometimes it was spoiled by mustard gas, low areas in the woods compelled men to wear gas masks nearly all the time The men themselves hung on without complaint, without a thought of giving an inch unless ordered to do so." 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:93.

¹¹³*Ibid.* 3:88.

¹¹⁴When the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 131st Infantry, reached the top of the ridge overlooking the second exploitation objective, the gap between them was filled by troops from one of the companies of the Brigade Machine Gun Battalion, as has been seen (see above, 1:357, n. 94). "These positions were maintained, even though the 3rd Battalion withdrew to the foot of the ridge to better protect that open flank." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:188. This was characteristic of the machine gun units of the 33rd Division—always out in front, always doing something unexpected to take the enemy by surprise.

¹¹⁵Compare Operations on East Bank of the Meuse, 3:43.

¹¹⁶See appendixes 31 and 32.

¹¹⁷"Co. C—Oct. 9 to 15 in brigade reserve in Forges Wood." Supplemental Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:200.

¹¹⁸Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:152 ff.

¹¹⁹"October 10th. Entire command of the 129th Infantry located and disposed on the east bank of the River Meuse under the command of the Commanding General, 66th Infantry Brigade at 18:00 hours. Third Bn., 129th Infantry, took part in the advance made by the 66th Brigade the morning of this date, reached their objective, and were then combined with the 1st Bn., 129th Infantry." Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:598.

¹²⁰Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:673.

¹²¹"10th October, 1918. Orders received from P. C. 65th Infantry Brigade at 1:30 P.M. directing that Companies A and D, 123 M. G. Bn. report to Commanding General 66th Infantry Brigade on east side of River Meuse in vicinity of Consenvoye. Co. B passed to command of Commanding Officer 130th Infantry from Commanding Officer 129th Infantry. Their disposition unchanged. One platoon of Co. C, 123 M. G. Bn. withdrawn from outpost line to main line of resistance during the night of 10-11th October, 1918. In new position before daylight. Our operations nil. Light

enemy shelling in Bois de Dannevoux, Bois de la Côte Lemont, and Bois des Moriaux. Slight activity of enemy aircraft. Casualties: None." Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:20.

¹²²Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:259.

¹²³Report of the Commanding Officer, 104th Field Artillery, 3:264; Report of Operations of 105th Field Artillery, 3:276; Operations, 106th Field Artillery, 3:284.

¹²⁴Operations Reports, 33rd Division, October 10 and 11, 1918.

¹²⁵17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 586-S/3, Order No. 5, October 10, 1918, 2:91.

¹²⁶It will be observed that the front of the 17th Army Corps, upon reaching the right or eastern extremity of the 33rd Division, turned straight south along Meridian 24 to Hill 371. It is just south of this hill that the Tranchée du Câble, which ran through the open valley between the Bois de Consenvoye and the Bois de Chaume, terminated in the woods on the east. The jumping-off line from which the attack of the 66th Brigade was launched at 6:05 that morning lay immediately south of this trench. Assuming that Hill 371 was occupied that evening by the 58th Brigade, it nevertheless meant that the left of the 29th American Division was fully two kilometers in the rear of the right flank of the front line of the 33rd Division east of the Magenta Ferme.

¹²⁷See 2:284.

¹²⁸"Journal of Operations—6 A.M. 10th Oct. to 6 A.M. 11th Oct.

Rendered usual situation and operation reports to G. H. Q. and Corps.

Issued Training Circular No. 182, quoting patrol of 1st Lieut. Clyde Brown, 130th Inf., inviting attention to same as being an example of a good report.

Issued Field Order No. 29, directing the troops of the Division east of the Meuse to hold the sector gained by it, and to insure the possession of Bois de Chaume and Bois Plat-Chêne. Designated Main Line of Resistance and Outpost Zone for Right Sector (east of the Meuse). Bridge completed for animal traffic across Meuse River, at Consenvoye. Mission of Left Sector (west of the Meuse) unchanged." Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, 2:470.

¹²⁹"11th October—106 rounds interdiction fire on Haraumont—75 rounds harassing fire on 24.7-84.0 and 25.0-84.0. 180 rounds harassing on Area 20.8-83.1." Operations, 106th Field Artillery, 3:284.

¹³⁰"October 11th.

9:00 Ordered Commanding Officer, 106th Field Artillery to fire on Sivry-sur-Meuse at request of Commanding General, 66th Infantry Brigade.

10:00 Ordered Artillery Detachment Commander to move 1st Battalion, 104th Field Artillery to vicinity of Consenvoye during night.

13:30 Requested Corps Artillery to fire on Battery [at] H 47.60.

22:00 Requested Corps Artillery to fire on Batteries near Haraumont.

22:35 Requested Corps Artillery to fire on enemy Batteries and Machine Guns in area Bois du Plat-Chêne." Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:260.

¹³¹Also Report of the Commanding Officer, 104th Field Artillery, 3:264.

¹³²131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:89.

¹³³Also Operations on East Bank of the Meuse, 3:43.

¹³⁴"October 11th . . . Third Battalion, 129th Infantry and 1st Bn. 129th Infantry, combined, spent the day digging in and protecting their new positions." Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:598.

"Oct. 11, 1918. The First and Third Battalions spent the day in improving positions; Second Battalion in trenches North of Consenvoye, to a point (22.4-79.4) East of Consenvoye. Enemy shell fire and Machine Gun fire very heavy. Casualties two (2) officers killed, three (3) officers wounded, seventy-eight (78) men wounded and killed." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:646.

"8:00 A.M. Oct. 11th combination Co. A-C-D arrived and were put in line on right of B Co. At 1:00 P.M. Co. L 129th Inf. arrived and was held in support in left rear of Bn." Narrative of Operations of 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:661. See also Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:654.

"On the morning of the 11th October, I re-organized my position in the line and caused all scattering detachments to be brought forward to rejoin their commands and moved my Hdqtrs. to this same position." Report of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, 2:695.

¹³⁵"The enemy launched a counter-attack on the afternoon of the 11th, when all the guns of this Company did very effective work and stopped it quickly. The 1st Battalion [131st Infantry] withdrew further down the slope of this ridge that night, and the 3rd Battalion took up positions in rear of guns positions of this Company." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:188.

"These companies remained in the outpost line despite the heavy gas concentrations, shelling and machine gun fire until withdrawn together with the Infantry on the night 13/14th October." Report of Operations, 122d Machine Gun Battalion, 2:558. Company A was attached to the 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, and Company B to the 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry.

¹³⁶All these measures had, as a matter of fact, been prescribed in Field Order No. 29, 33rd Division, issued at 2 P.M. the day before. See 2:284. For some unknown reason these Field Orders did not reach the commanding officer of the 131st Infantry until nearly forty-eight hours later.

¹³⁷The message sent by Lieutenant Moore, liaison officer of the 115th Infantry to the commanding officer of that regiment, dated October 11, 1918, 11:25 A.M. ran thus:

"Request present location your extreme left and progress being made. Right flank 131st being flanked by M. G. fire which is apparently from 115 [Infantry's] left flank. Report of 131st activities follows as soon as director of Regt. operations completed the consolidation of his line." Record of Messages Sent and Received, 131st Infantry, 3:99.

¹³⁸Also Operations on East Bank of the Meuse, 3:43.

¹³⁹"October 11th it was reported that Sivry-sur-Meuse was full of machine guns and enemy concentrated there. Prior to this date all efforts to have our artillery direct their fire on this town were unavailing until above reports were repeated. Heavy fire concentrated on the town finally cleared it of troops." 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:91.

¹⁴⁰Reports of the Commanding Officers, 132nd Infantry and 124th Machine Gun Battalion. The 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, which had been attached to the 132nd

Infantry for the operations of October 8 and 9, reverted to the commanding officer of the 131st Infantry on October 11 at 11:30 A.M.

¹⁴¹Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:646; Operations, Second Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:657; Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:189.

¹⁴²Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion. See below, n. 146.

¹⁴³Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:189.

¹⁴⁴"During the night October 10th-11th the two support companies were ordered to the front position to continue the attack. The remaining two companies of this battalion were assigned the task of protecting the right flank. The battalion carried the attack to a successful termination including its objective, the north edge of Bois de Forêt on scheduled time.

"A trench mortar section, a 37 mm section and the machine gun company of the regiment assisted the battalion in holding the line and making its advance.

"The battalion advanced the line for two kilometers.

"Captured material was accounted for by the units to which the battalion was attached.

"Approximately 450 prisoners were sent back to the Division Cage.

"Our Casualties were: 1 officer, and 37 men killed, and 11 officers and 315 men wounded.

"The following enemy units were engaged. 212 R. I. R." Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:152.

¹⁴⁵See 2:448 ff.

¹⁴⁶"11th October, 1918: Companies A and D having reported to the Commanding General 66th Infantry Brigade were put under command of the Commanding Officer 129th Infantry for tactical purposes. Went into line in Bois de Chaume with that organization, relieving units of the 66th Infantry Brigade. Disposition of Co. B unchanged. Remainder of Co. C withdrawn to main line of resistance night of 11-12th October, 1918. In position by daylight. Shelling by enemy light throughout the day. Casualties: Killed, 1 Wounded, slight 8." Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:20.

¹⁴⁷1st U. S. A., 17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 588-S/3, Order No. 6, dated October 11, 1918, 2:93.

¹⁴⁸Record of Messages Sent and Received, 131st Infantry, 3:99.

¹⁴⁹Operations on East Bank of the Meuse, 3:43; 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:89-90.

¹⁵⁰"The Regt. on our right was held up last night and we were therefore unable to advance. We are ordered to hold our present position and prepare it defensively against counter attacks. Our left rests at point 240-822 and we understand you have refused your right to meet us at this point. Conditions along our front last night and this morning quiet. The firing of your artillery does not interfere with us in any way." Commanding Officer, 115th Infantry, to Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, received October 12, 1918, at 7:30 A.M., 3:100.

"Your note received. Our line extending from approximately 240-817 to 247-818 at which point we connect with 1st Bn. 115th Inf. Our advance has been delayed by failure of 116th Inf. on our right to advance. When we will start do not know, but it appears we are held up for the present. You will be informed. . . ." Commanding

Officer, 3rd Battalion, 115th Infantry to Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry, received at 9 A.M., 3:100.

"225-787—No change in line today. sketch herewith shows present disposition. No Infantry activity today. Enemy artillery fairly active, paying special attention to Regt. P. C. 114th and 115th attacked today, but results are not yet known to us, although some ground was gained." Commanding Officer, 115th Infantry, to Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry, received at 9 A.M. Record of Messages Sent and Received, 131st Infantry, 3:100.

¹⁵¹"Next morning the guns were moved back to this line [i.e. that of the 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry] and placed so as to cover the front to the best advantage. After dark on the 12th, Lieut. White moved 2 guns over to support Co. M, 131st Infantry, in front of Sivry." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:188.

¹⁵²"Intense shelling since midnight amounting to a barrage." Commanding Officer, Company L, to Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, October 12, 1918, received at 3:55 A.M.

" . . . Intense barrage bombardment. . . ." Operations Officer to Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, October 12, received 4:20 A.M.

"Spec. Sit. Report. Heavy shelling throughout the day. Heavy M. G. Fire from right. Hostile planes flying over our lines all day dropping signal lights. . ." Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, to regimental commander, October 12, received at 6 P.M.

"Situation now quiet. Request that artillery continue harassing fire on our front and flanks. Line now 240-843 to 230-837. Counter attack driven off left flank by 2.15 P.M. No prisoners captured." Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion to Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, October 12, received at 7:05 P.M. Record of Messages Sent and Received, 131st Infantry, 3:96.

¹⁵³Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade; Reports of the Commanding Officers, 104th and 105th Field Artillery; Operations, 106th Field Artillery. The commanding officer of the 104th Field Artillery says, apropos of his 1st Battalion, that "The rationing and supplying of Major Austin's command near Consenvoye was made difficult by the almost constant bombardment of the Consenvoye bridge and the roads both north and south of Forges Woods were subjected to harassing fire. There were occasional bursts of fire at high speed, delivered by the enemy but most of the hostile fire seemed to be with one or two guns and at more or less regulated intervals. Gas was used by the enemy against Forges woods and against the Infantry and Artillery positions at the right side of the river." See 3:270.

¹⁵⁴Field Order No. 38, P. C. Pliable [code word for 131st Infantry], October 12, 1918, 3:102.

¹⁵⁵"Oct. 12, 1918. Location of Third Battalion, 129th Infantry, between coördinates 23-24 on Abs[c]issa 820. First Battalion, 129th Inf. locates between coördinates 24-24 on Abs[c]issa 810, extending to left of 29th American Division on our right. Second Battalion ordered to relieve First and Third Battalions in front line, they in turn to take position in Reserve trenches North of Consenvoye. Operation Order No. 25, 129th Infantry, 131st Infantry relieved. Third Battalion 130th Infantry taking over their position. Extremely heavy shell fire. Casualties—forty-six (46) men killed and wounded. 129th Infantry Transport moved from Hill 281 to point

midway between Brabant and Consenvoye on West side of road." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:646.

"Oct. 11-14th. In Brigade support on East bank of the Meuse south of Consenvoye." Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:157.

¹⁵⁶Major Allen's Report on Field Operations from 10th Oct., 1918. Colonel Sanborn states (131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:90) that "conditions during that night made the movement impossible. It was therefore deferred until the following night."

¹⁵⁷"Men digging new trenches and latrines, approximately 900 yards trenches dug 2 ft. wide and from 3 to 4 feet deep." Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, to Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, October 12, received at 7:20 P.M. Record of Messages Sent and Received, 131st Infantry, 3:96.

¹⁵⁸Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:188.

¹⁵⁹"12th October, 1918. Disposition of companies unchanged. Co. C carried on work improving gun emplacements in main line of resistance and improvements on shelters for men. Light shelling by enemy. Light concentration of gas in Bois de Danneveux. Casualties: None. Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:20. Compare Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:598.

¹⁶⁰1st U. S. A., 17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 595-S/3, Order No. 7, dated October 12, 1918, 2:94.

¹⁶¹Operations Reports, 33rd Division, October 13 and 14, 1918.

¹⁶²Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:260; also Report of the Commanding Officer, 104th Field Artillery, 3:264.

¹⁶³"13th October. Regimental F. O. # 6 issued, based on F. O. 8, 52nd F. A. Brigade. Mission to assist by artillery preparation in the attack of the 29th Division in the sector east of the 24th meridian. Operation to commence at 5:30 A.M., 14th October. At 6:10 P.M. Field Message # 11, 52nd F. A. Brigade, ordered the postponement of the attack 24 hours and changed the mission of the 2nd Battalion to the execution of fire on Sivry-sur-Meuse to cover the construction of emplacements of the 102d Trench Mortar Battery on the west bank of the Meuse." Report of Operations of 105th Field Artillery, 3:277.

"13th October—408 rounds harassing on 20.8-83. 1,350 rounds on Sivry. Hdqrs. 2nd Bn. 3rd Bn. and Batteries C, D and E moved to following positions at 23H00, arriving 6H00, 14th October. 2nd Battalion P. C. 18.1-79.4. 3rd Battalion P. C. 18.1-79.0. Battery 'C' # 1 Gun 18.0-79.5. Battery 'D' # 1 Gun 18.0-79.5. Battery 'E' # 1 Gun 17.7-79.3." Operations, 106th Field Artillery, 3:284.

¹⁶⁴Report of Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, 2:696; Report of Operations, 122d Machine Gun Battalion, 2:558; Operations of the 66th Infantry Brigade, 3:43.

¹⁶⁵Addendum No. 1 to Field Order No. 29, 2:286. The location of this line was the subject of several conversations between the division and brigade commanders by telephone. As a matter of fact warning had been given by the Division Commander verbally as to the necessity of eliminating any dangerous salient long before it was embodied in the written Addendum No. 1.

¹⁶⁶Major Allen's Report on Field Operations, 3:116.

¹⁶⁷See above, 1:129 and 133.

¹⁶⁸Field Order No. 39, P. C. Pliable [i.e., 131st Infantry], October 13, 1918, 3:113.

¹⁶⁹As a matter of fact, no mention of the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 129th Infantry, was made in Field Order No. 39, 131st Infantry, although they were included in the reserve in the account given by 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:85.

¹⁷⁰131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:90; Major Allen's Report on Field Operations, 3:116.

"On the night of Oct. 13th the 1st Bn. withdrew under orders to trenches at starting point N. E. of Consenvoye." Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:654.

"Continued to hold this line until 6:00 P.M. Oct. 13th when Bn. was withdrawn by order of Major Allen 131st Inf., and took up new position in trenches N. E. of Consenvoye." Narrative of Operations of 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:661.

"The Battalion moved forward the night of October 13th and entered Bois de Chaume where the troops established a line." Second Battalion, 129th Infantry, Operations, 2:657.

"Oct. 13, 1918... Second Battalion 129th Infantry completed relief of First and Third Battalions, 129th Infantry at 1:00 A.M. [October 14]. First and Third Battalions in position in trenches North of Consenvoye [after the relief]. Casualties, two (2) men wounded." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:646.

¹⁷¹"During the night of Oct. 13th-14th, the 131st Infantry and the machine gun companies attached thereto received orders to withdraw to Consenvoye, certain battalions of the 65th Brigade moving in during the same night to take their positions.

"The casualties during this action in this Company were: 2 killed and 26 wounded or gassed (Capt. Irwin and 1st Lieut. Fishburne evacuated on morning of Oct. 10th are included in this total)." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:188.

"These companies . . . [were] withdrawn together with the Infantry on the night 13/14th October, spending the balance of the night and the following day at Consenvoye." Report of Operations, 122d Machine Gun Battalion, 2:558.

"Disposition of companies unchanged during the day." Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:20. Companies A and D were attached to 129th Infantry.

"October 12th and 13th, holding these positions" [i.e. "along side of road leading into Consenvoye"]. Narrative of Machine Gun Company, 129th Infantry, 2:663.

¹⁷²131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:91; Major Allen's Report on Field Operations, 3:116; Report of the Commanding Officer, Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:188.

¹⁷³Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:157; Report of the Commanding Officer, Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:189; Report of the Commanding Officer, 104th Field Artillery, 3:270. Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, was relieved that night and took position "in reserve in trenches south of Consenvoye" according to the Supplemental Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:199.

¹⁷⁴131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:91.

¹⁷⁵A number of the prisoners captured on October 10, officers as well as men, stated that had the American advance been pushed that day it could have broken through

Kriemhild Stellung, as the Austrians were completely demoralized by the vigor of the attack.

¹⁷⁶Situation Reports, 33rd Division.

¹⁷⁷Operations Reports, 33rd Division, October 13 and 14, 1918.

¹⁷⁸"October 13th . . . Two platoons of the 2nd Bn., 130th Infantry, sent to hold the Dannevoux-Consenvoye Line, the remainder of the battalion holding the Woods and Dannevoux Subsectors. Patrols sent out at night along the entire front line." Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:599. The sector between Dannevoux and the road to Consenvoye had been occupied on the night of October 9-10 by two platoons from the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry (see 1:358, n. 83) which remained there eight days.

¹⁷⁹"13th October, 1918. Dispositions of companies unchanged during the day. Co. C withdrawn from positions in main line of resistance and ordered to proceed to east side of River Meuse in vicinity of Consenvoye. Move made night of 13-14th October, 1918. Arrived at destination by daylight. Went into bivouac in trenches one-half kilo. south of Consenvoye just off Consenvoye-Brabant Road." Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:20.

¹⁸⁰See 2:286.

¹⁸¹Compare Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, from 6 A.M., October 13, to 6 A.M., October 14, 1918, 2:471.

¹⁸²Operations Reports, 33rd Division, October 14 and 15, 1918; Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:646.

¹⁸³Diary of the Division Adjutant.

¹⁸⁴"14th October, 1918: Disposition of companies unchanged. Battalion P. C. moved from Hill 281 to east side of River Meuse just south of Consenvoye on Consenvoye-Brabant Road. Light enemy shelling. Casualties: None." Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:21.

¹⁸⁵"The Battalion moved forward the night of October 13th and entered Bois de Chaume where the troops established a line. They were engaged in improving their positions until the 15th of October. In this woods the weather continued damp and cold, a continual fog hanging in the woods, and rain falling often. The enemy used all calibres in strafing the woods, and swept from one end to the other with his batteries night and day. Gas was used extensively in his bombardments and the troops had to be constantly on the alert." Second Battalion, 129th Infantry, Operations, 2:657.

¹⁸⁶Major Allen's Report on Field Operations, 3:116.

¹⁸⁷Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:20.

¹⁸⁸"October 14th—Took over reserve trench positions, occupying these positions for about one hour, when ordered to take up out-post positions relieving 130th Infantry." Narrative of Machine Gun Company, 129th Infantry, 2:663.

¹⁸⁹In conformity with Confidential Field Orders No. 38, 131st Infantry, October 12, 1918, 3:102.

¹⁹⁰Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:646; Major Allen's Report on Field Operations, 3:116. "Complying with F. O. 40, 131 Inf., 14 Oct/18, 2nd Bn. 131 Inf. reports all O. K. except P. C. 2nd Bn. and M. G. not gone. Heavy shelling will prevent them moving for a while from position South of Bois de Chaume." This message was received at the P. C. 131st Infantry, at 7 P.M. October 14, 1918, but at 7:30 P.M. came a message from Major Allen saying, "Relief complete." Record of

Messages Sent and Received, 131st Infantry. Field Order No. 40, 131st Infantry, will be found in 3:112.

¹⁹¹“Moved into trenches N. E. of Consenvoye . . . Oct. 14th we relieved the 2nd Battalion of the 131st Inf. in support trenches near South edge of Bois de Chaume and Bois du Plat Chêne.” Narrative of Operations of 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:661.

¹⁹²Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:654.

¹⁹³131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:91.

¹⁹⁴Report of Operations, 122d Machine Gun Battalion, 2:558; Reports of the Commanding Officers of the 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:188, 189, 190; 132nd Infantry, 3:175, and 104th Field Artillery, 3:270.

¹⁹⁵“14th October—80 rounds adjustment fire 9H30 to 14H00. 1090 rounds accompanying fire from 7H20 to 8H00 on 24.2-822.8, 24.6-82.9, 24.2-83.3, 24.4-83.8. Operations Order No. 15, Hdqrs. 106th F. A.” Operations, 106th Field Artillery, 3:284.

¹⁹⁶“October 14th.

15:30 Ordered Commanding Officer, 105th Field Artillery to fire on H 45.40.

15:30 Ordered Commanding Officer, 105th Field Artillery to fire on Batteries at G 79.58, G 79.65, G 80.70, and G 83.70.

16:00 Received orders from 33rd Division, notifying of attack by 29th Division for reduction of the center of resistance in Bois de la Grande Montagne and the salient les Rapps.

16:20 Ordered Comdg. Officer, 104th Field Arty. to move 2nd Battalion to vicinity of Bois Juré on following night (October 15/16, 1918).

16:33 2nd Battalion, 105th Field Arty. ordered to neutralize fire from Villeneuve Fme. and one battery 105th Field Arty. to cover construction of emplacements by the 102nd Trench Mortar Battery on Dannevoux Ridge.

18:45 Notified that attack by 29th Division would be at 8 hrs.; informed the Artillery Detachment Commander.

20:20 Received request from Commanding General, 158th Field Artillery Brigade for fire on Magenta Fme. Notified Artillery Detachment Commander.” Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:260.

¹⁹⁷Field Order No. 20, P. C. Platte [code word for 66th Infantry Brigade], October 14, 1918, 10:30 A.M., 3:47.

¹⁹⁸Major Allen's Report on Field Operations, 3:115; Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:646. This relief was effected pursuant to Field Order No. 40, P. C. Pliable, October 14, 1918, 3 P.M., and in conformity therewith the 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, withdrew to the “trenches extending from Foot Bridge south of Consenvoye over Meuse River and East.” At 7 P.M. the following message in connection with this relief reached the P. C. 131st Infantry: “Complying with F. O. 40 131 Inf 14 Oct/18 2nd Bn 131 Inf reports all O K except P. C. 2nd Bn and M G not gone. Heavy shelling will prevent them moving for a while from position South of Bois de Chaume.” At 7:30 P.M. came a message from Major Allen announcing “Relief completed.” Record of Messages Sent and Received, 131st Infantry, 3:106.

¹⁹⁹“On night of October 14th-15th this Regiment moved to the west of the River Meuse as per field order No. 29, 33rd Division, and relieved the 65th Brigade in the Dannevoux Sector.” Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:157.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions were joined by the 3rd Battalion from Hill 281, and the relief was effected by the entire regiment.

"Co. D—Oct. 14–15 moved from Consenvoye with 1st Bn., 132nd Inf. and relieved units of 65th Brigade in Dannevoux Wood and Bois de la Côte Lemont." Special Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:200.

²⁰⁰Pursuant to Field Orders No. 6, 65th Infantry Brigade, October 14, 1918, 2:613; also Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:673.

²⁰¹Record of Messages Sent and Received, 131st Infantry, 3:115. In his Report on Field Operations, Major Allen gives the hour of his relief from command as 9 P.M.

"Oct. 14, 1918. Command of Sector passed to Colonel Edgar A. Myer, Commanding 129th Infantry. Second Battalion, 131st Infantry relieved in support line trenches by Third Battalion, 129th Infantry. First and Second Battalions, 130th Infantry moved from West Bank of Meuse River to trenches South of Consenvoye. All units of 66th Infantry Brigade withdrawing to West side of Meuse River, per F. O. No. 29, Headquarters 33rd Division, 13th October, 1918 . . . and Operations Order No. 27, 28, Hdqrs. 129th Inf., 14th Oct., 1918. Continued enemy artillery and Machine Gun fire, Casualties—seven (7) men wounded." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:646.

²⁰²Orders No. 1, P. C. Platte [code word for 66th Brigade], October 14, 1918, 3:49. These orders were based upon a Memorandum issued by the P. C. of the 33rd Division, October 14, 1918, at 4 P.M.

²⁰³Operation Order No. 28, P. C. Pinetree [code word for 129th Infantry], October 14, 1918, 2:666.

²⁰⁴Operations on East Bank of the Meuse, 3:43–44.

²⁰⁵See also 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume (3:92), in which Colonel Sanborn is high in his praise of the excellent work of the machine gun units. The initiative, daring, resourcefulness, and novel methods of the machine gun units—which completely nonplussed the enemy as many of the prisoners admitted—contributed in a large measure to the success achieved.

²⁰⁶See also 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:93. The medical arrangements made during these operations are set forth in the Medical History, 33rd Division, 3:307–308.

²⁰⁷Operations on East Bank of the Meuse, 3:44.

²⁰⁸See 3:361. General Wolf gives the number of prisoners as "approximately 1,200." In the Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, Major Putnam remarks that "Although machine gunners are not often privileged to take prisoners, yet . . . Co. 'B' took and hold receipts for 11 prisoners captured on night of Oct. 10, 1918."

²⁰⁹Operations on East Bank of the Meuse, 3:44; 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:94–95; Commanding Officer 131st Infantry, to Commanding General 66th Brigade, October 25, 1918, 3:110; Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, to Commanding General, 66th Brigade, October 19, 1918; *Matériel* captured by the 33rd Division, 3:362.

²¹⁰Operations on East Bank of the Meuse, 3:44.

²¹¹Training Circular No. 184 dealt with various matters in respect to artillery, and Training Circular No. 185 gave instructions on the subject of animals, of which there was a serious shortage in France.

²¹²1st U. S. A., 17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 615-S/3, Order No. 9, dated October 14, 1918, 2:97.

²¹³1st U. S. A., 17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 614-S/3, Secret Special Order, October 14, 1918, 2:98.

²¹⁴For a resumé of the orders issued in compliance with these instructions, see Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, from 6 A.M. October 14, to 6 A.M. October 15, 1918, 2:471.

CHAPTER VI

¹See above, 1:143. This relief was effected under the provisions of Field Order No. 6, 65th Infantry Brigade, October 14, 1918, 2:613; Field Order No. 20, P. C. Platte [code word for 66th Infantry Brigade], October 14, 1918, 10:30 A.M., 3:47; and Field Order No. 21, Headquarters 130th Infantry, October 14, 1918, 2:685.

²"On night of Oct. 14th, Co. D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion with 1st Battalion, 132nd Infantry took over gun positions in the Dannevoux Wood Sector." Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:190. "Our stay in this sector was without special incident. The enemy artillery harrassed our forward positions continuously with high explosive and gas shelling, resulting in few casualties." Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:157.

³Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:673.

⁴"On the night 14/15th October, the battalion was withdrawn to Forges Woods, where they remained as Divisional Reserve." Report of Operations, 122d Machine Gun Battalion, 2:558.

"Co. A . . . Oct. 14-15 moved to Forges Wood." Supplemental report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:199.

⁵"Co. C—Oct. 9 to 15 in brigade reserve in Forges Wood." *Ibid.*, 3:200.

⁶Field Order No. 20, 66th Infantry Brigade, October 14, 1918, 10:30 A.M., 3:48.

⁷"The last unit of the 131st Infantry crossed the river going west at 11:30 A.M., October 15th and the C.O. 131st Inf. turned over command of the sector with dispositions complete at 12 o'clock Noon.

"Pursuant to F.O. #20, 66th Infantry Brigade, October 14th the regiment went into position in trenches west of Forges Woods where needed new clothing and supplies were issued and the men made as comfortable as circumstances could permit." 131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:91.

⁸Pursuant to order of the Corps Commander, October 14. See 1:146. "15th October. Action ordered on the 14th begun at 7:30 A.M." Report of Operations of 105th Field Artillery, 3:277.

⁹"Progress very slow. Our present line on left is about 82.4. On right it recedes slightly toward the South. Badly held up by strong Machine Gun nests, and a prisoner states that there are 65 Machine Guns in the woods on the right of the 29th Inf. Div. U. S. The strong line of works along the south edge of Bois de la Grande Montagne are in our hands and will remain there. Everything indicates that progress will continue to be slow.

"Artillery fire from the right flank and north of it has been heavy and continuous throughout the day. Request active counter-battery work throughout the night to East of Meridian 26.3 and North of 82. Also request some Corps work during night north of 82.5 in Bois de la Grande Montagne.

"Our line approximately on 82.5." Telephone report from Commanding General, 29th Division, received at Headquarters 17th Army Corps, October 15, 1918, at 3:40 P.M.

"If we succeed in holding the ground won today, it is requested that 33rd Division be pushed forward. Also that 57th Brigade push forward. We must have support on our flanks." Telephone report from Commanding General, 29th Division, received at Headquarters 17th Army Corps, October 15, 1918, about 5 P.M.

¹⁰"On October 15th the Battalion went forward with Co. H on the extreme right advancing 1000 yards. This advance was made under heavy artillery fire and against machine gun nests. As the troops on the right of Company H failed to advance the entire Battalion returned to their old positions in the woods and ended the period preparing for another advance the next day." Second Battalion, 129th Infantry, Operations, 2:657.

¹¹"October 15th. Holding out-post positions." Narrative of Machine Gun Company, 129th Infantry, 2:663.

¹²"On the morning of Oct. 15th the Bn. moved up into support occupying the Tranchée Cabestan." Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:654.

"Oct. 15th we remained in the same position. ["support trenches near south edge of Bois de Chaume and Bois Plat Chêne"] with the exception of Co. L, who moved forward in support of the 2nd Battalion 129th Inf. with the mission to maintain liaison with the 115th Inf. on the right." Narrative of Operations of the 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:661.

¹³"Oct. 15, 1918. The Second Battalion, 129th Infantry, holding the line along the East and West Grid 820 between North and South Grids 23 and 24. Third Battalion 129th Infantry in trench south of Bois du Plat Chêne. First Battalion 129th Infantry, less detachments, with Third Battalion. Third Battalion 130th Infantry approximately along East and West grid 820, between North and South grids 22 and 23. Troops advanced at 8:00 A.M. to objective, pivoting on left flank Second Battalion 129th Infantry to 240-828. The 29th Division on our right failed to advance, we readjusted our lines as they were at 8:00 A.M. this morning. Regimental P. C. now at 232-815. Continued heavy enemy shell fire and machine gun fire. Casualties one (1) officer wounded, four (4) men killed thirty-four (34) men wounded. Preparations made to resume advance in morning." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:647.

¹⁴"October 15th . . . The 129th Infantry advanced 500 yards at 9:30 A.M., under command of the Commanding General, 66th Infantry Brigade in accordance with telephonic instructions from Headquarters 33rd Division, received at 3:00 A.M., in conjunction with the 29th Division on the Brigade right, their objective being reached at 11:00 AM, but were compelled to withdraw to their original position during the afternoon [on] account [of] 29th Division failing to advance to their objective. Command passed from the Commanding General 66th Infantry Brigade to the Commanding General 65th Infantry Brigade, just prior to withdrawal of the 129th Infantry from their objective to their original position." Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:599.

¹⁵"Co. B after being relieved October 13th remained in reserve in trenches south of Consenvoye until noon October 16th." Special Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:199.

¹⁶Report of the Commanding Officer, 104th Field Artillery, 3:264.

¹⁷Operations Reports, 33rd Division, October 15 and 16, 1918.

¹⁸"October 15th.

"19:00. Ordered Commanding Officer, 106th Field Artillery to fire on batteries at H 36.58, H 33.42, H 71.75." Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:261.

¹⁹"Co. C . . . Oct. 15-16 relieved Co. B, 123rd M. G. Bn. north of Dannevoux." Special Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:200.

"15th October, 1918. Co. B relieved in Bois de Dannevoux by Machine Gun Co. 66th Infantry Brigade. Proceeded to east side of River Meuse in immediate vicinity of Consenvoye. Move made night of 15th-16th October, 1918. Went in bivouac south of Consenvoye off Consenvoye-Brabant Road. Reverted to command of Commanding Officer 123 M. G. Bn. Scattered shelling by enemy throughout the day. Light concentration of gas during night in Consenvoye. Casualties: Wounded, slight 1." Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:21.

²⁰"2nd Battalion Headquarters, Batteries 'A', 'B' and 'F' moved to new forward position near the Bois de Juré, Co-ordinates: 2nd Battalion P. C. 17.2-80.5, Battery 'A' 17.5-79.8, Battery 'B' 17.4-79.6, Battery 'F' 17.9-79.5." Report of the Commanding Officer, 104th Field Artillery, 3:264.

²¹"15th October—Hdqrs. 1st Bn., Batteries A, B, and F moved at 19H00 to new positions west of Gercourt arriving at 23H00. Positions occupied as follows,—1st Battalion P. C. 17.2-78.3; 1st Battalion O. P. 18.5-74.9; Battery 'A' * 1 Gun 17.0-78.7; Battery 'B' * 1 Gun 16.6-79.1; Battery 'F' * 1 Gun 17.2-78.7." Operations, 106th Field Artillery, 3:284.

²²Order No. 11, 17th Army Corps, October 16, 1918 (see 1:154). "Following report from 29th Division at 15 hours 15 received here: 'The left of our line has reached First Objective of Exploitation. Right well up and still advancing.'" Report of Liaison Officer of 33rd Division at Headquarters 17th Army Corps, October 16, 1918, 3:40 P.M.

"Colonel Cloman [i.e. Chief of Staff of the 29th Division] reports that his Division has captured the summit of Grande Montagne." Report of Liaison Officer of 33rd Division at Headquarters 17th Army Corps, October 16, 1918, 6 P.M.

²³"October 16th.

1:40 Received request from Chief of Staff, 29th Division, for artillery support of attack by his Division east of Parallel * 24. Notified Artillery Detachment Commander, and instructed him to fire with three 155 m/m batteries and two 75 m/m batteries on requested objectives." Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:261.

²⁴"Oct. 16, 1918. Second Battalion, 129th Infantry advanced to its objective at 9:30 A.M. objective reached at 1:00 P.M. We had excellent Liaison with the 29th American Division at all times. New position consolidated. Heavy enemy shell fire. Casualties, one (1) man killed, twenty-three (23) men wounded." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:647.

"October 16th . . . 129th Infantry again advanced 500 yards, took their objective and held it, their right flank being protected this time by the advance of the 29th Division." Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:599.

"On October 16th the Battalion line in Bois de Chaume swung forward Company E holding its position and Company H on the extreme right advancing 1000 yards. The advance was made early in the morning without support of the artillery and the losses were very light. The rest of the 16th and 17th were spent in entrenching the new positions." Second Battalion, 129th Infantry, Operations, October 16 to December 7, 1918, 2:658.

²⁵"The 1st Bn., 129th Inf. took up position in support N. E. of Consenvoye on the 15th Oct., 1918 in which position it remained until the night of the 18th Oct." Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, January 5, 1918, 2:654.

"Oct. 16th and 17th this Battalion continued to act in the capacity of Regimental support." Narrative of Operations of the 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:661.

²⁶Reports of the Commanding Officers, 130th Infantry, 2:673, and 104th Field Artillery, 3:270.

²⁷"16th October, 1918. Disposition of companies unchanged. Co. B moved from bivouac one-half kilo. south of Consenvoye to bivouac in immediate vicinity of Brabant. Scattered shelling throughout the day. Casualties: Killed, 1; Wounded, slight, 6; Wounded, serious, 1." Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:21.

²⁸Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:157.

²⁹"On night of Oct. 15th, Co. C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion relieved Co. B, 123rd Machine Gun Battalion in this same sector, relief being made without incident. Both Companies C & D remained in these positions until night of Oct. 19th-20th." Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:190.

³⁰See 3:264, 277, 284.

³¹"Co. A . . . Oct. 15-16 moved in reserve on Hill 262 about 3 kilometers Northwest of Gercourt. Remained until Oct. 20th." Special Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:199.

³²131st Infantry Engagement at Bois de Chaume, 3:91.

³³Report of Operations, 122d Machine Gun Battalion, 2:558.

³⁴"Co. B after being relieved October 13th remained in reserve in trenches south of Consenvoye until noon October 16th, when they crossed the river and remained in reserve on the south of Bois de Forges." Special Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:199-200.

³⁵The only entry in the Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, has been quoted (see above, 1:374, n. 23). There were no entries for October 16 in the reports of the Commanding Officers of the 104th and 105th Field Artillery, while that in the Operations, 106th Field Artillery, is decidedly laconic: "16th October—No activity."

³⁶"Bois de Chaume and front lines shelled during the afternoon, caliber 77 m/m about 40 an hour. Intermittent shelling of Consenvoye—Gercourt road, Bois Juré and Gercourt. Slight harassing of Bois de Forges near Drillancourt during the night, about six m/m an hour. Some gas. Road intersection at point 20.6-79.4 shelled at irregular intervals during the night. Very quiet during the morning." Operations Report, 33rd Division, October 17, 1918.

³⁷Confidential Memorandum No. 21, prescribed that the men in the trenches should be supplied with blankets immediately and that they were to get two hot meals a day. Announcement was made that the quartermaster had an adequate supply of socks, breeches, and shoes; that it was the duty of every company commander to see that his men had proper clothing and hot food; and that failure to provide these things would be considered as proof of incompetency.

³⁸1st U. S. A., 17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 631-S/3, Order No. 11, October 16, 1918, 2:100.

³⁹Operations Reports, 33rd Division, October 17 and 18, 1918.

⁴⁰"Oct. 17, 1918. Regiment spent day in improving position. Continued heavy shell fire and machine gun fire. Casualties—four (4) men killed, twelve (12) men wounded, one (1) man missing." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:647.

"17th October, 1918. Disposition of companies unchanged. Intermittent shelling by enemy throughout day. A few enemy planes over during day. Casualties: Killed 1; Wounded, slight, 13; Wounded, serious, 1." Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:21.

⁴¹"October 17th, 1918. 1st Bn., 130th Infantry, relieved the 2nd Bn., 129th Infantry, in the front line and the Bois du Plat-Chêne, completing the relief at 22:45 in accordance with Orders No. 22, Hdqrs. 65th Infantry Brigade, which also provided relief of attached Machine Gun units." Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:588-600.

"17th October 1918 . . . the First Battalion 130th Infantry relieved the 129th Infantry in the Outpost Zone, right half sector, Bois du Plat-Chêne." Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:674.

Field Order No. 22, Headquarters 130th Infantry, October 16, 1918, prescribed that "the First Battalion of the 130th Infantry will relieve the Second Battalion of the 129th Infantry on the night 17th/18th October 1918, relief beginning at dark, and to be completed before daylight on the morning of 18th October." The relief of the machine gun company was to be made on the night of October 18-19.

⁴²"Report on activities of last night" rendered by the Commanding Officer, 129th Infantry on October 18, 1918.

⁴³"17th/20th October. Harassing and neutralization fire executed in accordance with Operation Orders, 52nd F. A. Brigade." Report of Operations of 105th Field Artillery, 3:277.

⁴⁴"17th October—Regimental P. C. closed at 20.1-72.6 at 13 Hoo opened at same hour at 17.2-78.3. Total 51 rounds fired during day for registration." Operations, 106th Field Artillery, 3:284.

⁴⁵"October 17th. Nothing to report." Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:261.

⁴⁶Operations Reports, 33rd Division, October 17 and 18, 1918.

⁴⁷"G3/ *Secret*

P. C. 33RD DIVISION, A. E. F.
17th October, 1918.

C. G. 65th Inf. Brigade.

The Division Commander directs that early tomorrow morning and also during the course of the day, you send patrols to the Second Exploitation Objective and report results.

W. H. SIMPSON,

Maj, Inf., A. C. of S., G-3

For W. K. NAYLOR,

Brigadier General, General Staff,

Chief of Staff."

⁴⁸See above, 1:155.

⁴⁹"October 18th . . . Command of front line occupation passed to the Com-

manding Officer, 130th Infantry." Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:600.

⁵⁰"18th October 1918, Field Orders # 23, Hdqrs. 130th Infantry, the Second Battalion 130th Infantry relieved the Third Battalion 130th Infantry in the left half sector Bois de Chaume, Third Battalion occupying the support positions immediately north and east of the town of Consenvoye, and on this date the command of the Outpost and Defense lines passed to the Commanding Officer 130th Infantry from the Commanding Officer 129th Infantry." Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:674.

"18th October, 1918. Disposition of companies unchanged during the day. Co. A 123 M. G. Bn. relieved in line in Bois de Chaume by M. G. Co. 130th Infantry, night of 18-19th October, 1918. Relief completed before daylight. Co. A moved to bivouacs in trenches south of Consenvoye just off Consenvoye-Brabant Road. Scattered shelling of entire area. Light concentration of gas. Casualties: None." Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:21.

This relief was effected under the provisions of Order No. 22, Headquarters 65th Infantry Brigade, October 16, 1918 (2:614), the Memorandum issued by the same headquarters on October 17, 1918, and Field Order No. 23, Headquarters 130th Infantry, October 18, 1918.

⁵¹"Oct. 18, 1918. Entire Regiment relieved by the 130th Infantry, all of the 130th Infantry North of Grid 80. Entire 129th Infantry disposed between East and West Grids 78 and 80, and between Meuse River and North and South Grid 24, per orders No. 22 and BA-914, 65th Infantry Brigade, 16th October, 1918. Command of Outpost Zone passed to Commanding Officer 130th Infantry. Entire 129th Infantry in trenches South of Consenvoye. Casualties—nineteen (19) men wounded." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:647.

Reports of the Commanding Officers of the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 129th Infantry; Second Battalion, 129th Infantry, Operations, October 16 to Dec. 7, 1918. These three reports concur in declaring that the trenches to which the regiment withdrew on October 18th were south and east of Consenvoye. See 2:655, 661, 658.

⁵²"1. Issued Confidential Memorandum No. 23: 'Great care must be taken to prevent men from firing on our own aeroplanes. Attention is directed to Confidential Memorandum No. 14, c.s., these Hdqrs.'

"2. Issued Training Circular 185: 'Reduction of hostile machine gun nests.'

"3. Issued Training Circular 186: 'Re-organization. Co. Comdrs. will effect at once such re-organization of the units as may have been necessary as a result of losses incurred in recent combat.'

"4. Sent warning orders to 65th, 66th, 52nd Brigades, 108th Engrs., Trains and 122nd M. G. Bn., regarding relief of Division.

"5. Rendered usual situation and operations reports to Corps and G. H. Q." Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, 6 A.M. October 8, to 6 A.M. October 19, 1918, 2:472.

⁵³1st U. S. A., 17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 649-S/3, Order No. 13, dated October 18, 1918.

⁵⁴A second communication from the 17th Army Corps requested a list of fifty men—including about ten officers—who had particularly distinguished themselves during the fighting since October 8, as General Claudel desired to recommend them for

French decorations. (1st U. S. A., 17th Army Corps, Staff, 1st Bureau, No. 10,593/p, October 18, 1918.) A third communication contained extracts from Special Orders, No. 70 of the First American Army fixing the line of resistance and the zone of outposts in the terrain already gained. (17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 648-S/3, note dated October 18, 1918.)

⁵⁵Statement of Operations Officer, 130th Infantry.

⁵⁶Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion for October 18, 1918. See above, 1:156 and 3:21.

⁵⁷"Oct. 19, 1918. Regiment moved to trenches South of Consenvoye. P. C. of 129th Infantry remained as before [viz: at Point 232-815 in eastern part of the Bois de Chaumel]. Casualties—eighty-six (86) men wounded." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:647.

"The night of the 18th Oct. . . . ordered to move to reserve position south of Consenvoye." Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:655.

⁵⁸See map illustrating operations of 130th Infantry in Woods and Dannevoux sub-sectors and right bank of the Meuse.

⁵⁹"19th October, 1918: Disposition of companies unchanged. Light hostile shelling. Casualties: None." Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:21.

⁶⁰"October 19th Work of strengthening front line position by 130th Infantry progressing in accordance with Brigade Defense Scheme, 129th Infantry in reserve and support position. Patrol sent out during the night for reconnaissance of the ridge in the immediate brigade front." Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:600. This patrol was executed pursuant to Memorandum order from Headquarters 65th Brigade, October 19, 1918, to the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry.

⁶¹The Report of the Commanding Officer, 104th Field Artillery, contains no entry for October 19.

⁶²Compare Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:674.

⁶³See March Table, Field Order No. 30, 2:290.

⁶⁴"Oct. 19-20 moved with Bn. Hdqrs. to Bois de Nixéville." Supplemental Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:200.

⁶⁵"The night of 19/20th October, . . . in compliance with the provisions of Field Order No. 30, P. C. 33rd Division, 19th October, they moved to the Camp Moulin Brulé, being relieved by the 15th French Colonial Infantry Division." Report of Operations, 122d Machine Gun Battalion, 2:558.

⁶⁶Operations Reports, 33rd Division, October 19 and 20, 1918.

⁶⁷"October 19th.

9:00 Received verbal information from Chief of Staff, 33rd Division, that Brigade would be relieved.

9:25 Artillery Detachment dissolved. Normal organization of the Brigade resumed.

11:00 A.M. Ordered Commanding officer, 105th Field Arty. to fire on Vilosnes Ravine.

19:15 Ordered Commanding Officer, 106th Field Artillery to fire on Vilosnes Ravine intermittently during the night.

- 19:20 Received F. O. 30-33rd Division, covering relief by the Artillery of the 15th Colonial Division—relief to be completed morning of 21st October, 1918.
- 19:20 Ordered Commanding Officer, 102nd Trench Mortar Battery to harass Vilosnes during the night.
- 19:40 Ordered Commanding Officer, 105th Field Artillery to harass Vilosnes Ravine and battery positions north of Vilosnes.
- 20:50 At request of Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, ordered Commanding Officer, 105th Field Artillery to fire two concentrations on Sivry-sur-Meuse, reported occupied by enemy using machine guns." Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:261.

"17th/20th October. Harassing and neutralization fire executed in accordance with Operation Orders, 52nd F. A. Brigade." Report of Operations of 105th Field Artillery, 3:277.

"19th October—554 rounds harassing fire on 17.7-85.4, 23.4-83.5, to 24.0-83.8, 23.9-86.8, 19.3-84.7, 24.9-85.4, 24.2-85.3, Btry at 17.9-86.5." Operations, 106th Field Artillery, 3:285.

⁶⁸"1. Rendered usual situation and operations reports to Corps and G. H. Q.

"2. Sent warning order to 66th Brig., 108th Engrs., and 122nd M. G. Bn. regarding relief.

"3. Issued Field Order No. 30, directing relief of Division." Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, 6 A.M. October 19, to 6 A.M. October 20, 1918, 2:473.

⁶⁹1st U. S. A., 17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 657-S/3, Operation Order No. 14, October 19, 1918.

⁷⁰See above, 1:159.

⁷¹"October 20th.

14:30 Received copy of order covering Artillery relief.

19:00 Issued orders to units of Brigade for relief." Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:261.

"20th October—no firing." Operations, 106th Field Artillery, 3:285. No mention of any activity is made in the Report of the Commanding Officer, 104th Field Artillery, but the 105th indulged in some slight harassing and neutralization fire according to the Report of Operations of the 105th Field Artillery.

⁷²"1. Rendered usual situation and operation reports to Corps and G. H. Q.

"2. Issued Addendum No. 1 to Field Order No. 30, completing relief of Division." Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, from 6 A.M. October 20, to 6 A.M. October 21, 1918, 2:473.

⁷³See 2:294.

⁷⁴1st A. U. S., 17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 660-S/3, Secret Sequel to Special Order No. 654-S/3 of October 18, 1918, dated October 20, 1918, 2:102.

⁷⁵1st A. U. S., 17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 664-S/3, Order No. 15, October 20, 1918.

⁷⁶The Headquarters of the Second American Army at Toul that day issued orders (G-3 Orders No. 18, Secret, October 20, 1918) that "the 33rd Division will relieve the 79th Division in the Troyon Sector"; that the "Relief will commence night 24/25 October, 1918, and be completed night 25/26 October, 1918;" and that the "Details

of relief will be ordered by the Commanding General, II Colonial Corps (French)," 2:104.

These orders did not, however, reach P. C. of the 33rd Division until 10:55 A.M. on October 24.

⁷⁷Supplementary Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:199-200.

⁷⁸"October 20th—The Regiment left forward positions on order from Brigade Commander to return to the rear arriving at Bois de Cinq Frères near Ancemont 10/22/18." Report of the Commanding Officer, 104th Field Artillery, 3:264.

"20th October—no firing. Relieved at 22H30 by French Colonial Troops. Regiment left position at 23H00 for Bois la Ville." Operations, 106th Field Artillery, 3:285.

⁷⁹See march table accompanying Addendum No. 1 to Field Order No. 30, 2:295.

⁸⁰"October 20th In accordance with the provisions of Field Orders No. 30 Headquarters 33rd Division, relief of this brigade by the 15th French Colonial Infantry Division commenced. 129th Infantry relieved in the Consenvoye Sector by the 6th French Colonial Infantry Regiment at 17:30 and proceeded by march to staging camp in the Bois Delolime. Brigade Headquarters proceeded by trucks to staging billets in Germonville." Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:600.

⁸¹"Oct. 20, 1918. Regiment relieved in Consenvoye Area by Sixth French Colonial Regiment at 3:15 P.M. Marched twenty Kilos to Bois du Chana, and Bois de Delolime arrived at 12:00 o'clock midnight. Movement carried out per F. O. No. 30, Headquarters 33rd Division, 19th October, 1918. Operation Order No. 29, Headquarters 129th Infantry, 20th October, 1918." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:647.

⁸²"Pursuant to said orders [i.e. F. O. No. 30, Hq. 33rd Division] and Field Orders # 24, Hdqrs. 130th Infantry, 20th October 1918, the 130th Infantry was relieved by the Second Colonial Infantry Regiment, (French) night of 20th/21st October 1918, the regiment marching from the Bois de Chaume area to the Bois Bourrus after relief was completed at 9:30 P.M. on said date. Total casualties while occupying positions on the east bank of the Meuse and while taking part in the attacks with the 129th and 131st Infantry, between the 10th and 16th October 1918, was 23 other ranks killed, 3 officers wounded, 66 other ranks wounded." Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:674.

⁸³"20th October, 1918: Disposition of companies unchanged during day. Pursuant to Field Order 30, H. Q. 33rd Division, 19th Oct., 1918, elements of 33rd Division were relieved in Consenvoye Sector by elements of 15th Colonial Infantry Division (French) night of 20-21 Oct. 1918. Move made from bivouacs in vicinity of Consenvoye and Brabant to Bois Delolime. Battalion P. C., Companies B and C proceeded to new location with 129th Infantry. Cleared Brabant at 6:30 P.M. and arrived at Bois Delolime at 11:00 P.M. Went into bivouac for the remainder of the night. Co. A 123 M. G. Bn. proceeded from vicinity of Consenvoye to Bois Bourrus with the 130th Infantry. Cleared Brabant at 12:00 midnight and arrived Bois Bourrus at 6:30 A.M. 21st Oct. 1918. Staging points for move to new area. Orders received from P. C. 65th Infantry Brigade that Co. D 123 M. G. Bn. would remain in

line, Consenvoye Sector, until night of 21-22 October, 1918." Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:21.

⁸⁴"Co. B. . . Oct. 20-21 moved to Camp les Tamaris, about 1 kilometer north-east of Récourt. Remained here until Oct. 24th." Supplemental Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:199-200.

⁸⁵"In accordance with the provisions of Addendum No. 1, to Field Order No. 30, P.C. 33rd Division, 19th October, the battalion on the night 20/21st October, moved to Rattentout where they rested until the night 24/25th October." Report of Operations 122d Machine Gun Battalion, 2:559.

⁸⁶Report of the Operations Officer, 131st Infantry, January 8, 1919.

⁸⁷Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁸⁸"1. Division moved into new area.

"2. Issued Confidential Memorandum No. 24, Quoting General Order No. 35, III Corps, regarding straggling and absenteeism in the command. Every officer and man in the command will be subject to two daily roll calls, and an absentee record will be kept.

"3. Issued Training Circular 187.' Three days, beginning Oct. 22 will be utilized by all units for rest, re-organization and the replenishment and cleaning of clothing and equipment. Infantry Platoons will be completed as provided for in the Tables of Organization 1914, and vacancies being filled up by replacements as they arrive. Training will be resumed on Friday, October 25. Drill schedules will be submitted to these Hdqrs. All animals will be given 3 days rest, only being used for such hauling as is absolutely necessary.'" Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, 6 A.M. October 21, to 6 A.M. October 22, 1918, 2:473.

⁸⁹"Oct. 21, 1918. Regiment billeted in Abris de Delolime and near Choisel. Marched at 4:00 P.M., destination, Sommedieue, distance twenty-two kilometers. A halt of two hours was made at Casernes Bevaux for dinner. Arrived at Sommedieue at 11:50 P.M. Casualties—one (1) officer wounded. Movement per Operation Order No. 30, Headquarters 129th Infantry, 21st October, 1918." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:648.

⁹⁰"October 21st. . . 129th Infantry completed move by march from staging camp in the Bois Delolime to Sommedieue Rest Area." Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:600.

⁹¹"Pursuant to Addendum #1, to Field Orders #30, Hdqrs. 33rd Division, 20th October 1918, and Addendum to Field Orders #24, Hq. 130th Inf. 21st Oct. 1918, the 130th Infantry marched from the Bois Bourrus to Rupt-en-Woëvre, arriving in billets at the latter point at 4:00 A.M. on the morning of 22nd October, 1918." Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:674.

⁹²"Co. A. . . Oct. 21-22 moved to Haudainville." "Co. C . . . With Co. A & D rest of time until going into Troyon Sector, Oct. 24-25." "Co. D . . . With Co. A rest of time until going into Troyon Sector, Oct. 24th and 25th." Supplemental Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:199.

⁹³"21st October. Regimental F. O. 8, based on F. O. 30, 33rd Division, and F. O. 12, 52nd F. A. Brigade, was issued, giving details of the withdrawal of the Regiment

from the sector upon relief by French units of the 15th Colonial Division, taking over the sector." Report of Operations of 105th Field Artillery, 3:277.

⁹⁴"October 21st

"10:00 A.M. Turned over Command to Commanding Officer, Divisional Artillery, 15 C. I. D. F. and moved P. C. to Dieue." Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:261.

⁹⁵"21st October, 1918. Personnel of Companies A, B, and C rested up during greater part of day. Pursuant to orders, Addendum No. 1 to Field Order No. 30, H. Q. 33rd Division, 20th October, 1918, move was continued from Bois Delolime to Sommedieue. Battalion P. C., Companies B and C proceeded to new location with 129th Infantry. Left Bois Delolime 4:00 P.M. 21st Oct. 1918, arrived Sommedieue 12:00 midnight. Move made without event. Companies went into billets. Co. A proceeded from Bois Bourrus to Rupt-en-Woëvre with 130th Infantry. Arrived at destination 7:30 A.M. 22nd October, 1918. Co. D, 123 M. G. Bn. relieved in line, Consenvoye Sector night of 21st and 22nd October, 1918 and proceeded to Bois Bourrus for staging enroute, to new area." Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:22.

⁹⁶"Oct. 22, 1918. Locations: Regimental Headquarters, Headquarters Company, First, and Third Battalions at Sommedieue. Day spent in cleaning billets which had been left in bad condition. Casualties—four (4) men wounded. (Gassed)." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:648.

⁹⁷Report of Operations, 122d Machine Gun Battalion, 2:559.

⁹⁸"October 22nd. Nothing to report." Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade. The Regiment . . . arriving at Bois de Cinq Frères near Ancemont 10/22/18." Report of the Commanding Officer, 104th Field Artillery, 3:264.

"22nd October. Regimental F. O. 9 issued in compliance with F. O. 30, 33rd Division, for the second stage of the relief." Report of Operations of 105th Field Artillery, 3:277.

"22nd October—Regimental Hdqrs. 1st Bn. Hdqrs. Batteries A and B, Hdqrs. Co., Supply Co. left Bois la Ville at 19H00 for billets at Camp Chêne Gossin, 3 km. southeast of Dugny, arrived at 24H00." Operations, 106th Field Artillery, 3:285.

⁹⁹"October 22/ to 24/18—Regtl P. C. Hq. Sup. & M. G. Co.—Camp Monthairons (260-505) Secret Map № 155; 1st Bn.—Le Chanois West (255-473); 2nd Bn.—Ferme Pontoux (263-494); 3rd Bn.—Les Tamaris, Camp (D)—(285-492)." Report of Operations Officer, 131st Infantry.

"Oct. 21-24th. At rest in rear area." Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:157.

¹⁰⁰"Co. A . . . Oct. 22-23 moved to Le Petit Monthairon. Remained until Oct. 24th. Up to this time was with 2nd Bn., 132nd Inf., which left them there." Supplemental Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:199. Companies C and D marched with Co. A.

¹⁰¹War Diary for October 22, 1918, 2:336.

¹⁰²"22nd October, 1918. Companies A, B, and C reorganizing companies, cleaning

up men and equipment. Co. D staged for the day in Bois Bourrus." Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:22.

¹⁰³2nd Colonial Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 3.381-T/3, Secret Particular Order No. 816, dated October 22, 1918, 2:105.

¹⁰⁴"1. Major Simpson visited 65th Brig. Hdqrs., 130th and 129th Inf. Hdqrs. to determine if they found suitable locations.

"2. Received order from II Col. Army Corps (French) for 33rd Div. U. S. to relieve 79th Div. U. S. in the Troyon sector.

"3. Sent warning order to 65th and 66th Brigades, 130th and 131st Inf. 'This Div. has been transferred to the Second Army A. E. F. and assigned to the II Col. Army Corps (French) in order to relieve the 79th Div. U. S. in the Troyon sector. One Bn. 130th Inf., to be designated by Regtl. Comdr., relieves the 1st Bn. 313th Inf. in Bois de Combres (2 Cos.) and Bois des Éparges (2 Cos.). 131st Inf. will exchange billets with the 315th Inf. as reserve for the Right Sub-sector of the Troyon sector, which will be held by the 66th Inf. Brig.'" Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, 6 A.M. October 22, to 6 A.M. October 23, 1918, 2:473-474.

¹⁰⁵General von Soden's Order of West Maas Group No. 250, Sept. 30, 1918, quoted in "Operations of the 17th Army Corps in front of Verdun, September and October, 1918" (17th Army Corps, Staff, 2nd Bureau, No. 3399/2, dated October 31, 1918).

¹⁰⁶See map to illustrate the Argonne—Meuse battle, issued by General Headquarters.

¹⁰⁷See List of Casualties, 33rd Division, 3:368.

¹⁰⁸This fact was abundantly attested by the statements of the prisoners taken in the Bois de Forges.

¹⁰⁹See above, 1:78.

¹¹⁰As has been remarked (see above, 1:62, n. 38), the plan followed by the 33rd Division was suggested by Major Bertier de Sauvigny, a French liaison officer at the Headquarters of the IIIrd Corps.

¹¹¹The following account, quoted from the Report of Operations, 122d Machine Gun Battalion (2:556)—the division machine gun battalion—is pertinent to the subject under discussion:

"THE ATTACK.

"In accordance with the provisions of Field Order No. 23, P. C. 33rd Division, dated 24th September 1918, this Battalion formed part of the attacking echelon, both companies participating in the barrage from C. R. l'Oison and Eiffel.

"Forty Vickers Machine Guns (3 companies plus 1 platoon) constituted the barrage. Two companies (24 guns) went forward with the attacking infantry while the two barrage companies on the left went forward with two infantry battalions in support. The two companies of this battalion remained in their positions to protect the right flank, which was open after the attack, from Samogneux to the north of Brabant. One section (2 guns) were disposed on the extreme right flank, firing across the Meuse and supporting a raid made by the 17th French Division, in conjunction with our attack. While the other two guns of this platoon were held in reserve owing to the lack of suitable positions in this vicinity and the liability of the two guns mentioned being knocked out. One platoon (4 guns) on special mounts were utilized for anti-aircraft defense. These guns were mounted on Ford trucks (delivery body) and were extremely

mobile. The rate of fire for the barrage was as shown in Annex No. 4, to Field Order No. 23, copy attached hereto.

"The terrain was such that safety angles could almost be disregarded. All guns being mounted on the military crest of a forward slope and firing on a forward slope at an average range of 2500 yards. The average of the guns were on the 235 meter contour while the attacking infantry were on the 200 meter contour and the first fall of the barrage was from the 215 to 220 contours at the range given, therefore, excellent covering fire was given the infantry during their advance.

"All emplacements in the old defensive line were abandoned, barrage guns taking up new positions in shell craters in and about the original 1st. and 2nd. lines. It was evident during the attack that good judgment had been shown in this respect as all of the original emplacements were well covered by the enemy's artillery and machine gun fire. These positions had been used for many months by the French and too much movement had taken place to and from them in the daytime by the American troops, furthermore, sufficient skill and care had not been used in camouflaging them, all of which resulted in their being spotted.

TARGET FRONTAGE—

"At the first glance it would appear that too much target frontage was taken on by the number of guns involved, however the ground covered by the first Barrage company (our right flank) was very thinly held by the enemy. The second company with a small traverse effectively covered their target while the normal frontage was engaged by the third company. The duration of the barrage entirely compensating for the wide target frontage engaged.

EFFECTIVENESS—

"Reports from prisoners indicate that the ground covered was well selected, this being borne out by the fact that the German machine guns did not retaliate to any great extent. One prisoner stated that the barrage was so heavy that it was impossible for them to get back. The two guns on our right which covered the French raid had as one target, a quarry on the east bank of the Meuse south of Brabant, in which the French found 25 German casualties, the effect of this machine gun fire."

¹¹²Notes on Recent Operations No. 3, Confidential No. 1376, G-5, issued by General Headquarters, October 12, 1918, page 15.

¹¹³See above, I:104-109.

¹¹⁴See map to illustrate the Argonne-Meuse battle, issued by General Headquarters.

¹¹⁵"During the period October 9th to 12th, our troops were three times in force on the final objective (2nd 'Exploitation' objective) and ready to continue their advance but were unable to do so because of our exposed right flank. Each time the enemy saw the opportunity to attack on our right and took quick advantage of it." Operations on East Bank of the Meuse, 3:43-44.

¹¹⁶Troops of the 66th Brigade crossed to the east bank of the Meuse on October 8 and remained there until the morning of October 15 when the last column proceeded to the west bank. The 65th Brigade as a whole occupied the right sector from the night of October 14-15 until the night of October 20-21, although certain elements had been sent across the river as early as October 9.

¹¹⁷See above, I:152. The second advance was that of 500 yards on October 16th in the Consenvoye Sector when our troops were enabled to hold their gain by reason of

the 29th Division advancing at the same time and protecting their right. Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:599.

¹¹⁸"The position held by this brigade on the left bank of the River Meuse was a Salient which for a considerable time was well in advance of other elements of the American Army. The position was subject to heavy shelling by high explosive, shrapnel and gas from three directions, besides machine gun fire and bombing from aeroplanes." Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:634. Compare Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:647.

¹¹⁹During the period that the brigade was in the line on both the west and east banks of the River Meuse offensive activities were constant in the way of patrols and raids. "There were also two decided advances made; the first in the Verdun Sector on the west bank of the River Meuse which covered a period of several days in the early part of October and resulted in clearing out the enemy and enabling our troops to push their Outposts up to the river proper, a distance of approximately two kilometers in advance of the Outpost Line taken over from the 80th Division." Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:633.

¹²⁰Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:678.

¹²¹Simonds, "America's Greatest Battle: The Meuse-Argonne" in the *American Review of Reviews*, November, 1919, p. 499. In his *History of the World War*, Mr. Simonds declares (volume 5, page 303) that "the achievement of the 33rd, in crossing the deep river and the canal beyond it, was one of the most brilliant circumstances in the battle and a fitting climax to the operation of the division on September 26th."

CHAPTER VII

¹ Division P. C.....	Dieue
Headquarters Troops.....	Dieue
122nd Machine Gun Battalion.....	Rattentout
108th Train Headquarters and Military Police.....	Ancemont
108th Field Signal Battalion.....	Ancemont
108th Sanitary Train.....	Faubourg Pavé
108th Engineers.....	Dugny
108th Supply Train.....	
65th Brigade P. C.....	Sommedieue
129th Infantry.....	Sommedieue and vicinity
130th Infantry.....	Rupt-en-Woëvre
123rd Machine Gun Battalion.....	Rupt-en-Woëvre
66th Brigade.....	Génicourt
131st Infantry.....	Camp Monthairons area
132nd Infantry.....	Les Monthairons—Génicourt area
124th Machine Gun Battalion.....	Le Petit Monthairon—Camp les Tamaris
52nd Field Artillery Brigade P. C.....	Dieue-sur-Meuse
104th Field Artillery.....	Bois des Cinq Frères
105th Field Artillery.....	Bois la Ville
106th Field Artillery.....	Bois la Ville and Le Chêne Gossin
102nd Trench Mortar Battery.....	Faubourg Pavé
102nd Ammunition Train.....	Faubourg Pavé

²"23rd October, 1918: Companies A, B, and C continued reorganizing and cleaning up men and equipment. Co. D proceeded from Bois Bourrus to Rupt-en-Woëvre via Sommedieue. Left Bois Bourrus 9:00 A.M. and arrived in Sommedieue 5:00 P.M. Staged in Sommedieue night of 23rd–24th October, 1918." Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:22.

³See Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:648; 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:658; Narrative of Operations of the 3rd Battalion 129th Infantry, 2:661; Operations, 106th Field Artillery, 3:285.

⁴As prescribed by Training Circular, 33rd Division, October 21, 1918. See above, 1:379, n. 88.

⁵See above, 1:165.

⁶"1. Issued Field Order No. 31 in connection with relief of 79th Div. U. S. by 33rd Division. Also march table.

"2. Sent warning order to 65th and 66th Brigades, 108th Engrs. and 122nd M. G. Bn., regarding march of units to relieve 79th Div. U. S." Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, 6 A.M. October 23 to 6 A.M. October 24, 1918, 2:474.

⁷"October 23rd

"19:45 Received copy of 17th (French) Corps order directing 33rd Division to relieve 79th Division in Troyon sector.

"22:00 Arranged with Divisional Artillery Commander, 79th Division, (Commanding

General, 55th Field Artillery Brigade) details of relief." Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade, 3:262.

⁸See 2:301.

⁹Field Order No. 21, P. C. 66th Infantry Brigade, A. E. F., was issued at 7:30 P.M. on October 23, 1918 (3:49), Field Order No. 8, P. C. 65th Infantry Brigade, A. E. F. was issued at 10:55 A.M. on October 4, 1918, but was preceded by a memorandum order to the C. O. Pilot [code word for 130th Infantry] on October 23 and by a warning order issued at 2:25 A.M. on October 23 [October 24], 2:615, 616.

¹⁰"Pursuant to Field Orders № 31, Hdqrs. 33rd Division, 23rd October, 1918, also Field Orders № 8, Hdqrs. 65th Brigade, and Field Orders № 27, Hdqrs. 130th Infantry, 25th Oct. 1918, the 139th Inf. relieved the 313th Inf. in the Connecticut Sub-sector with Outposts at Fresnes-Champlon-Saulx, and Line of Defense, Hill 372, Côte des Éparges, and Côte-de-Biolle . . . The Second Battalion 130th Infantry relieving the First Battalion 313th Infantry with two companies in the Bois de Combres, and two companies in the Bois-des-Éparges. Relief of the Reserve Battalion being made on the 23rd October 1918." Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:674.

¹¹Report of the Operations Officer, 131st Infantry.

¹²See Move Table annexed to Field Order No. 31, 2:300.

¹³See 1:165.

¹⁴See above, 1:377, n. 76.

¹⁵Records of the Message Centre, 33rd Division.

¹⁶See 2:104.

¹⁷See above, 1:165, 173, 174.

¹⁸"1. Issued order attaching 52nd F. A. Brig. to 79th Div. U. S. and relieving them from command of 33rd Division.

"2. Major Simpson visited Col. Sanborn's P. C.

"3. Rendered situation report to G. H. Q."

Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, 6 A.M. October 24, to 6 A.M. October 25, 1918, 2:474.

¹⁹Report of the Commanding General, 52nd Field Artillery Brigade. See above, 1:162; 3:264.

²⁰"Oct. 24, 1918. At 3:00 P.M. Regiment marched to rest area in Troyon Sector, relieving the 314th Infantry of the 79th Division there. Regimental Headquarters, Headquarters Company, Machine Gun Company, Supply Company billeted in Ambly. First Battalion at Récourt, Second Battalion at Tilly-sur-Meuse, Third Battalion at Ranzières. Relief completed at 6:30 P.M. Distance marched, ten kilos. Movement per F. O. No. 31, Headquarters 33rd Division, 23rd October, 1918. Operation Order No. 31, Headquarters 129th Infantry, 24th October, 1918." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:648. See also reports of the three battalion commanders of the regiment.

²¹"Third Battalion 130th Infantry relieving the Second Battalion 313th Infantry in the right section, C. R. Augusta, of Sub-Sector Connecticut . . . the relief of the Second Battalion 313th Infantry, in C. R. Augusta being made on 24th October." Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:674.

"October 24th . . . 130th Infantry relieved the 313th Infantry in the line and (f)

the 129th Infantry relieved the 314th Infantry in the Fort de Troyon Rest Area." Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:601.

²²"24th October, 1918. Co. D proceeded from Sommedieue to Rupt-en-Woëvre. Move made during the morning by small detachments. Pursuant to Field Order No. 8, P. C. 65th Infantry Brigade, dated 24th October, 1918, the 123rd M. G. Bn. will relieve 311th M. G. Bn. Co. B proceeded from Sommedieue 5:30 P.M. for area forward of Mouilly and relieved portion of guns of 311th M. G. Bn. in main line of resistance in sub-sector 'Connecticut.' Disposition of Companies A and C unchanged." Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:22.

²³"On night of October 24th-25th the Regiment took over the Troyon Sector, and remained in the line until night of November 6th-7th." Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:157.

²⁴See Move Table annexed to Field Order No. 31, 2:300.

²⁵"On the night of Oct. 24th-25th the battalion marched from its billets at Camp les Tamaris and Petite le Monthairons, where units had been resting for a few days, to the vicinity of Longeau Farm in the Troyon Sector. After a night march of 18 miles covering a period of 12 hours, the battalion arrived at its destination about 6:00 A.M., Oct. 25th, and companies proceeded to take over gun positions from the 312th Machine Gun Battalion, 79th Division, A. E. F., in the Massachusetts sub-sector. These reliefs were completed, except as to positions in the outpost zone, by 10:00 A.M. Reliefs in the outpost zone were completed the night of Oct. 25th by 9:00 P.M." Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:190.

²⁶"The regiment marched . . . to the Troyon-Chaillon Sectors; Headquarters P. C. being at Tilly-sur-Meuse; First and Second Battalion P. Cs. east of la Grande Tranchée de Calonne." Report of the Commanding Officer, 108th Engineers, 2:541.

²⁷Report of the Acting Division Signal Officer.

²⁸"Rattentout where they rested until the night 24/25th October, when in accordance with Field Order No. 31, P. C. 33rd Division, 23rd October, 1918, they moved to Woimbey relieving the 310th Machine Gun Battalion." Report of Operations, 122d Machine Gun Battalion, 2:559.

²⁹"Oct. 25, 1918. Two platoons from Second Battalion, plus one section Machine Gun Company, 129th Infantry marched five kilos to Fort-de-Troyon to reinforce French Garrison there (one platoon from Co. 'F', one platoon from Co. 'H'). Remainder of Regiment occupied in cleaning equipment and billets." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:648.

³⁰War Diary, 33rd Division, October 25, 1918, 2:336.

³¹"1. Rendered situation report to G. H. Q.

"2. Relief completed at 2:15 A.M. 26th Oct. 1918.

"3. Major Simpson, accompanied by Chief of Staff, visited P. C. and area of 132nd Inf. and 79th Division Hdqrs."

Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, 6 A.M. October 25, to 6 A.M. October 26, 1918, 2:474.

³²2nd Colonial Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 3.410-T/3, Secret Special Order No. 817, October 25, 1918, 2:109.

³³"Co. B: This company arrived at St. Maurice at 6:30 A.M., Oct. 25th, and took over from Co. A, 312th Machine Gun Battalion that afternoon and evening eight

positions, four between Doncourt and Woël and four at St. Maurice. Lieut. Price, with the 1st Platoon, took over the four forward guns and the other two platoons followed in turn, doing tours of five days each." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:192.

³⁴"The First Battalion relieved the Third (left) Battalion, 313th Infantry in the C. R. Providence of the Sub-sector Connecticut. . . the relief of the Third Battalion 313th Infantry in C. R. Providence being made on 25th October 1918 . . . the Machine Gun Company 130th Infantry relieved the Machine Gun Co. 313th Infantry in the C. R. Providence, Sub-sector Connecticut night of 25th October 1918." Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:674.

³⁵"25th October, 1918. Battalion P. C. moved from Sommedieue to Rivoli, 38.8—50.8 (Map St. Mihiel 1:50,000) sub-sector 'Connecticut'. Co. C moved from Sommedieue to sub-sector 'Connecticut' and relieved portion of guns of 311th M. G. Bn. Relief completed before daylight 26th October, 1918. Companies A and D moved from Rupt-en-Woëvre to sub-sector 'Connecticut' and relieved Companies C and B, 311th M. G. Bn. respectively, in reserve. All reliefs completed during night of 25-26th Oct. 1918. Casualties: None." Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:22.

³⁶As prescribed by Field Order No. 31, October 23, 1918, 2:298.

"October 26th . . . Command of Subsector Connecticut passed from the Commanding General 157th Infantry Brigade to the Commanding General 65th Infantry Brigade at 8:00 hours." Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:601.

"Oct. 23rd to 26th. Brigade relieved the 158th (Amer.) Brigade in the Troyon Sector. 132nd Inf. in line." Operations of the 66th Infantry Brigade, 3:28.

³⁷Diary of the Division Adjutant.

³⁸"1. Rendered situation and operation report to Corps G. H. Q.

"2. Sent letter to 66th Brig., 131st Inf. and 122nd M. G. Bn. regarding extension of front and relief of elements of the 39th Div. (French) by 131st Inf. and 122nd M. G. Bn. Also march of 131st Inf. and 122nd M. G. Bn. to Chaillon and St. Mihiel." Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, 6 A. M. October 26, to 6 A.M. October 27, 1918, 2:474.

³⁹2nd Colonial Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 3.417-T/3, General Order No. 344, October 26, 1918, 2:112.

⁴⁰See above, 1:55; 3:207, 215, 217, 220.

⁴¹See above, 1:55, 175.

⁴²See above, 1:175.

⁴³Operations of Divisional Artillery, 33rd Division, U. S., Troyon Sector, 55th Field Artillery Brigade. Upon the arrival of the 135th and 136th Field Artillery, the following distribution was made:

North Group, supporting the 65th Infantry Brigade, was composed of the 114th Field Artillery and the 1st Battalion of the 113th Field Artillery under Colonel Lea.

South Group, supporting the 66th Infantry Brigade, comprised the 135th Field Artillery and the 2nd Battalion of the 113th Field Artillery under Colonel Hard.

Heavy Group, supporting the entire division sector, included the 115th Field Artillery and the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 136th Field Artillery under Colonel Berry.

⁴⁴Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁴⁵"The General commanding the 2nd C. A. C. approves of all propositions from the General commanding the 33rd I. D. U. S. dated 29th October 1918, concerning dispositions of occupation on the front." 2nd Colonial Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 3453-T/3, Note from the Chief of Staff, October 30, 1918, 2:119.

⁴⁶Operations Reports, 33rd Division. The Troyon sector, supposedly a "quiet sector," was sometimes bombarded heavily by the enemy. Indeed, General Blondlat, in a letter to the Division Commander, dated October 31, 1918, stated that on the front of the 33rd Division "the enemy is using yellow cross shells (yperite) to make concentrations from 2,000 to 6,000 rounds against the localities in the Woëvre plain."

⁴⁷Operations Reports, 33rd Division, particularly those of October 29, 30, 31, November 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, 2:475-476.

"During the remainder of the period to and including November 8th, the brigade was employed in active patrolling and raiding in the front of the lines, capturing prisoners, matériel, and gaining identification," Chronological Record of Events; 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:601. "While the Troyon Sector, which was occupied from October 23rd to November 8th, inclusive, was presumed to be a quiet sector, enemy shelling was heavy. Due to the strong enemy defences consisting of wire entanglement, flooded areas, pill boxes, etc., patrolling and raiding were very difficult but were so maintained that No Man's Land belonged to this brigade." Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:634.

"The operations of the 130th Infantry from 25th October, 1918, to the 11th November 1918, consisted in developing the Outpost system in the Connecticut Sub-sector and strengthening the Defense system by digging trenches and wiring positions, also digging machine gun emplacements and alternative positions, following the plan laid down in the Defense Scheme for Troyon-Chaillon Sector by Hdqrs. 33rd Division, 4th November, 1918. Also active patrolling in order to gain contact with the enemy and conducting raids on strong points of the enemy." Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:675.

"Oct. 26th to Nov. 4th. Patrol operations in the vicinity of St. Hilaire and Warville Woods." Operations of the 66th Infantry Brigade, 3:28.

"The occupation of this sector was marked by unusual patrol activity. In compliance with orders contact was had with the enemy nightly and identification secured on every part of the line. Our combat patrols continually harassed the enemy and drove them to the rear. Our patrols penetrated the town of St. Hilaire, Bois de Warville, Bois les Épinés and southern edges of Butgnéville. During the occupation of the line twenty-nine prisoners were secured." Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:157.

⁴⁸II Army, U. S., 2nd Colonial Army Corps, Staff, No. 796-T/2, Secret, urgent letter from Chief of Staff to the General commanding the 33rd I. D. U. S., October 27, 1918, 2:117.

⁴⁹II Army, U. S., 2nd Colonial Army Corps, Staff, unnumbered, Secret letter from the Chief of Staff to the General Commanding the 33rd I. D. U. S., October 28, 1918, 2:118.

⁵⁰2nd Colonial Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 3442 T/3, Confirmation of telephone message sent the twenty-eighth at 23 hours 15, dated October 29, 1918, 2:118.

⁵¹“Following the extensive attack which resulted in the capture of the salient north of St Mihiel, enemy activity on this immediate front seems to have gradually lessened and at the time of our occupation there appeared to be some question as to where the enemy's lines were located with suspicions in some quarters that he had withdrawn from the immediate front. The only indication of occupation were a few shells sent over every night apparently searching battery positions, and an occasional aeroplane making observation in the day time. In consequence of this uncertainty it was determined that patrols should be sent well forward until they came in contact with the enemy, identification secured and No Man's Land covered in an aggressive manner preventing enemy reconnaissance or activity except in force. To that end strong patrols went out nightly, later, when contact was obtained raids were organized, soon clearing up the situation and resulting in the capture of a number of prisoners and gaining additional territory.” 131st Infantry Operations, St. Hilaire—Bois d' Harville, and Bertaucourt Farm, 3:117.

⁵²Defensive Zone of St. Mihiel, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 3.426-T/3, Secret Annex No. 7 to Chapter II of the Plan of Defense, Defense of the 2nd Position, dated October 27, 1918, 3:115.

⁵³Above, 1:177.

⁵⁴Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, 6 A.M. October 27, to 6 A.M. October 28, 1918, 2:474.

⁵⁵“In compliance with written orders from P. C. 33rd Division, 26th October, 1918, the battalion moved to Chaillon the afternoon of the 26th inst. staging the night of 26/27th October and relieving elements of the 39th French Division the night of the 27/28th October.” Report of Operations, 122d Machine Gun Battalion, 2:559.

⁵⁶Operation Report, 33rd Division, October 29, 1918. Report of the Operations Officer, 131st Infantry.

⁵⁷“1 patrol of the 132nd I. R. U. S. (1 officer, 23 men) from 19 hours to 2 hours encountered and put to flight an enemy detachment of about 40 men in the neighborhood of the Bois des Hautes Épinés and of the Bois de Warville (28-40), fusilade and fight with grenades. 1 man wounded.” Report from the 28th October (12 h.) to the 29th October, 1918 (12 h.), 2nd Colonial Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. T/3, the 29th October, 1918.

“132nd Inf. sent out patrol at 7 P.M. returning at 2 A.M. This patrol consisted of 23 men and 1 officer. During the course of their reconnaissance they encountered an enemy patrol of 40 men, who flanked them and opened fire with rifles, hand grenades and rifle grenades. Our patrol returned the fire and drove them off. One of our men was slightly wounded but was brought in by the patrol. It is believed the enemy still remains in the vicinity of Bois les Htes Épinés and Bois de Warville. It seems that the enemy is quite anxious to protect these places from a frontal attack, as the patrol encountered was apparently a well protected working party preparing M. G. emplacements of a strongly fortified character. Plenty of material was in evidence in the vicinity and minor positions unoccupied were noticed further south of this position. Trip wires with empty tin cans attached to warn approach, are placed across the main roads and paths.” Operations Report, 33rd Division, October 29, 1918.

⁵⁸Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, from 6 A.M. October 29, to 6 A.M. October 30, 1918, 2:475.

⁵⁹Special Order No. 132, Headquarters 33rd Division, October 29, 1918.

⁶⁰"Daylight reconnoitering patrol consisting of two officers and one other rank reconnoitered enemy positions in Trench de Moulin de Saulx returning with information that trenches were occupied. Combat patrol of one officer and 32 other ranks attempted to raid on positions reconnoitered during the afternoon, but found trenches occupied." Operations Report, 130th Infantry, October 31, 1918.

⁶¹"4 patrols [were] sent to gain contact with the enemy; one of them (1 officer, 19 men of the 132nd I. R.—19 hours 30—1 hour in the morning) advanced as far as 500 meters S. O. of St. Hilaire and captured five prisoners (51st K. u. K.) who made no resistance. One reconnaissance by day (2 officers, one N. C. O. of the 130th I. R. U. S.) toward Hill 233 was fired at in the region of the Bois Carré. At night a strong reconnaissance (2 officers, 23 men of the 130th) advanced into the region south of the Bois Carré; nothing to report. A patrol of the 132nd I. R. U. S. to the north of Doncourt was stopped by a violent fire of gas shells." Report from October 29 (12 hours) to October 30, 1918 (12 hours), 2nd Colonial Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 3459 T/3, October 30, 1918.

⁶²*Ibid.*; Operations Report, 33rd Division, for the same period, dated October 30, 1918.

⁶³Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, 6 A.M. October 30, to 6 A.M. October 31, 1918, 2:475.

⁶⁴2nd Colonial Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 3453-T/3, Note, October 30, 1918, 2:119.

⁶⁵"30th October, 1918. Co. A moved from reserve in Bois de Ranzières to main line of resistance in sub-sector 'Connecticut'. Disposition of other companies unchanged. Our operations nil. Co. D carried on training. Casualties: None." Operations of the 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:23.

⁶⁶"In accordance with memorandum from C. G. 66th Inf. Brigade, dated 29th October, this battalion was relieved by Company 'D,' 124th Machine Gun Battalion, the night 30/31st October proceeding to Camp South Thillombois." Report of Operations, 122d Machine Gun Battalion, 2:559.

⁶⁷"Nothing of moment transpired during the occupation of these positions. No suitable positions were prepared and a general re-organization of the sector was made, and on the night of Oct. 30th-31st, the re-organization took place and the machine gun positions of the sub-sector were re-arranged and taken over by Cos. B, C & D, Co. A being placed in reserve. Here these units remained, with Battalion Headquarters at Longeau Farm, until the operation of November 10th-11th. 16 gas casualties in 'B' Company at Avillers." Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:190.

⁶⁸"2 daylight patrols were ordered and 1 night patrol. Daylight patrol sent out to reconnoiter Trench du Moulin de Saulx. Engaged the enemy, who were found to be strongly protected. Hand grenades and rifles were used against the position with the result that 2 of the enemy are known to be killed and it was thought that other casualties were inflicted. Our casualties consisted of 1 man slightly wounded. The remaining patrols did not close with the enemy." Operations Report, 33rd Division, 12 o'clock October 30, 1918, to 12 o'clock October 31, 1918.

⁶⁹2nd Colonial Army Corps, Staff, No. 16081/c, October 31, 1918, 2:120.

⁷⁰As a matter of fact, so heavy were the casualties in Company D, 130th Infantry,

resulting from gas in the area of Fresnes that it had to be relieved from the outpost position that day by Company C of the same regiment. Operations Report, 130th Infantry.

⁷¹Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, 6 A.M. October 31, to 6 A.M. November 1, 1918, 2:476.

⁷²G-3 Orders No. 60, Headquarters, Second Army, October 30, 1918; 21.10 hours, transmitted with a notification annexed by IIInd Colonial Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 3466 T/3, dated October 31, 1918, 2:119.

⁷³Operations Report, 33rd Division, October 31, 1918.

⁷⁴"Oct. 31, 1918. Warning 'Alerte Générale' received at 10:30 A.M. Regiment ready to move at 11:00 A.M. and held in readiness until 5:30 P.M. when 'Recall' was sounded. No change." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:649.

⁷⁵Operations Report, 33rd Division, 12:00 o'clock October 30, 1918, to 12:00 o'clock October 31, 1918.

⁷⁶Operations Report, P.C. Pilot [code word for the 130th Infantry], November 1, 1918.

⁷⁷"The suspected post at 49.5—55.1 is undoubtedly occupied, as patrols yesterday noticed movement from this point. A patrol with the mission to patrol territory south and east of St. Hilaire left Wadonville at 9:30 P.M. and proceeded east and north of St. Hilaire to approximately 52.5—56.0. From there to outskirts of Butgnéville; thence south passing within 100 yards of Bois de Warville, and back to our lines. No enemy were seen, no enemy patrols were met." Operations Report, 33rd Division, 12:00 o'clock October 31, to 12:00 o'clock November 1, 1918. Also P. C. Pancake [code word for the 132nd Infantry], Daily Operations Report for twenty-four hours ending twelve o'clock noon November 1, 1918.

⁷⁸General Orders No. 140, Headquarters 33rd Division, October 30, 1918.

⁷⁹Training Circular No. 189 prescribed the reports to be made immediately after heavy bombardment with mustard gas. Training Circular No. 190 dealt with the development of noncommissioned officers as platoon leaders, drill schedules, reconnaissances, liaison, handling of 3-inch Stokes mortars, etc.

⁸⁰See above, 1:184. Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, 6 A.M. November 1, to 6 A.M. November 2, 1918, 2:476.

⁸¹"1 Austro-Hungarian, who was on sentry duty at Bois de Warville, left his post and came to the American lines in the vicinity of Woël and surrendered. He is from the 64th K. u. K. Regt., 35th A. H. Division. He also states that the 63rd and 64th K. u. K. Regts. were relieved in the line by German troops.

"1 Patrol from the 66th Brigade reconnoitered as far north as Bois de Warville, but could find no signs of the enemy." Operations Report, 33rd Division, 12 o'clock November 1, to 12 o'clock November 2, 1918.

⁸²"Two combat patrols were sent out during the day with instructions to obtain identifications. The patrol from the 1st Battalion failed to close with the enemy. The 3rd Battalion patrol, consisting of 2 officers, a detachment of 10 men from battalion headquarters, a detachment of 10 men from the engineers, and one platoon was ordered to take the post located as 49.5--55.1, under cover of darkness, and then proceed to the edge of the woods at 48.9--55.5, where they would lie in wait until daylight, when the enemy position at 58.8--55.5 would be occupied and consolidated. Full

reports of this patrol have not yet been received." Operations Report, 130th Infantry, November 2, 1918.

⁸³"N. C. O's from each Co. Btry. Troops or corresponding unit will be selected and required to act as comdrs. of platoons or corresponding units. This arrangement is made in order to develop leadership, insure availability of extra commanders in case of casualties and to ascertain prospective candidates for the officers' training schools.'" Journal of Operations, P. C. 33rd Division, 6 A.M. November 2, to 6 A.M. November 3, 1918, 2:477.

⁸⁴Daily Operation Report for twenty-four hours ending 12 o'clock noon November 3, 1918, 132nd Infantry.

⁸⁵Operations Report, 33rd Division, 12 o'clock November 2, to 12 o'clock November 3, 1918.

⁸⁶Daily Operations Report, Headquarters 55th Field Artillery Brigade, November 2, 1918.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, November 3, 1918.

⁸⁸Report from November 2 (12 h.) to November 3, 1918 (12 h.), 2nd Colonial Army Corps, 3rd Bureau, Staff, No. 3390 T/3, dated November 3, 1918.

⁸⁹Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁹⁰"1. Issued Training Circular No. 191. Calling attention of unit Commanders responsible for transportation to Par. III, General Orders No. 80, c.s., G. H. Q., A. E. F.

"2. Rendered usual situation and operation reports to Corps and G. H. Q." Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, 6 A.M. November 3 to 6 A.M. November 4, 1918, 2:477.

⁹¹Company C, 130th Infantry, in outpost position in Centre of Resistance Providence was relieved by Company D at 10:40 P.M. Company D, 132nd Infantry, relieved Company C of that same regiment.

⁹²"No contact with enemy. Enemy wire from 51.7-55.3 to 51.9-54.4 [i.e. south of St. Hilaire along road toward Doncourt] in poor condition. No new works found. Trenches reconnoitered along eastern side of St. Hilaire road near village, very old and not recently used.

"Nothing heard of the enemy during the whole evening. No movement whatever within the area of St. Hilaire and Butgnéville. Patrolled carefully this area with no information of enemy. Encountered no enemy patrol or enemy outposts in this sector. Flares were seen coming from N. E. of Bois de Harville and from vicinity of Marchéville. Enemy gun (77-millimeter) fired several rounds from nearby positions, apparently in Maizeray. Reported M. G. emplacement at 51.1-54.9 [i. e. on the road from St. Hilaire to Wadonville and midway between these two places] was investigated and found not to exist." Operations Report, 33rd Division, 12 o'clock November 3, to 12 o'clock November 4, 1918.

⁹³*Ibid.*

⁹⁴"1. Issued Confidential Memorandum No. 34. Regarding prevention of enemy observation, and proper protection by camouflage.

"2. Issued Training Circular No. 192, 'Casualties caused by Mustard Gas.'

"3. Sent records of students attending I Corps Schools to various organizations.

"4. Letter to C. G. 66th Inf. Brigade and C. O. 122nd M. G.Bn.

'Two Platoons of Inf. and 2 Sections of Machine Guns will be detailed as

re-inforcement garrisons at Fort du Camp des Romains (1-1/2 kilometers south of St. Hilaire), 1-1/2 Platoons of Infantry and 2 sections of Machine Guns will be detailed as re-inforcement garrisons at Fort Des Paroches.'

"5. Rendered usual situation and operation reports to Corps and G. H. Q." Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, 6 A.M. November 4, to 6 A.M. November 5, 1918, 2:477.

⁹⁵General Blondlat commanding the 2nd Colonial Army Corps to the General commanding the 33rd I. D. U. S. (2nd Colonial Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 3505 T/3, November 4, 1918, 2:130.

⁹⁶The 2nd Battalion, 130th Infantry, relieved the 3rd Battalion in C. R. Augusta at midnight.

⁹⁷"Our day and night patrols operating over our entire front gained contact with the enemy at all points. M. G. fire was heard to west and northwest of St. Hilaire. 2 patrols report hearing noises in St. Hilaire from horses and wagons. Tank trap or gun emplacement about 15 feet square found at 52.2-56.3 at 52.6-56.2 an enemy outpost was encountered, 3 of the enemy were killed including 1 officer, 17 taken prisoners. These men were in small dugouts, no trenches, in front of which was a single strand of wire in poor condition. The Bois Warville and Bois des Épinés were found strongly held by the enemy. Patrol was fired on by M. G. when the western edge of Bois Warville was reached. Patrol skirted southern edge of Bois Warville and Bois des Épinés and found strong wire of semi-apron type about 7 feet deep and 4 feet high. 6 machine guns at approximately 54.8-53.5 opened fire on our patrol. Bois de la Hte. Voye and La Haie Maréchal were penetrated and all surrounding country covered. No signs of enemy were seen, or signs of recent occupation. No wire was found in Bois de la Hte Voye and a little wire in La Haie Maréchal. Patrols on extreme right penetrated area south of Jonville and found enemy in fairly strong position at 57.5-52.5 from which fire was opened by 3 machine guns and supporting riflemen. Prisoners were identified as belonging to 439th Infantry, 94th Inf. Division." Operations Report, 33rd Division, 12 o'clock November 4, to 12 o'clock November 5, 1918.

⁹⁸See 2:623.

⁹⁹G-2 Bulletin, General Headquarters, A. E. F., November 4, 1918.

¹⁰⁰See 2:129.

¹⁰¹Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, 6 A.M. November 5, to 6 A.M. November 6, 1918, 2:478.

¹⁰²"2ND C. A. C.

AT THE H. Q., the 5th November, 1918.

STAFF

3RD BUREAU

NOTE.

No. 3.512-T/3

By order of the General Commanding-in-Chief the General commanding the 2nd Colonial Corps ceases to exercise the command of the sector of St. Mihiel and takes the command of the sector of Regret.

The command of the sector of St. Mihiel is exercised, beginning the 5th November at 18 hours, by General Hellot, Commanding the 17th Army Corps.

The elements not embodied with divisions remain in place, until further order, under the orders of the General commanding the sector of St. Mihiel.

By order. The Chief of Staff,

G. AIN."

¹⁰³The note just quoted reached the message centre of the 33rd Division at 8:20 A.M. on November 6, 1918. The original orders contemplated the transfer of the Headquarters and Staff of the 17th French Army Corps from Regret to St. Mihiel and those of the 2nd Colonial Army Corps from St. Mihiel to Regret. At noon on November 4 this was modified by orders directing General Claudel to remain at Regret and to assume command of the 2nd Colonial Army Corps upon its arrival there, *vice* General Blondlat who had been sent to command at Lille. The vacancy thus created in the command of the 17th Army Corps was filled by the assignment to that position of General Hellot, former chief of staff of Marshal de Castelnau. Diary of the Division Adjutant; this information was given to the Division Adjutant at Regret on November 4, by General Claudel himself.

¹⁰⁴Operations Report, 33rd Division, 12 o'clock November 5, to 12 o'clock November 6, 1918.

¹⁰⁵"Resistance to our patrols disclosed the fact that St. Hilaire is strongly held by the enemy. Rau du Moutru is from 6 to 10 (yards) wide in the vicinity of St. Hilaire but very shallow. Ground in vicinity of creek soft and swampy. One of our patrols penetrated woods surrounding draw between Bois Warville and Bois des Épinés for about 50 yards in four or five places. No signs of the enemy seen.

"A combat patrol consisting of one company left Saulx-en-Woëvre at 22:30 hour and proceeded in the direction of the small woods at 48.9—55.5 [i.e. at eastern terminus of the Tranchée du Moulin de Saulx]. The terrain in this direction is covered with ditches shell holes and very thick belts of wire rendering movement extremely difficult. The company commander, realizing the conditions, ordered the patrol to return. The patrol was unsuccessful in its mission." *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶"Patrol of 1 officer and 26 O. R. left Fresnes at 12:10 hour and proceeded in the direction of the Chateau d'Aulnois. About 800 yards north, the point of the patrol was fired upon by two machine-guns and one 37 mm. gun. The point of the patrol consisting of 9 men was cut off by an enemy patrol and captured. The main body of the patrol was forced to return." Operations Report, 130th Infantry, November 6, 1918.

¹⁰⁷"Nov. 5, 1918. No change [in schedule of training]. Officers assembled at Regimental Headquarters and were given a lecture by Colonel Myer treating on the robbing of enemy dead and prisoners, the seriousness of such an offense, etc., this was in turn delivered to every man in the Regiment." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:649.

¹⁰⁸See 2:624.

¹⁰⁹"Night of November 5th and 6th the Third Battalion moved out of Chaillon and relieved the first Battalion of the 132nd Infantry at CR St Maurice. The Second Battalion moved out of Deuxnouds night of 5-6th and relieved the Third Battalion, 132nd Infantry, at C. R. Hannonville." 131st Infantry Operations. St. Hilaire-Bois d' Harville and Bertaucourt Farm, 3:116.

¹¹⁰Summary of Intelligence, No. 52, 33rd Division (G2), November 6, 1918.

CHAPTER VIII

¹Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, 6 A.M. November 6, to 6 A.M. November 7, 1918, 2:478.

²"On November 7th the 3rd Battalion was disposed as follows:—Battalion Headquarters, Company I and Company K were located in the valley 1000 yards east of P. C. Marengo in reserve of the First Battalion, which was holding the front line in C. R. Providence, in front of Chateau d'Aulnois. Companies L and M were 1000 yards west of Combres Hill in reserve of the Second Battalion who were holding a line of observation in C. R. Augusta. . . . Companies I and K moved up to support an attack on Chateau d'Aulnois by the First Battalion on the night of November 6th/7th, returning to reserve position about noon 7th November." Report of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, 2:699; also Operations Report, 12 o'clock November 6, to 12 o'clock November 7, 1918, issued by the P. C. of the 33rd Division on November 7, 1918.

³"6th November, 1918. Orders received from P. C. 65th Infantry Brigade, covering raid by two companies of the 130th Infantry on the Chateau et fme. d'Aulnois. One M. G. Company 123 M. G. Bn. to assist with barrage and harassing fire. Co. D designated to back up the raid. Moved from reserve positions in Bois de Ranzières to Fresnes-en-Woëvre to take up positions for barrage fire on road, trench and strong point north-east of Fme. d'Aulnois and harassing fire on Pintheville and Riaville. All guns in place before daylight. Casualties: Wounded, slight 1." Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:24.

⁴"Two patrols consisting of 1 officer and 4 men each proceeded in direction of wood at 48.7--55.5, following the trench du Moulin de Saulx. No resistance was met until after the patrol had entered the woods when an attempt was made to ambush the party [but] without success. All attempts to cut the patrol off met with failure. Before reinforcements arrived, the patrol had succeeded in killing 12 and capturing 1 of the enemy. Our party returned without casualties." Operations Report, 130th Infantry, November 7, 1918.

⁵"Patrol No. 1—Night of Nov. 6-7; Two officers and 40 other ranks passes outpost near Wadonville toward Butgnéville along the stream northeast to east of St. Hilaire. Patrol left at 6 P.M. returned 2:30 A.M. Saw no enemy but observed signs of recent occupation in trenches near St. Hilaire." 131st Infantry Operations. St. Hilaire—Bois d' Harville and Bertaucourt Farm, 3:117.

⁶"The troops on our immediate front are mainly machine gunners. The roads and the entrances through the barbed wire are very strongly protected. The terrain between Saulx and Marchéville is very difficult to pass over. There appears to have been no intention of the enemy to withdraw." Operations Report, 33rd Division, 12 o'clock November 6, to 12 o'clock November 7, 1918.

⁷"In the night of 6-7th the First Battalion located at Deuxnouds relieved the Second Battalion 132nd Infantry at C R Viéville and the 131st M. G. [Company] moved to Longeau Farm." 131st Infantry Operations. St. Hilaire—Bois d' Harville and Bertaucourt Farm, 3:116.

⁸"Nov. 7-9th. Brigade reserve in Troyon Sector." Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:158.

⁹Operations Report, 55th Field Artillery Brigade, November 7, 1918.

¹⁰Records of the G-2 Office, Headquarters 33rd Division.

¹¹"*Operation on Chateau d'Aulnois*: Supporting 65th Infantry Brigade—130th Infantry Regiment.—executed at 5:45 November 7th. The outline of artillery support desired given in order B. A. 1228—65th Infantry Brigade. The following batteries all under command of Colonel Lea were used in this operation: 114th F. A.—A, B, C, E, F. 113th F. A.—A, B, C. 115th F. A.—A, D, E, F. The missions were: (A) Preliminary Bombardment. (B) Box Barrage. (C) Rolling Barrage. (D) Smoke Screen. (E) Covering Fire.—Heavy (F) Neutralization and Interdiction—Corps Artillery." Operations of Divisional Artillery, 33rd Division, U. S., Troyon Sector, 55th Field Artillery Brigade, 3:295.

As has been seen, Battery C, 113th Field Artillery, was put out of action by enemy gas shells scoring direct hits in its casemates.

¹²"7th November, 1918. 'D' day for raid 7th November, 1918. 'H' hour 5:45 A.M. At the designated time Co. D put down fire as described under date of 6th Nov. 1918 [see 1:395, n. 5] 76,000 rounds of ammunition expended. Raid by the two companies of 130th Infantry reported successful. Co. D returned to position in reserve in Bois de Ranzières 7:45 A.M. Disposition of Companies A, B and C unchanged." Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:24.

¹³Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry. The officer captured at the Chateau d'Aulnois declared that, when the 79th American Division was relieved, announcement was made to the enemy forces that it was to be succeeded by "green troops." After witnessing the manner in which the first few daylight patrols were conducted by the 33rd Division, the enemy quickly realized that he was confronted by thoroughly experienced officers and men and thereafter he was extremely wary in consequence. Statement made to the author by the Commanding General of the 65th Infantry Brigade.

¹⁴"During the period October 25th to November 8th, inclusive, there was constant offensive activity in the nature of patrols and raids in the front of our line, the most important of which was the raid made on the Chateau et Fme. d'Aulnois which was eminently successful, all details having been carefully worked out, including Machine Gun and Artillery barrages and harassing fire. Everything worked out as per schedule and so far as could be ascertained every individual enemy in this Strong Point was either killed or captured by the raiding party. This was a two-company raid by the 130th Infantry who accounted for 9 of the enemy killed and one officer and 21 Other Ranks taken prisoner, 5 of the prisoners being wounded." Report of the Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:601.

¹⁵Operations Report from 12 o'clock November 6, to 12 o'clock November 7, 1918, P. C. 33rd Division, November 7, 1918; Operations Report, Headquarters 55th Field Artillery Brigade, November 7, 1918. During this raid the divisional artillery fired 5,155 rounds of 75-millimeter shells and 806 rounds of 155-millimeter shells.

¹⁶"The morning of November 7th the various units of the 131st Inf. were located as follows: Headquarters Bois de la Montagne (48.2—48.6) First Battalion at C R Viéville, Second Battalion at C R Hannonville, Third Battalion at C R St Maurice and Machine Gun Co. at Longeau Farm. The position was defensive with centers of resistance on the line Hannonville—St Maurice—Viéville. Patrol zone, the terrain between the outpost zone and the enemy." 131st Infantry Operations. St. Hilaire—Bois d' Harville and Bertaucourt Farm, 3:116.

¹⁷"Patrol No. 2—Two officers and 40 other ranks leaving 4 A.M. and returning 8 A.M. the 7th of November. Reconnoitered Bois de Warville and Bois des Épinés. Returned on account of fog clearing up, located no enemy in woods reconnoitered.

"Patrol No. 3—One Officer and 25 other ranks left at 11 A.M., returning at dark November 7th, route to 500 yards southwest of south end of Bois les Épinés, thence through the village of Doncourt thence north about 100 yards returning without encountering the enemy." 131st Infantry Operations. St. Hilaire-Bois d'Harville and Bertaucourt Farm, 3:117-118.

¹⁸Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, 6 A.M. November 7, to 6 A.M. November 8, 1918, 2:478.

¹⁹See 2:131. These dispositions were largely based upon the secret instructions from the Chief of Staff, Second American Army, to the general commanding the 17th Army Corps, dated November 6, 1918, and transmitted on November 7 to the Commander of the 33rd Division for execution (2nd A. U. S., 17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 819-S/3). This order prescribed that each brigade be required to keep "on hand at all times a completed plan for a raid which can be executed on short notice." Such raids were to be confined to one battalion, the artillery and machine guns coöperating, and the remaining units were to be used to support and protect the battalion engaged.

²⁰"The Bn. was stationed in Récourt until 9th Nov., 1918, the time being spent in training." Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:655.

"Tilly-sur-Meuse where a drill schedule was followed until November 9th." Second Battalion, 129th Infantry, Operations, October 16 to December 7, 1918, 2:658.

"(Brigade Reserve) Oct. 25th to Nov. 9th inclusive. Received replacements, reorganized the Battalion and trained." Narrative of Operations of the 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:661.

²¹In quoting this telegram, G-3 of the 33rd Division attached the following paragraph: "The above is interpreted to mean that the Parliamentarians may be brought back as far as Division P. C. and no further. This message will be confirmed by telegram, but is furnished so that the information may be sent to lower echelons at once."

²²17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, 831-S/3, November 8, 1918, 2:132.

²³131st Infantry Operations. St. Hilaire-Bois d'Harville and Bertaucourt Farm, 3:119.

Field Order No. 47, P. C. Pliable, November 7, 1918, governing this raid will be found in 3:131.

²⁴Operations Report, 33rd Division, November 8, 1918.

²⁵Operations Report, 12 o'clock November 7, to 12 o'clock November 8, 1918, P. C. 33rd Division, November 8, 1918; Operations Report of the 130th Infantry for the same period.

²⁶"Patrol No. 4—Three officers and 40 other ranks left at 11:30 P.M. November 7th and returned 2:30 A.M. the 8th. Route from Woël northeast along the Woël-Jonville Road to opposite Bois de la Hte Voye thence north to Bois la Vachère through southern edge of wood and return. No enemy encountered.

"Patrol No. 5—One officer and 40 other ranks left at 3 A.M. and returned

8 A.M. the 8th. Route—Avillers—Doncourt—to S. W. of Bois de Warville at which point they captured 1 Sergeant, 1 Corporal, eight privates and a light machine gun. Prior to reaching this point German signals were sent up from Bois de Warville which were answered in three or four minutes by artillery. Barrage was laid down 250 yards west of Bois de Warville and moved slowly in the direction of Doncourt. Before the patrol reached Doncourt the Barrage lifted and was placed . . . for forty minutes. Bois de Warville was found to be heavily wired. Patrol was fired upon by at least four machine guns from edge of Bois d' Harville—road between Doncourt and Bois de Warville was found to be barricaded in two places." 131st Infantry Operations. St. Hilaire—Bois d'Harville and Bertaucourt Farm, 3:118.

²⁷"Enemy is using increased amount of gas—H. E. shells. Heavy fire upon Riaville-Maizeray, amounting to light barrage followed our patrol operations last night. Red single and 6-star rockets and green single star rockets were observed just previous to opening of this fire." Summary of Intelligence No. 54, 12 hours November 7, to 12 hours November 8, issued by G-2, 33rd Division, on November 8, 1918. Also Operations Report, 130th Infantry, November 8, 1918.

²⁸"Battery F, 114th F. A. bombarded by 150 m/m rifles for several hours during night starting at 9:15. Munitions of Battery F damaged, degree undetermined. Battery B, 114th F. A. bombarded with 105 m/m from 2:15 to 2:45. 1st Bn. Hqrs., 114th F. A. bombarded." Operations Report from 12H November 7, to 12H November 8, 1918. 55th Field Artillery Brigade, November 8, 1918.

²⁹"Operations on St. Hilaire. Supporting 66th Infantry Brigade—131st Infantry Regiment—executed at 5:45 November 8th. The following batteries under command of Colonel Hard were used in the operation. 113th F. A.—D, E, F. 135th F. A.—A, B, C, D, E, F. 115th F. A.—A, B, C, E,—Heavy. 136th F. A.—E, F. The missions were: (A) Box Barrage. (B) Rolling Barrage. (C) Smoke Screen. (D) Covering Fire—Heavy Artillery." Operations of Divisional Artillery, 33rd Division, U. S. Troyon Sector. 55th Field Artillery Brigade, 3:296.

³⁰131st Infantry Operations. St. Hilaire—Bois d' Harville and Bertaucourt Farm, 3:122.

³¹Operations Report from 12 o'clock November 7, to 12 o'clock November 8, 1918, P. C. 33rd Division, November 8, 1918.

³²See above, 1:397, n. 23.

³³Operations Report, 33rd Division, November 8, 1918.

³⁴2nd A. U. S., 17th Army Corps, Staff, 2nd Bureau, No. 3394/2, dated November 8, 1918.

³⁵Training Circular No. 194, announced that, in conforming with G-3 Training Memorandum No. 3, Headquarters Second Army, dated November 3, 1918, a training battalion would be established in each brigade for the purpose of instruction in automatic rifles, 37-millimeter guns, Stokes mortars, rifle grenades, hand grenades, signaling—including all technical liaison such as projectors, telephones, buzzers, fireworks, etc.—and gas defense. Training Circular No. 195 made known to the command that a course in practical training in gas defense would be inaugurated on November 11, 1918, at Camp Gibraltar. Announcement was made that training periods of three days each would begin every Monday and Thursday, and the number of men to attend this school from each unit was prescribed.

³⁶This annex was formulated in conformity with chapter XII of the plan of defense

for the Troyon sector, mentioned in General Blondlat's memorandum on November 4. See above, 1:189, and 2:127.

³⁷Journal of Operations, 6 A.M. November 8, to 6 A.M. November 9, 1918, P. C. 33rd Division, November 9, 1918, 2:478-479.

³⁸See 3:55.

³⁹"On the morning of November 8th 1918, Co. F Captain Fred G. Givens commanding, raided Evergreen Woods for the purpose of driving out the enemy and obtaining identifications. The enemy was driven out of the woods suffering casualties and identifications were obtained. Co. F, sustained no casualties in this fight. The company then returned to Saulx and at dark to their support position as per orders.

"An outpost consisting of one officer (Lt. D. W. Stevenson of Co. E) and sixteen men of Co. E, was immediately established in Evergreen Woods. The enemy did not try to recapture the woods but continually shelled it and Saulx.

"Two daylight patrols were sent out from Co. E to report on the condition of roads, one patrol proceeding on the road north from Saulx and one on the road northeast toward Bussy. Bussy was found unoccupied and patrol ordered to hold it. On the occupation of Bussy the enemy were seen running from a nearby dugout to a concrete pillbox. An attack was made on this pillbox after dark but the enemy had fled.

"Lieut. Frank W. Rawalt with one platoon of Co. H, relieved the platoon of Co. G, at Saulx at dark." Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 130th Infantry, 2:692.

"Preliminary to the raid on Marchéville a reconnaissance was made of the Evergreen Wood and position near Bussy which was occupied by a strong patrol on 8th November 1918, said patrol capturing one of the enemy and killing one officer and 13 other ranks of the enemy at this point, maintaining the position and affording a 'jumping-off' line for the attack of 10th November 1918." Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:675.

⁴⁰"During night of November 7/8th and day of November 8th there was no activity other than our own protective patrols along our outpost line. At about 8.00 P.M., evening of 8th November, order was received from Regimental Headquarters to send two additional Companies to the out-post line and Companies A and C were sent forward arriving at Fresnes about 2:00 A.M. November 9th." Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 130th Infantry, 2:690.

"On November 8th 1918 the Second Battalion 130th U. S. Infantry was holding the line in front of Combres, France, in sub sector C. R. Augusta, the Battalion P. C. being near Combres. The outpost troops consisted of Co. E, plus one platoon of Co. G, all under command of Capt. Ellacott of Co. G. The Outpost P. C. was in Saulxen-Woëvre. The sector being covered by outposts and patrols to the front of Saulx. Company G, less one platoon and Co. H were holding the first line of defense. Co. F. was in support position." Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 130th Infantry, 2:692.

Companies I and K were in the valley 1,000 yards east of P. C. Marengo acting as the reserve for the 1st Battalion. Companies L and M were 1,000 yards west of Combres Hill as the reserve for the 2nd Battalion. Report of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, 2:699.

⁴¹"Nov. 8, 1918. One officer and five guides per Battalion, all Company Com-

manders and Commanders of special units reconnoitered Connecticut Sub-sector (held by the 130th Infantry), per Verbal Order, Commanding General, Sixty-fifth Infantry Brigade. Otherwise, no change." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:649.

"On November 8th, 1918 the 1st Bn. 129th Inf., then billeted in Récourt, was engaged in preparation for the relief of the 3rd Bn., 130th Inf., then occupying reserve positions in the Bois des Épargés and Ravine Genousevaux, Troyon Sector. These preparations were suspended about noon on the same date upon receipt of a warning order from Regimental Headquarters relative to a concentration of the Regiment at Ranzières." The 2nd Battalion remained at Tilly-sur-Meuse, "where a drill schedule was followed until November 9th;" and the 3rd Battalion "was at Ranzières (Troyon Sector) engaged in the details of reorganizing, equipping and training." See Reports of the Commanding Officers of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions, 129th Infantry, 2:655, 658, 662.

⁴²This wireless message was published in a G-2 Bulletin on November 9, 1918.

⁴³131st Infantry Operations. St. Hilaire—Bois d' Harville and Bertaucourt Farm, 3:118.

⁴⁴"A second offensive was conducted on St. Hilaire on November 9th with support by the Heavy Artillery with one battery of light artillery all under command of Colonel Berry. The missions were to heavily bombard St. Hilaire until H hour and covering fire to H plus 60. Eleven pieces from the Corps Artillery assisted in this operation." Operations of Divisional Artillery, 33rd Division, U. S., Troyon Sector, 55th Field Artillery Brigade, 3:296.

⁴⁵131st Infantry Operations. St. Hilaire—Bois d' Harville and Bertaucourt Farm. An interesting account of this raid is contained in that report, which will be found in 3:122.

⁴⁶Confidential Memorandum No. 36 required each organization to submit a report of its operations from September 26 to November 8, 1918, inclusive. Confidential Memorandum No. 37 directed a "report to G-2 office by telephone of the capture of prisoners."

⁴⁷Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, 6 A.M. November 9, to 6 A.M. November 10, 1918, 2:479.

⁴⁸See 2:121.

⁴⁹"Patrol No. 7—Consisting of two officers and 40 other ranks went out at 11 A.M. the 9th to 4:30 P.M. the 9th in the direction of Bois de Warville. After the patrol crossed the Doncourt—St. Hilaire road and had advanced about 350 meters, they received machine gun fire from 52.6–54.7 and rifle fire from 52.5–55.5. Saw eleven enemy. Drove the enemy into Butgnéville. A rocket was fired from the south of the town which was followed by machine gun fire in front of the town and toward the east men were seen moving at about 53.0–54.3 which rocket was sent up from that point. Also, enemy aeroplane flew over directing artillery fire on the patrol. Barrage was laid down in front of St. Hilaire for five minutes then moved down the road in the direction of Doncourt. By this time machine gun fire was coming from front and flanks and patrol withdrew. No captures. Casualties—no officers, 3 other ranks.

"Patrol No. 8—Two officers and 40 other ranks left Wadonville at 9:30 P.M. Nov. 9th [and] returned 2:30 A.M. November the 10th. Proceeded to St. Hilaire and found the town flooded with water. Enemy patrol of eight men seen retreating.

At 52.6—55.5 there was an enemy post, enemy seen withdrawing with light machine gun. Patrol received heavy fire from northeast direction beyond St. Hilaire—Butgnéville Road. Strong point located at 52.7—55.7. St. Hilaire unoccupied by the enemy. Machine gun emplacements at 52.3—55.3 and 51.9—54.9. Patrol withdrew without capturing any prisoners. Casualties, officers—0, other ranks—2.” 131st Infantry Operations. St. Hilaire—Bois d’Harville and Bertaucourt Farm, 3:118—119.

⁵⁰Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 130th Infantry, on its operations November 8 to 11, inclusive, 2:690-691.

⁵¹See above, 399, n. 40.

⁵²Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 130th Infantry, November 8 to 11, 1918, 2:692.

⁵³131st Infantry Operations, St. Hilaire—Bois d’Harville and Bertaucourt Farm, 3:123.

⁵⁴See 3:59.

⁵⁵131st Infantry Operations. St. Hilaire—Bois d’Harville and Bertaucourt Farm, 3:122.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 3:124.

⁵⁷Field Order No. 23, P. C. 66th Infantry Brigade, November 9, 1918, 1:00 P.M., 3:56.

“Nov. 7—9th. Brigade reserve in Troyon Sector.” Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:158.

⁵⁸See above, 1:192.

⁵⁹Field Order No. 23x, Headquarters 66th Infantry Brigade, November 9, 1918, 10:00 P.M., 3:60.

⁶⁰Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, to Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry, telephoned at 11:30 P.M. on November 9: “You will assemble your command immediately and march to Doncourt, Doncourt—Woël Road and be there by 5 A.M. March with full combat equipment. There will be two battalions make an attack on Bois d’Harville assembling in Bois de Warville and Bois les Épinés. Your M. G. Co. will assemble at your present Bn. Hq. and await further orders. Upon arrival at Doncourt of the 2nd Bn. you will assemble command and move forward into the Bois les Épinés and Bois Warville, placing your troops under cover awaiting the hour of attack. H hour unless changed will be at 2 P.M. 10—11—18. Co. A 124th M. G. Bn. to 3rd Bn. Co. B 124th M. G. Bn. to 2nd Bn. M. G. Cos will meet you at Doncourt. 1st Bn. (2 companies at Woël 2 companies in woods Les Épinés are now clearing them up). You will meet them somewhere upon arrival and take them under your command. At H hour minus 30 minutes, the attacking Bn. (3rd Bn.) will assemble in Bois de Warville and the support Bn. (2nd Bn.) will be in support position in Bois les Épinés. Complete orders will follow. See that you have plenty of wire cutters. You will be sure to be in the woods before there is visibility tomorrow to prevent shelling.”

Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, to Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry. sent at 11:30 P.M.; “You will assemble your battalion less 1 Co. immediately and march to Doncourt and come under the command of Major Allen. You will meet Co. B, 124th M. G. Bn. at Doncourt who will be attached to you, will be at Doncourt at 5 A.M. 10th Nov. Your Company on mission to hold St. Hilaire (g)

will continue its mission. Major Allen's command will be at Doncourt, crossing on Doncourt-Woël road at that time. Your present M. G. Co. will assemble at your present Bn. Hq. and await further orders."

Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, to Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, sent at 11:45 P.M. "Give the exact location of your position. The regiment will attack Bois d' Harville tomorrow morning, change your plans as follows. Clean up Bois de Warville and Bois les Épinés and hold the N. W. edges with outposts and your support immediately behind in depth. Send runners to Doncourt to meet the other Bns. Rest of the force will meet you in the woods about dawn. Acknowledge quickly."

Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, to Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, telephoned at 11:45 P.M.: "You will have your companies A & B go to Doncourt and meet me or my representative at 5 A.M." Record of Messages Sent and Received, 131st Infantry.

⁶¹See 2:627.

⁶²See 2:629.

⁶³"Nov. 9, 1918. Regiment concentrated at Ranzières in preparation for the anticipated attack per 'Conduct in case of Enemy Withdrawal, scheme of defense, Troyon Sector,' Hqs., 33rd Div., 8th November, 1918, F.O. No. 10, 65th Bde., 9th November, 1918. Regtl. Hqs. Hqs. Co. & M. G. Co. left Ambly 3:00 P.M., arrived Ranzières 6.00 P.M. Distance marched six kilos. 1st Bn. left Récourt 2:40 P.M. arrived Ranzières, 6.30 P.M., distance marched twelve kilos. 2nd Bn. left Tilly-sur-Meuse at 3.15 P.M., and arrived at Ranzières 5:00 P.M. Distance marched, seven kilos. Supply Co. remained at Ambly. P. C. closed at Ambly 4.00 P.M. and opened at Ranzières 4.30 P.M." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:650.

"At 2:30 P.M. Nov. 9th, 1918, the Battalion marched to Ranzières and billeted there for the night. On the evening of the same date a meeting of Field Officers was held at which relevant points of 'Secret Operation Order No. 33, Reg. Hq.' were carefully gone over." Report of Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, for November 8 to 11, 2:655.

"On November 9th the Battalion moved to Ranzières." Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:658.

"(Brigade Reserve) Oct. 25th to Nov. 9th inclusive. Received replacements, reorganized the Battalion and trained." Narrative of Operations of the 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:661.

⁶⁴"Nov. 9th—Companies A and B were assigned to 2nd and 3rd Battalions 129th Infantry respectively. Companies C and D to 2nd and 3rd Battalions 130th Infantry. Company D left for Fresnes at 4:00 P.M. for purpose of supporting raid on Marchéville by 130th Infantry." Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:24.

⁶⁵"Companies I and K. . . again moved up to the support position on the night of November 9th/10th. . . Companies L and M were moved forward to the eastern slope of Combres Hill on the night of November 9th/10th in support of the attack upon Marchéville. Battalion Headquarters also moved and a P. C. was established on Combres Hill." Report of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, 2:699-700.

⁶⁶Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:602, thus summarizes the important happenings in that command:

"Nov. 9th, 1918. In accordance with Warning Order published at the 129th Infantry 9 A M to be ready to move forward at once, that regiment (less 3rd Bn. already stationed at Ranzières), moved forward to Ranzières at 14:15 hours, to stage before relieving units of the 130th Infantry in the line, 130th Infantry held the line with the 1st and 2nd Bns. in the line and the 3rd Bn. in reserve.

"Reconnoitering and contact patrols sent out.

"Companies of the 123rd M. G. Bn. automatically attached to Infantry Battalions, as follows: Co. A, to 2nd Bn., 129th Inf., Co. B to 3rd Bn., 129th Inf.; Co. C to 2nd Bn., 130th Inf.; and Co. D to 3rd Bn., 130th Infantry.

"Co. D, 123rd M. G. Bn., left for Fresnes at 16:00 hours to support the raid on Marchéville by the 130th Infantry, morning of 10th November, in accordance with Brigade Field Orders No. 9, and supplemental Memorandum Order.

"Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry notified in code, by 'phone, at 20:40 of uncertain situation of Division on his left (especially the right flank of that division) and to carefully guard his own left flank.

"Memorandum Order issued to Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, directing two patrols to be sent from Fresnes to occupy Pintheville and Riaville and a large patrol to move on Marchéville-Maizeray.

"Commanding General, 66th Brigade, on our right, requested to engage by machine guns, the vicinity of St. Hilaire and the road St. Hilaire—Marchéville when the right battalion of this brigade should attack the morning of 10th November.

"Casualties: 1 enlisted man killed; 1 enlisted man missing."

⁶⁷Report of the events of the 24 hours from November 9 (12 h.) to November 10 (12 h.). 17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 1126-S/3, November 9, 1918.

⁶⁸"A very heavy artillery fire was kept up throughout the day, principally on our forward positions in Fresnes, Champlon and Saulx. This fire was principally of a harassing nature, of 75-s, 105-s, 150-s, HE and Gas. Counter barrage fell on the road between Fresnes and Champlon and on the town of Fresnes." Operations Report, 130th Infantry, from 12 hours November 9, to 12 hours November 10, dated November 10, 1918.

⁶⁹As prescribed by Field Order No. 9, Headquarters 65th Infantry Brigade, November 8, 1918, 9:15 P.M., 2:627.

⁷⁰"Operations on Marchéville: Supporting 65th Infantry Brigade—130th Infantry Regiment at 5:45 November 10th: The batteries used were under command of Colonel Lea. 113th F. A.—A, C, D, E, F. 114th F. A.—A, C, E, F. 115th F. A.—A, B, C, E. The missions were: (A) Box Barrage. (B) Rolling Barrage. (C) Concentrations—Light and Heavy. (D) Covering Fire—Heavy. (E) Neutralization fire—Corps Artillery." Operations of Divisional Artillery, 33rd Division, U. S. Troyon Sector. 55th Field Artillery Brigade. 10,826 rounds were fired.

⁷¹"Nov. 10th—Company D assisted raid of 130th Infantry by barrage fire on area just north of Marchéville and embarrassing fire on Riaville, from positions at Fresnes. 75,000 rounds of ammunition expended. Casualties: Nil." Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:24.

⁷²Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 130th Infantry, for November 8 to 11, 1918, 2:692-693.

⁷³Bulletin of Information No. 118, issued by the 17th Army Corps, November 10, 1918.

⁷⁴Interrogatories of prisoners captured at Marchéville, published in Annex No. 1 to Summary of Intelligence No. 56, 33rd Division (G-2), November 10, 1918.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*; Bulletin of Information No. 118, 17th Army Corps.

⁷⁶"On the morning of November 10th, about one hour after the attack on Marchéville, I received a telephone message from Capt. Gravenhorst requesting me to send troops to support the attack. Company L was placed at his disposal. I, myself, went to Saulx to have a conference with Capt. Gravenhorst and on my return I sent Company M forward. This company moved up into the front lines." Report of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, on Operations from November 8 to 11, 1918, 2:700.

⁷⁷"On 10th November 1918, at 5:45 A.M., the Second Battalion, under command of Captain Albert H. Gravenhorst, attacked Marchéville with the aid of an artillery barrage capturing six officers, 85 other ranks, and killing a great number of the enemy who were not counted owing to a counter attack and gas barrage which drove our forces into the trenches at the southern edge of the town. The village of Marchéville was held by the Second Battalion 130th Infantry and afforded a covering point for the attack of the 11th November 1918. Four heavy and eight light machine guns were captured in the raid on Marchéville and one six-inch Howitzer in the vicinity of Côte 233." Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:675.

⁷⁸Operations Report, 130th Infantry, November 10, 1918.

⁷⁹"130 Infantry carried out attacking raid on Marchéville, cleaning up all Trench Systems, northeast of Saulx and captured and destroyed the Observation Post in Hill 233, also captured the village of Marchéville, with the aid of artillery, but two enemy counter-attacks forced the two companies of occupation to retire to the trench system at the southeastern edge of the village, from which position two further counter-attacks were repulsed.

"38 of the enemy were killed; 92 prisoners were taken, of which 5 were officers and 87 Other Ranks. Our casualties not definitely known at this time, but included in later reports. . . .

"Letters of commendation published by the Brigade Commander to Captain Albert H. Gravenhorst, Battalion Commander, 130th Infantry, and Major Albert L. Culbertson, Commanding the 123rd Machine Gun Battalion, upon the success of their commands in the raid upon Marchéville, the morning of this date.

"Co. D, 123rd M. G. Bn., carried out its mission of barrage fire on the area just north of Marchéville and of harassing fire on Riaville from positions in Fresnes.

"Material Captured: 4 heavy Machine Guns.
8 light Machine Guns."

Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:603.

⁸⁰"The barrage which your people put down in front of Marchéville during the 10th of November, when the Boche counter-attacked, had a wonderful effect. One officer told me that he saw two machine guns knocked to pieces, and other men and officers say that the effect on the Boche was splendid." Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade, to Commanding General, 55th Field Artillery Brigade, November 16, 1918, 3:297; also statement of General King to the writer.

⁸¹Operations Report, 130th Infantry, November 10, 1918.

⁸²Report of the events of the 24 hours from November 9 (12 hours) to November 10, (12 hours) 17th Army Corps, Staff, 2nd and 3rd Bureaus, No. 1122-C/3.

⁸³See above, 1:201.

⁸⁴See 2:309.

⁸⁵17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. S/3, "True copy certified to the General commanding the 33rd I. D. U. S. (and) the General commanding the Artillery of the A. C.," dated November 10, 1918.

⁸⁶The western boundary of the IVth Corps as then existing was extended north through Jonville (exclusive)—Latour-en-Woëvre (exclusive)—Hannonville (exclusive)—Ville-sur-Yron (exclusive) to Jarny (exclusive). Tactical use of the road from Hannonville past the Mars-la-Tour monument to Jarny was reserved for the 17th Army Corps.

⁸⁷Records of the Message Centre of the 33rd Division.

⁸⁸"Our attack is progressing along the entire front in spite of a stubborn resistance. The 17th A. C. has captured Marchéville, St. Hilaire, the Bois de Warville and the Bois les Hautes Épinés. The VIth Corps has captured the Bois de Fréhaut and the Bois de la Woivrotte.

"The IIInd Army will continue its attack by concentrating its efforts upon the points where the enemy seems to offer less resistance. The mission of the Army remains unchanged as well as the zones of action devolving upon the A. Cs.

"The 17th A. C. will continue with energy the success already obtained."

⁸⁹See 2:135.

⁹⁰Journal of Operations, 6 A.M. November 10, to 6 A.M. November 11, 1918, P. C. 33rd Division, November 11, 1918, 2:479.

⁹¹See above, 1:208-209.

⁹²See above, 1:206-207.

⁹³".... I. With reference to Field Order No. 10, these Headquarters, dated 9th November, 1918, the following change is made:

"The battalion of the 130th Infantry now in Fresnes and the Machine Gun Company attached to it, will follow the battalion of the advance guard that will move along the Fresnes—Riaville—Pintheville—Pareid—Villers Road, maintaining such a distance from the advance guard as will enable them to support the advance guard if necessary.

"2. It will cover the left flank of the advance, maintaining liaison with the elements of the 81st Division."

"HEADQUARTERS,
65TH INFANTRY BRIGADE,
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES. RW/w.
FRANCE, 10th November, 1918.
3:45 P.M.

"MEMORANDUM ORDER:

I. With reference to Field Order No. 10, these Headquarters, dated 9th November, 1918, 'D' day will be Monday, November 11th, 1918, and 'H' hour 5:00 A.M.

ROANE WARING,
Major, U. S. A.,
Brigade Adjutant."

⁹⁴"F. O. No. 34, Hdqrs. 33rd Division, received and F. O. No. 10, these Brigade

Headquarters published, covering advance to be made on Monday, 11th November, in conjunction with the 66th Brigade on our right and the 81st Division on our left, the mission to be as laid down in Annex No. 11, to Defense Scheme Troyon-Chaillon Sector, dated Nov. 8th, 1918. Further details of attack contained in F. O. No. 35, Hdqrs. 33rd Division, published at 11:00 P.M.

"Addendum to Plan of Liaison to accompany F. O. No. 34, Hdqrs. 33rd Division, received." Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:603.

⁹⁵"129th Infantry moved from Ranzières staging area to front line locations, preparatory to relieving the 130th Inf." Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:602-603.

⁹⁶"Nov. 10, 1918. Pursuant to Field Order No. 34, Hqs. 33rd Div., 10th, Nov. 1918, F. O. No. 10, 65th Bde., 9th November, 1918, Operation Order No. 33 (Amended) 129th Inf., 10th November, 1918, the units of this Regiment marched to take up position for advance, as follows: 1st Bn. left Ranzières, 2.15 P.M., marched to Herbeuville, arriving at latter place 10.30 P. M. Distance marched fifteen kilos. 2nd Bn. left Ranzières 2.00 P.M., marched to Fresnes, arriving there at 11.30 P.M. Distance marched sixteen kilos. 3rd Bn. left Ranzières 2:30 P.M., marched to vicinity of Saulx, arriving at 9.35 P.M. Distance marched fifteen kilos. Regtl. P. C. closed at Ranzières, and opened at Saulx, 10.00 P.M. Supply Co. at Ambly. Transport near St. Rémy." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:650.

"At 2:30 P.M. Nov. 10th, 1918, the Regiment moved from Ranzières to the Bois Rémy where a hot meal was consumed after which about 8:00 P.M., the Battalions moved to their starting positions outlined in Operations Order. This Battalion accompanied by M. G. Co., 129th Inf. moved to and occupied a system of trenches on the heights overlooking Herbeuville." Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:655.

"The Battalion continued its march at 2:00 P.M. November 10th, arriving at Fresnes-en-Woëvre November 11th at 2:00 A.M. Here the Battalion relieved a Battalion 130th Infantry." Second Battalion, 129th Infantry, Operations, 2:658.

"Nov. 10th. The Battalion left Ranzières and marched to Saulx-en-Woëvre and relieved the 2nd Battalion 130th Infantry, then in front of Marchéville, at 4:00 A.M. 11th Nov." Report of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:662.

⁹⁷"Nov. 11, 1918. Relief of 130 Inf. completed 4.30 A.M." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:650.

⁹⁸"On the night of November 10th/11th the 129th Infantry were to relieve the Second Battalion and Companies L and M of this Battalion, but for some reason or other the relieving troops did not move up. This caused a change in orders and instead of this Battalion being the advanced guard of the right column, it came under the command of Colonel Myer of the 129th Infantry, and was to be the support of the center column of the 65th Brigade. . . . Companies L and M remained in front of Marchéville." Report of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:700.

⁹⁹See above, 1:403, n. 66.

¹⁰⁰Confidential Field Order No. 49, P. C. Pliable (code word for the 131st Infantry) November 10, 1918.

¹⁰¹"At 1 A.M. orders were received to assemble the battalion, less troops in outpost position, and report to Doncourt at 5 A.M. Nov. 10th to Major Allen. The battalion left its position at 3:30 A.M., arriving in Doncourt at 5 A.M., where orders were received placing the writer [Captain Walter H. Wagner, commanding 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry] in command of both battalions and ordering the 2nd Battalion to Bois le Warville." Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, on "operations Nov. 6-11, 1918." See 3:136.

"At midnight of Nov. 9th-10th, this company received orders from 131st Infantry to join that regiment at Doncourt at 5:00 o'clock next morning. Upon arriving there it was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, and moved forward into Haute Épinès and Warville Woods with that regiment. This company was given the task with the 2nd Battalion of protecting the flanks of the 3rd Battalion while it attacked and held a part of Harville Woods." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:192.

¹⁰²By Companies A and B, 1st Battalion, and by the detachment under Lieutenant Cronin. See above, 1:205.

¹⁰³"3rd Bn. is now located in Bois de Warville and 2nd Bn. in Bois les Épinès. My P. C. is located at present at 535.539." Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, to Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, November 10, 1918, 7:15 A.M. Record of Messages Sent and Received, 131st Infantry. Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, which was attached to the 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry, apparently followed somewhat later according to the report of its Commanding Officer, who states that "On the evening of 9th Nov. 1918, received Field Order # 49 from C. O. 131st Infantry, U. S. A., and at 11:00 P.M. received a message from the C. O. 124th Machine Gun Battalion to the effect that Co. A and Co. B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, were to report to the C. O. 131st Infantry or his representative by 5:00 A.M. on the 10th Nov. 1918, at Doncourt. Left billets at 3:00 A.M. on Nov. 10, 1918, and reported to Capt. Wagner, 131st Infantry, U. S. A., and from there moved to Bois les Ht. Épinès and remained there under cover until 10:00 A.M. of the 10th Nov., 1918, and under cover of the fog moved to Bois de Warville."

¹⁰⁴131st Infantry Operations. St. Hilaire—Bois d'Harville and Bertaucourt Farm, 3:123.

¹⁰⁵"About 10 P.M. an order was received to send 1 company and 1 platoon of machine guns into St. Hilaire and occupy it at daybreak. This was accomplished with no resistance." Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, 3:136.

"The morning of November 10th, 1918, Co. F, 131st Infantry, commanded by 1st Lieut. C. F. Schnepf, and the 3rd platoon, Co. C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 4 guns, commanded by 1st Lieut. Allan R. Goodman, occupied St. Hilaire without opposition. We immediately organized the town for defense." Report of Lieutenant Goodman in the Report of the Commanding Officer, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:194.

"The order for the occupation of St. Hilaire by these troops was sent by the Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, to the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion of that regiment on November 9, 1918, at 9:05 P.M. and in it specific instructions were

given that the "Troops will hold St. Hilaire at all costs." Record of Messages Sent and Received, 131st Infantry.

¹⁰⁶To the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, at 8:50 A.M.: "Report your own and enemy positions and if you have Warville and Épines Woods. We must know quickly as an attack is to be made on Harville Wood. Also report if any other Bns. have arrived and which one."

To Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, at 9:10 A.M.: "Advise me quick when you expect to be in position. We attack this morning. You must be ready at a moment's notice to support the attack or protect the flanks."

To Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, at 9:15 A.M.: "Advise me quick when you get in position and where. Be ready to attack at once when ordered." Record of Messages Sent and Received, 131st Infantry.

¹⁰⁷"Artillery is shelling Bois de Harville, at 11 hr. artillery will cease and 3rd Bn. will attack Harville Woods. You will advance and occupy La Bertaucourt Farm and hold it as flank protection to the troops attacking Harville Woods as soon as artillery ceases." Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, to Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, November 10, 1918, at 10:35 A.M. *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸"Select a position forward in Harville Woods and hold it. Watch flanks and ask for protection if required. Our troops (Capt. Wilson's 2 Cos.) will occupy Bertaucourt Farm. This cancels Par. 4-e and F in F. O. 49, pertaining to withdrawing troops." Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, to Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry, at 10:45 A.M. *Ibid.*

"At 11:00 o'clock received orders to the effect that sub-paragraph 'E' of paragraph 4 of Field Order № 49 would be stricken out, and that the position would be held." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:191.

¹⁰⁹131st Infantry Operations; Report of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion 131st Infantry (Captain Stockwell). The "H" hour was originally fixed at 2 P.M. on November 10 (see 1:403, n. 66) but was changed during the morning to 11 A.M. Although notification of this change was sent to this officer, he did not receive it until about 11 A.M., and prior to that time all the battalion commanders were acting on the supposition that the "H" hour was still 2 P.M.

¹¹⁰At 8:50 A.M. the commander of the 1st Battalion reported "Artillery falling short" and at 5:55 P.M. the same officer stated that "Artillery first few shots at 7:45 A.M. fell 200 yards short into Bois les Hautes Épines." Record of Messages Sent and Received, 131st Infantry.

¹¹¹"Plymouth [code word for 1st Battalion] in position, outposts along N. E. edge of Warville & Épines Wood. 3rd Bn. in position in Warville Wood. 2nd Bn. in support in Épines Wood. Start artillery fire when you wish on Harville Wood, also on Bertaucourt Farm. Advise how long Artillery fire will continue." Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, to Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, 9:25 A.M.

¹¹²At 10 A.M. the Commanding General of the 66th Brigade sent the following message to the Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry:

"Artillery action now on Harville Wood will cease at 11:00 hr. Be ready to jump in at this time and see that support Bn. is ready to protect and support your flanks. Acknowledge and follow out." At 10:10 A.M. this message was relayed to the com-

manding officer of the 3rd Battalion. Record of Messages Sent and Received, 131st Infantry.

In his report Colonel Sanborn remarks that the "Artillery rolling barrage, interdiction and harassing fire was weak, especially barrage fire on the Bois d' Harville, between 10 and 11 A.M. Officers who were in observation state that a few shells fell in the woods but not in sufficient volume to destroy wire entanglements or drive out enemy machine gun posts. Some officers reported no shelling on their fronts."

As a matter of fact, no mention whatsoever is made of any firing by the 55th Field Artillery Brigade in the report of its operations officer.

¹¹³131st Infantry Operations, 3:128, states that "at 3 P.M., a second attack was made."

In his report as the commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, Captain Wilson says: "At 11:05 A.M. received word, verbal orders from Capt. Magner, to attack Bertaucourt Farm in support of 3rd Battalion who were to attack Bois d' Harville at 11 A.M. Ordered Lieut. Gegenback to attack the farm from the right flank, withdrew Lieut. Cronin and D Company from Bois de Warville, and ordered them to attack from the left. At 11:20 A.M. received word from Capt. Magner that he had changed time of attack to 11:45 and for me to attack farm at that hour. Withdrew A and D Company to edge of the woods. No casualties. At 11:45 A.M. advanced to the attack, but met heavy enemy flanking fire from La Vachère Bois which had been vacated . . . A Co. lost 7 wounded but though unable to continue the attack, kept up heavy frontal fire on farm to prevent enemy flanking 3rd Battalion. Fell back to edge of Bois Épinés when 3rd Bn. fell back from Bois d'Harville. Stayed in our positions night of November 10-11," 3:134-135.

¹¹⁴"Moved up in rear of forming up line at 12:30 P.M., which was on the Northeast side of Bois de Warville, facing the Bois d' Harville which we were to attack at H hour, it being 2:00 P.M., Nov. 10th, 1918. Formation for attack was as follows: One platoon to form on the left flank, their task being to cover the advance of attacking troops across the open ground and, after the attacking infantry had reached the Bois d' Harville, this platoon was to advance to and take positions along the left of the Harville Woods, guns being placed in depth. One platoon was placed on the right flank to advance with and in rear of attacking infantry, their task being to assist the advance of the infantry until they reached their objective, and take positions along the right of Harville Woods, guns to be placed in depth. One section of the support platoon was sent forward to take positions, one section on the right center and one section on the left center of Harville Woods, guns to be placed in depth." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:191.

¹¹⁵"The 110th Infantry on our immediate right operating toward Jonville in position with their left at the northwest corner of Haravillers Woods, were put in liaison with our line by sending to them 1st Lt. William C. Sanger, Jr., and 50 other ranks." 131st Infantry Operations, 3:128. General Wolf's order for this detachment was issued at 12:55 P.M.

¹¹⁶Record of Messages Sent and Received, 131st Infantry.

¹¹⁷"Attack commenced at 2:22 P.M. Companies advanced about 100 yards when enemy sent S. O. S. Troops advanced 250 yards and took cover from machine gun fire. Advanced by squad rushes to within 150 yards of Bois d'Harville. At this time the enemy's barrage was put down, and fell in Company M's line. Lieut. A. G. Miller

in order to save his troops immediately gave the order to charge which was done the enemy being driven back and our troops occupying the edge of the Bois d'Harville. Our troops pushed on and reached their objective, the sunken road in Bois d'Harville at 3:20 P.M. During the attack the troops were met by heavy fire from light and heavy machine guns and from enemy infantry." Report of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry, 3:137.

¹¹⁸"The 3rd Bn. moved forward at 2:18 P.M. and were met by very heavy machine gun and artillery fire. At 3:15 it became necessary to send a company to the right for the protection of their flanks. Co. H, 2nd Battalion under command of 1st Lt. William E. Simpson moved forward. As they neared the woods they suffered many casualties, Lt. Simpson being killed. The company was at once re-enforced and consolidated with Company G, 1st Lt. Julian L. Douglas was placed in command of the combined force gaining a position to the right of the Battalion. With this aid the line moved forward cleaning up the woods and driving the enemy beyond the Jonville-Harville Road." 131st Infantry Operations 3:127.

"They attacked Bois de Harville at 2:18 P.M. Nov. 10. Heavy resistance was met but supporting the 3rd Battalion, we were able to advance to 543-554 to 546-553." Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, 3:136.

"The 3rd Battalion attacked about the middle of the afternoon and went right through to the objective, but before it had gone far the 2nd Battalion and this company were called upon to support the 3rd Battalion. These troops moved forward at once, entering the woods from the right under very heavy artillery and machine gun fire.

"Lieut. Rockhill, with the 1st platoon, moved forward to support the front line. Lieut. White, with the 2nd Platoon, moved forward almost to the objective and took up positions along the right flank. While reconnoitering some of these positions, Sgt. Ely of this company met and captured 11 prisoners single-handed." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:192.

¹¹⁹"Have reached objective in F. O. 49. Have captured 3 more prisoners." Captain Magner to Captain Malstrom, by telephone, November 10, 1918, 3:55 P.M. Record of Messages Sent and Received, 131st Infantry.

¹²⁰See Summary of Intelligence No. 57, 33rd Division (G-2), November 11, 1918.

¹²¹Bulletin of Information No. 118, 17th Army Corps, November 10, 1918.

¹²²131st Infantry Operations, 3:127.

¹²³*Ibid.*, 3:128.

¹²⁴"On account of the numerous casualties caused by heavy machine gun fire and artillery fire we were unable to hold the ground gained and at 5:30 P.M. fell back to the edge of Bois les Hautes Épinés, the 3rd occupying Bois de Warville. One officer and 67 O. R.'s were captured by the two battalions in this operation." Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, 3:136.

"At dusk Lt. Miller called a conference of the officers and it was decided that it would be best to withdraw at dark as his force was too small to hold the line. At dark the troops were withdrawn to edge of Bois de Warville where a line of resistance was established." Report of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry, 3:137.

"Fell back ^{to} _{to} edge of Bois Épinés when 3rd Bn. fell back from Bois d'Harville.

Stayed in our positions night of November 10-11," Report of the Commanding Officer 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, 3:135.

"The woods during all this time was under heavy fire from artillery of all sizes from three sides, some of this being at very close range. Enemy machine guns also were covering the edges of these woods. All this, together with the heavy gas caused by the shelling, made the woods untenable, and the troops were ordered to withdraw about 7:00 P.M.

"This company moved back to the edge of Hautes Épinés Woods and immediately took up positions. The C. O. of this company then returned to 2nd Battalion Headquarters, but found no infantry officers there. Capt. Wagner at this time was handling operations from Warville Woods, so took charge there temporarily. Runners were sent out at once to collect all infantry moving back (many of these misunderstood orders and were returning to Doncourt) and they were placed along the Northern edge of the woods to support our guns, and in this way a strong line was formed along the edge of the woods." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:192.

"At 8:00 P.M., 10th Nov. 1918, received orders that the infantry were withdrawing on account of gas, and at once sent runners to all platoons to withdraw to forming up line. Right platoon withdrew with Infantry, left and center platoons did not withdraw on account of the intensive artillery fire on the open ground between the Harville Woods and the Warville Woods until 3:00 A.M., 11th Nov. 1918, and then withdrew to the Warville Woods and took up their former positions on the Northeast edge of Bois de Warville." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:191.

¹²⁵See 1:205.

¹²⁶"On the night of November 10th-11th the Regiment moved forward and was disposed of as follows:

1st Battalion.....	Bois les Épinés
2nd Bn. less Co. H.....	Avillers
Co. H.....	St. Hilaire
3rd Bn. less Cos. L & M.....	Woël
Cos. L and M.....	Doncourt"

Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:158.

At 6:20 P.M. the Commanding Officer, 131st Infantry, sent this cheering news to Captain Wagner: "You are being reinforced tonight by two Bns. of 132nd, also our M. G. Co. has advanced to forward area. Hold ground until reinforcements come. Food and ammunition are coming." Record of Messages Sent and Received, 131st Infantry.

¹²⁷"10th Nov., 1918, when 4 guns were ordered to occupy St. Hilaire attached to 132nd Infantry (one company). Company F, 131st Infantry, having same orders, came first, and these 4 guns in command of an officer went to St. Hilaire with latter company." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:193.

¹²⁸See 1:214.

¹²⁹Report of the Commanding Officer, Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:196.

¹³⁰Field Order No. 23-a, P. C. 66th Infantry Brigade, November 10, 1918, 9:00 A.M., 3:57.

¹³¹At 6:45 P.M. the commanding officer, 131st Infantry, sent the following message to Captain Wagner, in command of the forward troops of that regiment:

"I will be at Woël about 5 A.M. with 2 Bns. 132nd in reserve. The woods in front of you will be shelled from 5 to 5:45 A.M. following which you will push on and clean up the woods. Keep in touch with men by phone at Woël." Record of Messages Sent and Received, 131st Infantry.

¹³²"At 9:00 P.M. this order arrived by mounted messenger from Woël:
 "From: C. O. 131st Infantry 10/11/18-6:15 P.M. (by phone)
 To: C. O. of Co. at St. Hilaire.

At 5:00 A.M. tomorrow morning a heavy artillery destructive fire will be laid down on Butgnéville about 1 kilo. N. E. of you. You will advance to town and, following the artillery shoot, take this town of Butgnéville and hold same, using your entire force of one company and 4 machine guns. Acknowledge receipt of this message and keep us informed hourly or oftener of your moves. Also have phone connection made with St. Hilaire and Woël tonight and have Signal Officer at Woël follow you in the attack with a wire.

(C. O. 131st Infantry)

(Pliable 1)"

Report of the Commanding Officer, Company C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:194.

¹³³"On November 10th in accordance with Field Order No. 34 orders were given to units of this command to conform to missions as laid down in 'Conduct in Case of Withdrawal of the Enemy' Annex No. 11. During the night November 10/11th the 114th and 1st Battalion 115th F. A. moved to the Plain in support of the 65th Brigade." Operations of Divisional Artillery, 33rd Division, U. S., Troyon Sector, 55th Field Artillery Brigade, 3:296.

¹³⁴"The six lettered companies being in area preparatory to advance and laying out Principal Lines of Resistance were conducted, in addition to repair of P. Cs., laundries, bath houses, operation of delousers, management and operation of dumps, repairs to light railways, making of ration dumps, reconnaissances in forward areas, and removal of mines and mine traps.

"On November 10th and 11th the regiment was in position to take its part in the advance, necessary material having been sent forward and all arrangements made as far as practicable. The required engineering companies were with the advance echelon ready for duty." Report of the Commanding Officer, 108th Engineers, 26-11-18, 2:541.

¹³⁵Annex No. 1 to Summary of Intelligence No. 56, Headquarters 33rd Division (G 2), November 10, 1918.

¹³⁶Annex to Summary of Intelligence No. 57, Headquarters 33rd Division (G-2), November 11, 1918.

¹³⁷Annex No. 1 to Summary of Intelligence No. 56, Headquarters 33rd Division (G-2), November 10, 1918.

¹³⁸Above, 1:213. "Orders were received to relieve 130th Inf. in Marchéville-St. Hilaire system. This relief was accomplished during the night of Nov. 10-11." Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:655.

"The Battalion continued its march at 2:00 P.M. November 10th, arriving at

Fresnes-en-Woëvre November 11th at 2:00 A.M. Here the Battalion relieved a Battalion 130th Infantry." Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:658.

"Relieved the 2nd. Battalion 130th Infantry, in front of Marchéville, at 4:00 A.M. 11th Nov." Narrative of Operations of the 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:662.

"Night of November 10/11th the Battalion was relieved by the Second Battalion 129th Infantry." Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 130th Infantry, 2:691.

¹³⁹Field Orders No. 35, P. C. 33rd Division, November 10, 1918, 11:00 P.M. See above, 1:211.

¹⁴⁰See above, 1:216.

¹⁴¹Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:604; Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:650-651. Addendum to Operation Order No. 33, P. C. Pinetree [code word for the 129th Infantry], November 10, 1918.

¹⁴²Addendum to Operation Order No. 33, P. C. Pinetree. "The Battalion . . . went forward at 5:00 A.M. with Pintheville as the first objective." Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:658.

"Nov. 11th—Companies A and B under command of 2nd and 3rd Battalions 129th Infantry occupied main line of resistance and took part in the operations with the respective Battalions with which assigned. Companies C and D under command of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions 130th Infantry." Operations of 123d Machine Gun Battalion, 3:24.

¹⁴³Addendum to Operation Order No. 33, P. C. Pinetree: "At 4:30 A.M. 11th Nov. the Bn. advanced in support of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 129th Inf." Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, dated January 5, 1919, 2:655.

¹⁴⁴Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry. "About 3:00 A.M. morning of November 11th, Company B, 130th M. G. Co. and Battalion Headquarters moved forward to Fresnes under orders to follow and support the attack of 129th Infantry. After the 129th Infantry had started their advance some doubt was felt as to the protection of their left flank and Company 'B' was sent as a combat unit to that flank." Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 130th Infantry, 2:691.

¹⁴⁵"On the night of November 10th/11th the 129th Infantry were to relieve the Second Battalion and Companies L and M of this Battalion, but for some reason or other the relieving troops did not move up. This caused a change in orders and instead of this Battalion being the advanced guard of the right column, it came under the command of Colonel Myer of the 129th Infantry and was to be the support of the center column of the 65th Brigade.

"The Second Battalion left their position in front of Marchéville and marched to Wadonville to become a part of the right column. L and M Companies remained in front of Marchéville until relieved by a Battalion of the 129th Infantry, when they were moved back to a support position on Combres Hill; about 10:00 A.M. November 11th. At 5:30 A.M. Companies I and K were moved from St. Remy, where they had assembled, to a position on the eastern slope of Combres Hill, in support of the center column.

"General King had established his P. C. at my Headquarters at 4:00 A.M. November 11th and on verbal orders from General King the Third Battalion was changed from the right column to the center column." Report of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry, 2:700.

¹⁴⁶Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry.

"Upon being relieved the companies returned to Saulx and from there the Battalion proceeded to Wadonville and took up a defensive position in the trenches near the town, arriving at these trenches at 9:00 A.M. The enemy began shelling our position at 9:45 A.M." Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 130th Infantry, 2:693.

¹⁴⁷Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:650.

¹⁴⁸"The 3rd Bn., 130th Inf. . . . reached the village of St. Hilaire at 8:21 A.M." Chronological Record of Events, 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:604.

Nine minutes later the 1st Battalion of the 129th Infantry reached the line between Marchéville and St. Hilaire, according to the report of its commanding officer, who thus relates the operations of his battalion that morning:

"This Battalion accompanied by M. G. Co., 129th Inf. moved to and occupied a system of trenches on the heights overlooking Herbeuville. At 3:30 A.M. Nov. 11th, 1918, a message was received for this Battalion to move forward at 'H' Hour, minus 30 (4:30 A.M.).

"A dense fog hung over the Woëvre valley rendering all troop movement undiscernable. Promptly at the designated time the Battalion moved forward via Herbeuville-Wadonville-St. Hilaire road. Upon reaching Wadonville increasing enemy artillery action precluded any further use of this road. An ammunition dump was established here, machine guns unloaded and all animals and vehicles sent to rear. From this point the Battalion advanced in approach formation, the right moving along the Brigade south boundary and extending to the left; Companies 'B', 'C' and 'D' plus two platoons of M. G. Co. in line; Company 'A', less one platoon, plus one section of M. G. . . . had preceded the Battalion by way of the road for the purpose of locating the flanks of, and maintaining liaison between, the 65th and 66th Brigades.

"A rapid advance in this formation was not possible due to the flooding of valley by the enemy and numerous lines of barbed wire. At 8:30 A.M. the Battalion reached the lateral line St. Hilaire-Marchéville. A combat patrol sent forward between these two towns had not advanced 200 yards when it drew enemy machine gun fire. Reconnaissance of St. Hilaire disclosed the left flank of the 66th Brigade resting in the town. A Battalion P. C. was established in cemetery at roadfork southwest of St. Hilaire and message outlining position and containing all information dispatched by Runner to Regtl. P. C. at Saulx." See 2:655-656.

¹⁴⁹"The Battalion attacked Marchéville at 9:00 A.M. and were entering the town of Marchéville about 9:30 A.M." Narrative of Operations of the 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:662.

¹⁵⁰The extreme left of the 66th Brigade was already ensconced in St. Hilaire, as remarked by the commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, above. As a matter of fact it had been occupied by Company F, 131st Infantry, and four machine guns about dawn on November 10. See above, 1:214.

¹⁵¹"2nd & 3rd Bn.s., assisted by Co's A & B, 123rd M. G. Bn., advanced at Zero hour. Heavy fog, country inundated by enemy, hindered advance. No artillery

preparation. Met stubborn resistance in enemy machine gun nests, but advanced and occupied Chateau d'Aulnois, Riaville, Marchéville and controlled terrain between and on line with these towns." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:650.

¹⁵²See 1:217-218.

¹⁵³131st Infantry Operations. St. Hilaire—Bois d'Harville and Bertaucourt Farm, 3:128.

¹⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 3:129.

¹⁵⁵Compare 66th Infantry Brigade, Meuse-Argonne, Operations in the Troyon Sector, 3:52.

¹⁵⁶"The battalion to which we were attached was moved forward on the night of the 9/10 Nov. with another M G Co. attached, as we could not have assembled our company in time, we were left in position until later. At 2:30 A.M. 10 Nov. we received orders to assemble the company and wait orders, which assembly was completed at 7 A.M. During the afternoon of the 10th Nov. we were ordered to Woël, in reserve, to await orders and also instructed to relieve one section of D Co. 124th M G Bn. which was with a liaison group of the 110th Infy. on the south of the Woël-Jonville road. This relief was completed about midnight 10/11 Nov. 1918.

"About daylight on the 11th Nov. I received orders to proceed to the Bois de LaVachère and cover with the full fire of all my remaining guns (10) two areas East of Bertaucourt Farm and to report my arrival in position, through our Battalion P. C. in the Bois les Hautes Épinés. This was to cover the operations of our troops in and around the Bois de Harville. Before reaching my position I received orders to stop at Doncourt and await further orders. I reported by telephone from Doncourt and received instructions to remain for orders." Narrative of Operations, November 8 to 17, 1918, by Commanding Officer, Machine Gun Company, 131st Infantry, 3:138.

¹⁵⁷131st Infantry Operations, 3:129.

¹⁵⁸The story of this attack and the gallantry displayed by the machine gunners in it is thus graphically told by First Lieutenant Allan R. Goodman in his report of November 13, 1918, which was incorporated into the Report of the Commanding Officer, Company C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:194.

"We had received no water and rations since coming to St. Hilaire, and had very little water and one day's iron rations left. Messages sent by me to my company commander through 131st Infantry Regimental Headquarters did not reach him. Shortly after 5:00 A.M. a few, not more than ten, shells exploded in or near Butgnéville. There was no other artillery fire on the town. At 5:20 A.M. we moved out for the attack. There was a heavy fog, could see about 100 yards.

"FORMATION:

"Two platoons, Co. F, 131st Infantry, 1st wave. Two platoons same company, 2nd wave. Two machine guns behind and supporting both flanks.

"Two platoons, Co. H, 132nd Infantry, in support at 200 yards. Capt. Wigglesworth gave us these platoons only upon our earnest request, as his orders from his commanding officer were to hold St. Hilaire. He did this with his remaining two platoons.

"Our total force, about 150 infantrymen and 4 machine guns. 8 infantrymen were attached to machine gun platoon as ammunition carriers. We received machine

gun and rifle fire about 500 yards from Butgnéville. We continued the advance, our machine guns firing and advancing by echelon. 100 yards from the town we found a strong belt of wire about 30 yards wide, high wire over low wire, and indications of being mined. Enemy fire was so heavy and effective here that any movement meant a casualty. We continued the fight here for about half an hour, hoping the enemy intended to evacuate after an initial resistance. We finally had to withdraw under cover of our own machine guns, who stayed when the infantry withdrew. We had located some enemy machine guns and our fire at this stage was so effective that the withdrawal, a difficult operation, was made without receiving any casualties.

"Our total casualties, 10 killed, 52 wounded. Machine gunners casualties, 6 killed, 5 wounded. Total rounds fired by machine guns—about 1500. I was forced to abandon two machine guns after disabling them on account of their crews being reduced to one man.

"The gallantry and devotion of every man could not have been greater. The killed and wounded were all hit at their posts, and their sacrifice tells the story. 1st Cl. Private Albert A. Vahl fought his gun alone when every one around had withdrawn. Corporal Homer Bale and Private Edwin S. Stensaas, with their squads, fought their guns ten minutes after the infantry had been withdrawn. Bugler Hildred D. Davis fearlessly carried messages under heavy machine gun fire. Sergeant Michael P. McCarthy and Bugler Hildred D. Davis, after being ordered to the rear, came back and helped carry out Lieut. Storrs, who was badly wounded, under very heavy fire. This was after machine guns and infantry were all withdrawn."

The commanding officer of Company C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, says in his report that "On the night of 10th Nov., these two small units received orders to take and hold the town of Butgnéville after a destructive artillery barrage at 5:00 A.M. 11th Nov. This barrage never fell, yet knowing that the enemy outnumbered them and that they were strongly fortified, after a consultation the officers in command decided to make the attempt. Using the usual formation governed by their strength, they moved to the attack about 5:30 A.M. under a heavy fog. They finally reached the wire which belted the town, but after 62 casualties they decided to withdraw. . . . Eleven of the casualties were machine gunners, 6 killed and 5 wounded, 2 of them severely." See 3:193.

¹⁵⁹"At 5:45 on November 11th, Co. H, in coöperation with other troops of the 66th Brigade was engaged in attacking the town of Butgnéville and driving the enemy to the north edge of such town. This company's casualties were one man killed, one officer and six men wounded." Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:158.

¹⁶⁰See above, 1:410, n. 124.

¹⁶¹Report of the Commanding Officer, Company C, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:193.

¹⁶²"At 4:00 A.M. the advance to Doncourt was begun. When about one kilo. from Doncourt the enemy opened a systematic shelling with long range guns upon the town of Doncourt. Owing to this, it was not considered advisable to continue the advance. Accordingly, the company was taken to the best shelter that a low ditch on the South side of the Woël-Doncourt road afforded and kept there until the period of shelling had ceased. After the cessation of the bombardment of Doncourt, the company arrived safely at the designated point at 5:15 A.M., reporting upon arrival

to the officer temporarily in charge of the infantry battalion. C. O. 1st Battalion, 132nd Infantry arrived at Doncourt about 6:00 A.M. and, in conference with C. O. this organization, stated that his orders were to proceed from Doncourt to Bois les Hautes Épinés and there relieve 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, already in occupation at this point.

"Before proceeding from Doncourt limbers were unloaded, because further transportation by means of vehicles was impracticable. The limbers were returned to Woël to await orders, it not being deemed safe to retain them in the vicinity of Doncourt because of the periodical, systematic shelling of this point by the enemy long range and 77 millimeter guns. This organization was not distributed as has been heretofore the custom in assigning platoons to each infantry company, but was given a set mission . . . of preventing any infiltration on the part of the enemy from the Bois d' Harville toward the point of La Bertaucourt Farm, where it was believed from information received that the enemy was maintaining a strong point. This was believed to be composed principally of machine guns, principally of a heavy type. From this point it was thought the enemy might, under cover of machine gun fire, make a flank attack on the East side of Bois les Hautes Épinés. One platoon on the left was given special mission to protect the left flank of 1st Battalion, 132nd Infantry, from any infiltration on the enemy's part from the West side of the Bois d'Harville toward the Bois de Warville. The 3rd platoon was held in reserve in the position to the South of the road running directly Northeast through the Bois les Hautes Épinés so as to be in readiness to support either right or left platoon as the situation should develop. All platoons were in position at the hour of 8:00 A.M." See 3:197.

¹⁶³"The 122nd Machine Gun Battalion was at Camp South Thillombois, France (28.5—42.0 Vigneulles 1/20,000) on November 9th, 10th and 11th, 1918, held as part of the Division Reserve. This per Annex II Chap. XIV 'Defense of Troyon—Chaillon Sector,' dated November 8, 1918.

"Orders were to have the Reserve assemble at Troyon but the order giving the hour for this move was not received." Report of the Commanding Officer, 122d Machine Gun Battalion, January 24, 1919, 2:562.

¹⁶⁴Records of the radio station at Headquarters 33rd Division.

¹⁶⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶2nd A. U. S., 17th Army Corps, Staff, 1st Bureau, No. 12.180 P, dated At the H. Q., the 11th November, 1918.

¹⁶⁷At 9:45 A.M. the following telephone message was received from G-3 of the Second Army at Toul:

"At the same time that you send a sketch showing the line reached, join a list or sketch of the areas gassed with mustard gas. Take all necessary precautions to avoid billeting in woods gassed."

¹⁶⁸"G-3"

P. C., 33RD DIVISION, A. E. F.,

12th November, 1918.

JOURNAL OF OPERATION—6 A.M. 11th Nov. to 6 A.M. 12th Nov. 1918.

1. Rendered usual situation and operation reports to Corps and G. H. Q.
2. Issued Field Order No. 36. 'Stating Armistice has been signed and becomes effective November 11, 1918 at 11:00 A.M. All hostilities will cease at once and no further advance will be made. Each Brigade will at once make all arrangements to advance in appropriate formation with Advance Guards, in case orders

(h)

are received to move forward to occupy surrendered territory. Each Brigade will detail two officers to make a sketch, scale 1:20,000, showing the exact line reached by our troops.'

3. Word was received at 7:50 A.M. 11th Nov. that the Armistice had been signed. This was transmitted to the Brigades and hostilities ceased as soon as the Brigades transmitted it to the front.

W. H. SIMPSON,
Lt. Col., Inf., G-3."

¹⁶⁹"Orders received at 9.00 A.M. that Armistice had been signed—messages immediately sent to attacking line, who withdrew at appointed time (9.45 A.M.)." Chronological Record of Events, 129th Infantry, 2:651.

"About 9:15 A.M. a telephone message was received by the Captain of the left flank company, 131st Inf. to 'cease hostilities and hold all ground gained.' This message was immediately transmitted to C. O. 1st Bn., 129th Inf.

"The enemy continued to vigorously shell St. Hilaire, Marchéville and intervening territory, the latter being quite flat and unsuited for cover. No further advance being contemplated and before the heavy fog should lift and disclose the positions of the Companies, the Battalion—less two platoons of Company 'A' and one platoon of M. G. which were left to strengthen the flank of the 131st Inf.—was withdrawn to more advantageous supporting positions in the vicinity of Wadonville and message notifying Regimental Commander of this move sent to P. C. at Saulx. At 11:00 A.M. and for the remainder of the day the Battalion was occupying these positions." Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:656.

"The troops were going forward when at 9:30 a message from the Commanding General ordered them to stop and hold what they had until 11:00 A.M. At 11:00 A.M. the armistice terms went into effect and the Battalion Headquarters returned to Fresnes. Companies F and G returned to Trésauvaux and Companies E and H established a line of outposts along the line the Battalion had held when the fighting ceased." Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:658.

"The Battalion attacked Marchéville at 9:00 A.M. and were entering the town of Marchéville about 9:30 A.M. when the order came to cease hostilities due to the signing of the Armistice. The Germans ceased at 11:00 A.M." Narrative of Operations of the 3rd Battalion, 129th Infantry, 2:662.

"Orders received dated 11th November, 1918, at 8:21 A.M., Hdqrs. 65th Brigade to cease firing and hold positions occupied, echeloning units of command in depth and hold same as Armistice had been signed." Report of the Commanding Officer, 130th Infantry, 2:676.

"The enemy began shelling our position [in the trenches near Wadonville] at 9:45 A.M. and continued until hostilities ceased at 11:00 A.M." Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 130th Infantry, 2:693.

¹⁷⁰"Ordered to support the other two battalions and attack Bois Harville as soon as relieved by 132nd, verbal orders C. O. Major Dodd and 1st Bn. 132nd relieved me at 10:00 A.M. Nov. 11. Moved into Bois Warville and prepared to attack. Notified at 10:00 A.M. that Armistice had been signed." Report of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, 3:135.

"Orders were received at 8:30 A.M., Nov. 11, to fire only in defense as the Armistice had been signed." Report of the Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry, 3:136.

"At 7:40 A.M., orders received to cease firing and hold positions and watch movements and fire of enemy and report the same. Firing of the enemy continued until 11:00 A.M. Enemy put over two barrages one at 8:30 to 8:35 A.M. and one at 9:45 to 9:50 A.M. All operations ceased at 11:00 A.M. upon receipt of orders from C. O. that armistice was in effect." Report of the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry, 3:137.

"The 1st Battalion was coöperating with other troops of the Brigade in attacking Bois d'Harville when hostilities ceased." Report of the Commanding Officer, 132nd Infantry, 3:158.

"At 8:30 A.M. on the 11th Nov. 1918, received orders from P. C. 131st Infantry to the effect that we would not fire upon the enemy unless ordered, and that we would report all enemy shelling by wire and that all firing would cease at 11:00 A.M., Nov. 11th, 1918. All firing ceased at the appointed hour." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company A, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:191.

"The next morning orders came to attack again and, while the 131st Infantry was being assembled to carry this out, word came of the truce and these operations ceased." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company B, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:193.

"About 9:00 A.M. C. O. 1st Battalion, 131st Infantry, who was then relieved and personally about to vacate P. C. which had been turned over to C. O. 1st Battalion, 132nd Infantry, received a message over the wire, presumably from C. O. 131st Infantry, that the armistice between Germany and the associated powers would go into effect at 11:00 A.M., Nov. 11, 1918. About 9:30 this information was corroborated to C. O. 1st Battalion, 132nd Infantry by C. O. 132nd Infantry, with additional instructions that no firing would take place either by infantry or machine guns on the sector occupied by him, and that in addition thereto, all firing on the part of the enemy should be immediately reported to him. At the same time he stated that information of the armistice was being gotten to the enemy as fast as possible. These orders were carried out absolutely to the letter." Report of the Commanding Officer, Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, 3:197.

¹⁷¹To comply with the instructions from G-3 of the Second Army in respect to the line occupied at the time the advance ceased (see above, 1:227), the following report from Colonel Davis of the 132nd Infantry, acting in behalf of General Wolf, reached the G-3 of the 33rd Division at 10:30 A.M. on November 11:

"Line starting on the left:—Road at following coördinates: 516-557, running directly east to southern edge of Butgnéville; then running further east slightly to the south below Hill 227; along edge of Bois d' Harville; then directly east to road running north and south through Bois d' Harville; running in a southeasterly direction along road to Bertaucourt Farm; then in a southeasterly direction through center of Bois le Vieux; from there in a southeasterly direction to la [Ferme des Hauts] Journaux."

¹⁷²In his Narrative Report of the Operations of Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, in connection with the operations of the 1st Battalion, 132nd Infantry, during the period covered by the dates of November 10 and November 11, 1918 (3:203-204), Captain Dodd relates that:

"At the hour of ten fifty four A.M. a solitary machine gun, believed by C. O. this organization, to be of a light type, opened fire from the direction of the low land between the Bois les Hautes Épinés and the Bois d' Harville and not more than 800 meters from our direct front. It kept up a continued galling fire, using a wide traverse which was more than the capability of the heavy type of German machine gun, causing our men and those of the infantry to seek cover and to remain therein. The bullets from this gun at no time passed higher than from three to six feet over our heads at many times clipping the top of the protection our men had sought. This fire seemed to be limited only by the cyclic rate of the gun and was, in the opinion of the C. O. this organization, delivered to the extent of from six to eight belts of ammunition. Many of these bullets fell in the immediate vicinity of the Battn. C. O. (Parrish) [code word for 1st Battalion, 132nd Infantry].

"Promptly at one second after the hour of eleven A.M. this bloodthirsty individual ceased his fire and was not heard from any more, his position could not be exactly located because of the density of shrub in front of the infantry positions and because of the ground fog existing at that time. In conjunction with this Swan Song of German machine gunnery, German artillery a great way to our right opened up with an intensive barrage at the hour of ten forty nine A.M. continuing until one second after eleven A.M. From the sound of the firing during this barrage, one would judge that there must have been at least six batteries in action. Whether this artillery Hymn of Hate was real or blank it was impossible to say because it was too far to our right to be able to discern the impact of the shells in question."

¹⁷³At 5:20 P.M. on November 12, 1918, there was received from the Chief of Staff of the 17th Army Corps a "true copy notified to the General Cdg. the 33rd I. D. U. S." of a telegram to the Corps Commander, dated November 11, 1918, which ran thus:

"G No. 45—The G. H. Q. reports that the Germans are complaining that the Americans did not cease firing at Stenay-Beaumont and along the Meuse. As this state of things refers particularly to the 1st Army and constitutes an impropriety, the Army Commander wishes you to take necessary measures to stop the fire along the entire line. Although keeping the first lines intact, no act of hostility must be committed. Acknowledge receipt.

Brigadier General HEINTZELMAN,
Chief of Staff."

17TH ARMY CORPS, STAFF, 3RD BUREAU, No. 1143. C/3.

¹⁷⁴Records of the Statistical Section, Office of the Division Adjutant, 33rd Division.

"Faithful to their trust, true to their traditions, noble in their sacrifice the men of Illinois were suffering, wounded and dying when the curtain came down at the end of the great world tragedy." 131st Infantry Operations: St. Hilaire—Bois d' Harville and Bertaucourt Farm, 3:130.

¹⁷⁵Narrative Report of the Operations of Company D, 124th Machine Gun Battalion, in connection with the operations of the First Battalion 132nd Infantry during the period covered by the dates of November 10 and November 11, 1918, 3:204.

¹⁷⁶65th Infantry Brigade: Brigade P. C. at Mouilly;

129th Infantry, subsectors of Fresnes, Saulx, Bois des Épargés, and Bois de Combres;

130th Infantry, in reserve extending from Ranzières to Mouilly;
123rd Machine Gun Battalion, Companies A and B with 129th Infantry;
Companies C and D with 130th Infantry.

66th Infantry Brigade: Brigade P. C. at Deuxnouds:

131st Infantry, between Herbeuville and St. Maurice, both exclusive;

132nd Infantry, Viéville, St. Maurice, Woël, Doncourt, Wadonville,
Bois les Hautes Épinés, and Bois de Warville;

124th Machine Gun Battalion, Companies A and B, Longeau Ferme;
Company C, Doncourt, (with two platoons near Butgnéville); Com-
pany D, Viéville.

¹⁷⁷From daylight on September 9 until the cessation of hostilities on November 11 the major part, if not all, of the 33rd Division had been uninterruptedly in the trenches except for the short period from October 20 to 25, during most of which it was in movement from Verdun to Troyon.

¹⁷⁸As prescribed by Field Order No. 36, Headquarters 33rd Division. See above, I:227.

¹⁷⁹See above, I:42, 43, 49, 50, 52, 53, 151.

CHAPTER IX

¹The 58th Field Artillery Brigade was composed of the 122nd Field Artillery (Colonel Milton J. Foreman), 123rd Field Artillery (Colonel Charles G. Davis), the 124th Field Artillery (Colonel Horatio B. Hackett), the 108th Trench Mortar Battery (Captain C. J. Kraft), and the 108th Ammunition Train (Major Samuel N. Sorenson). The 122nd and 124th were armed with 3-inch guns and, upon arrival in France, with French 75-millimeter pieces, while the 123rd was a regiment of heavy artillery, armed with 6-inch howitzers and later with French 155-millimeter howitzers.

²See I:317, n. 96.

CHAPTER X

¹"Div. P. C. Troyon; Hdq. Troop Troyon; 122 M. G. Bn. So. Thillombois; 108 F. S. Bn. Troyon; 108 San. Tr. Troyon; 108 Engs Tilly-sur-Meuse; 108 Tn. Hq. & M. P. Troyon; 55 F. A. Bde. Troyon; 62 F. A. Bde. Thillombois; 65 Inf. Bde. Mouilly; 66 Inf. Bde. Deuxnouds." War Diary, 33rd Division, 2:340.

²See above 1:227.

³"IIND A. U. S.
17TH ARMY CORPS
STAFF
3RD BUREAU
No. 865-S/3.

AT THE H. Q., the 12th November, 1918.

SERVICE NOTE.

The IInd A. U. S. telephones as follows:

1st. By virtue of Clause No. 8 of the Armistice, the Germans are within 48 hours to make known to the Allied Command the dispositions of delayed mines existing in the sectors which they have abandoned.

If one or any parlementarians present themselves in front of your lines, inform the IInd A. U. S. immediately and make known the declarations which they make.

2nd It is reported that some Germans have approached our lines in order to seek to enter into conversation with the Americans. If similar occurrences happen on your front, there is ground to arrest the Germans and to deliver them to the American authorities.

The General comdg. the 33rd I. D. U. S. will give the necessary orders of execution, and will at once inform the General comdg. the 17th A. C. if one or more of the above occurrences have happened on his front.

By Order. The Chief of Staff,

R. KASTLER.

33RD I. D. U. S."

⁴"*Pyrotechnics.*

"Commencing at 16:00 hr., continuous illumination by flares of all colors and descriptions to 24:00 hr. Minor activities in our own lines. All about the German back area, they were apparently celebrating in this manner. Abated from 24:00 to 4:00 hr. and again became keen from 4:00 to 5:00 hr.

"X. Activity of Our Own Troops.

"Our troops employed in organizing their positions and picketing their lines to prevent fraternization.

"XI. Miscellaneous.

"During the afternoon and night many fires, explosions and much smoke. Enemy reported burning mined area, which may account for the smoke. The enemy throughout the sector displays extreme joy and hilarity over the cessation of hostilities. They are heard singing and cheering and pyrotechnic activity is a further expression of their joy." Summary of Intelligence No. 59, issued by the 33rd Division, Second Section, for the period from 12 hour November 12 to 12 hour November 13, 1918.

⁵Summary of Intelligence No. 60, covering the twenty-four hours from noon on November 13 to noon on November 14.

⁶"This Division, less 62nd F. A. Bde. passes to the command of the Fourth U. S. Corps at 8:00 o'clock P.M. per order № 875-S/3 from 17th Army Corps (French)." War Diary, 33rd Division, November 13, 1918, also Journal of Operations, 33rd Division, November 14, 1918. This transfer was also directed in Field Order No. 23, Headquarters, Second Army, November 13, 1918, 12 hours.

⁷17th Army Corps, Staff, 3rd Bureau, No. 870-S/3, "transmitted for execution to the Gen. comdg. the 33rd I. D. U. S. [and] to the General comdg. the 17th Army Corps each insofar as concerns him" two orders, viz: (1) G-3 Order No. 162, 11 hours 40, Wabash, November 12 for the "immediate withdrawal from the lines of the 62nd F. A. Brigade which will be cantoned near the railway between St. Mihiel and Troyon. . . and (2) G-3 order No. 163 announcing that 'The General Commanding orders that you send immediately sufficient personnel from the 55th F. A. Brigade to be placed at the disposal of the 167th F. A. Brigade (IVth Corps) to accompany the auto transports of the 167th to the 55th F. A. Brigade. . . ."

⁸"Staff of the IIInd A. U. S. telephones as follows to the General comdg. the 17th French Army Corps:

You will transmit any messages received from Germans relative to the location of mines to these Hdqrs., but will make no response.

All negotiations [sic] will be conducted directly by G. H. Q. without utilizing subordinate commanders as intermediaries.

The Army Commander directs that you take measures to assure the execution of these instructions. Acknowledge.

HEINTZELMAN,

Chief of Staff, IIInd A. U. S.

17TH ARMY CORPS

STAFF

3RD BUREAU

No. 873-S/3

Transmitted for execution to the General commanding the 33rd I. D. U. S.

All reports mentioned above will be sent to the General Comdg. the A. C. who will transmit them to the Army.

At the H. Q. the 13th November 1918.

By Order. The Chief of Staff.

R. KASTLER."

⁹At 4:15 P.M. on November 13, 1918, the following was received at the message centre of the 33rd Division at Troyon-sur-Meuse:

"WABASH 12 November,

TO THE GENERAL COMMANDING THE 17TH FRENCH A. C.

22h. 35-161 G-3.

Confirming the telegraphic instructions of this day the General commanding the Army prescribes:

1st. That any German who enters our lines be immediately arrested and treated as a prisoner.

2nd. If parlementarians present themselves with the object of giving information about mines or dangerous dispositions referred to in Parag. 8 of the Armistice, they will be conducted to the rear as far as the P. C. of the Division but not farther and immediate information thereof will be given to the H. Q. of the Army.

3rd. Men on duty at the outposts will be thoroughly provided with arms and all necessary equipment.

4th. Officers of the Division Staff will be sent to the front line to see to the observance of the order relative to the interdiction of all communication with the enemy, and to assure that the orders which have been given up to the present are strictly observed.

Please acknowledge,

(Signed) HEINTZELMAN.

17TH ARMY CORPS
STAFF

True copy notified for execution to the General Commanding the 33rd I. D. U. S.

3RD BUREAU
No. 872-S/3

At the H. Q., the 13 November 1918.

B. O. The Chief of Staff,
R. KASTLER."

¹⁰Summary of Intelligence No. 60 from noon on November 13 to noon on November 14, 1918, issued by 33rd Division, Second Section.

¹¹"Issued Conf. Memo. # 40. 'Entire day, Nov. 16th to be devoted by all organizations of the Division to a thorough policing and cleaning of billets, camps, horse-lines and their vicinity.'

"Issued Training Circular # 198 Re: 'Training Battalion'.

"Issued Training Circular # 197-Re: 'Policing and cleaning.'" War Diary, 33rd Division.

¹²"The following prisoners were forwarded this date to the Corps Enclosure:

Italians.....	372
Russians.....	33
French.....	26
French Civilians.....	8

Total..... 439."

Summary of Intelligence No. 61.

¹³As prescribed by Field Order No. 25, Headquarters Second Army, November 15, 1918, 11:30 Hours.

On November 17 a report was tendered to General Hellot, commanding the 17th French Army Corps, with citations in both French and English of the fifty officers and men of the 33rd Division recommended for the Croix de Guerre. Diary of the Division Adjutant.

¹⁴"I. (b) The Third American Army, in liaison with French forces on its right and left, at 5 A.M., 17 November, 1918, takes over the present front of the First and Second Armies and advances toward Luxembourg.

"(c) The First and Second American Armies and Allied troops, not participating in the advance, remain in reserve ready to move forward if required.

"2. The Second Army, after the troops of the Third Army have cleared its front, will reassemble its units, except as noted below, for training and remain in reserve of G. H. Q. . . ." Field Order No. 26, Headquarters Second Army, November 17, 10 hours.

¹⁵"IV. ABANDONED GERMAN MATERIALS.

"1. It is reported that the German troops have left behind them, in various places, boxes marked, 'Vorsicht-Infektioses Material.' These boxes may contain cultures of bacteria or other things that are likely to be dangerous to troops and civilians if carelessly handled. Boxes of this nature, as well as tubes, bottles, glassware of any kind,

or packages, the nature of which is obscure but which suggest the possibility of containing bacteria or virus, will be sent unopened to the Office of the Chief Surgeon, Second Army, for investigation." Administrative Bulletin No. 18, Headquarters, Second Army, November 17, 1918.

¹⁶"November 18, 1918.

"Issued orders for entire Division area to be salvaged per 33rd Div. Adm. order No. 9.

"Lt. Col. W. H. Simpson, G. S., relieved as Asst. C. of Staff, G-3, & appointed Acting Chief of Staff per 33rd Div. G. O. 147.

"Major Roane Waring, Inf., Adj. 65th Inf. Brig. made Acting Asst. Chief of Staff G-3 by same order." War Diary, 33rd Division.

¹⁷On November 19, French forces, headed by Marshal Pétain, made their triumphal entry into Metz. On November 20, a letter from the Army Commander to the Division Commander was received on the subject of "Instructions for Divisional Training," and the following day a memorandum relative to the "Policing of Troyon" was issued by Division Headquarters.

¹⁸"122 M. G. Bn. from South Thillombois to Chaillon. Issued Training Circular # 200: 'Training for Division for first week' under provisions of general order # 207 G. H. Q. Issued Training Circular # 201 'Training schedules for four weeks' as prescribed under provisions of general order # 207 G. H. Q. Issued Divisional location list." War Diary, 33rd Division.

¹⁹Diary of the Division Adjutant.

²⁰These places are grouped about Benoite Vaux, which is on the eastern edge of the Bois de Meuse about four and one half kilometers east and slightly north of Issoncourt and about seven kilometers southeast of Souilly.

²¹See above, I:140, 147.

²²"Issued Conf. Memo. 44 'Command of the 33rd Div. passed to Ninth Corps at 12:00 hours 26th Nov. 1918.'" War Diary, 33rd Division, November, 1918. This transfer was prescribed by Field Order No. 27, Headquarters Second Army, November 26, 1918, 10:10 hours, Paragraph 3 of which announced that "The 33rd and 35th Divisions and the 62nd and 151st Artillery Brigades are assigned to the IX Corps."

²³"Division problem carried out with success. Issued Training Circular # 203 'The designation of an Executive Officer in Regiments and Companies for the purpose of inspections.'" War Diary, 33rd Division, November 27, 1918. This innovation was introduced by General Bell, who modeled it on that of the Navy in which it had been long employed to great advantage. The executive officer was required to make inspections and to see that orders from higher authority were complied with. He did not attend training himself, but his functions were to inspect all meals, to make certain that every order and regulation was obeyed, and to keep his unit commander thoroughly informed as to actual conditions. The work of the executive officer in nowise relieved the organization commander of responsibility.

"66th Inf. Bde. maneuver carried out." War Diary, 33rd Division, November 30, 1918.

On November 24th the Headquarters of the 65th Infantry Brigade were transferred from Mouilly to Génicourt. On the 25th and 26th the 129th Infantry moved from the Troyon sector to the vicinity of Rupt-en-Woëvre, and on the 27th a tactical manoeuvre in liaison was executed from 9 A.M. until 1 P.M. in the neighborhood

of La Croix-sur-Meuse. Report on the Operations of the 65th Infantry Brigade, dated February 28, 1919, 2:606.

²⁴"Policing of Division area commenced," War Diary, 33rd Division, December 2, 1918.

²⁵"December 1st, the units of the brigade were located in rest billets in the Fort du Troyon Area, France. . . . the 123rd M. G. Battalion having moved from the Bois de Ranzières that date." Report on the Operations of the 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:606.

²⁶Telegraphic orders from the Chief of Staff, Second Army, to the Commanding General, 33rd Division, transmitted by telephone and received December 2, 1918, at 5:38 P.M.

²⁷War Diary, 33rd Division; Diary of the Division Adjutant.

²⁸War Diary, 33rd Division.

²⁹"Under G-3, orders # 254, Second Army, 33rd Division relieved from assignment to IX Corps, and placed in Army Reserve, effective 15 hours, Dec. 5th, 1918." War Diary, 33rd Division, December 5, 1918. G-3 Order No. 254, Headquarters of the Second Army, December 5, 1918, 11:00 hours, announced that "The 33rd Division is relieved from assignment to the IX Corps and placed in Army Reserve, Second Army, effective 15 Hours, December 5th."

³⁰"1. The 33rd Division, with the 55th Field Artillery Brigade attached, will proceed by marching, commencing December 7th, to the Leudelange area (southwest of Luxembourg), per march table attached. . . ." G-3 Order No. 257, Headquarters, Second Army, American E. F., France, December 6, 1918, 9:40 Hours, 3:427.

³¹"Issued Field Order # 37, and March Tables for Dec. 7th & 8th. Issued Memo. # 45—'Road discipline, stragglers, etc.' Issued Memo. re Policing, preparatory to move. Issued Memo., giving Billeting lists for Dec. 9th, 10th, 11th, 1918." War Diary, 33rd Division, December 6, 1918.

³²See above, 1:260.

³³Diary of the Division Adjutant. The Tables of Organization then in force prescribed that an infantry division have 768 truck-tons of transport, either in 2-ton or 3-ton trucks or both. The 33rd Division, after turning over the quota required of it, had only about four hundred truck-tons and those which remained were in sad need of repair.

³⁴This action anticipated by a considerable time the requirements prescribed in the following order:

"HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY,
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.

GENERAL ORDERS,

December 7, 1918.

No. 32.

The Second Army is about to be used as an Army of Occupation.

Accordingly all men, animals and transportation will be put in the very best possible condition. Special attention will be given to neatness of appearance of animals, but fetlocks will not be trimmed. A careful inspection will be made before any division or organization is allowed to go forward.

No time must be lost in putting all units in condition and in preparing for the inspection that will shortly be held.

By Command of Lieutenant General BULLARD:

STUART HEINTZELMAN,

Official:

Chief of Staff.

PHILIP L. SCHUYLER,
Adjutant General."

³⁵See the Division Commander's first indorsement, February 1, 1919, to the Report of the Commanding Officer, 122nd Machine Gun Battalion, made on January 4, 1919, on the subject of the "Condition of Motor Transport as issued to this Battalion," 3:493.

³⁶Administrative Bulletin No. 48, issued by the Headquarters Second Army on December 7, 1918, contained the following information:

"COMMANDING GENERAL, 2nd Army.

You are informed that Trèves will hereafter be considered a closed town. No troops will be permitted to billet in this city without direct authority from these Headquarters. Please inform all elements of your command.

By order:

PRESTON BROWN."

³⁷" 108th F. S. Bn.....Moved from Troyon to Avillers
108th San. Tr.....Moved from Troyon to Conflans
108th Engs.....Moved from Tilly-sur-Meuse to Avillers
108th Tn. Hq. & M. P...Moved from Troyon to Avillers
55th F. A. Bde.....Moved from Troyon to Puxe
65th Inf. Bde.....Moved from Génicourt to Thillot
66th Inf. Bde.....Moved from Deuxnouds to Labry

"Issued Annexes № 2-3-4 to Field Order № 27 'March Tables for Dec. 9th-10th & 11th, 1918.'

"Issued Divisional Location List." War Diary, 33rd Division, December 7, 1918.

³⁸"Div. P. C.....Moved from Troyon to Conflans
Hq. Troop.....Moved from Troyon to Conflans
122 M. G. Bn.....Moved from Chaillon to Doncourt
108th F. S. Bn.....Moved from Avillers to Labry
108th San. Tr.....Conflans
108th Engs.....Moved from Avillers to Droitaumont
108th Tn. Hq. & M. P...Moved from Avillers to Conflans
55th F. A. Bde.....Puxe
65th Inf. Bde.....Moved from Thillot to Jarny
66th Inf. Bde.....Labry

647 officers 20,712 men Cloudy weather Muddy Roads Good Health.

"Div. Completed move from Troyon to Conflans, ordered by Field Order № 37, 33rd Div." War Diary, 33rd Division, December 8, 1918.

³⁹Commanding General, Second Army, to Commanding General, 33rd Division, December 8, 1918, on the subject of "Relief of Detachments of the 5th Division by the

33rd Division." The pith of these instructions was contained in the first paragraph, which ran thus:

"You will relieve, by detachments of your division, all elements of the 5th Division on guard and police duty within the area marked 'A' on the accompanying map and which surrounds your future billeting area, as shown in red on the same map. Detachments from other divisions of this Army will relieve the remainder of the detachments of the 5th Division at an early date. You will make the necessary arrangements direct with the Commanding General, 5th Division, as to the details of reliefs and will obtain from him all orders and instructions as may have been issued in connection therewith and also such lists of material turned over by the Germans as may be in the possession of the 5th Division. It is desired that the relief be completed as early as practicable and that upon completion of the relief in the area for which you will be responsible, that these Headquarters be advised, by wire, of its completion."

⁴⁰In passing in review the order of march was as follows: the Commanding Officer of the 131st Infantry (Colonel Sanborn), the band from American General Headquarters, the Staff of the 73rd French Division, the battalion of the 131st Infantry, French infantry, French cavalry, French artillery, French tanks, armoured cars, etc.

⁴¹See the extremely graphic and interesting bulletin on the Formal Occupation of Metz, issued by Colonel Sanborn to the 131st Infantry on December 13, 1918, 3:429.

⁴²"P. C.—Conflans

Hq. Troop—Conflans.

122nd M. G. Bn.....Moved from Doncourt to Briey

108th F. S. Bn.....Moved from Labry to Bettainvillers

108th San. Tr.....Conflans

108th Engrs.....Moved from Droitaumont to Briey

108th Tn. Hq. & M. P...Moved from Conflans to Briey

55th F. A. Bde.....Moved from Puxe to Spincourt

65th Inf. Bde.....Moved from Jarny to Norroy

66th Inf. Bde.....Moved from Labry to Mancieulles

"Issued Memo. stating truck transportation for Div. Hdq. limited, and will be dispatched by Transportation Officer. . ." War Diary, 33rd Division, December 9, 1918.

⁴³"HEADQUARTERS, SECOND ARMY, 9th December, 1918, COMMANDING GENERAL, 33rd Division.

The following telegram to C. G. III Army repeated for your information and guidance quote No. 2344, G-3, period The Fifth Division is transferred to the II Army and will be maintained on its present duties in connection with lines of communication period The 33rd Division is transferred to the III Army period Actual date of passing of command will be arranged by conference between you and Commanding General II Army period By order Conner period end quote II Army letter of December 8 comma with maps comma regarding relief of detachments of Fifth Division by 33rd Division revoked period Transmit to Fifth Division your instructions regarding final billeting area and your instructions of December 8th regarding area A comma which will apply to the Fifth Division comma together with a copy of above quoted telegram

period Continue your march as previously ordered period Date of passing of command will be communicated to you later period Acknowledge.

HEINTZELMAN."

44" Div. P. C.....Moved from Conflans to Aumetz
 Hdq. Troops.....Moved from Conflans to Aumetz
 122nd M. G. Bn.....Moved from Briey to Anderny
 108th F. S. Bn.....Moved from Bettainvillers to Aumetz
 108th San. Tr.....Conflans
 108th Engrs.....Moved from Briey to Murville
 108th Tn. Hq. & M. P...Moved from Briey to Beuvillers
 55th F. A. Bde.....Moved from Spincourt to Longuyon
 65th Inf. Bde.....Moved from Norroy to Villerupt
 66th Inf. Bde.....Moved from Mancieulles to Esch, Lux.
 650 officers 20,924 men Rainy weather Muddy Road Good Health
 Good Camp.

"Division completed move from Conflans to Aumetz ordered by F. O. # 37, 33rd Div., dated Dec. 6th, 1918." War Diary, 33rd Division, December 10, 1918.

"Div. P. C.....Aumetz
 Hdq. Troop.....Aumetz
 122nd M. G. Bn.....Moved from Anderny to Wollmeringen
 108th F. S. Bn.....Aumetz
 108th San. Tr.....Moved from Conflans to Aumetz
 108th Eng.....Moved from Murville to Havange
 108th Tn. Hq. & M. P...Moved from Beuvillers to Berchem
 55th F. A. Bde.....Moved from Longuyon to Longwy
 65th Inf. Bde.....Villerupt
 66th Inf. Bde.....Esch

"Issued Annex # 5 to F. O. # 37 March table for Dec. 12th, 1918. Former March table suspended. Telephone conversation with Major Cain, G-3/VII Corps substituted. Remain south of the line Luxembourg—Remich, until further orders.

"Issued Memo. stating Div. P. C. would not open (at) Leudelange, but would open in the Casino, Esch, at 12 noon Dec. 12th, 1918." War Diary, 33rd Division, December 11, 1918.

"Div. P. C.....Moved from Aumetz to Esch
 Hdq. Troop.....Moved from Aumetz to Esch
 122 M. G. Bn.....Moved from Wollmeringen to Schiffingen
 108th F. S. Bn.....Moved from Aumetz to Esch
 108th San. Tr.....Moved from Aumetz to Schiffingen
 108th Eng.....Moved to Havange to Kayl
 108th Tn. Hq. & M. P...Berchem
 55th F. A. Bde.....Moved from Longwy to Esch
 65th Inf. Bde.....Moved from Villerupt to Bertrangen
 66th Inf. Bde.....Moved from Esch to Hesperingen
 658 officers 20,786 men Rainy weather Muddy Roads Good Health
 Good Camp.

"Issued Memo. quoting Memo from VII Corps Re: Covering by outposts, when in Bivouac, on the march, etc.

"Issued Training Circular № 204." War Diary, 33rd Division, December 12, 1918.

⁴⁵Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁴⁶"Div. Hdq..... Esch

Hdq. Troop..... Esch

122 M. G. Bn..... Shifflange

108th F. S. Bn..... Esch

108th San. Tr..... Shifflange

108th Eng..... Kayl

108th Tn. Hq. & M. P.... Berchem to Hesperingen

55th F. A. Bde..... Esch

65th Inf. Bde..... Bertrangen

66th Inf. Bde..... Hesperingen

663 Officers 20,753 Men Rainy Weather Muddy Roads.

"Issued Field Order № 38 Move of Div. to Saarburg Area.

"Issued Annex № 1 to F. O. № 38 March table for Dec. 14th, 1918." War Diary, 33rd Division, December 13, 1918.

⁴⁷"Div. Hdq..... Esch

Hdq. Troop..... Esch

122 M. G. Bn..... Moved from Shifflange to Mondorf

108th F. S. Bn..... Moved from Esch to Itzig

108th San. Tr..... Moved from Esch to Sandweiler

108th Eng..... Moved from Kayl to Altzingen

108th Tn. Hq. & M.P.... Moved from Hesperingen to Mensdorf

55th F. A. Bde..... Moved from Esch to Remich

65th Inf. Bde..... Moved from Bertrangen to Neideranven

66th Inf. Bde..... Moved from Hesperingen to Remich

"Issued Annexes № 2 and № 3 (March Tables for Dec. 15th & 16th, 1918) to Field Order No. 38, 33rd Div.

"Issued Plan of Liaison, in connection with Field Order № 38." War Diary, 33rd Division, December 14, 1918.

⁴⁸Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁴⁹"Copy of telegram from the 3rd Army to the Commanding General, 7th Army Corps.

201 G-3 Number of divisions to enter Germany is limited to eight period 33rd Division will be transferred to 2nd Army at a later date period This division will at once be halted in place comma except that any elements of it that may have entered Germany will be withdrawn west of the German-Luxembourg frontier period Repeat to 33rd Division and acknowledge period

CRAIG, Chief of Staff.

To COMMANDING GENERAL 33rd Division for information and compliance.

BREES, Chief of Staff.

The order directing this transfer is to be arranged by the two generals of the 2nd and 3rd Army, and will probably take place at Noon 12 hours on the 17th."

⁵⁰"Div. P. C.....Esch

Hq. Troop.....Esch

122nd M. G. Bn.....Moved from Mondorf to Canach

108th F. S. Bn.....Moved from Itzig to Horstert

108th San. Tr.....Moved from Sandweiler to Grevenmacher

108th Engrs.....Moved from Altzingen to Senningen

108th Tn. Hq. & M. P...Mensdorf

65th Inf. Bde.....Moved from Neideranven to Manternach

66th Inf. Bde.....Moved from Remich to Saarburg

55th F. A. Bde.....Remich

661 Officers 20,699 Men Rainy weather Fair Roads Good Health

Good Camp.

"Rec'd notification from VII Corps that the Division would be halted in place, and any elements now over the border would be withdrawn west of the German-Luxembourg frontier.

"Issued instructions to all units to stand, and withdraw any units over the line.

"March Table for Dec. 16th annulled." War Diary, 33rd Division, December 15, 1918.

⁵¹Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁵²Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁵³"Div. P. C.....Esch

Hq. Troop.....Esch

122 M. G. Bn.....Canach

108th F. S. Bn.....Horstert

108th San. Tr.....Grevenmacher

108th Engrs.....Senningen

108th Tn. Hq. & M. P...Mensdorf

55th F. A. Bde.....Remich

65th Inf. Bde.....Manternach

66th Inf. Bde.....Saarburg

672 Officers 20,501 Men Rainy Weather Muddy Roads Good Health

Good Camp.

"Notified 65th & 66th & 55th F. A. Bde. by telegram to move units, across the German border, back." War Diary, 33rd Division, December 16, 1918.

⁵⁴"December 16th:

"Account further movement forward in accordance with Field Orders No. 38, Hdqrs. 33rd Division and Annexes thereto, having been canceled, the units of the brigade remained in staging areas in which they were located December 15th, with the exception of the 1st Battalion and Supply Company, 130th Infantry, which were moved back from Oberbillig, Germany, to Manternach and Wasserbillig, Luxembourg, an average distance of 11 kilometers, respectively, where they remained until the morning of Dec. 19th. . . ." Report of Operations of the 65th Infantry Brigade, dated February 28, 1919, 2:609.

⁵⁵Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁵⁶This transfer was announced by General Order No. 151, Headquarters 33rd Division, December 17, 1918.

⁵⁷"Div. P. C.....Moved from Esch to Grevenmacher

Hdq. Troop.....Moved from Esch to Grevenmacher

122 M. G. Bn.....Canach

108th F. S. Bn.....Horstert

108th San. Tr.....Grevenmacher

108th Eng.....Senningen

108th Tn. Hq. & M. P...Mensdorf

55th F. A. Bde.....Remich

65th Inf. Bde.....Manternach

66th Inf. Bde.....Moved from Saarburg to Remich

667 Officers 20,461 Men Rainy Weather Muddy Roads Good Health
Good Camp.

"Command passed from III Army to II Army at 12 hours, 17th Dec. 1918, and placed in Army Reserve.

"Issued orders for 108th Eng., 108th F. S. Bn., Hdq. Troop, Mil. Police, Tn. Hdq. to move Dec. 18th to final destination." War Diary, 33rd Division, December 17, 1918.

⁵⁸Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*

⁶⁰Prescribed by Field Order No. 31, Headquarters Second Army, December 18, 1918, 24 hours.

⁶¹"Div. P. C.....Grevenmacher

Hdq. Troop.....Grevenmacher

122 M. G. Bn.....Canach

108th F. S. Bn.....Moved from Horstert to Heffingen

108th San. Tr.....Grevenmacher

108th Eng.....Moved from Senningen to Medernach

108th Tn. Hq. & M. P...Moved from Mensdorf to Diekirch

55th F. A. Bde.....Remich

65th Inf. Bde.....Manternach

66th Inf. Bde.....Remich

669 Officers 20,493 Men Rainy Weather Muddy Roads Good Health
Good Camp.

"Issued orders for 65th & 66th Bdes. to move Dec. 19th. Also 55th F. A. Bde. Orders for 66th Bde. & 122 M.G. Bn. to move Dec. 20th, 1918.

"Command of the 33 Div. passed from II Army Reserve to VI Army Corps. II Army F. O. No. 31." War Diary, 33rd Division, December 18, 1918.

⁶²Diary of the Division Adjutant. As a matter of fact, Esch had been vacated with unusual haste on December 17 to make room for the 5th Division.

⁶³"Div. P. C.....Moved from Grevenmacher to Diekirch

Hdq. Troop.....Moved from Grevenmacher to Diekirch

122 M. G. Bn.....Canach

108th F. S. Bn.....Moved from Heffingen to Diekirch

108th San. Tr.....Moved from Grevenmacher to Diekirch

108th Engrs.....Medernach

108th Tn. Hq. & M. P.... Diekirch
 55th F. A. Bde..... Remich
 65th Inf. Bde..... Moved from Manternach to Ettelbruck
 66th Bde..... Remich
 671 Officers 20,480 Men Rainy Weather Muddy Roads."

War Diary, 33rd Division, December 19, 1918.

⁶⁴Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁶⁵"December 20th:

"The various units of the brigade completed the movement back into Second Army Area in Luxembourg, as follows: 129th Infantry Headquarters, Headquarters Co., and 1st Battalion, Larochette to Ettelbruck, 11 kilometers; 2nd Battalion, 129th Inf., Christnach to Ettelbruck, 11 kilometers; 3rd Battalion, 129th Inf., and Machine Gun Co., Heffingen to Schieren, 12 kilometers; 129th Supply Co., Heffingen to Warken, 12 kilometers; 130th Infantry Headquarters, Headquarters Supply Co., and 3rd Bn. Junglinster, to Bettendorf, Gilsdorf, Ermsdorf and Eppeldorf, 26 kilometers; 130th Machine Gun Co., Altlinster to Beaufort, 20 kilometers; 1st Bn. 130th Infantry, Bourglinster to Bettendorf, 28 kilometers 2nd Bn., 130th Infantry, Bourglinster to Reisdorf and Mostroff, 26 kilometers; 123rd M. G. Battalion, Fishbach to Erpeldingen and Ingeldorf, 22 kilometers. Brigade remained in this area up to and including December 31st." Report of Operations of the 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:609.

⁶⁶"Div. P. C..... Diekirch
 Hdq. Troop..... Diekirch
 122 M. G. Bn..... Canach
 108th F. S. Bn..... Diekirch
 108th San. Tr..... Diekirch
 108th Eng..... Medernach

108th Tn. Hq. & M. P... Diekirch
 55th F. A. Bde..... Remich
 65th Inf. Bde..... Ettelbruck

66th Inf. Bde..... Moved from Remich to Chateau Meysembourg.

676 Officers 20,452 Men Rainy Weather Muddy Roads Good Health
 Good Camp."

War Diary, 33rd Division, December 20, 1918.

⁶⁷Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁶⁸

"HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY,

AMERICAN E. F.

FRANCE, 20, December, 1918.

TO: COMMANDING GENERAL,
 33rd Division,
 American E. F.

1705 hrs period Number three six eight G-three period Following repeated for your information and compliance Quote Commanding General Second Army comma Information from Headquarters Allied Commander-in-Chief indicates certain amount of unrest among inhabitants of Luxemburg in region of Echternach period While so far it has been of a political nature and it is not desired to interfere at all in the politics of Luxemburg the Allied Commander-in-Chief has received information which indicates there may possibly be a certain amount of disorder period It is desired that you take

all necessary measures to suppress any disorder should such occur period By order
Conner period Unquote Acknowledge and report action taken period

HEINTZELMAN."

⁶⁹Telegram handed in at Toul, December 19, 1918.

"TO GENERAL GEORGE BELL,
Hdqrs. 33rd Division.

G number eight four period As Senior Division Commander in the Sixth Corps the Army Commander directs that you assume command of that Corps until further orders period The Corps Headquarters now at Saizerais is directed to open at Piemes twelve hours twenty-third December period Acknowledge.

HEINTZELMAN."

⁷⁰Paragraph four of General Order No. 152 issued by the Headquarters 33rd Division on December 20, 1918, ran thus:

"IV *Food For French Civilians.*

"1. The distribution of food to French civilians by American organizations was provided for in instructions which were published in G. O. 143, Sec. VI, these Headquarters. Memorandum 46, Sec. I, these headquarters, stated that no further rationing of the French civilian population would be made by American organizations until further instructions.

"2. The instructions now in effect in this regard are contained in a letter from Headquarters, Second Army, dated 6th December, 1918, to Commanding General, 33rd Division, which letter is as follows:

"1. Many requests seem to be coming in to the organizations in this Army from French civilians for rations. The following telegram from G. H. Q. is quoted for your information and action.

"“Number 8175-S-4. Reference our number 6276 G-# and supplementary telegrams. Our only agreement with French for supply civil population definitely limited to ‘food of first necessity’ for population towns liberated by our troops until civil authorities could bring up their own supplies which was definitely understood would not exceed more than four or five days at maximum. It is now eighteen days since armistice was signed and since French are refusing to supply sufficient railroad facilities to bring up necessary food for our own troops you will supply no more food for French civilian population pending further instructions, and certainly not until the supply of our own armies is first assured. Notify accordingly French authorities making request. Signed, MOSELEY.””

⁷¹"During the period December 21st to 31st, inclusive, the entire time was spent by all units of the brigade resting, cleaning equipment, attending to routine of camp duties and carrying out miscellaneous training." Report of Operations of the 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:610.

⁷²Adjutant General, Second Army, to Commanding Generals, VIth Corps, IInd Corps, 5th, 7th, 28th, 33rd, 35th, 79th and 88th Divisions, and Army Air Service Commander, on the subject of Suspension of Training, dated Headquarters Second Army, December 21, 1918. All divisional courses of instruction were directed to be suspended for the two weeks from December 22 to January 4, and the drills and manoeuvres prescribed by General Order No. 207, G. H. Q. concluded "before noon of the period from December 26 to 31 inclusive."

(ii)

⁷³Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁷⁴

HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY
AMERICAN E. F.,

FRANCE, 23 December, 1918.

TO: COMMANDING GENERAL,
33rd Division, Diekirch.

1500 Hrs period Number three nine one G-three period Reference your telegram December 23rd regarding situation at Echternach comma Army Commander calls your attention to orders from General Headquarters which require that you stand ready to suppress any disorders in that vicinity should they occur.

HEINTZELMAN."

⁷⁵Telegram addressed to General George Bell, 33rd Division, which was received at the P. C. of the 33rd Division on December 24, 1918, at 5:40 P.M.:

"G number 91 period Reference G Number 84 period Directing you as senior Division Commander to assume command of the 6th Corps comma G. H. Q. states that no Corps Commander will be designated period Consequently Army Commander has decided that the 6th Corps will function under his own immediate command period He expects to spend part of his time at 6th Corps Hdqrs. period The Chief of Staff will issue orders and instructions pursuant to the Army Commander's orders thus given period The Chief of Staff Sixth Corps has been directed to issue the following orders quote Pending the designation of a Corps Commander by G. H. Q. the Sixth Corps Staff will function under authority of the Army Commander end quote period Acknowledge.

HEINTZELMAN."

General Bell's relief was also announced in Paragraph 1, General Order No. 9, Headquarters, Sixth Army Corps, December 24, 1918.

⁷⁶Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁷⁷G-3 Order No. 357, dated Headquarters Second Army, American E. F., France, 26 December, 1918, 12:30 hours directed that:

"1. The 58th Field Artillery Brigade, including the 108th Ammunition Train, will proceed overland to rejoin the 33rd Division in the Diekirch area commencing 28th December, 1918. . . ."

G-3 Order No. 359, bearing the same address and date but at 17:10 hours announced that:

"1. The 55th Field Artillery Brigade, including the 105th Ammunition Train, is relieved from duty with the 33rd Division, and will proceed by marching to join the 28th Division in the Woinville area, commencing 30th December, 1919. . . ." Both of these orders were received at the message centre of the 33rd Division at Diekirch on December 27, 1918, at 12:10 P.M.

⁷⁸Diary of the Division Adjutant. The condition of that brigade is fully set forth in the following telegram sent from Stenay on December 26, 1918, to G-3, 2nd Army, Toul:

"Number three six naught period Retel your wire No. four one one G-Three directing Fifty eight F. A. Brigade to rejoin Thirty third Division movement to commence December twenty eighth period It will be impossible to start movement at that date period Although animals have just been received there is no harness on hand and the Horse Regiments are immobile period In compliance with instructions

from Headquarters of the First Army all harness was turned in when the animals were transferred to the First and Second F. A. Brigades period Receipt of harness being arranged for through Chief Ordinance Officer and M. T. O. G-Four Second Army period Lack of motor transportation will prevent Brigade from taking delivery of harness without proper assistance and upon receipt of harness some days will be required for proper distribution and adjustment period. All seventy-five guns and caissons also in compliance with orders from the First Army are now parked at railhead at Dun-sur-Meuse period.

TODD, Brigadier General commanding,
58th F. A. Brigade."

79

"HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY,
AMERICAN E. F.,
FRANCE, 27 December, 1918.

COMMANDING GENERAL,
33rd Division,
Diekirch.

1200 hrs period Number four one six G three period The movement of the fifty eighth Field Artillery Brigade to join your division which was to have commenced December twenty eighth has been temporarily delayed period You will be advised later when the movement will take place period Acknowledge period
HEINTZELMAN."

⁸⁰Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁸¹"Div. P. C.....Diekirch

Hq. Troop.....Diekirch

122nd M. G. Bn.....Niederfeulen

108th F. S. Bn.....Diekirch

108th San. Tr.....Diekirch

108th Eng.....Medernach

108th Tr. Hq. & M.P....Diekirch

55th F. A. Brig.....Remich

65th Inf. Brig.....Ettelbruck

66th Inf. Brig.....Chateau Meysembourg, Schonfels

578 officers 16,698 men Cloudy weather.

"55th F. A. Brig. relieved from command 33rd Div. by G-3 orders # 359 Hdq. 2nd Army but assigned to command by telegram again. For this reason no War Diary submitted. . . ." War Diary, 33rd Division, December 31, 1918.

⁸²G-3 Orders No. 374, dated Headquarters Second Army, American Expeditionary Forces, France, December 31, 1918, 17:00 Hours, was as follows:

"Paragraphs 1 and 3, G-3 Orders No. 359, Second Army, dated 26th December, 1918, are changed to read as follows:

"1. The 55th Field Artillery Brigade, including the 105 Ammunition Train, is relieved from duty with the 33rd Division and will proceed overland to join the 28th Division in the Woinville area, commencing 6th January, 1919.

"2. All elements of the 55th Field Artillery Brigade must be south of the line Arlon-Kopsal-Lorentzweiler, not later than 7th January, 1919. The town of Bissen must be vacated on 6th January, 1919, by the 55th Field Artillery Brigade."

G-3 Orders No. 375, issued on the same date and at the same hour,⁸³ prescribed that:

"Paragraphs 1, 4, 6 and 7, G-3 Orders No. 357, Second Army, dated 26th December, 1918, are changed to read as follows:

"The 58th Field Artillery Brigade, including the 108th Ammunition Train, is relieved from duty with the 79th Division and will proceed overland to join the 33rd Division in the Diekirch area commencing 4th January, 1919. . . ."

⁸³"Div. Hdqrs. Diekirch
Hq. Troop Diekirch
122 M. G. Bn. Niederfeulen
108th F. S. Bn. Diekirch
108th San. Tr. Diekirch
108th Engrs. Medernach
108th Tr. Hq. & M.P. . . . Diekirch
108th Supply Tr. Mersch
33rd M. P. Co. Diekirch
58th F. A. Brig. Stenay
65th Inf. Brig. Ettelbruck
66th Inf. Brig. Meysembourg

777 officers	} available for duty	Cold & Cloudy Weather	Poor Roads
22,872 men			

Good Health Good Camp."

War Diary, 33rd Division, January 1, 1919.

⁸⁴See above, 1:272 ff.

⁸⁵Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁸⁶"Issued Training Circular No. 1 stating Div. enters upon a 4 week training period beginning Jan. 6th, following program prescribed in G. O. 236, G. H. Q.

"Issued Training Cir. No. 2, Commencing Jan. 14 an inspection will be made of all horse transport of the Div. 3 officers will be detailed to make an inspection of Animals, 3 to report upon harness and leather, and 3 to examine Vehicles and Equipment of the men." War Diary, 33rd Division, January 4, 1919.

⁸⁷Diary of the Division Adjutant. The 58th Field Artillery Brigade was inspected January 13 by General Bowley, Chief of Artillery of the VIth Corps, and January 23 by General Aultman, Chief of Artillery of the Second Army. Record of Events, 58th Field Artillery Brigade, January, 1919, 3:251.

⁸⁸Lack of transport in the 58th Field Artillery Brigade necessitated a number of trucks being sent from the 33rd Division to assist its march.

⁸⁹Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁹⁰"55th F. A. Bde. completed move from Div. Area. 58th Arty, Bde. completed move into Divisional Area." War Diary, 33rd Division, January 8, 1919.

⁹¹"Movement overland and from Stenay to Diekirch area—60 miles—begins Jan. 4th and ends Jan. 10, over route Stenay, Montmédy, Virton, Arlon to destination." Record of Events, 58th Field Artillery Brigade, January, 1919, 3:250.

"Entire 58th Field Artillery Brigade has rejoined and is billeted: Hdqrs. at Schonfels, 122nd F. A. at Bissen, 123rd F. A. at Lintgen, 124th F. A. at Berschbach, 108th Ammunition Train at Tuntingen." Diary of the Division Adjutant, January 10,

1919. The 108th Trench Mortar Battery, which had been attached to the Army Artillery, First Army, since November 29, 1918, had received orders on January 3, 1919, to prepare for return to the United States and had left Souilly for Angers on January 8.

⁹²The following message was received by telephone at the message centre of the 33rd Division at Diekirch on January 8, 1919, at 12:15 P.M.

"HEADQUARTERS 6TH CORPS, January 8, 1919. Following telegram repeated for your information and action indicated therein colon quote Headquarters A. E. F. January 8, 1919. Commanding General, Second Army, Toul period Y-274. The funeral of ex-President Roosevelt is announced for Wednesday afternoon, January 8th. Each military post and station will display National Flag at half mast and the troops will be paraded and this announcement read to them at 3:00 P.M. on the day of the funeral. The ex-President's salute of twenty-one guns will be fired. Notify all posts and organizations under your command. (Signed) DAVIS Unquote.

(Signed) SCHUYLER.

The Corps Commander directs that you take action as directed above throughout your command.

COLLINS, Chief of Staff."

⁹³Diary of the Division Adjutant.

⁹⁴"66th Inf. Brig. moved from Meysembourg to Echternach." War Diary, 33rd Division, January 11, 1919.

⁹⁵These schools, officially designated as the Division Training Centre, opened at Vianden on January 13, in conformity with Training Circular No. 4, issued on January 8, 1919. War Diary, 33rd Division, January 13, 1919.

⁹⁶Report of Operations of the 65th Infantry Brigade, 2:611.

⁹⁷Paragraph 14, Special Order No. 19, Headquarters 33rd Division, January 19, 1919.

⁹⁸General Order No. 9, dated January 19, 1919, 3:432.

As a matter of fact, the ceremony of presentation of these Medals of Honor did not occur until Monday, February 10. The *Stars and Stripes*, February 14, 1919, stated that "The Congressional Medal of Honor . . . has been won by only 47 men in the present war, and of these 47, 16 are dead."

⁹⁹Corporals Paul F. Hobscheid, Jake Alex, and Stephen M. Mance, who had then become sergeants.

¹⁰⁰Sergeants Sidney C. McGuire, and George B. Gourley, Corporals Walter N. Larson, Walter G. Peabody, and Frank L. Mills, and Privates Mathew Thorneycroft, Gordon Wickhan, Charles W. Michaelis, Charles C. Bark, Dickson A. Woodward, C. C. Dunne, Ragnar Liljeberg, W. A. Anderson, and William Curr, and Mechanic Anton J. Watkin. At that time Corporals Larson, Peabody, and Mills and Privates Thorneycroft and Wickhan had been promoted to sergeants, and Privates Michaelis, Bark, and Woodward had become corporals. British decorations had also been awarded to the following men of the 131st Infantry, who for various reasons were not present:

Distinguished Conduct Medal: Private Frank J. Kostak. Military Medal: Sergeants J. Breakey, William Scholes, and Louis R. Rivers; Corporals C. Somnitz and N. Lieberman; and Privates R. Redding, Harry Stokes, David T. Leahy, S. De Borris, G. F. Gaston, and Albert P. Holmes.

¹⁰¹Diary of the Division Adjutant: About a week later General Bell received the following letter:

"NEUWIED,

23, Jany. 19.

MY DEAR GENERAL BELL.

I must write to thank you for the very pleasant time I had at Diekirch—and for the extremely cordial reception given me at Larochette.

It was a great honour to be allowed to inspect the 131st and to speak to them. It will be a day that I shall always remember.

Above all I have seen—and I shall tell the King—how the 33rd Division regard their former friends in the British Army. I think friendships were made, and ties cemented, in those few months last year, which will last for the good of the world.

I hope I shall see you again before you vanish back to the United States.

Again many thanks for your kindness to me personally—it was of a kind I shall always remember.

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) C. M. WAGSTAFF."

¹⁰²General Order No. 11, Headquarters 33rd Division, Luxembourg, January 24, 1919, 3:433. This corrected copy of General Order No. 232, General Headquarters, A. E. F., dated December 19, 1918, has already been quoted on page 233. The original General Order No. 232, bearing the same date, was published to the 33rd Division in Bulletin No. 141 on December 28, 1918. In them no mention was made of "the Second Colonial and Seventeenth French Corps" nor of "the 10th and 15th French Colonial divisions" and "the 18th and 26th French Divisions" which composed them and which formed part of the First American Army during the Meuse-Argonne Battle. These French Corps and Divisions were inserted in the corrected copy issued by General Headquarters.

¹⁰³G-3 Order No. 19, Headquarters VI Army Corps, A. E. F., January 31, 1919, 12 hours, 3:435. Paragraph 3 of these orders read thus:

"3. 33rd Division Police Area: That part of VI Army Corps area east and north of a line, point northwest of Hobscheid at junction of Belgian-Luxembourg boundary and northern boundary of Commune of Capellen (Luxembourg), south along the Belgian-Luxembourg boundary to a point east of Autel Bas (Belgium)—east, Bettingen (excl)—Capellen (incl)—Strassen (excl)—Eich (excl)—Contern (incl)—Waldbredemus (incl)—Wellenstein (excl)."

¹⁰⁴See above, 1:272-273.

¹⁰⁵War Diary, 33rd Division, February 6, 7, 13, 20, and 21, 1919.

¹⁰⁶"Beginning of 2nd week of 3rd training period in accordance with provisions of G. O. 236, G. H. Q." *Ibid*, February 10, 1919.

¹⁰⁷"1. Issued Training Cir. No. 22 quoting G-5 Training Memorandum No. 26, Hdq. Second Army, regarding tactical walk, athletic exercises etc. Authority has been obtained from the Commander in Chief to change the work of training insomuch that tactical walk will be substituted for the Brigade terrain exercises until further notice." *Ibid.*, February 19, 1919.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, February 27, 1919. This program was to go into effect on March 3.

¹⁰⁹See above, 1:273.

¹¹⁰War Diary, 33rd Division, February 11, 1919.

¹¹¹"Issued Division Location List.

"Issued Training Cir. # 28 outlining Training school for enlisted men of the Ammunition, Supply and Sanitary Trains and of the Transport sections of those units equipped with Animal Transport." War Diary, 33rd Division, February 25, 1919.

¹¹²"1. Issued Training Cir. No. 29 quoting telegram from G. H. Q., regarding A. E. F. Universities for officers and soldiers of the A. E. F. at Beaune, Côte d'Or. Applications must be in the office of G-3 not later than 12 hours fourth March, 1919.

"2. Issued Memorandum # 19 quoting telegram from G. H. Q. regarding officers and soldiers qualified to teach in the A. E. F. University. Application of officers and soldiers qualified to teach will be in the office of G-3 not later than 12 hours 4th of March, 1919." *Ibid.*, February 28, 1919.

¹¹³Paragraph 11 of Special Order No. 53, Headquarters 33rd Division, February 22, 1919, opened thus:

"11. In compliance with instructions, Chief of Staff, VIth Corps, dated 19th February, 1919, and also telegraphic instructions, VIth Corps, wire 162-G-3, dated 20th February, 1919, the following officers and enlisted men will report on the 24th February, 1919, to General Bjornstadt, Menil-la-Tour, France, for course of instruction in game of 'Doughboy' at Royaumeix, Meurthe et Moselle." Then followed the list twenty-eight officers and twenty-nine enlisted men, ending with the necessary instructions as to bedding rolls, blankets, mess equipment, transportation, rations, hour of entraining at Mersch, etc.

"Memorandum No. 18 regarding course of instructions at Royaumeix, Meurthe et Moselle in the game of 'Doughboy'" was also issued that day. War Diary, 33rd Division, February 20, 1919.

¹¹⁴The following paragraph of General Bell's indorsement will afford a fair understanding of the condition of the motor transport allotted to the 33rd Division shortly before it went into the line at Verdun on September 7-10, 1919:

"At Tronville we received 169 trucks, the Medical Department were given 22—7 of which would run and 15 had to be hauled off. Of the remaining 147 delivered to the Supply Train, 68 would not start and needed vital parts. In order to move such of these trucks as could be used, it was necessary to salvage 17 to get the spare parts to move the balance, and even then 22 more had to be towed to our next station."

¹¹⁵War Diary, 33rd Division.

¹¹⁶Memorandum No. 15, Headquarters, 33rd Division, February 3, 1919, 3:437.

¹¹⁷General Bell assumed command of the VIth Corps by virtue of telegraphic instructions from the Second Army, dated February 3, 1919, and also Paragraph 1, General Order, No. 4, Headquarters Sixth Army Corps, February 3, 1919. He was relieved of the command of the VIth Corps by Paragraph 1, General Order No. 5, Headquarters, Sixth Army Corps, February 18, 1919.

¹¹⁸G-3 Order No. 20, Headquarters VI Army Corps, February 7, 1919, 10 hours, 3:438, of which the final paragraph read thus:

"3. 33rd Division Area: That part of the VI Army Corps Area east and north of a line: point on Belgian-Luxembourg boundary east of Toutelange—South along Belgian-Luxembourg boundary to point east of Autel Bas (Belgium)—east, Bettingen

(excl)—Capellen (incl)—Strassen (excl)—Eich (excl)—Contern (incl)—Waldbredemus (incl)—Wellenstein (excl)."

¹¹⁹See above, 1:271.

¹²⁰On February 11, pursuant to orders issued in compliance with telegraphic instructions from the Adjutant General the Division Adjutant left for Paris for temporary duty with the presidential party of the American Peace Commission, but returned to the division on February 18.

¹²¹" . . . Issued Training Cir. # 19. 'To stimulate interest in the appearance of the men, the condition of their equipment, and knowledge of the School of the Soldier, and in order to get an accurate comparison between the different units, every man in the Div. will be inspected and marked. Regtl. Comdrs. will report to Brig. Comdrs. the Co. or Battery receiving the highest rating, Brig. Comdrs. will report [to the] Div. Commander and the method of rating and marking units [was] outlined. . . .'" War Diary, 33rd Division, February 12, 1919.

¹²²Memorandum No. 22, Headquarters 33rd Division, February 20, 1919.

¹²³General Order No. 24, Headquarters, 33rd Division, February 23, 1919.

¹²⁴General Order No. 27, Headquarters 33rd Division, February 25, 1919, 3:439. The indorsements of the Headquarters of the Second Army and VIth Corps forwarding this letter were also inserted, and the order closed with this paragraph:

"II. This order will be read to the troops at the first assembly formation after its receipt and organization commanders will emphasize the fact that any failure to maintain the standard which has evoked such a recognition as that contained in the letter quoted above would be unworthy of the 33rd Division."

¹²⁵Diary of the Division Adjutant.

¹²⁶The efficiency of the management was evidenced by the fact that, as the tail of the class which had been judged disappeared through the outgoing gate, the head of the next class entered by the incoming gate; that at no stage was the program five minutes behind the time scheduled; and that the horse show finished slightly ahead of the hour specified.

¹²⁷The awards, published in General Order No. 31, Headquarters 33rd Division, on March 4, 1919, were as follows:

Class	First	Second	Third
12 Singles, Mules, shown to Machine Gun, Ammunition or 37 mm. cart.	Hdq. Troop	122 F. A.	122 F. A.
3 Singles, Horses, shown to Officer, Mess or other cart.	123 M. G.	131 Inf.	132 Amb. Co.
11 Mounts, Mules, Enlisted Men . . .	124 F. A.	122 F. A.	122 F. A.
14 Pairs of Mules, shown to water cart.	130 Inf.	130 Inf.	124 F. A.
6 Pairs of Horses, shown to British limber of ration cart. . . .	Hdq. Troop	33rd M. P.	130 Inf.
1 Mounts, Horses, Enlisted Men . .	129 Inf.	33rd M. P.	33rd M. P.
15 Two pairs of Mules, shown to British limber, Escort, G. S. or Ambulance.	130 Inf.	130 Inf.	122 F. A.

7	Pairs of Horses, shown to G. S. or fourgon.....	65 Inf. Brig.	Hdq. Troop	Hdq. Troop
8	Two pairs of Horses, shown to Escort or G. S. wagon.....	130 Inf.	Hdq. Troop	Hdq. Troop
17	Fives, Horses or Mules, shown to Chariot du Parc.....	122 F. A.	132 Inf.	124 F. A.
2	Mounts, Horses of Officers....	Hdq. Troop	33rd M. P.	66th Inf. Brig.
9	Sixes, Horses or Mules, shown to fourgon.....	122 F. A.	122 F. A.	130 Inf.
10	Six Horses, shown to 75 mm. gun carriage, caisson or reel cart.....	108 Eng.	122 F. A.	122 F. A.
13	Wheeler, Mules, free for all, shown to bridle.....	124 M. G. Bn.	124 F. A.	122 F. A.
4	Light Draft Horses (under 1300 lbs.) free for all, shown to bridle.....	130 Inf.	124 F. A.	124 M. G. Bn.
5	Heavy Draft Horses (over 1300 lbs.) Free for all, shown to bridle.....	Hdq. Troop	129 Inf.	Hdq. Troop
19	Booby.....	No decisions.		

Major General George Bell, Jr., Trophy. Winner: Headquarters Company, 122nd Field Artillery (Class 9, six horses or mules shown to fourgon).

¹²⁸Diary of the Division Adjutant.

¹²⁹On March 5, Colonel McNab of General Headquarters delivered to the division brigade, regimental, and separate battalion commanders, assembled at the Division Headquarters at Diekirch, a lengthy dissertation on the subject of his system of target practice. A few days later Colonel Gowan of General Headquarters inspected the various units in connection with their training. Diary of the Division Adjutant; Journal of Operations of the 33rd Division.

¹³⁰Journal of Operations of the 33rd Division, March 28, 1919, 2:482.

¹³¹General Order No. 30, Headquarters 33rd Division, March 4, 1919.

¹³²"March 6th, 1919.

"Issued Memorandum No. 21. 'Enlisted men detailed to the Division Infantry School at Redingen will leave their organizations so as to reach Redingen not later than 3:00 P.M. every Saturday. List of men detailed will be sent to G-3 office not later than 9:00 P.M. Friday.'" Journal of Operations of the 33rd Division, 2:480.

¹³³"March 13th, 1919.

"Issued Training Circular No. 30, establishing Sanitary School at Redingen in accordance with G-5 Memorandum No. 33, Second Army. The school will open March 17th and will continue thereafter in weekly sessions. Captain Arthur B. Hansen, M. C., is detailed as commandant." *Ibid.*, 2:481.

¹³⁴"March 23rd, 1919.

"Issued Training Circular No. 31, establishing Riding and Driving School at Dommeldingen, Luxembourg, and detailing Captain Styles, as commandant. Also giving list of officers and N. C. O's, detailed as Instructors." *Ibid.*, 2:482.

¹³⁵Journal of Operations of the 33rd Division, March 11, 15, 18, and 25, 1919, 2:481-482.

¹³⁶*Ibid.*, March 7, 9, 16, and 24, 1919, 2:480-482.

¹³⁷Furlough is the term used in military parlance in the United States.

¹³⁸Detailed information and instructions respecting leaves were contained in Memorandum No. 29, March 3, 1919; General Order No. 30, March 4; Memorandum No. 30, March 5; Memorandum No. 34, March 9; General Order 37, March 14; and General Order No. 40, March 18, 1919.

¹³⁹Paragraph I, General Order No. 38, Headquarters 33rd Division, March 16, 1919.

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"Summary

Organization.....	First	Second	Third	Total
33rd Division.....	9	8	7	24
7th Division.....	7	6	9	22
5th Division.....	6	7	4	17
VI Corps Troops.....	0	1	2	3

General Orders No. 7, VIth Army Corps, dated 23rd March, 1919, quoted in Bulletin No. 4, Headquarters 33rd Division, March 26, 1919.

¹⁴¹Journal of Operations of the 33rd Division, March 23, 1919, 2:482.

¹⁴²All details respecting the classes, method of judging, etc., were announced in Memorandum No. 40, issued by the Headquarters 33rd Division on March 24, 1919, 3:447.

¹⁴³Telegram, signed Collins, from VIth Corps to C. G., 33rd Division, dated March 1, 1919, (186 G-3) and quoting Telegram No. 3324 G-3, dated General Headquarters, January 27 and addressed to General Commanding 2nd Army, Toul.

¹⁴⁴Diary of the Division Adjutant.

¹⁴⁵General Order No. 32, Headquarters, 33rd Division, March 9, 1919, 3:445.

¹⁴⁶On March 10, Lieutenant Colonel Huidekoper, who had been the Division Adjutant since August 28, 1917, left Diekirch for Chaumont, having been relieved from duty with the 33rd Division and ordered to General Headquarters for temporary duty before proceeding to the United States for discharge. He was succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel James H. Stansfield as acting division adjutant.

¹⁴⁷Memorandum No. 34, Headquarters 33rd Division, March 9, 1919.

¹⁴⁸In the category of headquarters companies, the first was the 33rd Military Police Company with a total of 279.48. Of the supply companies, the highest rating, viz: 272.38, was given to that of the 132nd Infantry. Of the machine gun and medical companies, that of the 132nd Infantry was first with a mark of 269.42. Among the medical detachments, that of the 122nd Field Artillery was rated top with a score of 278.73. Both in the categories of 1st and 2nd Battalions, those of the 132nd Infantry were placed first with ratings of 278.48 and 274.14 respectively. Of the 3rd Battalions that of the 130th Infantry was given the highest mark, 272.44, while the 124th Machine Gun Battalion led the separate battalions with a score of 275.13. These ratings were given in detail in General Orders No. 34, Headquarters 33rd Division, March 12, 1919, 3:446.

¹⁴⁹"March 12th, 1919.

"Issued Memorandum No. 27, quoting telegram from VI Corps: 'The Corps Comdr. directs that you maintain a strict guard over all grenade and ammunition dumps so as to absolutely preclude the possibility of explosives of any kind falling into the hands of unauthorized persons.' Unit commanders will report to G-3, these Hdqrs. when the necessary precautions are completed." Journal of Operations of the 33rd Division, 2:481.

¹⁵⁰General Order No. 35 (Paragraph II), Headquarters 33rd Division, March 13, 1919. Also Memorandum No. 41, March 26, 1919.

¹⁵¹See above, 1:274.

¹⁵²General Order No. 39, Headquarters 33rd Division, March 17, 1919. On March 12, 1919, Medals of Honor had been awarded to 63 officers and men in the American Expeditionary Forces—17 of these being to those who had died—and of these 63, eight were granted to officers and men of the 33rd Division. Diary of the writer who ascertained these facts from the Decorations Section at General Headquarters on March 12, 1919.

¹⁵³Paragraph II, General Order No. 42, Headquarters 33rd Division, March 29, 1919.

¹⁵⁴"Prepared Program of Training for March 31 to April 26 (incl) for division." Journal of Operations of the 33rd Division, March 27, 1919, 2:482.

¹⁵⁵"Issued T. C. [i.e. Training Circular] No. 33, regarding Musketry competition by platoons, particular attention being paid to developing competitors for the A. E. F. Rifle and Pistol competitions to be held early in May. Divisional Competition to be held April 16, 1919. Brig. Comdrs. will conduct Brig. competitions in accordance with Pars. 4 and 5 (c), Bulletin No. 7, G. H. Q." *Ibid.*, April 1, 1919.

¹⁵⁶"April 15, 1919.

"... Issued Memo No. 41. 'The Div. Musketry Competition for Inf. Platoons representing the 65th and 66th Inf. Brigs. will be held on the afternoon of Thursday Apr. 17. Competing Platoons will report to Lt. Col. Bittel at the Rifle Range of the 130th Inf. near Erpeldingen at 13 hours, Thurs. 17th Apr.'

"Issued T. C. No. 36. 'In compliance with Bulletin No. 29, c.s., G. H. Q., each Inf. Regtl. Comdr. will select a competitor for the Auto Rifle Match to be held at Le Mans. Name of competitor will be submitted to G-3 on or before 17 Apr. M. G. match will be held by each Inf. Brig. Comdr. and C. O. 122nd M. G. Bn. on or before 23 Apr. to select a platoon to enter a Div. M. G. match at date and place to be announced later.'" Journal of Operations of the 33rd Division, 2:485.

¹⁵⁷*Ibid.*, April 1, 2, 3, 5, 1919.

¹⁵⁸Memorandum No. 45, Headquarters 33rd Division, April 7, 1919, 3:451.

¹⁵⁹Journal of Operations of the 33rd Division, April 8, 1919, 2:484.

¹⁶⁰*Ibid.*, April 1 and 3, 1919, 2:483.

¹⁶¹*Ibid.*, April 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10, 1919, 2:483-484.

¹⁶²"April 14, 1919.

"Issued G-3 Orders No. 10. 'In compliance with Operations Orders No. 96, Hq. 3rd Army, the following S. O. S. units are relieved from being attached to the 33rd Div. and are attached to 3rd Army: Salvage Squad No. 303, Bakery Co. 330—Laundry Co. 503—Cloth and Bath Unit No. 330—Mobile Vet Section 110—Service Park

Units No. 305 and 304.” Journal of Operations of the 33rd Division, 2:485.

¹⁶³*Ibid.*, April 16 and 17, 1919.

¹⁶⁴Arrangements had been made in February to send the 42nd, 32nd, and 33rd Divisions down the Rhine and to embark them either at Rotterdam or Antwerp. The large number of floating mines adrift in the North Sea and the heavy weather which made effective mine-sweeping impossible, caused Admiral Sims to declare that he could not guarantee the safety of army transports proceeding from those two ports. These three Divisions were accordingly embarked at Brest. Author's notes.

¹⁶⁵Journal of Operations of the 33rd Division, April 15, 1919, 2:485.

¹⁶⁶“Received Operations Orders No. 82, Hq. 3rd Army, dated 8 Apr. 1919, transferring 33rd Div. to S. O. S. effective 12 Apr. 1919.” *Ibid.*, April 10, 1919, 2:484.

¹⁶⁷“April 11, 1919.

“Issued G-3 Memo No. 36. ‘33rd Div. is relieved from duty with VI Corps and 3rd Army effective 12 Apr. 1919, and is placed at the disposal of the C. G., S. O. S., for return to U. S. Training will proceed as usual but preparation for embarkation will take precedence.’” *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸On April 14 a report was rendered to the Third Army relative to guard detachments; four days later a telegram was sent to the Army Commander specifying the location and strength of the guard detachments of the 33rd Division; on April 22 Operations Memorandum No. 21 was received from the Headquarters of 5th Division announcing that the “3rd Bn., 6th Inf. less 1 Co., will relieve guard detachments of the 33rd Div. not later than 22nd Apr.,” and the next day G-3 Order No. 13 were issued, stating that “All points guarded by 33rd Div. detachments will be taken over at once by detachments of the 5th Div.” *Ibid.*, April 14, 18, 22, and 23, 1919, 2:485-486.

¹⁶⁹Four officers and 6 men were decorated with the Croix de Guerre with the palm leaf (army citation); 2 officers and 8 men were awarded that with the gold star (army corps citation); 4 men were given the decoration with a silver star (division citation); one man received the Croix de Guerre with a bronze star (brigade citation); and 3 officers and 6 men that with a bronze star awarded on regimental citation. These facts, together with their grades, names, and organizations were published in General Order No. 46, Headquarters 33rd Division, April 11, 1919. See 3:514.

¹⁷⁰General Order No. 44, Headquarters 33rd Division, April 10, 1919, 3:513.

¹⁷¹General Order No. 48, Headquarters 33rd Division, April 16, 1919, 3:515.

¹⁷²This pamphlet was written by the author of this history during the first week in March, just prior to his detachment from the division.

¹⁷³

“HEADQUARTERS 33RD DIVISION,
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,

DIEKIRCH, LUXEMBOURG,
March 5, 1919. 3

TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE 33RD DIVISION:

This small pamphlet summarizes the principal events in the operations of this Division from its arrival in France until the Armistice with Germany, November 11, 1918. It is published for your convenience and so that others may know of your achievements.

What you have accomplished is now a matter of history. The organizations, the officers and men throughout this command, have done their duty magnificently. The efficiency you have attained, the gallantry you have invariably shown, the devotion to duty, your steadfast resolution and cheerfulness under the most trying circumstances, and the superb *esprit de corps* throughout this Division are beyond all praise. I am proud to have had the honor and privilege of commanding such men as you.

(Signed) GEO. BELL, Jr.

Major General, U. S. A."

¹⁷⁴Several events of secondary importance may be mentioned here: On April 4, Bulletin No. 5 announced the restrictions relative to the use of automobiles imposed by telegraphic instructions from General Headquarters and prohibited officers from visiting Coblenz unless under specific orders. On April 7, Memorandum 46 forbade further applications for leave to Italy and announced that recruiting for the Regular Army had been resumed. The next day, Memorandum No. 47 stated that applications for leave to Paris would be discontinued, and announced the holding of a carnival at Coblenz from April 23-27 by the Third Army, from which invitations could be secured. On April 10, General Order No. 45 quoted a telegram from the Third Army declaring that "in view of the gravity of the coal situation in the Saar Region, *greatest economy* is enjoined on all concerned in using fuel," and directed that all clothing and blankets be put through sterilizers in order to avoid possible detention at the port of embarkation. On April 12, General Order No. 47, announced the appointment of Major Robin C. Keene, A.G., as acting division adjutant, and April 17 Memorandum No. 49 directed that all leaves be discontinued.

¹⁷⁵Journal of Operations of the 33rd Division, April 7, 9, and 10, 1919. See 2:484.

¹⁷⁶General Order No. 49, Headquarters 33rd Division, April 16, 1919. The first place was rated at 7 points, the second at 5, and the third at 3 points. The 33rd Division scored 87 points, the 5th Division 81, and the VIth Corps, 54. See 3:453.

¹⁷⁷Miscellaneous memoranda.

¹⁷⁸Author's notes.

¹⁷⁹On April 9, G-3 Memorandum No. 35 was issued respecting the Ceremony of Presentation of the D. S. C. On April 11, three memoranda were issued, viz: No. 37 relative to Presentation of Decorations, No. 38 regarding the Inspection and Review of Troops by the C-in-C. and No. 39 regarding the condition of uniforms for the review of the 33rd Division by the Commander-in-Chief. The next day, the information contained in G-3 Memoranda Nos. 37, 38, and 39 was embodied in Memorandum No. 40 entitled Instructions for the Review for the Commander-in-Chief, Journal of Operations of the 33rd Division, April 9, 11, and 12, 1919, 2:484, 485.

¹⁸⁰*Ibid.*, April 16, 1919, 2:485.

¹⁸¹Brigadier General Edward L. King, commanding the 65th Infantry Brigade, had been presented with the Distinguished Service Medal at Chaumont on March 23.

¹⁸²General Order No. 50, Headquarters 33rd Division, April 22, 1919. See 3:516.

¹⁸³The original letter contained several inaccuracies respecting the operations of the 33rd Division. On May 8, 1919, General Bell accordingly, in acknowledging its receipt to the Commander-in-Chief, enclosed a copy of the pamphlet history of the 33rd Division, *A.E.F.*, specified certain of the inaccuracies, announced that it was desired to publish this letter and requested, for that reason, "that such corrections be

made as may be justified by an examination of the facts as stated" in the pamphlet history. Upon reaching Hoboken, General Bell received a long cablegram from General Pershing, dated Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, May 16, 1919, specifying the corrections to be made in the original letter. The letter here quoted is the corrected version.

¹⁸⁴Journal of Operations of the 33rd Division, April 23, 1919. See 2:486.

¹⁸⁵*Ibid.*, April 25—May 1, 1919.

¹⁸⁶General Bell received the decoration of a Commander of the Legion of Honor; Generals Wolf and King and Colonel Sanborn that of an Officer of the Legion of Honor. The citation upon which this decoration was conferred upon General Bell read thus:

"Major General Bell commanded the 33rd Division which distinguished itself in the Somme Sector of the British front and then took a brilliant part in the Argonne-Meuse offensive.

"Owing to the energy and cleverness of its chief, that unit broke the stubborn resistance of the enemy by capturing the very strongly defended Bois de Forges."

¹⁸⁷On board the *Mount Vernon* were the Honorable Josephus Daniels, secretary of the navy, Rear Admirals Griffin, Taylor, and Earle, and Captain Percy Foote, naval aide, who had spent about a month in Europe in consultation with the officials of the British, French, and Italian navies.

¹⁸⁸Brigadier General Paul A. Wolf did not accompany the 66th Infantry Brigade, but remained in France and captained the A. E. F. team which won the Inter-Allied Rifle and Pistol match at Le Mans on June 23-25, 1919, after which he returned to the United States.

¹⁸⁹The first unit of the 33rd Division to leave France was the 108th Trench Mortar Battery, which sailed from Brest on February 2, 1919, in the transport *Iowan* and reached Hoboken on March 12. The rest of the division sailed during May, 1919, as follows:

DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM BREST	TRANSPORT	DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HOBOKEN, N. J.
May 9, 1919.....	<i>Mount Vernon</i>	May 17, 1919
May 11.....	<i>Siboney</i>	May 20,
May 12.....	<i>Charleston</i>	May 22,
May 14.....	<i>Kaiserin Augusta Victoria</i>	May 23,
May 15.....	<i>Leviathan</i>	May 22,
May 15.....	<i>Harrisburg</i>	May 23,
May 16.....	<i>America</i>	May 24,
May 18.....	<i>Kronprinz Friedrich Wilhelm</i>	May 27,

This movement is given in detail, 2:4.

¹⁹⁰The translation of M. Tardieu's letter contained in General Orders No. 54 is somewhat different from the translation given above.

¹⁹¹Upon disembarking, all troops of the 33rd Division proceeded to Camp Mills,

Long Island, with the exception of the 108th Trench Mortar Battery and the 129th Infantry, which were sent to Camp Merritt, New Jersey.

¹⁹²On May 27, the troops detrained at the La Salle Street, Union, Grand Central, and Polk Street stations; on June 2, at the Park Row, Dearborn Street, La Salle Street, Grand Central, and Union Stations; and on June 5, at the Park Row, La Salle Street, Dearborn Street, and Grand Central stations.

¹⁹³In the parade of May 27, the troops were reviewed jointly by Governor Lowden and by Major General Leonard Wood, commanding the Central Department.

¹⁹⁴The program for the review of May 27 was followed, with slight modifications, in the subsequent reviews on June 2 and 5:

7 to 9 A.M. Detrainment (13 trains) at the following stations:
 La Salle.....5 trains Grand Central.....3 trains
 Union.....3 trains Polk Street.....2 trains
 Move to Grant Park.

9.30 A.M. Reception by relatives.

11 A.M. Parade started, passing the reviewing stand at 11.10 A.M.

12 to 12.30 P.M. Banquets at the "Loop" hotels.

3 P.M. Entrainment for Camp Grant.

Parade. From Grant Park at 11 A.M. over the Eighth Street Viaduct, south along the Illinois Central Railway tracks to Twelfth Street, north in Michigan Avenue to Randolph Street, west to State Street, south to Adams Street, west to Clark Street, north to Randolph Street, west to La Salle Street, south to Jackson Boulevard, east to State Street, south to Harrison Street, and east to Michigan Avenue.

At Clark and Madison Streets, the parade began to break up, the tail unit proceeding to the Hotel Morrison. At Clark and Randolph Streets another tail unit moved to the Hotel Sherman. At La Salle and Madison Streets the next tail unit marched into the Hotel La Salle. At Harrison Street and Michigan Avenue the rest of the troops proceeded to the Congress, Auditorium, Stratford, and Blackstone Hotels.

At 2 P.M. a lunch in honor of General Bell, the officers of the Division Staff and of the 65th Infantry Brigade Headquarters was given at the Congress Hotel by Governor Lowden.

CONCLUSION

¹In the Peking Relief Expedition in 1900, American troops had fought by the side of the British in the Allied forces, but the battles which attended the advance from Tientsin to the Chinese capital were small affairs compared with those in the late war in Europe.

²In his letter of congratulations to Major General Bell on July 5, 1918, Lieutenant General Sir John Monash, the Commander of the Australian Corps, declared that Hamel was "an historic [event] of such significance that it will live forever in the annals of our respective Nations." See above, 1:43.

³Fourth British Army.....May 26 to August 23, 1918.

First American Army.....August 26 to September 5, 1918.

September 14 to October 20, 1918.

Second French Army.....September 5 to September 14, 1918.

Second American Army.....October 20 to December 12, 1918.

December 17, 1918, to April 1, 1919.

Third American Army.....December 12 to December 17, 1918.

April 1 to April 12, 1919.

IIInd American Corps.....May 27 to August 23, 1918.

(for administration).

XIXth British Corps.....May 27 to June 21, 1918.

IIIrd British Corps.....June 21 to August 23, 1918.

Australian Corps.....June 26 to August 20, 1918.

Vth American Corps.....August 26 to September 5, 1918.

17th French Army Corps.....September 5 to September 14, 1918.

October 6 to October 20, 1918.

November 5 to November 14, 1918.

IIIrd American Corps.....September 14 to October 6, 1918.

2nd Colonial Army Corps.....October 20 to November 5, 1918.

IVth American Corps.....November 14 to November 17, 1918.

IXth American Corps.....November 26 to December 5, 1918.

VIIth American Corps.....December 12 to December 17, 1918.

VIth American Corps.....December 18, 1918, to April 12, 1919.

⁴The total number of American divisions sent to France was forty-two.

⁵*The War with Germany: A Statistical Summary*, written by order of the Secretary of War by Colonel Leonard P. Ayers, General Staff, Chief of the Statistics Branch of the General Staff, second edition pp. 33, 115, 116, 117.

⁶Ordinarily speaking, "butcher bills" are a criterion of the lack of skill in the handling of troops in action.

⁷From the night of August 23-24 until the morning of August 26, 1918.

⁸The last unit of the 33rd Division was relieved in the Verdun sector on the night of October 21-22; the first units occupied positions in the Troyon-sur-Meuse sector on the night of October 23-24, 1918.

⁹General Rawlinson to 33rd Illinois Division, August 21, 1918. See above, 1:52.

¹⁰Lieutenant General R. L. Bullard, to Major General George Bell, Jr., February 18, 1919, 2:453.

¹¹The 89th, 1st, 91st, and 32nd Divisions in succession, and for a second time with the 89th Division.

¹²The 79th Division.

¹³Cf. 1:68 ff.

¹⁴General Henri Claudel, commanding the 17th French Army Corps, to which the 33rd Division was attached from October 6 until October 20, 1918.

¹⁵Diary of the Division Adjutant.

¹⁶American decorations..... 213

British decorations..... 57

French decorations..... 92

Belgian decorations..... 16

Italian decorations..... 2

Total..... 380 See 3:498.

¹⁷The seven divisions in the A. E. F. to which the greatest number of Medals of Honor were awarded were as follows:

30th Division..... 12

33rd Division..... 9

89th Division..... 9

2nd Division..... 7

27th Division..... 7

77th Division..... 6

91st Division..... 4

This information, together with that contained in the text above, was furnished to the author by the Decorations Section of the General Staff at Washington.

¹⁸See above, 1:290.

¹⁹General Sir Henry Rawlinson, commanding the Fourth British Army, to 33rd Illinois Division, August 21, 1918. See above, 1:52.

²⁰See above, 1:292.

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